

CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT

CLASSICAL RHETORIC

for the Modern Student

EDWARD P. J. CORBETT

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This book is gratefully dedicated to my family

PREFACE

This book endeavors to present a coherent, realistic art of composition— an adaptation of classical rhetoric. The men from whom we inherited the classical system—Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian—firmly believed that some of the skills involved in the process of composition could be taught. Having studied the practice of successful speakers and writers, they brought together a set of precepts to aid their students in acquiring those skills, but they were sensible enough to recognize that one does not acquire a skill simply by studying rules; one must also submit to the discipline provided by imitation and practice. And they recognized too that in order to derive the maximum benefit from precept, imitation, and practice, the student had to be fired with a desire to learn as much as his natural endowments permitted.

So stated, the subject matter of this book would not seem to be revolutionary, for the methods of learning how to write have not changed very much since the Sophists first set up their schools of rhetoric in fifth-century Athens. In a sense, however, it is a new approach that is presented here, for the kind of rhetoric set forth in this book has been absent from American classrooms for about a century and has been replaced by other systems of teaching whatever is teachable about composition. In writing this book, the author believes that the elaborate system of the ancients, which taught the student how to find something to say, how to select and organize his material, and how to phrase it in the best possible way, is still useful and effective—perhaps more useful and effective than the various courses of study that replaced it. No system, classical or modern, has been devised that can change students suddenly and irrevocably into masters of elegant prose, but the ancient teachers of rhetoric, refusing to be impressed by the notion of “creative self-expression” until the student had a self to express and a facility for expressing it, succeeded in large part in developing a method which, when well taught, could help students to write and speak effectively.

Classical rhetoric is a positive discipline. Rather than tell the student what not to do, it instructs him in what should be done. Schoolboys of Shakespeare's time crept as unwillingly to class as students do today, but because classical rhetoric prevailed in Renaissance schools, they were not as much intimidated by a blank sheet of paper as their modern counterparts are.

The first chapter of this book gives a brief explanation of the kind of rhetorical training that flourished in the schools of the West for over two thousand years. The next three chapters develop the three vital parts of classical rhetoric: Chapter II, Discovery of Arguments; Chapter III, Arrangement of Material; Chapter IV, Style. The Appendix provides a history of rhetoric and a bibliography for those who will pursue their interest in the subject.

The present order of the chapters does not have to be the order followed in the classroom. In one sense, the order observed here is a natural one: we first must find something to say, then organize our material, and then put it into words. However, long before the student reads his way through the second chapter, he will be writing themes, an activity that involves all three processes. He must know something about all three processes when he sits down to write, but he cannot be instructed in all three at once. Every teacher makes his own adjustment to this fact. Since style is the most teachable of the skills involved in composition, some teachers will find it more convenient to start with Chapter IV. Others may prefer to begin with the chapter on arrangement.

Some explanation should be offered for the heavy emphasis on argumentative discourse. The bias is partly historical; rhetoric, throughout the ages, was primarily concerned with the means of argument. But a more important reason for concentrating on it in this text is that argumentative discourse is the form of rhetoric that students will be most exposed to in their lives. And they will exercise their power of argumentative discourse, more than any other, if they speak or write formally at all. However, only a few of the rhetorical principles presented in this book are peculiar to persuasive prose. Most of the principles of invention, arrangement, and style are equally applicable to exposition, description, and narration.

Because the bulk of this book is taken up with instruction in the principles of rhetoric, only a limited number of readings could be provided. Hopefully, by the time the student has worked his way through them, he will be able to apply the rhetorical principles he has learned to any reading matter available to him. He will begin to see classical rhetoric operating in any prose he hears or reads, whether it be an editorial or a letter-to-the-editor in the local newspaper, a clever advertisement in a current magazine, a campaign speech, a television commercial, a "begging letter" that comes in the morning mail, or a classmate's impassioned plea in the student council.

I am indebted to Wilbur Samuel Howell of Princeton University, Marvin T. Herrick of the University of Illinois, Dudley Bailey of the University of Nebraska, and Wayne C. Booth of the University of Chicago, who read various portions of the manuscript and offered helpful criticism. I am sure that wherever I have followed their advice the book has been improved. I am grateful also to the editorial staff of the Oxford University Press for their persistent confidence in the book and their judicious guidance. Finally, I must profess my gratitude to my wife, whose patience and encouragement did much to bring the book to completion.

E.P.J.C.

Omaha, Nebraska
January 1965

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CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT

I fear, however, that I may be regarded as setting too lofty an ideal for the orator by insisting that he should be a good man skilled in speaking, or as imposing too many subjects of study on the learner....I would ask the skeptical to consider how great are the powers of the mind of man and how astonishing its capacity for carrying its desires into execution. For has not man succeeded in crossing the high seas, in learning the number and the courses of the stars, and almost measuring the universe itself—all of them accomplishments of less importance than oratory but of far greater difficulty?

QUINTILIAN

For the rules in textbooks of rhetoric cannot by themselves make expert those who are eager to dispense with study and practice.

DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS

Of all skill, part is infused by precept, and part is obtained by habit.

SAMUEL JOHNSON

It is foolish to suppose that you can teach anybody to write, but it is equally foolish to suppose that you cannot teach people a great deal about writing.

ROLFE HUMPHRIES

I / INTRODUCTION

Adlai E. Stevenson: Custodians of History

1 The path to peace lies through thickets of conflict. And the biggest obstacle in the path, the most overwhelming danger of all, is the onrushing arms race. Every day it gathers momentum as the nuclear powers and others, large and small, enlarge their arsenals. Some of us continue to invent and test frightful new weapons. We feel obliged to do this for the sake of our separate national interests—at a time in history when the national interest of all nations, those with nuclear weapons and those without, demands not the expansion but the abolition of the power to wage war.

2 Let me be as clear and simple as I can: this prodigal arms race is dangerous and deadly folly. Here in the United States we want to save, not destroy our fellow man. We want to devote the resources now swallowed up by this insatiable monster to the unfinished tasks of our own society. And we want to devote these resources to giving every soul on this earth a chance for a better life.

3 Yet the arms race goes on. It goes on because no nation, confronted by hostile nations, can neglect its defenses. No great power can risk unilateral disarmament. There is one way—and one way only—out of this intolerable dilemma; that is a system of complete and general disarmament under which all nations progressively tear down—in plain view of the international community and with suitable safeguards—their own capacity to wage war.

4 A great achievement of our last session was to endorse an agreement on a set of principles for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

From a speech delivered to the General Session of the United Nations, New York City, September 20, 1962. Reprinted from *Vital Speeches of the Day*, October 15, 1962, by permission of the publisher.

But while we have made some progress, we have not made enough progress toward translating these agreed principles into an agreed plan—to move by mutual actions in rapid stages toward total disarmament and effective international peace-keeping.

5 The United States has proposed such a plan. It has submitted its proposals to this Assembly and to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva.

6 But, just as it takes at least two to make an arms race, it takes at least two to stop an arms race. No one in his senses would expect one side to abandon the means of self-defense unless it knew for sure that the other side was giving up its arms as well. This means that practical verification is the essence of any workable agreement on general disarmament.

7 It need not be total verification. We have demonstrated again and again during long negotiations that we are prepared to take certain risks to lessen the chance of an intensified arms race. But we are not prepared to risk our survival. If other nations permit—as we have agreed to do—the degree of international inspection technically required for mutual security, we can end the arms race. But we cannot stake our national existence on blind trust—especially on blind trust in a great and powerful nation which repeatedly declares its fundamental hostility to the basic values of our free society.

8 The issue is plain. The price of general disarmament is mutual security within the framework of the United Nations. Because such security would be by international inspection, it could have no conceivable connection with espionage. Is inspection by a United Nations agency too high a price to pay for the safety, perhaps survival, of mankind? Can any society value its secrecy more than everyone's safety—especially a society which avows itself the model toward which all other societies must irresistibly evolve?

9 Mr. President, I put this issue in all gravity. I ask the members of this Assembly to join the peoples of the world in demanding a program of general disarmament which stands a chance of ending the arms race.

10 Once again, the answer to this issue is not to be found in exhortation or emotionalism. It is not to be found by passing virtuous resolutions which proclaim noble ends without realistic means. It is to be found only in remorseless effort to solve the infinitely complicated problems of disarmament. We believe that serious negotiations in Geneva will bring us closer to our goal, and I hope the discussions there will continue to have the prayerful and wholehearted support of this Assembly.

11 Here in New York, the Assembly can insist on the indispensable condition of world disarmament: assurance that agreements made are agreements kept.

12 But there is a situation even more immediate and more hopeful than general disarmament. I refer to the testing of nuclear weapons. If we see in

this a more acute problem, let me suggest that it is also more manageable—and therefore offers brighter hopes for early progress.

13 For nearly four years the nuclear powers, including my country, have been locked in negotiation for a reliable and permanent ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. From such a ban would come a barrier to the spread of such weapons; and there would come an end to this new source of radiation in the human environment; and a great step toward the comprehensive disarmament treaty we so earnestly seek.

14 As is plain from the draft treaties tabled in Geneva, the United States Government is prepared to stop the testing of all nuclear weapons, provided only that others are prepared to assume the obligation to do the same. Testing in the atmosphere, in the oceans and in space causes radiation. Testing underground does not. We are prepared to stop testing even without any international verification in the atmosphere, in the oceans and in space, because we have national means of detecting testing by others. And we are prepared to stop testing underground—where we don't have our own means of verification—provided an international system is created to assure that others are doing the same.

15 It may be interesting to you to know that since 1945, when it began, the United States has exploded nuclear devices with a total yield of about 140 megatons.

16 Since 1949, when it began, the USSR, so far as we can tell by distant instrumentation, has exploded devices with a total yield of about 250 megatons.

17 Since the USSR broke the moratorium last fall, its explosions have yielded 200 megatons—those which the United States was then compelled to undertake, only 25 megatons.

18 I repeat, we want to cease testing nuclear weapons. If other nuclear powers are also willing to make an agreement to cease, the testing will cease. But let there be no doubt about it—the United States prefers a comprehensive treaty banning all tests in all environments for all time. On this transcendent issue, we in the United States are in dead earnest. And I conclude with the thanks of my government to the eight non-aligned nations for their helpful and constructive efforts to bring about agreement at Geneva.

Commentary on "Custodians of History"

This excerpt from a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations exemplifies the kind of discourse with which classical rhetoric was concerned—the use of words to persuade someone of something. Mr. Stevenson is here

using *spoken* words to effect his purpose. The “someone” he has to persuade is the convention of delegates from more than a hundred nations of the world. What he has to persuade this audience to do is to adopt a certain course of action during this session of the General Assembly.

The broadest definition of the kind of rhetoric displayed here might be phrased this way: the art by which a discourse is adapted to its end. Marie Hochmuth Nichols sharpens that definition somewhat when she says that rhetoric is “a means of so ordering discourse as to produce an effect on the listener or reader.” Kenneth Burke gets closer to describing the particular kind of verbal activity in which Mr. Stevenson is engaged when he defines rhetoric as “the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.” Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric focuses most sharply on the specific kind of verbal activity in which Mr. Stevenson is engaged: “the faculty of discovering all the available means of persuasion in any given situation.”

Although this text will be primarily concerned, as was classical rhetoric, with persuasive discourse, most of its precepts will be applicable to other forms of discourse as well. So any of the definitions presented in the previous paragraph would fit the art of effective writing or speaking that will be discussed in this book. Whether we are seeking, as George Campbell put it, “to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will,” we must adopt those strategies that will best achieve our end.

Let us look at this excerpt from Mr. Stevenson’s speech to see what its purpose is and how that purpose or end is achieved.

The general object of Mr. Stevenson’s speech is “to influence the will” of his audience. Hence he is engaged in persuasive discourse. What strategies does he employ to achieve this end? To answer that question adequately, we would have to study the entire speech. The excerpt reproduced here represents only about one-fifth of the speech, and any final judgment of the effectiveness of the speech would have to be made on the basis of the whole speech. But in this brief selection, we can observe, on a small scale, how means are adapted to an end.

One of the ways in which we can persuade others is to appeal to their reason. In appealing to reason, we can either present a series of facts and make some generalization from those facts or make statements and draw inferences from those statements. In the first instance, we would be arguing *inductively*; in the second instance, we would be arguing *deductively*. With either method, the effectiveness of our persuasion will depend largely on the “truth” of what we say and the “validity” of our reasoning. When we reason validly from incontrovertible facts or statements, we compel assent; we *convince* an audience. When the premises of our argument are only probable,

we can only induce belief; we *persuade* an audience. Traditionally, reasoning from universal truths has been the province of logic; reasoning from probabilities has been the province of rhetoric.

In trying to get the Assembly to adopt a certain course of action, Mr. Stevenson is talking about the future. The future of human affairs, being contingent, is always attended with uncertainties. And because of the uncertainty about the effects of many human actions, the best that an advocate of some course of action can do is to make it appear likely that particular results will follow from the action in question. Therefore, Mr. Stevenson is clearly operating within the province of rhetoric. The Greek word for rhetorical proofs was *pisteis*, a word that has its roots in the verb meaning "to believe." Mr. Stevenson must make his audience *believe* that the course of action he is proposing is the best course of action.

In the first three paragraphs of the excerpt, Mr. Stevenson is establishing the *issue* of this section of his speech. He moves toward a definition of the issue by making a series of related assertions, the truth of which is for some self-evident, for others only probable. He begins in this fashion:

1. There are many obstacles to peace.
2. The most formidable obstacle to peace is the arms race.
3. The arms race is a deadly and dangerous course of action.
4. But the arms race goes on.
5. The arms race goes on because no nation can neglect its defenses.
6. Faced with this dilemma, what do we do?

Mr. Stevenson makes no attempt to argue the truth of any of his statements or propositions. Knowing his audience as he does, he presumes general agreement about the truth of his assertions. There are some hidden assumptions here too: peace is a good thing; what is deadly and dangerous is a bad thing; if the bad thing is an obstacle to the good thing, the obstacle must be removed. Mr. Stevenson presumes general agreement about these assumptions too.

Although Mr. Stevenson is not pausing to demonstrate the truth of any of these propositions, he is *arguing* here. There are logical links between the statements; each successive statement seems to "grow out of" the previous one. The logical link between the propositions is perhaps most apparent in (5), where we detect an abbreviated syllogism—what logicians call an enthymeme. The full argument implicit in this proposition would run something like this:

No nation can afford to neglect its defenses.
Halting the arms race would represent a neglect of defenses.
Therefore, no nation can afford to halt the arms race.

In other words, Mr. Stevenson is trying to persuade his audience that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the threats to national security and the growth of the arms race.

The issue is clearly defined now: a serious threat to the peace of the world exists, and the members of the Assembly must find a way to remove the threat without jeopardizing national security. Mr. Stevenson proposes two solutions: (1) ultimately, general and complete disarmament; (2) immediately, banning of nuclear testing in the atmosphere.

Now, in order to win acceptance for his proposed solutions, he must persuade his audience that his proposals are practical and practicable. In arguing the *possible*, he urges a number of points that he hopes will persuade the delegates that his plan can work:

1. The last session of the Assembly agreed on a set of principles for disarmament.
2. A plan to implement these principles is even now being considered by the Disarmament Conference at Geneva.
3. The key to the workability of any disarmament plan is a system of international inspection.
4. Total verification of disarmament is desirable but not absolutely necessary for the success of an inspection plan.
5. The United States, one of the key nations in the arms struggle, has repeatedly expressed its willingness to stop the arms race and to submit to international inspection.

Mr. Stevenson concludes his section of his speech by quoting some awesome figures about the amount of yield from the explosion of nuclear devices since 1945. He quotes these figures for two purposes. He wants to remind the delegates, first of all, of the dangers of radiation from continued testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. And secondly, he wants to make the delegates aware that Russia, the chief opponent to international inspection, has done more to pollute the atmosphere than the United States has.

We have been reviewing the general course of Mr. Stevenson's arguments. Where did Mr. Stevenson get the matter for his arguments? Most of the matter was implicit in the case he was arguing. How did he discover that matter? How does the student discover the arguments latent in the case he is discussing? The classical rhetoricians devised the system of *topics* to aid the process of *discovering* or *inventing* arguments in any given case.

These topics will be explored in great detail in the next chapter. After the student has studied that chapter, he should be able to return to this speech and detect the operation of such topics as Cause and Effect and the Possible (the two topics we have already noted), Contraries (we want to save our

fellow men, yet we are engaged in a program to destroy them), Antecedents and Consequents (if we want disarmament, we must agree on a system of verification), and Degree ("Can any society value its secrecy more than everyone's safety?").

The student will also be made aware that there are other modes of appeal besides the appeal to reason that we reviewed here. He will see, for instance, that in seeking to persuade others we sometimes make appeals to their emotions. And he will see the powerful effect exerted by the ethical appeal—the persuasive value of the speaker or writer's moral character, good sense, and good will, as those qualities are exhibited in the discourse itself.

In the third chapter, the student will be instructed in the principles governing the arrangement of arguments once they have been discovered. Then he should be able to come back to this selection and judge whether Mr. Stevenson organized his arguments in the most effective order. He should be able to decide, for instance, why Mr. Stevenson chose to treat the proposal for total disarmament before he discussed the proposal for banning nuclear testing.

The fourth chapter will deal with style and the contribution that style can make to effective discourse. Clarity and vivacity of style not only facilitate communication with our audience but can also enhance the persuasive value of our discourse by delivering our arguments more forcefully and by helping to establish our ethical appeal. Although Mr. Stevenson's speech has a great deal of stylistic merit, we would probably have to discount the contribution that his style made on this occasion. Since most of the delegates listened to the speech in translation, the effectiveness of the prose style was probably not felt by many of them. Realizing this fact, Mr. Stevenson did not put the high finish on this speech that characterized the speeches he delivered in the 1952 and 1956 campaigns for the Presidency.

In our final assessment of this selection or of the whole speech, we would have to keep in mind the kind of speech it was. It was a keynote speech at the opening session of the United Nations, a speech that attempts to set the tone and suggest an agenda for the coming session. So if we find the arguments thinly developed here, we must remember that Mr. Stevenson is not yet actively engaged in debate. In the coming debates on his proposals, we can be sure that many of the points that he merely asserts here will be substantiated and that the general lines of argument will be elaborated.

This selection from a modern speech shows that deliberative rhetoric plays as vital a part in our world as it did in the forums of ancient Greece and Rome. And this kind of rhetoric is being exercised today as often in written form as in the spoken medium. We are exposed to it every day of our lives in printed advertisements, in editorials, in newspaper and magazine articles, in promotional letters, and in many other kinds of printed copy.

Lest we think, however, that deliberative rhetoric is another of the glorious products of our technological age, let us look at one more example of this kind of persuasive effort. The example is taken from one of the world's great masterpieces, written many centuries before the art of rhetoric was even formulated. It is the famous scene in Book IX of Homer's *Iliad* in which Odysseus, Phoinix, and Ajax come to Achilles' camp and plead with him to return to battle. Achilles has been sulking in his tent ever since Book I, when Agamemnon, the leader of the Greek forces besieging the city of Troy, affronted Achilles by taking the girl Briseus, one of his prizes of war. After Achilles withdrew his troops from the front lines, the fortunes of war went from bad to worse for the Greeks. Agamemnon's army is now desperate. The envoys must succeed in persuading Achilles to return to battle.

We will look at only the first two speeches in this scene—Odysseus' plea to Achilles and Achilles' reply to Odysseus.

Homer: The Envoys Plead with Achilles

1 "Hail, O Achilles! The fair feast lack we not either in the hut of Agamemnon son of Atreus neither now in thine; for feasting is there abundance to our heart's desire, but our thought is not for matters of the delicious feast; nay, we behold very sore destruction, thou fosterling of Zeus, and are afraid.

2 "Now is it in doubt whether we save the benched ships or behold them perish, if thou put not on thy might. Nigh unto ships and wall have the high-hearted Trojans and famed allies pitched their camp, and kindled many fires throughout their host, and ween that they shall no more be withheld but will fall on our black ships. And Zeus son of Kronos sheweth them signs upon the right by lightning, and Hector greatly exulteth in his might and rageth furiously, trusting in Zeus, and recketh not of god nor man, for mighty madness hath possessed him. He prayeth bright Dawn to shine forth with all speed, for he hath passed his word to smite off from the ships the ensigns' tops, and to fire the hulls with devouring flame, and hard thereby to make havoc of the Achaians confounded by the smoke.

3 "Therefore am I sore afraid in my heart lest the gods fulfil his boastings, and it be fated for us to perish here in Troy-land, far from Argos pasture-land of horses. Up then! if thou art minded even at the last to save the failing sons of the Achaians from the war-din of the Trojans. Thyself shalt have grief hereafter, and when the ill is done is there no way to find a cure there-

From Book IX of the *Iliad*, trans. Andrew Lang, Walter Leaf, and Ernest Myers. Reprinted from the Modern Library College edition of *The Iliad of Homer*, Random House, Inc.

fore; in good time rather take thou thought to ward the evil day from the Danaans.

4 "Friend, surely to thee thy father Peleus gave commandment the day he sent thee to Agamemnon forth from Phthia: 'My son, strength shall Athene and Hera give thee if they will; but do thou refrain thy proud soul in thy breast, for gentlemindedness is the better part; and withdraw from mischievous strife, that so the Argives may honour thee the more, both young and old.' Thus the old man charged thee, but thou forgettest. Yet cease now at the last, and eschew thy grievous wrath; Agamemnon offereth thee worthy gifts, so thou wilt cease from anger.

5 "Lo now, hearken thou to me, and I will tell thee all the gifts that in his hut Agamemnon promised thee: seven tripods untouched of fire, and ten talents of gold and twenty gleaming caldrons and twelve stalwart horses, winners in the race, that have taken prizes by their speed. No lackwealth were that man, neither undowered of precious gold, whose substance were as great as the prizes Agamemnon's steeds have borne him off. And seven women will he give, skilled in excellent handiwork, Lesbians whom he chose him from the spoils the day that thou thyself tookest Lesbos, surpassing womankind in beauty. These will he give thee, and with them shall be she whom erst he took from thee, even the daughter of Briseus; moreover he will swear a great oath that never he went up into her bed nor had with her converse as is the wont of mankind, O king, even of men and women.

6 "All these things shall be set straightway before thee; and if hereafter the gods grant us to lay waste the great city of Priam, then enter thou in when we Achaians be dividing the spoil, and lade thy ship full of gold and bronze, and thyself choose twenty Trojan women, the fairest that there be after Helen of Argos. And if we win to the richest of lands, even Achaian Argos, thou shalt be his son and he will hold thee in like honour with Orestes, his stripling boy that is nurtured in all abundance. Three daughters are his in his well-built hall, Chrysothemis and Laodike and Iphianassa; take thou of them which thou wilt, without gifts of wooing, to Peleus' house; and he will add a great dower such as no man ever yet gave with his daughter. And seven well-peopled cities will he give thee, Kardamyle and Enope and grassy Hire and holy Pherai and Antheia deep in meads, and fair Aipeia and Pedasos land of vines. And all are nigh to the sea, on the uttermost border of sandy Pylos; therein dwell men abounding in flocks and kine, men that shall worship thee like a god with gifts, and beneath thy sway fulfil thy prosperous ordinances. All this will he accomplish so thou but cease from wrath.

7 "But and if Agamemnon be too hateful to thy heart, both he and his gifts, yet have thou pity on all the Achaians that faint throughout the host; these shall honour thee as a god, for verily thou wilt earn exceeding great glory at their hands. Yea now mightest thou slay Hector, for he would come very

near thee in his deadly madness, because he deemeth that there is no man like unto him among the Danaans that the ships brought hither."

8 And Achilles fleet of foot answered and said unto him: "Heaven-sprung son of Laertes, Odysseus of many wiles, in openness must I now declare unto you my saying, even as I am minded and as the fulfilment thereof shall be, that ye may not sit before me and coax this way and that. For hateful to me even as the gates of hell is he that hideth one thing in his heart and uttereth another: but I will speak what meseemeth best. Not me, I ween, shall Agamemnon son of Atreus persuade, nor the other Danaans, seeing we were to have no thank for battling with the foemen ever without respite. He that abideth at home hath equal share with him that fighteth his best, and in like honour are held both the coward and the brave; death cometh alike to the untoiling and to him that hath toiled long. Neither have I any profit for that I endured tribulation of soul, ever staking my life in fight. Even as a hen bringeth her unfledged chickens each morsel as she winneth it, and with herself it goeth hard, even so I was wont to watch out many a sleepless night and pass through many bloody days of battle, warring with folk for their women's sake.

9 "Twelve cities of men have I laid waste from ship-board, and from land eleven, I do you to wit, throughout deep-soiled Troy-land; out of all these took I many goodly treasures and would bring and give them all to Agamemnon son of Atreus, and he staying behind amid the fleet ships would take them and portion out some few but keep the most. Now some he gave to be meeds of honour to the princes and the kings, and theirs are left untouched; only from me of all the Achaians took he my darling lady and keepeth her—let him sleep beside her and take his joy!

10 "But why must the Argives make war on the Trojans? why hath Atreides gathered his host and led them hither? is it not for lovely-haired Helen's sake? Do then the sons of Atreus alone of mortal men love their wives? surely whatsoever man is good and sound of mind loveth his own and cherisheth her, even, as I too loved mine with all my heart, though but the captive of my spear. But now that he hath taken my meed of honour from mine arms and hath deceived me, let him not tempt me that know him full well; he shall not prevail. Nay, Odysseus, let him take counsel with thee and all the princes to ward from the ships the consuming fire. Verily without mine aid he hath wrought many things, and built a wall and dug a foss about it wide and deep, and set a palisade therein; yet even so can he not stay murderous Hector's might.

11 "But so long as I was fighting amid the Achaians, Hector had no mind to array his battle far from the wall, but scarce came unto the Skaian gates and to the oak-tree; there once he awaited me alone and scarce escaped my onset. But now, seeing I have no mind to fight with noble Hector, I will

to-morrow do sacrifice to Zeus and all the gods, and store well my ships when I have launched them on the salt sea—then shalt thou see, if thou wilt and hast any care therefor, my ships sailing at break of day over Hellespont, the fishes' home, and my men right eager at the oar; and if the great Shaker of the Earth grant me good journey, on the third day should I reach deep-soiled Phthia.

12 "There are my great possessions that I left when I came hither to my hurt; and yet more gold and ruddy bronze shall I bring home hence, and fair-girdled women and grey iron, all at least that were mine by lot; only my meed of honour hath he that gave it me taken back in his despitfulness, even lord Agamemnon son of Atreus. To him declare ye everything even as I charge you, openly, that all the Achaians likewise may have indignation, if haply he hopeth to beguile yet some other Danaan, for that he is ever clothed in shamelessness. Verily not in my face would he dare to look, though he have the front of a dog. Neither will I devise counsel with him nor any enterprise, for utterly he hath deceived me and done wickedly; but never again shall he beguile me with fair speech—let this suffice him. Let him begone in peace; Zeus the lord of counsel hath taken away his wits. Hateful to me are his gifts, and I hold him at a straw's worth. Not even if he gave me ten times, yea twenty, all that now is his, and all that may come to him otherwhence, even all the revenue of Orchomenos or Egyptian Thebes where the treasure-houses are stored fullest—Thebes of the hundred gates, whence sally forth two hundred warriors through each with horses and chariots—nay, nor gifts in number as sand or dust; not even so shall Agamemnon persuade my soul till he have paid me back all the bitter despite.

13 "And the daughter of Agamemnon son of Atreus will I not wed, not were she rival of golden Aphrodite for fairness and for handiwork matched bright-eyed Athene—not even then will I wed her; let him choose him of the Achaians another that is his peer and is more royal than I. For if the gods indeed preserve me and I come unto my home, then will Peleus himself seek me a wife. Many Achaian maidens are there throughout Hellas and Phthia, daughters of princes that ward their cities; whomsoever of these I wish will I make my dear lady. Very often was my high soul moved to take me there a wedded wife, a help meet for me, and have joy of the possessions that the old man Peleus possesseth. For not of like worth with life hold I even all the wealth that men say was possessed of the well-peopled city of Ilios in days of peace gone by, before the sons of the Achaians came; neither all the treasure that the stone threshold of the archer Phoebus Apollo encompasseth in rocky Pytho. For kine and goodly flocks are to be had for the harrying, and tripods and chestnut horses for the purchasing; but to bring back man's life neither harrying nor earning availeth when once it hath passed the barrier of his lips.

14 “For thus my goddess mother telleth me, Thetis the silver-footed, that twain fates are bearing me to the issue of death. If I abide here and besiege the Trojans’ city, then my returning home is taken from me, but my fame shall be imperishable; but if I go home to my dear native land, my high fame is taken from me, but my life shall endure long while, neither shall the issue of death soon reach me. Moreover I would counsel you all to set sail homeward, seeing ye shall never reach your goal of steep Ilios; of a surety far-seeing Zeus holdeth his hand over her and her folk are of good courage.

15 “So go your way and tell my answer to the princes of the Achaians, even as is the office of elders, that they may devise in their hearts some other better counsel, such as shall save them their ships and the host of the Achaians amid the hollow ships: since this counsel availeth them naught that they have now devised, by reason of my fierce wrath. But let Phoinix now abide with us and lay him to rest, that he may follow with me on my ships to our dear native land to-morrow, if he will; for I will not take him perforce.”

Commentary on “The Envoys Plead with Achilles”

The situation dramatized in this scene from the *Iliad* is one that we see enacted frequently today, possibly in our own lives, certainly in public life: one man or a group of men trying to persuade another man to do something or to assent to something. Today it may be a young man begging his father to let him use the family car for a Saturday night date, or it may be, as it was in 1952, the party leader trying to convince an indifferent General Eisenhower or a reluctant Governor Stevenson to run for the office of the President. This rather common situation calls for uncommon rhetorical powers.

Viewed from the standpoint of narrative, this is an intensely dramatic scene that Homer has posed in the ninth book of his epic; viewed from the standpoint of rhetoric, this is a situation that will call upon all the resources of the men sent on this crucial mission. Agamemnon chose his ambassadors shrewdly: Odysseus, “the man who was never at a loss”; Ajax, reputed to be the mightiest Greek warrior after Achilles; Phoinix, Achilles’ beloved old tutor. Each of them will work on the aggrieved and disgruntled Achilles in his own way.

The Homeric heroes took as much pride in their skill with words as in their skill with arms. When Phoinix rose to plead with Achilles, he reminded his former pupil of how he had schooled him to be “both a speaker of words and a doer of deeds.” And throughout the *Iliad*, Achilles boasts of, and his companions acknowledge, his skill in oratory. Odysseus knows that he is not as great a warrior as Achilles, but he is conscious that he is superior to

Achilles in rhetorical prowess. In Book III of the *Iliad*, Antenor described Odysseus when he came to the Trojan court to negotiate for the return of Helen: "But when he uttered his great voice from his chest, and words like unto snowflakes of winter, then could no mortal man contend with Odysseus." And it was Odysseus, remember, who in Book II restrained the Greeks, by the power of his rhetoric, from rushing off to their ships and sailing home. Phoinix too is on his mettle in this scene. As Quintilian said, "The teacher should therefore be as distinguished for his eloquence as for his good character, and like Phoinix in the *Iliad* be able to teach his pupil both how to behave and how to speak" (*Institutio Oratoria*, II, iii, 12).

It is no wonder that rhetoricians found Homer a rich mine for quotations and illustrations, for the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are filled with models of almost every kind of eloquence. Quintilian remarked that the magnificent speeches in the first, second, and ninth books "display all the rules of art to be followed in forensic or deliberative oratory" (*Institutio Oratoria*, X, i, 47). Today we find it almost laughable to read about warriors pausing in the heat of battle, as they do in some of the scenes of the *Iliad*, to hurl long speeches at one another. But the tradition of oratory was already well established—if not yet well formulated—in Homer's time, and this tradition persisted and grew stronger throughout the Golden Age of Athens. So we must take the oratory displayed in this scene as seriously as the participants took it, and we must savor the relish with which they indulged in this battle of words.

The participants in this battle of words are clearly engaged in what the classical rhetoricians called *deliberative* discourse. In classifying the three kinds of oratory, Aristotle pointed out that deliberative oratory is concerned with *future* time; that the means used in this kind of oratory are *exhortation* and *dissuasion*; and that the special topics that figure most prominently in this kind of discourse are the *expedient* and the *inexpedient*, or the *advantageous* and the *injurious*. In other words, when we are trying to persuade a man to do something, we try to show that the recommended course of action is either a good in itself (and therefore worthy of pursuit for its own sake) or something that will benefit him. The envoys are trying to exhort Achilles to undertake an action in the future (on the morrow, if he will) that will be advantageous both to himself and to the Greeks. Achilles is engaged in refuting the exhortations.

Our selection from this scene reproduces only Odysseus' plea to Achilles and Achilles' reply to Odysseus. Let us look at the strategies of argument in these two speeches.

We have already remarked that Odysseus was reputed to be the most accomplished speaker among the Greeks. And indeed his speech here is a model, in miniature, of the well-organized oration. It has an exordium, a

narration, a proof, and a peroration. None of these parts is developed to the extent that it would be in a full-fledged deliberative oration, but the speech does conform to the standard *dispositio* or arrangement laid down by the teachers of rhetoric.

Odysseus begins his speech by offering a toast to Achilles. Here he is doing what is often done in the exordium or introduction to a discourse: attempting to ingratiate himself with his audience, to conciliate his audience that is indifferent or reluctant or hostile (whichever term best describes Achilles' mood at the moment). All the rhetoricians emphasize the importance of putting the audience in a receptive frame of mind, especially if the audience is suspicious or hostile. The need to dispose an audience favorably explains why so many speakers begin their talk with a joke or a humorous anecdote.

Odysseus then proceeds to the *narratio*, or the exposition of the state of affairs at the moment (paragraphs 2 and 3). He describes for Achilles the desperate straits in which the Greeks now find themselves. In doing this, he employs the device of *enargeia*, which, as Quintilian puts it, "makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence" (*Institutio Oratoria*, VI, ii, 32). Thus Odysseus pictures for Achilles the countless watch-fires burning in the Trojan bivouac outside the line of the Greek ships; the favorable omen given by Zeus's lightning; and the "devouring flame" that threatens to engulf the ships. All these fire images are subtly calculated to arouse Achilles' anger, since to the Greek mind fire was intimately associated with the emotion of anger. By picturing Hector in his frenzied, arrogant, triumphant assault on the ships, Odysseus seeks to touch Achilles' pride and envy. He is needling Achilles. Are you going to let Hector make good his boast that he will chop down our ensigns and smother our ships with fire and smoke? If an appeal like this does not touch Achilles' pride, perhaps it will touch his sense of loyalty and patriotism.

Odysseus then launches into that part of his speech that the Latin rhetoricians called the *confirmatio*—the proof of one's case. It is in this section that the speaker brings to bear "all the available means of persuasion" to support the cause he is espousing.

Odysseus first tries to influence Achilles by reminding him of his father Peleus' warning that he should restrain his proud temper and avoid quarrels. Not only is restraint of temper a good in itself, but it disposes a man to fight more effectively, and it disposes the gods, in whose hands our fortunes rest, to look with favor on our cause. Odysseus is here appealing to filial piety. Achilles is not as distinguished for *pietas* as was that later epic hero Aeneas, but in a strongly patriarchal society such as existed in ancient Greece, a son would not be entirely impervious to the advice of his father. If this reminder

of a forgotten warning does not prevail with Achilles, it is only because Achilles feels that there is an over-riding justification for his anger.

After this, Odysseus catalogues for Achilles all the gifts that Agamemnon is prepared to give him if he will return to battle. Aristotle pointed out in his *Rhetoric* that exhortation and *dissuasion* turn ultimately on considerations of happiness or, more generally, the Good. Whenever we try to persuade someone to do something, we try to show him the benefits that will result from his action. Some of the goods that most men agree upon as contributing to happiness are such external goods as a respected family, loyal friends, wealth, fame, honor, and such personal excellences as health, beauty, strength. Of all these goods, Odysseus comes down heaviest on wealth. He entices Achilles with the list of all the gold, the horses, the servant women, and the property that Agamemnon will bestow on him. Not only will he get back the girl Briseus, the object of the quarrel with Agamemnon in the first place, but he will be honored with one of Agamemnon's daughters as a bride.

Odysseus is plainly appealing to Achilles' self-interest here. Achilles could not help being tempted by the king's generous offerings, for in this aristocratic society one of the marks of honor for a hero was abundant possessions. And, besides, these generous offerings would be a manifestation of Agamemnon's humiliating capitulation to Achilles. We shall see, when we consider Achilles' rebuttal, why it is that he was able to resist the tempting offer of these goods.

Odysseus did not, of course, have to *invent* these appeals. He is merely repeating, verbatim, the offer that Agamemnon had made, at the beginning of Book IX, before the council that immediately preceded this embassy. Odysseus was using the available means of persuasion, but he didn't have to discover these means.

One point needs to be made, however, about this verbatim retailing of Agamemnon's offer. The shrewd Odysseus did leave out one part of Agamemnon's council speech. At the very end Agamemnon had said: "All this will I accomplish so he but cease from wrath. Let him yield; Hades I ween is not to be softened neither overcome, and therefore is he hatefulest of all gods to mortals. Yea, let him be ruled by me, inasmuch as I am more royal and avow me to be the elder in years." Odysseus knew that if he were to repeat these words he would only increase Achilles' anger. For these words reveal that Agamemnon's capitulation is grudging and half-hearted. And certainly the king's insistence that he is still the superior man would have antagonized rather than conciliated Achilles.

Odysseus concludes his appeal by playing a slightly different note. If Achilles cannot rise above his hatred of Agamemnon, let him consider the

honor he can win for himself by destroying Hector and rescuing the Greeks. This is another appeal to self-interest, but it is self-interest on a higher plane than the previous reminder of material rewards. For the Homeric hero, personal glory was the highest good. Odysseus has reserved the strongest appeal for the climax of his argument.

Achilles' reply is immediate and impulsive. There is no reflective pause to weigh the arguments. One gets the impression that Achilles had given only half an ear to Odysseus' plea and that he has been waiting impatiently for Odysseus to stop speaking so that he can have his say. One is not surprised then to find Achilles' speech emotionally charged—and, as a consequence, disorganized.

Achilles seems not so much to answer Odysseus as to express, vigorously and repeatedly, his scorn of Agamemnon's offer and to declare his determination not to fight. At first he talks as though he had not listened to Odysseus at all. He says he won't fight anymore because he gets no thanks or reward for risking his life. But Odysseus has just told him of the thanks and reward he will get if he returns to battle. He will get not only what he had before the quarrel but additional rewards in superabundance.

As Achilles' torrent of speech tumbles on, however, it is clear that he *has* heard Odysseus. Achilles shows himself to be aware of all the details of Agamemnon's offer. But he spurns the offer. He is not just holding out for a higher price. No, he would reject the offer even if it were infinitely greater than it is. Some other considerations are now influencing Achilles.

Something has happened to Achilles while he has been brooding in his tent. He has been evaluating the rationale of war in general and this war in particular. Why have they been fighting here for ten years? To rescue Helen? But that is an inane cause to fight and die for. Why should hundreds of wives be widowed so that the king's brother can recover his wife? The sheer stupidity of the war and the egregious arrogance of Agamemnon in marshalling so many noble warriors to fight such a war magnifies the insult that Achilles has sustained. Does Agamemnon really think that he can compensate for all this with his paltry gifts?

Nor has Achilles been deaf to Odysseus' plea on the grounds of personal honor. As we have pointed out, the prospect of winning personal glory exercised a strong attraction for the Greek heroes. But having seen this war in proper perspective, Achilles no longer finds the attraction of personal honor as potent as it once was for him. There is something more dear to him now than honor and wealth—life. "For not of like worth with life," he says, "hold I even all the wealth that men say was possessed of the well-peopled city of Ilios"; and a little later he says, "...if I go home to my dear native land, my high fame is taken from me, but my life shall endure long while, neither

shall the issue of death soon reach me." Achilles has decided that life is a higher good than fame or wealth.

In making this decision, Achilles has employed one of Aristotle's common topics—the topic of degree. When men deliberate about a course of action, the choice is not always between a good and an evil; sometimes the choice is between two or more goods. In making a choice from among several goods, men decide on the basis of degree: which of these goods is the greater good or the greatest good? And that is the topic that Achilles resorts to here. As readers of the *Iliad* know, Achilles later changes his mind and elects honor over life. But at the moment and in answer to Odysseus' persuasive appeals, he declares his preference for life over wealth and honor.

This is all the argument that one can make out of Achilles' rebuttal. Most of his speech is taken up with impassioned but eloquent ranting. One thing is clear, though, at the end of his speech: he will not fight. And it appears that Odysseus, the renowned orator, the man who was never at a loss, has utterly failed to move Achilles. It is now Phoinix's turn to appeal to him, and then Ajax's. But we have not reproduced these two speeches in our selection. If the student is interested in observing the rhetorical appeals made by Phoinix and Ajax, he can read them in the ninth book of the *Iliad*.

What lessons about rhetoric can the modern student learn from a study of this episode, which constitutes a dramatic scene in a narrative poem but which is presented in the form of an oratorical debate? He learns for one thing that, despite the hundreds of years that separate his society from Homer's, men acted and responded then in much the same way that they do today. Men still sulk because of a real or supposed affront to their dignity; other men try to salve the wounds of the insult. The dominant ideals of a society change with the passage of time—today, for instance, we put more of a premium on actions that contribute to the common welfare than on actions that contribute only to a man's personal honor—but the basic human passions and motivations are the same today as they were in Homer's day.

In this episode, we see men arguing in much the same way as we argue today. What do we do when we want to change someone's attitude or get someone to do something? We appeal to him in much the same way that Odysseus, Phoinix, and Ajax appealed to Achilles. We try to show a man how a proposed course of action will benefit him, how it will contribute to his happiness. The material rewards we offer him may not be fancy tripods and swift race horses, but they will be similar lures—deep-freezes and Cadillacs. Or we may try to show him how much honor or power he will reap for himself. Or we may try to show him how foolish or how dangerous his failure to act will be.

If these appeals to his understanding fail to move him, we try other ap-

proaches. We try to induce such emotions as anger, fear, pity, shame, envy, contempt. Since it is the will that controls whether a man will act or not and since an appeal to the emotions is one of the most potent means of moving the will, we may find that in some circumstances the emotional appeal is the most effective tactic. We would hope too that the ethical appeal of our speech would help to influence our reluctant man. If the man perceives from our persuasive efforts that we are men of intelligence, good character, and good will, he will be disposed to listen and respond to our logical and emotional appeals.

In short, what we learn from this display of rhetoric is that in similar circumstances we employ the same strategies of appeal that the envoys did. We make use of "all the available means of persuasion in any given case." We may find and employ *more* arguments, we may arrange them differently, we may use a more temperate or a more florid style in which to convey our arguments; but fundamentally our strategies will be the same as those used by the envoys.

It is with the strategies of discourse directed to a definite audience for a definite purpose that this text will be concerned.

A Brief Explanation of Classical Rhetoric

The student has just seen two examples of persuasive discourse. The analyses of these two pieces introduced some terminology that may be completely unfamiliar to him. The terminology is strange because it belongs to an art that was formulated many centuries ago and that ceased to be a vital discipline in our schools sometime in the nineteenth century. Although the student may often have heard the term *rhetoric* used, he probably does not have a clear idea of what it means. His uncertainty is understandable, because the word *rhetoric* has acquired many meanings. Rhetoric may be associated in his mind with the writing of compositions and themes or with style—figures of speech, flowery diction, variety of sentence patterns and rhythms—or with the notion of empty, bombastic language, or rodomontade (to use a bombastic word), of "sound and fury, signifying nothing," of "sounding brass and tinkling cymbals." Perhaps tucked away somewhere in his consciousness is the notion of rhetoric as the use of language for persuasive purposes.

What all these notions have in common is that rhetoric implies the use or manipulation of words. And, indeed, a look at the etymology of the word *rhetoric* shows that the term is solidly rooted in the notion of "words" or "speech." The Greek words *rhēma* ("a word") and *rhētor* ("a teacher of oratory"), which are akin, stem ultimately from the Greek verb *eirō* ("I

say"). Our English noun *rhetoric* derives from the Greek feminine adjective *rhetorikē*, which is elliptical for *rhetorikē technē* ("the art of the rhetor or orator"). English got its word immediately from the French *rhétorique*.

This investigation of the etymology of the term brings us somewhat closer to the original meaning of rhetoric: something connected with speaking, orating. From its origin in fifth-century Greece through its flourishing period in Rome and its reign in the medieval *trivium*, rhetoric was associated primarily with the art of oratory. During the Middle Ages, the precepts of classical rhetoric began to be applied to letter writing, but it was not until the Renaissance, after the invention of printing in the fifteenth century, that the precepts governing the spoken art began to be applied, on any large scale, to written discourse. Today, curiously enough, the principles of classical rhetoric are more likely to be studied in Speech classes than in English classes: we have come full circle.

Although the etymology of the word does not imply it, rhetoric was associated primarily with persuasive discourse, as in the examples we read at the beginning of this chapter. From its beginnings and throughout its history, classical rhetoric was thought of as the art of persuasive speech. Its end was to convince or persuade an audience to think in a certain way or to act in a certain way.

Rhetoric as persuasive discourse is still very much exercised among us, but American students no longer receive any extensive training in the art of persuasion. Frequently, the only remnant of this training in the modern college is the attention paid to argumentation in a study of the four forms of discourse—Argumentation, Exposition, Description, and Narration. But this study of argumentation usually turns out to be just an accelerated course in logic. For the classical rhetorician, logic was an ancillary but distinct discipline. Aristotle, for instance, spoke of rhetoric as being "an offshoot" or "a counterpart" of logic. The speaker might employ logic to persuade his hearers, but logic was only one among many "available means of persuasion." So the student who studies argumentation in his Freshman English class today is not really exposed to the rich, highly systematized discipline that earlier schoolboys submitted to when they were learning the persuasive art.

Although classical rhetoric has largely disappeared from our schools, there was a time when it was very much alive. For extended periods during its two-thousand-year history, the study of rhetoric was the central discipline in the schools. Rhetoric enjoyed this eminence because, during those periods, skill in oratory or in written discourse was the key to preferment in the courts, the forum, and the church. One of the reasons why the study—if not the practice—of rhetoric has declined in our own times is that in an industrial, technological society like our own there are avenues to success other than the communication skills. It is part of the folklore of America that in

the years from about 1870 to 1910 some barely literate men became millionaires—some of whom, happily, eventually founded libraries and endowed universities.

One fact that emerges from a study of the history of rhetoric is that there is usually a resurgence of rhetoric during periods of violent social upheaval. Whenever the old order is passing away and the new order is marching—or stumbling—in, a loud, clear call goes up for the services of the man skilled in words. One needs only to hearken back to such historical events as the Renaissance in Italy, the Reformation in England, and the Revolution in America to find evidence of this desperate reliance, in times of change or crisis, on the talents of men skilled in the persuasive arts. As Jacob Burckhardt has pointed out in *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, the orator and the teacher of rhetoric played a prominent role in the fifteenth-century humanistic movement that was casting off the yoke of the medieval church. After Henry VIII broke with Rome, the Tudor courts resounded with the arguments of hundreds of lawyers engaged to fight litigations over confiscated monastic properties. Students of the American Revolution need recall only Tom Paine's incendiary pamphlets, Patrick Henry's rousing speeches, Thomas Jefferson's daring Declaration of Independence, and Hamilton's and Madison's efforts to sell constitutional democracy in the *Federalist Papers* to be convinced that in time of upheaval we rely heavily on the services of men equipped with persuasive tongues and pens. Something of the same kind of rhetorical activity is raging today among the nationalists fighting for independence in African and Asian countries.

The student who wants to learn something about the history of rhetoric can read the Survey of Rhetoric in the Appendix of this book, and he can further pursue his interest by reading some of the primary and secondary texts on rhetoric listed in the Bibliography in the Appendix. Before getting into the study of rhetoric in the next chapter, however, the student may want to gain some general knowledge of the classical system of rhetoric and its terminology. By the time Cicero came to write his treatises on rhetoric, the study of rhetoric was divided, mainly for pedagogical convenience, into five parts: *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*, *memoria*, and *pronuntiatio*. Since this text professes to be an adaptation of classical rhetoric, the student may appreciate an explanation of these terms and other key terms so that he might better understand the kind of rhetoric presented in the next three chapters.

THE FIVE PARTS OF A DISCOURSE

Inventio is the Latin term (*heuresis* was the equivalent Greek term) for "invention" or "discovery." Theoretically, an orator could talk on any subject, because rhetoric, as such, had no proper subject matter. In practice,

however, each speech that he undertook presented him with a unique challenge. He had to find arguments which would support whatever case or point of view he was espousing. According to Cicero, the speaker relied on native genius, on method or art, or on diligence to help him find appropriate arguments. Obviously, that man was at a great advantage who had a native, intuitive sense for proper arguments. But lacking such an endowment, a man could have recourse either to his dogged industry or to some system for finding arguments. *Inventio* was concerned with a system or method for finding arguments.

Aristotle pointed out that there were two kinds of arguments or means of persuasion available to the speaker. First of all, there were the non-artistic or non-technical means of persuasion (the Greek term was *atechnoi pisteis*). These modes of persuasion were really not part of the art of rhetoric; they came from outside the art. The orator did not have to *invent* these; he had merely to use them. Aristotle named five kinds of non-artistic proofs: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, oaths. Apparently, the lawyer pleading a case in court made most use of this kind of proof, but the politician or the panegyrist could use them too. The councilman today, for instance, who is trying to persuade the citizens to adopt a sales tax quotes statistics, legal contracts, existing laws, historical documents, and the testimony of experts to bolster his case. He does not have to invent these supporting arguments; they already exist. True, there is a sense in which he has to find such supporting arguments. He has to be aware that they exist, and he has to know what departments or records to go to in order to discover them. (One of the sections in the next chapter will provide expositions of some of the standard reference books which can supply the student with the facts, figures, testimonies to support his arguments.) But the councilman does not have to imagine these arguments, to think them up—to invent them, in the classical sense of that term.

The second general mode of persuasion that Aristotle spoke of included artistic proof—"artistic" in the sense that they fell within the province of the art of rhetoric: *rational* appeal (*logos*), *emotional* appeal (*pathos*), and *ethical* appeal (*ēthos*). In exercising the rational appeal, the speaker was appealing to his audience's reason or understanding. He is "arguing," in other words. When we argue, we reason either *deductively* or *inductively*—that is, we either draw conclusions from affirmative or negative statements (e.g. No man can attain perfect happiness in this life; John is a man; therefore John cannot attain perfect happiness in this life) or make generalizations after observing a number of analogous facts (e.g. Every green apple that I bit into had a sour taste. All green apples must be sour.) In logic, the deductive mode of arguing is commonly referred to by the term that Aristotle used, the *syllogism*. In rhetoric, the equivalent of the syllogism was the *en-*

thymeme. The rhetorical equivalent of *full induction* in logic is the *example*. Since the next chapter will provide an elaborate explanation of syllogism, enthymeme, induction, and example, we will not dwell on them here.

A second mode of persuasion is the emotional appeal. Since man is by nature a rational animal, he should be able to make decisions about his private and public life solely by the light of reason. But man is also endowed with the faculty of free will, and often enough his will is swayed more by his passions or emotions than by his reason. Aristotle expressed the wish that rhetoric could deal exclusively with rational appeals, but he was enough of a realist to recognize that man is often prompted to do something or accept something by his emotions. And if rhetoric was, as he defined it, the art of discovering "all the available means of persuasion," then he would have to give a place in his *Rhetoric* to an investigation of the means of touching the emotions. Accordingly, he devoted the major portion of Book II of his *Rhetoric* to an analysis of the more common human emotions. This was the beginning of the science of human psychology. If the orator was to play upon man's emotions, he must know what those emotions were and how they could be triggered off or subdued.

A third mode of persuasion was the ethical appeal. This appeal stemmed from the character of the speaker, especially as that character was evinced in the speech itself. A man ingratiated himself with his audience—and thereby gained their trust and admiration—if he managed to create the impression that he was a man of intelligence, benevolence, and probity. Aristotle recognized that the ethical appeal could be the most potent of the three modes of persuasion. All of an orator's skill in convincing the intellect and moving the will of an audience could prove futile if the audience did not esteem, could not trust, the speaker. It is for this reason that politicians seeking election to public office take such great care to create the proper image of themselves in the eyes of the voters. It was for this reason also that Cicero and Quintilian stressed the need for high moral character in the speaker. Quintilian defined the ideal orator as "a good man skilled in speaking." In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle explored the *ēthos* proper for the individual; in his *Politics*, the *ēthos* proper for individuals living together in a society.

The method that the classical rhetoricians devised to aid the speaker in discovering matter for the three modes of appeal was the *topics*. *Topics* is the English translation of the Greek word *topoi* and the Latin word *loci*. Literally, *topos* or *locus* meant "place" or "region" (note our words *topography* and *locale*). In rhetoric, a topic was a place or store or thesaurus to which one resorted in order to find something to say on a given subject. More specifically, a topic was a general head or line of argument which suggested material from which proofs could be made. To put it another way, the topics constituted a method of probing one's subject in order to discover possible

ways of developing that subject. Aristotle distinguished two kinds of topics: (1) the special topics (he called them *idioi topoi* or *eidē*); (2) the common topics (*koinoi topoi*). The special topics were those classes of argument appropriate to particular kinds of discourse. In other words, there were some kinds of arguments that were used exclusively in the law courts; some that were confined to the public forum; others that appeared only in ceremonial addresses. The common topics, on the other hand, were a fairly limited stock of arguments that could be used for any occasion or type of speech. Aristotle named four common topics: (1) more and less (the topic of degree); (2) the possible and the impossible; (3) past fact and future fact; (4) greatness and smallness (the topic of size as distinguished from the topic of degree). In the text itself we shall see how the topics are put to work.

All of the considerations reviewed in the last two or three pages fell within the province of *inventio*. Chapter II, entitled "Discovery of Arguments," will be concerned with this aspect of rhetoric—how to "discover" something to say on some given subject, which is the crucial problem for most students. The chief reason for the student's inarticulateness on certain subjects is the lack of experience or reading background that can stock a student's reservoir of ideas. At other times, his inarticulateness stems from his inability to look into a subject to discover what he already knows about the subject. Since *inventio* is a systematized way of turning up or generating ideas on some subject, the student may find this rhetorical approach helpful.

The second part of rhetoric was *dispositio* (Greek, *taxis*), which may be translated as "disposition," "arrangement," "organization." This was the division of rhetoric concerned with the effective and orderly arrangement of the parts of a written or spoken discourse. Once the ideas or arguments are discovered there remains the problem of selecting, marshalling, and organizing them with a view to effecting the end of the discourse.

In the simplest terms, one might say that any discourse needs a beginning, a middle, and an end; but this is self-evident and not much help. Rhetoricians spelled out the division of a discourse more specifically and functionally. Aristotle held that there were really only two essential parts of a speech: the statement of the case and the proof of the case; but he was ready to concede that in practice orators added two more parts: an introduction and a conclusion. Latin rhetoricians, like the author of the *Ad Herennium*, further refined these divisions, recognizing six parts: (1) the introduction (*exordium*); (2) the statement or exposition of the case under discussion (*narratio*); (3) the outline of the points or steps in the argument (*divisio*); (4) the proof of the case (*confirmatio*); (5) the refutation of the opposing arguments (*confutatio*); (6) the conclusion (*peroratio*).

Such a division may strike the student as being arbitrary, mechanical, and

rigid. Two things may be said in defense of this conventional pattern. It did set forth clear principles of organization, and inexperienced writers need nothing so much as simple, definite principles to guide them in arrangement of material. Then too the rhetoricians allowed for some adjustments in this scheme. Accepting the Aristotelian notion of the "available means of persuasion," they acknowledge that on some occasions it was expedient to omit certain parts altogether (for instance, if one found it difficult to break down the opposing arguments, it might be advisable to omit the stage of *confutatio*) or to re-arrange some of the parts (for instance, it might be more effective to refute the opposing arguments *before* advancing one's own arguments).

Unquestionably, there is a close inter-relation between *inventio* and *dispositio*, and in many rhetoric books these two divisions were treated under one head. Disposition was looked upon as just another aspect of invention; *inventio* was the originaive aspect, and *dispositio* was the organizing aspect. As the student may learn from the history of rhetoric in the Appendix, Peter Ramus and his followers, like Francis Bacon, wanted to relegate invention and disposition to the province of logic and to limit rhetoric to considerations of style, memory, and delivery. Chapter III of this text, entitled "Arrangement," will deal with this aspect of rhetoric.

The third part of rhetoric was *elocutio* (Greek, *lexis* or *hermēneia* or *phrasis*). The word *elocution* means something quite different to us from what it meant to the classical rhetorician. We associate the word with the act of speaking (hence, the elocution contest). This notion of speaking is, of course, implicit in the Latin verb from which this word stems, *loqui*, "to speak" (cf. Greek, *legein*, "to speak"). We have a number of English words based on this Latin verb: *loquacious*, *colloquial*, *eloquence*, *interlocutor*. It was after the revival of interest in delivery in the second half of the eighteenth century that the word *elocution* began to take on its present meaning. But for the classical rhetorician, *elocutio* meant "style."

Style is a difficult concept to define, although most of us feel we know what it is. Famous definitions of style, like Buffon's "style is the man," Swift's "proper words in proper places," Newman's "style is a thinking out into language," and Blair's "the peculiar manner in which a man expresses his conceptions," are apt, but they are just vague enough to tease us out of thought and just general enough to give us a sense for style without giving us a clear definition of it. None of the major rhetoricians attempted to give a definition of style, but most of them had a great deal to say about it; in fact, some of the Renaissance rhetorics were devoted exclusively to a consideration of style.

One of the points that elicited a great deal of discussion was the classification of styles. Various terms were used to name the kinds of style, but

there was fundamental agreement about three levels of style. There was the *low* or *plain* style (*attenuata, subtile*); the *middle* or *forcible* style (*mediocris, robusta*); and the *high* or *florid* style (*gravis, florida*). Quintilian proposed that each of these styles was suited to one of the three functions that he assigned to rhetoric. The plain style was most appropriate for instructing (*docendi*); the middle for *moving* (*movendi*); and the high for *charming* (*delectandi*).

All rhetorical considerations of style involved some discussion of *choice of words*, usually under such heads as correctness, purity (for instance, the choice of native words rather than foreign words), simplicity, clearness, appropriateness, ornateness.

Another subject of consideration was the composition or arrangement of words in phrases or clauses (or, to use the rhetorical term, *periods*). Involved here were discussions of correct syntax or collocation of words; patterns of sentences (e.g. parallelism, antithesis); proper use of conjunctions and other correlating devices both within the sentence and between sentences; the euphony of sentences secured through the artful juxtaposition of pleasing vowel and consonant combinations and through the use of appropriate rhythmic patterns.

A great deal of attention was paid, of course, to *tropes* and *figures* (Greek, *schēmata*, hence the English term *schemes*, which was often used in place of *figures*). Since the concept of tropes and schemes is very complex, it is better that we defer any definition and illustration of these terms to the appropriate section of the text.

Also involved in considerations of style were arguments about (1) the functional vs. the embellishing character of style; (2) Asianism vs. Atticism; (3) the written style vs. the spoken style; (4) economy of words vs. copia of words. These points of discussion are rather peripheral matters, but it is remarkable how much time and energy the rhetoricians devoted to such controversies. The final chapter of this book will be devoted to consideration of style.

The fourth part of rhetoric was *memoria* (Greek, *mnēmē*), concerned with the memorizing of speeches. Of all the five parts of rhetoric, *memoria* was the one that received the least attention in the rhetoric books. The reason for the neglect of this aspect of rhetoric is probably that not much can be said, in a theoretical way, about the process of memorizing; and after rhetoric came to be concerned mainly with written discourse, there was no further need to deal with memorizing. This process did receive, however, some attention in the schools of rhetoric set up by the sophists. The orator's memory was trained largely through constant practice (just as professional actors today acquire an amazing facility in memorizing a script), but the rhetors

did suggest various mnemonic devices that facilitated the memorizing of speeches. The courses that one sometimes sees advertised in newspapers or magazines—"I Can Give You a Retentive Memory in Thirty Days"—are modern manifestations of this division of rhetoric. There will be no consideration in this book of this aspect of rhetoric.

The fifth division of rhetoric was *pronuntiatio* (Greek, *hypokrisis*) or delivery. As in the case of *memoria*, the theory of delivery was conspicuously neglected in the rhetoric texts until the elocutionary movement began about the middle of the eighteenth century. But most rhetoricians would acknowledge the importance of effective delivery in the persuasive process. When Demosthenes, the greatest of the Greek orators, was asked what he considered to be the most important part of rhetoric, he replied, "Delivery, delivery, delivery." Despite the neglect of delivery in the rhetoric books, a great deal of attention was devoted to this aspect in the Greek and Roman schools of rhetoric. Skill in delivery can best be acquired, of course, not by listening to theoretical discussions of this art but by actual practice and by analyzing the delivery of others. Understandably enough, discussions of delivery, as well as of memory, tended to be even more neglected in rhetoric texts after the invention of printing, when most rhetorical training was directed primarily to written discourse.

Involved in the treatment of delivery was concern for the management of the voice and for gestures (*actio*). Precepts were laid down about the modulation of the voice for the proper pitch, volume, and emphasis and about pausing and phrasing. In regard to action, orators were trained in gesturing, in the proper stance and posture of the body, and in the management of the eyes and of facial expressions. What this all amounted to really was training in the art of acting, and it is significant that all the great orators in history have been great "hams."

There is no denying the importance of delivery in effecting the end that one sets for oneself. Many speeches and sermons, however well prepared and elegantly written, have fallen on deaf ears because of inept delivery. The writer lacks the advantage a speaker enjoys because of his face-to-face contact with an audience and because of his vocal delivery; the only way in which the writer can make up for this disadvantage is by the brilliance of his style.

THE THREE KINDS OF PERSUASIVE DISCOURSE

All rhetoricians distinguished three kinds of orations, and this tripartite classification is well-nigh exhaustive. First of all, there was *deliberative* oratory, also known as *political*, *hortative*, and *advisory*, in which one deliberated about

public affairs, about anything that had to do with politics, in the Greek sense of that term—whether to go to war, whether to levy a tax, whether to enter into an alliance with a foreign power, whether to build a bridge or a reservoir or a temple. More generally, however, deliberative discourse is that in which we seek to persuade someone to do something or to accept our point of view, as in the two pieces we considered at the beginning of this chapter. According to Aristotle, political oratory was always concerned about the *future* (the point at issue is something that we shall or shall not do); its special topics were the *expedient* and the *inexpedient*; and its means were *exhortation* and *dehortation*.

Secondly, there was *forensic* oratory, sometimes referred to as *legal* or *judicial* oratory. This was the oratory of lawyers in the courtroom, but it can be extended to cover any kind of discourse in which a person seeks to defend or condemn someone's actions. (Richard Nixon's famous "Checkers" speech before a nationwide television audience can be considered as an example of forensic rhetoric; and Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* is another example of forensic discourse.) Forensic oratory, according to Aristotle, was concerned with *past* time (court trials are always concerned with actions or crimes that took place in the past); its special topics were *justice* and *injustice*; and its means were *accusation* and *defense*.

Thirdly, there was *epideictic* oratory. This species has had a variety of other titles: *demonstrative*, *declamatory*, *panegyric*, *ceremonial*. It is the oratory of display, the kind of oratory exemplified in the *Gettysburg Address* and in the old-fashioned Fourth of July speeches. In this kind of discourse, one is not so much concerned with persuading an audience as with pleasing it or inspiring it. *Ceremonial* discourse—the term we shall use in this text—is the most "literary" and usually the most ornate of the three kinds of discourse. Aristotle had to strain to fit a proper time-province to this form of oratory, but in the interests of neatness he laid it down that ceremonial oratory was concerned primarily with the *present*. Its special topics were *honor* and *dishonor*, and its means were *praise* and *blame*. The ancients made no provision in their rhetorics for sermons or homiletics. But later, when rhetoric was studied in a Christian culture, the art of preaching was usually considered under the head of epideictic oratory—even though preachers are also concerned with man's past and future actions.

The Relevance and Importance of Rhetoric for Our Times

After reading the foregoing explanation of some of the key terms of classical rhetoric, the student might be prompted to say: "This is all very interesting. But what does it have to do with me? This kind of rhetoric may have had

a long and honorable tradition in Western culture, but this rather stodgy and highly formalized approach to composition seems to be quite useless in our technological age. And as for myself, I don't see that I'll ever have any use for rhetoric, since I am going to be an electrical engineer."

The student's doubts about the usefulness and relevance of the kind of rhetoric that will be presented in this text deserve an answer. In reply, one might say first of all that the student cannot escape rhetoric, no matter what his vocation in life is. Every day of his life, he either uses rhetoric or is exposed to it. Every half-hour that he spends in front of his television set he is subjected three or four times to somebody's efforts to get him to buy something. And he himself employs rhetoric countless times every day. Perhaps he has to convince his father to let him use the car or to induce his girl friend to go bowling with him instead of working on her term paper or to inveigle his friend into changing shifts with him at the parking lot where they work after school. He is not aware, of course, that the announcer in the TV commercial (nor is the announcer aware probably) may have been wooing him with the common topic of degree; nor is he aware that in the debate with his father over the use of the family car he may have been using an enthymemic chain of arguments. No, he was using persuasive devices that come naturally, instinctively to human beings. Just as men immediately acknowledge the validity of the logical principle that a thing cannot at the same time be and not be, so they readily use or respond to those verbal strategies that men have always used to induce attitudes in others or to prompt others to action.

Rhetoric, like grammar or logic or poetics, is not an *a priori* science. Aristotle did not sit in his cubicle and dream up a set of principles for convincing other men. Rather, he observed the practice of effective orators, analyzed their strategies, and from that observation and analysis codified a body of precepts to guide others in the exercise of the persuasive art. Aristotle believed, as did every other rhetorician who composed a treatise on the persuasive art, that what men did instinctively they could do more effectively if they consciously schooled themselves in the *art* of that activity. Many jazz pianists never took a lesson in their life; they just "picked it up," as they will tell you. None of these accomplished performers would deny, however, that they might improve their performance if they were to take a course in, say, harmonics at some music school.

Rhetoric then is an inescapable activity in our lives. Of the four conventional forms of spoken or written discourse—exposition, argumentation, description, and narration—we indulge in, or are exposed to, argumentation most often. Everyone living in community with other men is a rhetorician. A mother constantly uses rhetoric on her child; a teacher, on his students; a salesman, on his clients; a foreman, on his workers. So if our student thinks

that he will have no use for rhetoric when he becomes an electrical engineer, he is mistaken. If nothing else, he will have to convince his assistants to be orderly, precise, and thorough in the experiments they conduct for him.

Grammar, logic, and rhetoric are the three arts of language. Skill in the language arts is more important today than it used to be. Technological improvements in communication and transportation have brought us into more frequent and crucial converse with the inhabitants of our own country and with the peoples of other nations. It is important to our welfare that we learn how to ingratiate ourselves with others, how to express our thoughts and desires, how to allay their fears, and how to conciliate our differences. Rhetoric can help here. With the invention of the "ultimate weapon," the hydrogen bomb, science has brought us to the brink of annihilation. It behooves us now to withhold this means of settling the tensions that exist in the world and exploit the possibilities of settling those tensions by the use of the powerful weapons of words. Rhetoric is the art that shows us how to hone that weapon and to wield it most effectively.

Many public activities today rely heavily on the art of rhetoric. Advertising, that vast, ubiquitous industry in twentieth-century life, is perhaps the best example of an activity that practices what Aristotle preached. Advertising certainly makes use of all the "available means of persuasion" to induce people to buy things, and while questions are sometimes raised about the ethics of advertising, there is no denying that specialists in advertising are remarkably effective rhetoricians.

Many other fields of endeavor in modern life rely on rhetoric in varying degrees. The diplomat is a traveling rhetorician with portfolio. The public-relations man is a practitioner of ceremonial rhetoric, that variety which is not so much interested in effecting persuasion as in reflecting credit on a person or an institution. Law is such a many-faceted profession today that many lawyers never get a chance to exhibit the forensic brand of rhetoric in the courtroom; but even those lawyers whose principal function is to prepare briefs for the Clarence Darrows of the courtroom can be said to be engaged in the *inventio* and *dispositio* aspects of rhetoric. Insurance men and salesmen (especially the door-to-door salesmen) practice deliberative rhetoric, often very effectively, every day. Preachers, candidates for public office, and parliamentary speakers are as actively exercising their rhetorical skills today as they ever were.

There are some forms of rhetoric practiced today that we regard with suspicion, and even disdain. One of these is propaganda. The term *propaganda* was once a neutral word, signifying the dissemination of truth. But because some men have used propaganda for unscrupulous purposes, *propaganda* has taken on decidedly unfavorable connotations. Closely allied to this disreputable form of rhetoric is demagoguery. The names of the most successful

of the twentieth-century demagogues are etched so painfully into our memories that they need not be specified here. These were the exploiters of specious arguments, half-truths, and rank emotional appeals to gain personal advantage rather than to promote the public welfare. The newest variety of dangerous rhetoric is *brainwashing*. A definitive analysis of this diabolical technique has yet to be written, but a beginning has been made in the terrifying final chapters of George Orwell's *1984*. A good argument for an intensive study of rhetoric is that citizens might thereby be put on their guard against the onslaughts of these vicious forms of persuasion.

One of the chief values of rhetoric, conceived as a system of gathering, arranging, and expressing our material, is that it represents a *positive* approach to the problems of writing. Students have too often been inhibited in their writing by the negative approach to composition—don't do this, beware of that. Classical rhetoric too had its negative prescriptions, but, in the main, it offered positive advice to help the student in the composition of a specific kind of discourse directed to a definite audience for a particular purpose. Rhetoric cannot, of course, tell the student what he must do in any and every situation. No art can do that. But rhetoric can lay down the general principles that the student can adapt to fit the particular situation. At least it can provide the student with a set of procedures and criteria that can guide him in making strategic decisions in the composition process.

Rhetoric was primarily a synthetic art—an art for “building up” something. But it can also be used as an analytical art—an art for “breaking down” what has been composed. As such, the study of rhetoric can make us better readers. Once we are made aware of all the artifice that goes into the composition of a discourse, we are better equipped to analyze what other speakers and writers have done to achieve their effects. As Malcolm Cowley pointed out a few years ago, the New Criticism of men like Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren represented an application of rhetorical principles to the close reading of poetic texts. Mortimer Adler's *How to Read a Book*, which became a surprising bestseller during the 1940's, presented a rhetorical technique for the reading of expository and argumentative prose. Wayne C. Booth, in his book *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (1961), has shown us how “rhetoric” operates in the short story and the novel. And in recent years, hardly an issue of the professional journals in Speech or English appears without someone's rhetorical analysis of some piece of didactic or non-didactic literature.

The student will be amazed at the new dimensions revealed when he uses the rhetorical approach for the study of satire, to name just one of the literary genres. Satire is essentially an exercise in rhetoric—rhetoric in the classical sense of persuasive discourse. The satirist is engaged either in deliberative rhetoric or in ceremonial rhetoric: either the satirist is seeking to influence

the attitude of his audience, often with the ultimate purpose of moving his audience to do something, or he is seeking, through the medium of praise or blame, to induce his audience to accept or reject some person or group of persons. Jonathan Swift's "A Modest Proposal" is a display of deliberative rhetoric. For examples of ceremonial rhetoric, we can hearken back to those devastating portraits of political and literary enemies that we get in John Dryden's "Absalom and Achitophel" or "Mac Flecknoe" or in Alexander Pope's "Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot" or "The Dunciad." Today the eighteenth-century brand of satire seems to be enjoying a revival, especially among young people of college age. Whether it is the satire in *Mad Magazine* or the satire of the stand-up comedians who reach their audience through television or records, all of the techniques have their roots in Aristotelian rhetoric.

The student may fear that an elaborately systematized approach to composition will inhibit rather than facilitate writing. There is no denying that formula can retard and has retarded inventiveness and creativity. But to admit that formula can inhibit the writer is not to admit that it invariably does inhibit him. Almost every one of the major English writers, from the Renaissance through the eighteenth century—Chaucer, Jonson, Shakespeare, Milton, Dryden, Pope, Swift, Burke—had been subjected to an intensive rhetoric course in their grammar school or university. If one cannot claim that the study of rhetoric made them great writers, one might yet venture to say that rhetoric made them better writers than they might have been on genius alone.

Lest we raise any false hopes, however, we hasten to warn the student that this adaptation of classical rhetoric offers no magic formula for success in writing. The student will have to work hard in order to profit from the instruction offered in this book, for it is not all easy to understand, and what is learned must be applied.

The road to eloquence is a hard road and a lonely road, and the journey is not for the faint-hearted. But if, as we are told, the ability to use words to communicate thoughts and feelings is man's most distinctively human accomplishment, there can be few satisfactions in life that can match the pride a man feels when he has attained mastery over words. As Quintilian said, "Therefore let us seek wholeheartedly that true majesty of expression, the fairest gift of God to man, without which all things are struck dumb and robbed both of present glory and the immortal acclaim of posterity; and let us press on to whatever is best, because, if we do this, we shall either reach the summit or at least see many others far beneath us."

II / DISCOVERY OF ARGUMENTS

Formulating a Thesis

The beginning of all discourse is a subject. Subject is the *res* of the *res-verba* combination that rhetoricians talked about. *Res* (*what* is said) was the province of rhetoric called "invention." *Verba* (*how* it is said) was the concern of two other parts of rhetoric, "style" and "delivery." Obviously, no decisions about expression can be made until one's subject matter has been clearly defined.

Frequently, our subject matter is assigned to us. The teacher announces in class, "For next Friday I want you to write a 500-word letter to the editor of the school newspaper, giving your views on the proposed increase in tuition." Or the editor of a magazine writes to one of his authors and asks him whether he will do a 3000-word piece on the civil rights demonstrations in his community. Or the president of a corporation asks one of his junior executives to prepare a report for the next business meeting on the success of the latest advertising campaign. In such instances, our subject is given to us. At other times, of course, an author chooses his own subject.

But the choice or designation of a subject is only a beginning; in fact, it can be a dead-end if something further is not done to define the subject. It is not enough to decide that one is going to write on "democracy." Before "democracy" can become a real subject for a discourse, something must be *predicated* of it. The subject must be converted into a theme; it must, to use a term from logic, be stated in the form of a *proposition*. So our vague subject "democracy" must become something like "Democracy is the form of government which best allows a man to realize his potentialities as a human being" or "Democracy functions best when the people are educated." Now we have a theme; now we have a more precise notion of what we are going to write about.

John Henry Newman, in a section called "Elementary Studies" in his *Idea of a University*, points out the importance of stating a subject in the form of a proposition. His fictitious Mr. Black is commenting on a composition written by a boy named Robert:

"Now look here," Mr. Black says, "the subject is '*Fortes fortuna adjuvat*' [Fortune favors the brave]; now this is a *proposition*; it states a certain general principle, and this is just what an ordinary boy would be sure to miss, and Robert does miss it. He goes off at once on the word '*fortuna*.' '*Fortuna*' was not his subject; the thesis was intended to *guide* him, for his own good; he refuses to be put into leading strings; he breaks loose, and runs off in his own fashion on the broad field and in wild chase of 'fortune,' instead of closing with a subject, which, as being definite, would have supported him.

"It would have been very cruel to have told a boy to write on 'fortune'; it would have been like asking him his opinion 'of things in general.' Fortune is 'good,' 'bad,' 'capricious,' 'unexpected,' ten thousand things all at once (you see them all in the *Gradus*), and one of them as much as the other. Ten thousand things may be said of it: give me *one* of them, and I will write upon it; I cannot write on more than one; Robert prefers to write upon all."

Hundreds of Roberts are defeated every year in their composition classes because they will not or cannot define their subject. The Latin rhetoricians used a formula for determining the point of issue in a court trial that might help students decide on a thesis. The formula consisted of three questions that were asked about the subject of dispute or discussion:

- An sit* (whether a thing is)—a question of fact
- Quid sit* (what it is)—a question of definition
- Quale sit* (what kind it is)—a question of quality

In a murder trial, for instance, the case for the prosecution and the defense could turn on one of three issues:

1. Did Brutus, as has been alleged, kill Caesar? (whether a thing is)
2. If it is granted that Brutus *did* kill Caesar, was the act murder or self-defense? (what it is)
3. If it was in fact murder, was Brutus justified in murdering Caesar? (what kind it is)

The application of this formula settles the issue in a trial and in turn suggests the topics that the lawyers resort to in arguing their case.

The use of this formula will not establish the thesis of a discourse, but it can help the student determine what aspect of the subject he is going to treat, and then he is in a position to formulate a thesis. Let us suppose that his

instructor has asked him to write a letter to the editor about the increase in tuition. What aspect of the subject is he going to talk about? Is there actually going to be an increase in tuition next term? Or has an increase only been proposed? Perhaps the student knows that the Board of Trustees has been considering an increase in tuition but has not yet formally voted on the proposal. If so, that could very well be the burden of the letter he writes: "The students of this university have been in an uproar about something that is not yet a fact. If they had taken the trouble to investigate the facts, they would know that they do not yet have any just cause for complaint."

Suppose that the report about the cost per credit-hour has been confirmed. What aspect is there left to talk about? Well, he might become involved in a question of definition. Is the change from \$15 to \$17 per credit-hour really an *increase* in tuition costs? Not if one considers that the Board of Trustees has also voted to reduce the number of credit-hours that students will be allowed to take in any one semester. So although the cost per credit-hour will go up, the total cost of tuition per semester will remain the same. It is apparent that in this instance a discussion of the definition of *increase* could turn into a mere quibble on words, but with other subjects, like "democracy" or "socialized," there would be more of an opportunity to deal with a definition of terms.

But suppose that a change in tuition has been approved and that this change does constitute a substantial increase in the cost of tuition. Now the third question (*quale sit*) can disclose the area of discussion. Was the increase necessary? Can it be justified? In comparison with the general rise in the cost of living, does the increase in tuition become minimal? Will the increase in tuition ensure the continuance of or even an improvement in the quality of our education? Or will the increase prevent many students from continuing their education? The application of the third question to this particular subject turns up a number of areas of discussion.

The subject matter considered in relation to the current situation or occasion and to the audience often dictates which of the three questions is most applicable. In any case, however, the application of the pertinent question does help to define the aspect of the subject that is to be discussed. Once that aspect has been determined, the student should be prepared to formulate a thesis sentence. Once the subject has been narrowed down, what does he want to say about his subject?

The cardinal principle is to *state the thesis in a single declarative sentence*.

It is important that the thesis be formulated in a *single* sentence. As soon as the student launches into a second sentence, he introduces foreign or subsidiary matter which is likely to violate the unity of his thesis. It is equally important to formulate the thesis in a *declarative* sentence. Hortatory sentences like "Let us fight to preserve the integrity of our democracy" and in-

interrogatory sentences like "Is democracy a feasible form of government?" leave the subject fuzzy; both kinds of sentence have a tentative or uncertain air about them. The thesis will be clearly and firmly stated if the predicate *asserts* or *denies* something about the subject: "The integrity of our democracy can be preserved only if we fight to maintain it"; "Democracy is (is not) a feasible form of government."

The thesis sentence is a good starting-point in the composition process because it forces the writer to determine at the outset just what it is that he wants to say about his chosen or designated subject. Moreover, it lays the foundation for a unified, coherent discourse. Then, too, it often suggests some of the *topics* that can be used for the development of the discourse.

Say that a student took as his thesis this proposition: "Democracy is a feasible form of government for the newly emergent countries of South Africa." That statement precisely defines what the student wants to say about his subject: he is going to argue that a democratic form of government will work in South Africa. If the student keeps that objective constantly in mind, there is a good chance that his discourse will have a tight unity. The mere verbalization of the thesis also suggests some lines of development. Will he not, for instance, have to define at the beginning of his essay at least two of the key terms in his proposition, *democracy* and *feasible*? Will it not be advisable also to specify which countries of South Africa he is talking about? Is it possible that in arguing the feasibility of a democratic government in certain countries of South Africa he could compare the situation in these countries with the situation in other countries where democracy proved successful? The statement of his thesis has already suggested the topics of definition and comparison as possible lines of argument and has also suggested a possible organization of his essay that will be conducive to coherence.

Defining the thesis in a single declarative sentence will also help the student determine whether he can adequately handle the given or chosen subject within the word limit set for him. The subject "democracy" is so broad that the student could not forecast how much development would be necessary. A proposition like "Democracy is the best form of government" is still somewhat broad and vague, but at least it fixes some limits to the subject. The student could perhaps not do justice to such a thesis in 500 words; but he might be able to treat it satisfactorily in 1500-2000 words. On the other hand, a proposition like "Representative democracy allows each citizen to exercise some voice in the conduct of his government" might very well be satisfactorily treated in 500 words.

Simple as the principle is, many students have difficulty in framing their thesis in a single declarative sentence. Part of their difficulty stems from the fact that they do not have a firm grasp on their ideas before they sit down to compose a thesis sentence. Thought and language interact upon each other.

Hugh Blair once said, "For we may rest assured that whenever we express ourselves ill, there is, besides the mismanagement of language, for the most part, some mistake in our manner of conceiving the subject. Embarrassed, obscure, and feeble sentences are generally, if not always, the result of embarrassed, obscure, and feeble thought."

It often takes considerable practice before the student acquires the ability to define his thesis sharply. He can foster the development of this ability if he will make a habit of formulating a thesis sentence for any formal prose he reads. Sometimes the author helps him by stating his thesis somewhere in the essay, and in that case his job is to detect that thematic sentence. In some cases, however, the central idea of an essay is nowhere explicitly stated, and he must be able to abstract the central idea from the whole essay. The ability to generalize in this way is often the last ability the student acquires in learning how to read. If he cannot abstract a thesis from what he reads, it is not likely that he will have much success in formulating his own thesis sentences.

He must acquire this ability if he hopes to be able to communicate clearly and coherently with others through the medium of written prose. Failure to sharply define one's subject is the chief cause of fuzzy, disunified discourse. Vague beginnings invite chaotic endings. The audience for a discourse, whether written or spoken, can achieve no firmer grasp of the thesis than the writer or speaker himself has. As a matter of fact, if we make allowance for what is inevitably lost in the process of transmission, the audience's grasp will always be *less* firm than the writer's or speaker's.

So we round back to what was said at the beginning of this chapter: the beginning of all good writing is a sharply defined subject. Just as it would be folly to set out by automobile from New York to Los Angeles without a sheaf of road maps in the glove compartment, so it would be futile to start inscribing words on a blank sheet of paper without having carefully plotted one's direction and destination. This is the first lesson about writing that the student must learn. Until he learns it, he will arrive nowhere.

The Three Modes of Persuasion

The thesis we formulate serves as an objective for the discourse we intend to compose. It specifies the idea that we would like to "put across" to others. In argumentative discourse, the thesis indicates the truth or proposal that we want our audience to accept or act upon. But how do we get others to accept our point of view? How do we get others, in Kenneth Burke's terms, "to identify" with us?

Aristotle said that we persuade others by three means: (1) by the appeal to their reason (*logos*); (2) by the appeal to their emotions (*pathos*); (3) by the appeal of our personality or character (*ēthos*). We may use one of these means exclusively or predominantly, or we may use all three. Which of these means we use will be partly determined by the nature of the thesis we are arguing, partly by current circumstances, partly (perhaps mainly) by the kind of audience we are addressing. All men develop some instincts for adapting means to fit the subject, occasion, and audience, but by experience and education some men so refine these instincts that their success in dealing with others can be attributed to an art rather than to a mere knack. And when persuasive activities approach the condition of art they can be said to fall within the province of rhetoric.

Before we discuss the *topics*, the system that the classical rhetoricians devised to help one find something to say on any given subject, we will consider the strategies of these three modes of appeal.

The Appeal to Reason

Rationality is man's essential characteristic. It is what makes man human and differentiates him from other animals. Ideally, reason should dominate all of man's thinking and actions, but actually, man is often influenced by passions and prejudices and customs. To say that man often responds to irrational motives is not to say that he never listens to the voice of reason. We must have faith not only that man is capable of ordering his life by the dictates of reason but that most of the time he is disposed to do so. Because the rhetoricians had that faith in their fellow men, they thought of rhetoric as an offshoot of logic, the science of human reasoning. "Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectics," Aristotle said in the first sentence of his *Rhetoric*. Aristotle had dealt with strict logic in the six treatises that collectively have been called the *Organon*, and in two of these treatises, the *Prior Analytics* and the *Posterior Analytics*, he had dealt primarily with deductive and inductive reasoning. Dialectics was the popular form of "analytics" or logic, in the same way that rhetoric was the popular form of the strict demonstration that took place in the sciences. Plato's *Dialogues*, with their give-and-take of question and answer, are good examples of the informal way in which men argue logically with one another. Similarly, rhetoric is the practical art by which we learn how to manipulate all the available means of persuading a large, heterogeneous, perhaps uneducated audience. The appeals to reason that an orator might use do not violate the principles of strict logic; they are merely adaptations of logic. So, whereas the syllogism and induction are the forms

that reasoning takes in logic, the enthymeme and the example are the forms that reasoning takes in rhetoric.

Whenever formal deductive or inductive logic is "an available means of persuasion," we should, of course, make use of it. In literary and scientific journals, we often find the authors of articles presenting masses of evidence or employing full-fledged deductive reasoning in order to convince their professional colleagues of the soundness of their experiments or theses. Even in popularized articles on abstruse subjects, where we do not expect to get the full panoply of logical demonstrations, those authors who are jealous of their professional reputations will take care not to violate the principles of logical reasoning.

As a foundation for the discussion of the rhetorical appeals to reason, we will review some of the principles of logic. First, let us consider the matter of definition.

PRINCIPLES OF DEFINITION

Exposition and argumentation often turn on definition. Exposition, in fact, is a form of definition. In order to *explain* something, we have to tell what a thing is or describe it or enumerate its parts or demonstrate its operation. A dictionary is an expository work—a work that defines, not things, but words which stand for things. All "how to" books are primarily expository, because, by showing how something works or operates, these books are in a sense explaining or defining that thing. Discourses that analyze or classify things are also instances of expository definition.

In the *Topica*, one of his treatises on logic, Aristotle lays down the principles governing what is commonly referred to as an "essential definition." An essential definition is one that designates that which makes a thing what it is and distinguishes that thing from all other things; in other words, it is one that spells out a thing's fundamental nature. For instance, the widely accepted essential definition of *man* is as follows: "A man is a rational animal." The predicate term "rational animal" designates a man's essence and cannot be used of any other creature.

One of the tests by which we can determine whether we have arrived at an essential definition is to see whether we can *convert* the proposition—that is, interchange the subject and predicate terms without destroying the truth of the proposition. The proposition "A man is a rational animal" can be converted to "A rational animal is a man." The proposition is as true in its second form as it is in its first. Let us apply the test to another definition of man, "Man is a biped animal." When we convert the proposition to "A biped animal is a man," we can readily see that the "truth" has been upset, because while it is true that every man is a biped animal, it is not true that

every biped animal is a man. "Two-footedness" is a characteristic of man, but it does not designate the essence of man. "Rationality" does designate man's essence, not only because it is characteristic of man, but because it "belongs" exclusively to man.

In an essential definition, the subject and predicate are equivalent terms. In a loose sense, an essential definition sets up an equation: *man* equals *rational animal*; *rational animal* equals *man*. To use another analogy, the subject term in an essential definition must "weigh" as much as the predicate term. We must be able to interchange the weights on the scale and still keep the scale in balance. That's the trouble with the terms *man* and *biped animal*—they do not "weigh" the same.

It was Aristotle, with his biologist's passion for classification, who showed us how to formulate an essential definition. We put the "thing to be defined" (the *definiendum*) into a *genus* or general class and then give the *differentiae* or the specific differences that distinguish this thing from every other thing comprehended in the same general class. In the essential definition that we used, "animal" is the *genus*, and "rational" is the *differentia* that distinguishes man from every other creature that can be classified as an animal.

The student must not get the idea that the *differentia* will always be given in a single word, as in our definition of man. Sometimes we have to designate several differences in order to distinguish the thing from other things in the same class. Consider this definition for instance: "An automobile is a vehicle that runs on four wheels." We have the *genus* (vehicle) and a *differentia* (runs on four wheels), but obviously this *differentia* is not sufficient to distinguish an automobile from other vehicles that run on four wheels. The etymology of the word suggests another *differentia* that would help to distinguish an automobile—*auto*, "self-," and *mobilis*, "movable." So we would add that this four-wheeled vehicle is propelled by an internal engine. If this were not sufficient to distinguish an automobile we could add *differentiae* which specify the kind of engine that propelled it, the material the vehicle is made of, its shape, and what it is used for.

The *differentiae* in a definition often specify one or more of the four causes of a thing: the *material*, the *formal*, the *efficient*, and the *final*. For instance, if one were explaining a table, one might say that a table is a piece of furniture (the *genus*) made by a carpenter (efficient cause) from wood (material cause) with a broad, flat top resting horizontally on four legs (formal cause) on which one puts things, often dishes for a meal (final cause, the end or purpose of the thing). It goes without saying that the *differentiae* will change as we attempt to define various kinds of tables. Some tables are made of metal or stone by metalworkers or stonemasons; some tables rest on three legs, others on six; people use tables for a variety of purposes, e.g. to sit or stand at while they are writing or drawing or cutting cloth.

The student will find it instructive to open his dictionary at random and look at the definitions of nouns on the page to which he opens. He will find that most definitions of nouns follow the Aristotelian pattern: the substantive is assigned to a general class and then differentiated in one or more ways. He will also find that a dictionary does not often attain or even strive for an essential definition. For practical purposes, we do not often need the precision or exclusiveness of an essential definition. And besides, it is extremely difficult to arrive at, or to know when we have arrived at, an essential definition. Most of us would find it frustrating to specify the essence of a typewriter (even though we would be able to pick out a typewriter from a group of other artifacts), and unless we have desperate need of an essential definition, we do not take the trouble to seek one. We will settle for a serviceable definition of a typewriter. On the other hand, philosophers have sought an essential definition of *man* because it has seemed important to determine just what a man's essence is.

Definitions of anything will vary, of course, according to the definer's point of view and his particular basis of classification. In fact, one of the ways to distinguish the various branches of knowledge is to note the methods and bases of definition used by each science. A biologist, for instance, might define a man as "an erect, bipedal, giant mammal relatively unspecialized in body form." Or if he were attempting an operative definition, he might define man as "the only creature capable of modifying his evolutionary future." A behavioral scientist might define man as a "social animal" or a "tool-making creature" or "a creature that prepares its food with fire." A theologian might define man as "an adopted son of God." Each of these definitions is true in its own way, and each of them tells us something useful to know about man. For some purposes, we will find the biologist's definition of man more useful than the logician's definition. (In Vercors's fascinating novel *You Shall Know Them*, a murder trial turns on whether the strange creatures that a scientist has discovered in the jungle and brought back to civilization can be classified as human. In our space age, we may be faced with a similar problem if we find some form of primate life on other planets.) A rhetorician is especially interested in the fact that words admit of a variety of valid definitions.

OTHER METHODS OF DEFINITION

Synonyms

There are other ways to define words besides the Aristotelian method of giving the genus and the specific differences. One of the common ways is to cite synonyms. We often resort to this method in the case of adjectives, nouns,

and verbs. So if we want to convey the meaning of *inflexible*, we might cite such synonyms as *adamant*, *implacable*, *obdurate*, *stiff*, *unbending*; to clarify the meaning of *infer* we might offer such synonyms as *deduce*, *conclude*, *judge*, *gather*. Aristotle questioned this method of definition; he maintained that a real definition could be rendered only in a phrase. And he was probably right, for although a synonym can illuminate the meaning of a strange word, it does not really inform us about the mode of being of that word. Still and all, synonyms do play a useful part in clarifying the words used to convey ideas or feelings.

Etymology

Closely allied to definition by synonyms is definition by reference to etymology. One might explain the meaning of *inflexible* by pointing out that the word derives from the Latin prefix *in-*, meaning in this case “not,” the Latin verb *flectere*, meaning “to bend,” and the suffix *-ible*, meaning “able to be”—hence “not able to be bent.” A study of etymology can throw light on the meaning of words, can suggest subtle shades of meaning, and can serve as a mnemonic device—especially for those who have some knowledge of the parent languages. But there is one caution about relying on etymology for the meaning of words: the meanings frequently drift far from the etymological roots. The English word *police*, to take only one example, has strayed considerably from its root in the Greek word *polites*, meaning “citizen.” Citing the etymology of *democracy* might stir up more arguments than it would settle.

Description

Another method of definition, frequently used to convey a notion of a complex organization or mechanism, is the extended description. These descriptions often mention the *genus* and several of the *properties* and *accidents* of the thing to be defined, but the definition is presented in discursive prose rather than in the tight, unitary phrases that a dictionary uses. Comparisons, analogies, metaphors, and similes are frequently employed to facilitate definitions by description.

Example

A method especially useful in defining abstractions is giving an example. The dubious syntax, “Honesty is when . . .” is usually a signal that we are about to get a definition by this method. A definition by example might run something like this:

You ask me what *honesty* is. Well, I’ll tell you. One night about 10:30 while a rather elderly man was walking to the subway after work, he

spied a black purse lying in the gutter. Some woman must have dropped it as she was getting into a cab. He looked about him. There was no one else on the street at the moment. He picked up the purse and opened it. Inside the purse was a bundle of ten-dollar bills bound with a rubber-band. Riffling through the bills, he estimated that there was 150 to 200 dollars in the bundle. The only identification in the purse was an envelope bearing the name and address of a lawyer. What should he do? Nobody had seen him pick up the purse. The woman who had dropped the purse obviously didn't need the money as desperately as he did. The money could solve a lot of his financial problems at home. He was tempted. But he knew he wouldn't sleep at night if he took the purse home. He snapped the purse shut and walked two blocks out of his way to turn the purse in at the police station. You ask me what honesty is. *That* is honesty.

Defining by example has long been a favorite device of preachers, orators, and teachers. The *exemplum*, an anecdote or short tale with a moral, once played a prominent part in literature. Aesop's *Fables* and Chaucer's *Pardoner's Tale* are just two instances of this genre.

In conclusion, here are three rules which should govern our attempts to define terms:

1. The defining terms should be clearer and more familiar than the term to be defined.

This principle is so self-evident that it hardly needs to be enunciated, yet it does need some qualification. Dr. Johnson's notorious definition of a *network* as a "reticulated fabric, decussated at regular intervals, with interstices at the intersections" is not very enlightening to someone who has no notion of a network—although this much-ridiculed definition is remarkably accurate and precise. By using more familiar words, modern dictionaries succeed in conveying a clearer notion of a network. The real difficulty in observing the first rule presents itself when one has to define a relatively simple, everyday object. How does one define an *egg*? Will not the defining terms necessarily be "harder" words than the term to be defined?

2. The definition should not repeat the term to be defined or use synonymous or derivative terms.

As we said above, synonyms do not really define; they are merely similar, perhaps more familiar words, which may illuminate the meaning of an unknown word. Nor can the repetition of the same word or of an inflectionally derivative word do much to clarify the meaning of the *definiendum*. So we should avoid definitions like these: "Justice is a virtue which prompts

a man to deal justly with another man"; "Man is a creature possessing a human nature"; or definitions like Bardolph's in *King Henry IV*, Part Two, Act III, scene ii: "Accommodated: that is, when a man is, as they say, accommodated; or when a man is, being, whereby 'a may be thought to be accommodated—which is an excellent thing."

3. The definition, wherever possible, should be stated positively, not negatively.

The phrase "wherever possible" has to be inserted here because sometimes a concept is so obscure or ambiguous that it is difficult to define it positively; in such cases we realize some gain if we are told at least what the concept is *not*. Of course, concepts that are themselves negative in meaning can hardly be defined positively. So a concept like *darkness* has to be defined negatively as "the absence of light." There can be a rhetorical advantage also in the use of negative definitions—for instance, a series of statements telling what a thing is *not* before one comes forth with the statement of what a thing is. The kind of definition that the third rule cautions against is one like this: "Democracy is that form of government which does not deprive its citizens of their civil liberties." If this is the *only* definition of democracy offered, no one is going to have much of an idea about what democracy *is*.

THE SYLLOGISM

The syllogism was a schematic device that Aristotle invented to analyze and test deductive reasoning. People in real life rarely argue in a strict syllogistic form, but the syllogism is a useful device for analyzing the method or form that people observe when they reason deductively. We cannot give a full course in logic here, but we can set down some of the basic principles governing this form of deductive reasoning.

The syllogism reasons from statements or propositions. These propositions are called *premises*. The reasoning follows this course: if *a* is true, and *b* is true, then *c* must be true. Before we consider the syllogism itself, we should say something about the kinds of propositions that appear in categorical syllogisms. Let us start out with the *square of opposition*, a device that logicians invented mainly for mnemonic purposes (see figure on page 46).

The square of opposition presents schematically the four kinds of *categorical propositions*—that is, propositions that either assert or deny something, without conditions or alternatives proposed.

The A-proposition (All men are mortal beings) is a *universal affirmative*.

The E-proposition (No men are mortal beings) is a *universal negative*.


The I-proposition (Some men are mortal beings) is a *particular affirmative*.

The O-proposition (Some men are not mortal beings) is a *particular negative*.

The letters attached to these propositions happen to be the first four vowels in the English alphabet, but these letters were chosen to label the propositions because they are the first two vowels in two pertinent Latin verbs:

AFFIRMO (I affirm)—so the A and I are attached to the affirmative propositions.

NEGO (I deny)—so the E and O are attached to the negative propositions.



In argument, it is frequently necessary that one be able to classify propositions as to their *quantity* and *quality*. When we ask about the quantity of a proposition, we are seeking to determine whether the proposition is *universal* or *particular*—that is, whether a statement is being made about a whole class or about only part of a class. When we ask about the quality of a proposition, we are seeking to determine whether the proposition is *affirmative* or *negative*—that is, whether the predicate asserts something about the subject or denies something about the subject. Notice that the two propositions above the horizontal line drawn through the square of opposition are *universal* propositions; the two below the line are *particular* propositions. The two propositions to the left of the vertical line are *affirmative* propositions; the two propositions to the right of the vertical line are *negative* propositions.

Each language has its own lexical and grammatical devices for indicating the quantity and quality of propositions. In English, universal propositions are signalled by such words as *every*, *all*, *no* before the subject term of the propositions. Particular propositions are signalled by such words as *some*, *most*, *many*, *a few*, *the majority of*. The presence of the adverb *not* in the predicate indicates that a proposition is negative. But propositions can also be rendered negative in English by the presence of *no*, *none*, *none of the*, *not all*, *not any of the* in the subject.

In classifying propositions, one never has any difficulty determining whether a proposition is affirmative or negative. One does have difficulty at times, however, determining the quantity of a proposition. What is the quantity, for instance, of a proposition with a proper name as the subject, e.g. "John Smith is mortal"? It seems that since we are asserting something about a particular person, the proposition must be particular. Most logicians, however, would classify this as a universal affirmative, because mortality is being predicated of the entire subject in the same way as in the proposition, "All men are mortal," mortality is being predicated of the whole class of men. By the same reasoning, "John Smith is not mortal" would be classified as a universal negative.

How does one classify the quantity of a proposition like "Men are more stable emotionally than women"? If one is arguing face to face with someone, he can stop his opponent and ask him to clarify the quantity of his statements:

"Look, you just said that men are more stable emotionally than women. Do you mean *all* men or just *some* men?"

"I mean *some* men . . . no, I'll go so far as to say the *majority* of men."

"All right, go on—but remember now what limits you have placed on the extension of your term."

Whenever we are engaged in discussions or arguments with someone present before us, we frequently stop him to ask for clarifications of statements. But when we see a categorical statement in print we cannot call upon the author for clarification. The common practice in such circumstances is to assume, especially if the assertion has the air of a general statement—e.g. "Quakers are zealous, sincere pacifists" or "Birds are feathered creatures"—that the author meant the statement to be taken as a universal. In reconstructing his argument for the purpose of analysis, we would put an "all" in front of the subject term.

How does one classify a proposition like "All men are not mortal"? It is clearly a negative proposition, but despite the "All" in front of the subject term, this proposition does not have the same meaning as the E-proposition,

"No men are mortal." "All men are not mortal" is the contradictory form of "All men are mortal." In the square of opposition, contradictory propositions are opposed diagonally. So "All men are not mortal" is really an O-proposition, equivalent in meaning to "Some men are not mortal." The same would be true if the statement took the form of "Not all men are mortal." The final test must always be the *meaning*, not the *form*, of the statement.

It is customary and useful to put categorical statements in the following form:

	(Quantity word)	(substantive)	(copulative verb)	(substantive)
Example:	All	men	are	mortal beings

Oftentimes, statements put in this form will be awkward and unidiomatic. "All men are mortal" is certainly more idiomatic than "All men are mortal beings." Frequently, too, assertions are made with transitive or intransitive verbs—e.g. "Men run faster than women" and "Most men can hit a golf ball farther than most women can." Putting such categorical statements into the prescribed form frequently results in some very awkward locutions:

"Men run faster than women." > "All men are faster runners than women." "Most men can hit a golf ball farther than most women can." > "Some men are athletes capable of hitting a golf ball farther than most women can."

The reason for putting statements into the prescribed form is that when these statements occur in syllogisms it is easier for the beginner to pick out terms. As we shall see, some of the rules for a valid syllogism involve the distribution of terms. So it is important that we be able to ascertain the terms. Substantives with their cluster of modifiers are easier to pick out than terms hidden in predicate adjectives or action verbs. After the student has had practice analyzing arguments, he can dispense with this conversion process and deal with statements in their natural form.

One can learn a great deal about the process of deductive reasoning from studying the relationships of propositions in the square of opposition. Here are the valid deductions we can make from the various propositions:

1. If the A-proposition is true, the I-proposition must be true; likewise, if the E-proposition is true, the O-proposition must be true.

If it is true that *all* men are mortal, it logically follows that *some* men are mortal. And if it is true that *no* men are mortal, it is equally true that *some* men are not mortal.

2. If the I-proposition is true, no deduction can be made about the A-proposition; likewise, if the O-proposition is true, no deduction can be made about the E-proposition.

If we determine that *some* men are mortal, we cannot infer from that fact that *all* men are mortal. In other words, we cannot *infer* the truth of the universal proposition from the particular proposition; we have to *prove* the truth of the universal.

3. If the A-proposition is true, the E-proposition is false; likewise, if the E-proposition is true, the A-proposition is false.

We know *a priori* that if one of a pair of *contrary* propositions is true, the other is necessarily false. Common sense tells us that if *all* men are mortal, the contrary proposition "No men are mortal" must be false.

4. If the A-proposition is false, no deduction can be made about the E-proposition; likewise, if the E-proposition is false, no deduction can be made about the A-proposition.

Although, as we saw in (3), contrary propositions cannot both be true, they both may be false. So if the proposition "No men are mortal" is false, we may not conclude that all men are mortal. That proposition may also be false.

5. In the case of contradictory propositions (A and O; E and I), one of them must be true and the other false. Accordingly, these are the valid deductions we may make about the propositions opposed diagonally in the square of opposition:
 - a. If A is true, O must be false.
 - b. If A is false, O must be true.
 - c. If O is true, A must be false.
 - d. If O is false, A must be true.
 - e. If E is true, I must be false.
 - f. If E is false, I must be true.
 - g. If I is true, E must be false.
 - h. If I is false, E must be true.

The law of contradiction is based on the principle that a thing cannot at the same time be and not be. This law plays an important part as one of the means of logical proof in persuasive discourse.

6. If the I-proposition is true, no deduction can be made about the O-proposition; likewise, if the O-proposition is true, no deduction can be made about the I-proposition.

If the I-proposition is false, the O-proposition is true; likewise, if the O-proposition is false, the I-proposition is true.

In the case of subcontraries (the propositions opposed horizontally at the bottom of the square of opposition), both of them can be true, but both of them cannot be false (compare this with the relationship between contrary propositions). It is easier to see that both the subcontraries could be true if we take the propositions "Some men are Republicans" and "Some men are not Republicans." But we cannot deduce the truth of one from the truth of the other. We can, however, infer the truth of one from the falsity of the other.

We are now ready to look at a syllogism. The following syllogism has become Exhibit A in almost every elementary book of logic:

All men are mortal beings.

Socrates is a man.

Therefore, Socrates is a mortal being.

This syllogism sets forth the full chain of reasoning that is implicit in a statement like this: "Socrates is bound to die too, because he is, like the rest of us, a human being." The syllogism is made up of three categorical propositions, the first two of them being called *premises*, the last one being the *conclusion* drawn from these premises. The categorical syllogism is built on three terms: a major term, a minor term, and a middle term. Here are the simple criteria for picking out these terms:

The *major term* is the predicate term of the conclusion ("mortal beings").

The *minor term* is the subject term of the conclusion ("Socrates").

The *middle term* is the term that appears in both of the premises but does not appear in the conclusion ("men" and its singular form "man").

The syllogism is made up of three propositions: a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. The major premise is the proposition that contains the major term ("All men are mortal beings"). The minor premise is the proposition that contains the minor term ("Socrates is a man"). In constructing a syllogism, we usually put the major premise first—although it should be understood that in actual deductive reasoning the major premise

could occur in any order and, in fact, need not be expressed at all (see the later discussion of the enthymeme).

It is not so easy to define the conclusion. We could say that the conclusion is the proposition deduced from the two premises or that the conclusion is the proposition that contains both the major term and the minor term but not the middle term. But such definitions involve us in a circular argument. We cannot determine the major and minor premises unless we know the major term and the minor term, and we cannot determine the major and minor terms unless we know which proposition is the conclusion. If we were to remove the word *Therefore* from the third proposition in our model syllogism and if we were then to scramble the order of the propositions, it would be impossible to tell which of the propositions was the conclusion. Any one of the propositions could serve as the conclusion, although only one combination—the combination in our model—would produce a valid syllogism.

The main point of this is that we cannot reconstruct a syllogism from deductive reasoning as we are likely to find it in argumentative discourse unless we can pick out the conclusion. In the enthymeme, "Socrates is bound to die too, because he is, like the rest of us, a human being," the first clause is clearly the conclusion; *because* signals one of the reasons or premises for the conclusion. In argumentative discourse, conclusions are often signalled by the use of such function words as *therefore, thus, hence, consequently, so*. The context of an argument will also serve as a guide to the conclusion.

So much for the form of the syllogism. Before we set down the rules for a valid syllogism, we need to establish two important points. The first is the distinction between *truth* and *validity*. Truth has to do with the *matter* of the syllogism; validity has to do with the *form* of the syllogism. When we inquire about the truth of a syllogism, we are asking whether a proposition is true or false. "All men are mortal beings." Is that a true statement? Do you agree? When we inquire about the validity of a syllogism, we are not at all concerned about whether the propositions are true; we are concerned only with whether the inferences are justifiable, whether we can logically draw this conclusion from those premises. All the rules for the syllogism concern the form, the validity, of the syllogism.

It is extremely important that the student keep this distinction in mind. If he withholds his assent to a conclusion, he must know whether he is objecting to the truth of the premise or the validity of the reasoning. If he detects an invalid argument, he can utterly destroy his opponent's argument in a matter of minutes. If he objects to the truth of a proposition, he has a harder task on his hands, for it may take a long time to demonstrate that his opponent's statement is false. We must be satisfied about *both* the truth of the premises and the validity of the reasoning before we will give our

assent to a conclusion. But the peculiar force of a syllogistic argument resides in this: *if* we assent to the truth of the premises and *if* we agree that the reasoning is valid, we *must* grant the conclusion. Under these conditions, rational people cannot resist the conclusion.


The second point we need to establish is the meaning of the term *distribution*. In logic, distribution signifies the full extension of a term to cover all the objects or individuals in the class denoted. In the phrase "all men," the term *men* is said to be distributed because the *all* designates the total number of individuals in the class of *men*. In the phrase "some men," *men* is undistributed because the *some* designates something less than the total number of individuals in the class. Sometimes we speak of a distributed term as being a *universal term* and of an undistributed term as being a *particular term*.

In the syllogism, we usually have no difficulty determining whether the subject term of propositions is distributed, because the quantity words (*all, every, no, some, most*), if present, will tell us. Since, as we have pointed out, most logicians regard a proposition that has a proper name as the subject as being a universal proposition ("Socrates is a rational animal"), the proper name may be regarded as a distributed term (the predicate applies to the *entire* subject).

It is a little more difficult to determine—or at least to recognize—whether predicate terms are distributed. For the beginning student, it is just as well that he use this simple formula:


1. The predicate terms of all *affirmative* propositions (all A- or I-propositions) are *undistributed*.
2. The predicate terms of all *negative* propositions (all E- or O-propositions) are *distributed*.

Let us see why this is so. When we assert "All men are mortal beings," it is clear that "mortal beings" is predicated of every member of the class of men. At the same time, however, we are not saying, "All men are all the mortal beings that are." Perhaps this can be clarified with a system of circles. Let one circle represent the entire class of men and another circle represent the entire class of mortal beings. Now here is a picture of the proposition "All men are mortal beings":



The proposition asserts that the entire class of men is “in” the class of mortal beings, but as the circles make clear, the class of men does not have as wide an extension, does not cover as much area, as the class of mortal beings. There are other mortal beings (birds, animals, fish) that are not men. We have then made an assertion about the entire class of men but not about the entire class of mortal beings. So the term *men* is distributed, but the term *mortal beings* is undistributed.

Now here is a picture of the proposition “No men are mortal beings”:




We have asserted that *none* of the class of men is “in” the class of mortal beings: or, to put it another way, the entire class of men is excluded from the entire class of mortal beings. Both terms are being used in the widest possible extension, and therefore both the subject term and the predicate term of an E-proposition are distributed.

The scheme of circles can also illustrate the distribution of the predicate terms in I- and O-propositions:


I-proposition:

Some men are mortal beings.



O-proposition:

Some men are not mortal beings.



In the I-proposition, part of the *men* circle (the checkmarked area) overlaps part of the *mortal being* circle, and so it is clear that neither the subject term nor the predicate term is distributed—in neither case is the entire class involved. In the O-proposition, part of the *men* circle (the checkmarked area) falls outside the *mortal being* circle; consequently, the subject term *men* is undistributed (a predication is made about something less than the whole class of men), but the predicate term *mortal beings* is distributed (the “some men,” represented by the checkmark, is wholly outside the entire class of mortal beings).

The distribution of predicate terms is not an easy concept to grasp. If the

circle diagrams have not clarified this concept, it would be well for the student to rely, until the light strikes him, on the simple formulas that the *predicate terms of all affirmative propositions are undistributed* and that the *predicate terms of all negative propositions are distributed*. This matter of distribution is important, because two of the rules for a valid syllogism involve distribution of terms and because many of the fallacies in deductive reasoning are the result of an inference being drawn from undistributed terms.

We are ready now to look at the rules for a valid syllogism. Remember that these rules concern the form or the logic of the argument, not the truth of the propositions:

1. There must be three terms and only three terms.
2. The middle term must be distributed at least once.
3. No term may be distributed in the conclusion if it was not distributed in the premise.

Most invalid syllogisms will be detected by the application of these three rules. Occasionally, however, a syllogism will pass the test of these three rules and yet will not be a valid syllogism. So we must add three more rules:

4. No conclusion may be drawn from two *particular* (as opposed to *universal*) premises.
5. No conclusion may be drawn from two negative premises.
6. If one of the premises is negative, the conclusion must be negative.

Let us apply these six rules to our model syllogism and see whether the reasoning is valid. Here is the syllogism again:

All men are mortal beings.

Socrates is a man.

Therefore, Socrates is a mortal being.

The first rule is that there must be *three terms and only three terms*. In the elementary stages of testing syllogisms, the student must actually count the terms. Once he has counted three terms, he may not stop there; he must go on to make sure that there are *only* three terms. In the first proposition, there are two terms, *men* and *mortal beings*. In the next proposition, there are two terms, *Socrates* and *man*. Since *Socrates* is a term clearly distinct from the *men* and *mortal beings* of the first proposition, we have now determined that there are three terms in this syllogism. But we must now go on to check that the syllogism has no more than three terms. What about *man* in the second proposition? Is it not a fourth term? Is it not different from *men* in the first proposition? *Men* does differ grammatically from *man*,

being the plural form of the singular noun, but lexically the two terms do not differ, since they both have the same referent. Terms are the “same”—are *univocal*, to use the logician’s term—if the referent of the terms is identical. If, for instance, we substituted *He* for *Socrates* in the conclusion, we would not be introducing a fourth term into the syllogism because the referent or antecedent of *He* is, presumably, *Socrates*. (We would, of course, be introducing another term if the antecedent of the pronoun were not *Socrates*.) Sometimes in arguing with someone we call for a clarification of the ambiguity of pronoun reference. “Who is *they*?” we ask our opponent, just to make sure that he hasn’t shifted referents. Likewise we can use synonyms or periphrasis without introducing a new term. If in the conclusion we were to substitute “a man who will die” for *mortal being*, we would not be introducing another term. In such cases, of course, we must be satisfied that the synonym or periphrasis means the same as the term for which it is substituting.

What we must be especially on our guard against is the use of the same term with different meanings. To do this is to be guilty of what the logician’s call *equivocation*. Let us look first at an obvious example of equivocation:

All men have hearts.
All celery plants have hearts.

No native speaker of English would be deceived by the shift of meaning in the two uses of the word *hearts*. The second *hearts* is clearly a new term. It is subtle shifts of denotation that can trap us. We must be alert enough to catch a subtle shift like this:

All draftsmen are designing men.
All politicians are designing men.

The point might be made here that from the logician’s point of view shifts in denotation will result in fallacious reasoning, but that from the rhetorician’s point of view shifts in denotation can be used for certain stylistic effects, in which case the audience is aware of both meanings. The pun, the figure of speech that rhetoricians called *paronomasia*, is an example of this kind of shift in denotation. One of the famous examples of paronomasia was Christ’s promise to the chief of his apostles: “Thou art Peter [Greek, *petra*, rock], and upon this rock I will build my church.” Rhetorical effects are also achieved by shifts in the connotation of words. We shall discuss this further in the chapter on style.

Let us go back now to counting the terms in our model syllogism. We had gone through the two premises and discovered that we had three distinct terms and decided that *man* in the second premise was not a fourth term. In the conclusion, *Socrates* is a repetition of a term in the minor premise,

and *mortal being* is a repetition, in singular form, of a term in the major premise. So our model syllogism passes the first test: it has three terms and only three terms.

Now to test the syllogism by the second rule: *the middle term must be distributed at least once*. The middle term, we said, was the term that occurred in both premises but not in the conclusion. Our middle term here is *men (man)*. We must determine whether it is distributed, whether it is used, at least once, to include the whole class. "All men are mortal beings" is our major premise. The middle term *men* is distributed. We can tell that it is distributed by noting the *All*. Is the middle term distributed in the minor premise, "Socrates is a man"? No, it is not; here it is the predicate term of an affirmative proposition, which, as we have said, is never distributed. But since our middle term is distributed *once*, our syllogism passes the test of the second rule. Later on, we shall see examples of the fallacy of the undistributed middle—one of the commonest fallacies in deductive reasoning.

According to the third rule for a valid syllogism, *no term may be distributed in the conclusion if it was not distributed in the premises*. The conclusion of our model syllogism is "Therefore, Socrates is a mortal being." If, as we observed, propositions with a proper noun as subject must be regarded as universal propositions, *Socrates* is a distributed term. So we must check to see whether this term was distributed in the premise. *Socrates*, we find, is the subject term of the same kind of proposition in the minor premise and is therefore a distributed term. *Socrates* is distributed in the conclusion, but *Socrates* is also distributed in the premise; hence our third rule is satisfied. The predicate term (*mortal being*) of the conclusion is undistributed (remember, the predicate term of affirmative propositions is undistributed). If we find any term in the conclusion to be undistributed, we can stop right there; we do not have to check to see whether the term is distributed in the premise.

Our model syllogism has passed the test of the first three rules, and generally this indicates that the reasoning is valid. But, just to be sure, we have to apply the fourth, fifth, and sixth rules. We can do that hurriedly. The fourth rule is that *no conclusion may be drawn from two particular premises*. Both of the premises in our model syllogism are universals. The fifth and sixth rules do not apply at all because neither of the premises is negative.

So the reasoning in our model syllogism is unshakably valid. We are satisfied about the *form* of the argument. Now before we assent to the conclusion, we must be satisfied about the *matter* of the argument—that is, about the truth of the premises. Is it true that all men are mortal, that all men are destined to die? Do we agree that Socrates is a man, that Socrates is a species of the genus *man*? If we answer "yes" to both of those questions, we must grant the conclusion.

If, on the other hand, we deny the truth of either premise, we will have to settle down to demonstrating that the premise is false or to listening to our opponent's arguments that the premise is true. Arguments about the truth of premises can go on for a long time and even then not be settled. Usually, arguments that go on and on are arguments about the truth or falsity of propositions. Even those arguments that are stalemated by the lack of agreement about the definition of terms are arguments about the matter and not about the form of the argument. Whenever it can be shown that the mode of arguing is illogical, the dispute can be settled very quickly. The rules for a valid syllogism were derived inductively from a study of the way in which the human mind reasons, and no one has successfully challenged the validity of these rules. Even one who has no formal training in logic and its technical terminology can be shown very quickly, in layman's terms, that his reasoning is invalid, if it is.

Once the student has been instructed about the form, the terminology, and the rules for the syllogism, it is simply a matter of practice with sample syllogisms before he acquires a proficiency in detecting fallacies in deductive reasoning. A number of syllogisms have been provided in the exercises immediately following this section. In the beginning stages, the student may have to apply the rules, one by one, in a mechanical fashion. After he has had some practice in dealing with syllogisms, he will be able to tell at a glance whether the syllogism is valid or not. For instance, any time he finds a syllogism taking this form, he will detect the Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle:

All A is B.
 All C is B.
 ∴ All C is A.

Whenever the middle term (B) is the predicate term of two affirmative premises, the middle term will be undistributed, and consequently no conclusion can logically follow from those premises.

Since the arguments based on the topic of antecedent and consequent often take the form of a hypothetical or conditional proposition, we should consider the principles that govern validity of reasoning in the hypothetical syllogism. When we argue in the form of a hypothetical proposition, we are proposing that the truth of the antecedent (the *if* clause) implies the truth of the consequent (the main clause). So we say, "If he has leukemia, he will die." The truth of the consequent, however, does not necessarily imply the truth of the antecedent: "If he dies, he has leukemia" is not necessarily true.

If we construct a deductive argument from the hypothetical proposition, we can detect, from another angle, that the truth of the antecedent does not

follow from the truth of the consequent. First let us look at a valid deductive argument:

1. If he has leukemia, he will die.
 He has leukemia.
 Therefore, he will die. (VALID)

Here the second premise affirms that the antecedent is true. If it is confirmed that a man has leukemia and if everyone afflicted with leukemia invariably dies, then it logically follows that this man will die.

Now let us see what happens to the validity of the argument when the second premise affirms the consequent:

2. If he has leukemia, he will die.
 He will die.
 Therefore, he has leukemia. (INVALID)

Confronted with this argument, most of us would be prompted to say, "Somehow I don't feel that the conclusion follows from the premise." Our feeling about the conclusion would be right. A logician labels this form of argument "the fallacy of affirming the consequent." Common sense tells us that from this sequence of propositions one may not validly infer that the man has leukemia from the affirmation that the man is going to die.

If the consequent is *denied*, a valid conclusion may be drawn. We can use the same sort of propositions to illustrate this form of argument:

3. If he has leukemia, he will die.
 He will not die.
 Therefore, he does not have leukemia. (VALID)

The validity of this conclusion may not be immediately apparent, but if we reflect a moment on what the premises say, we are forced to agree to the conclusion. If a man afflicted with leukemia inevitably dies and if a doctor affirms that this man is not in apparent danger of death, the one thing we can assert definitely is that this man does not now have leukemia.

Let us look at an example of "the fallacy of denying the antecedent":

4. If he has leukemia, he will die.
 He does not have leukemia.
 Therefore, he will not die. (INVALID)

Common sense tells us that even if both premises are true, the conclusion does not follow, because we recognize that a man could die from something other than leukemia.

Here is a simple table of criteria for testing the validity of hypothetical syllogisms:

If the minor premise (that is, the second premise)

- (1) affirms the antecedent—the conclusion is valid (see syllogism 1 above)
- (2) affirms the consequent—the conclusion is invalid (see syllogism 2)
- (3) denies the consequent—the conclusion is valid (see syllogism 3)
- (4) denies the antecedent—the conclusion is invalid (see syllogism 4)

Since arguments based on the topic of contradiction sometimes take the form of “either/or,” or disjunctive, propositions, we might take a look at some of the principles governing this kind of deductive reasoning.

The issue in an argument might take this form: “Either he committed the murder, or he did not commit the murder.” We recognize that these are the only two possibilities. Therefore, if one of the possibilities is disproved, the other one must be true. As anyone knows who has witnessed a fictional or real-life courtroom drama, it sometimes takes a protracted trial to prove or disprove one of the alternatives posed in our sample disjunctive proposition. But once we have proved one of the alternatives to be true, we automatically prove the other to be false.

In setting up the disjunctive proposition, however, we must take care to set up *mutually exclusive* alternatives. The proposition “He is either a student or a teacher” has the form of a disjunctive proposition, but the alternatives, the matter of the disjunctive statement, are not mutually exclusive. For he could be a teacher and a student in any one period. However, if we were to say, “Either he is a teacher, or he is not a teacher,” we have set up mutually exclusive alternatives, for being a teacher and not being a teacher are the only two possibilities in this instance.

EXERCISE

Test the following syllogisms for validity. Wherever necessary, convert the propositions into the form of substantive terms on both sides of a copulative verb. Where no quantity word is expressed, presume that *All* precedes the subject term if the proposition is affirmative or that *No* precedes the subject term if the proposition is negative—e.g. *Men are not happy* > *No men are happy people*. Since the student should not be at all concerned with the truth

of the propositions when he is testing a syllogism for validity, nonsense words or symbols will occasionally be used for the terms of the propositions.

1. No out-of-state students are taxpayers.
 Some freshmen are out-of-state students.
 $\therefore$ Some freshmen are taxpayers.
2. All Catholics are Protestants.
 All Protestants are Baptists.
 $\therefore$ All Catholics are Baptists.
3. All typhoons are destructive windstorms.
 All cyclones are destructive windstorms.
 $\therefore$ All cyclones are typhoons.
4. All college graduates are potential wage-earners.
 No high-school graduates are college graduates.
 $\therefore$ No high-school graduates are potential wage-earners.
5. No Russians are democratic.
 All Americans are democratic.
 $\therefore$ All Americans are Russians.
6. All those who contribute to the Community Chest are charitable.
 John Smith does not contribute to the Community Chest.
 $\therefore$ John Smith is not charitable.
7. All horse-race betting is gambling.
 Some gambling is illegal.
 $\therefore$ Some horse-race betting is illegal.
8. Some Marines have been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.
 No civilians have been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.
 $\therefore$ Some civilians are not Marines.
9. Those who get good grades study diligently.
 All students are anxious to get good grades.
 $\therefore$ All students study diligently.
10. All brilligs are slithy toves.
 No slithy toves are borogoves.
 $\therefore$ No borogoves are brilligs.
11. No planets are suns.
 No planets are satellites.
 $\therefore$ No satellites are suns.

12. All cosmonauts are highly trained men.
Some test pilots are not highly trained men.
 $\therefore$ Some cosmonauts are not test pilots.
13. All A is B.
Some B is C.
 $\therefore$ Some C is A.
14. Some A is B.
All B is C.
 $\therefore$ Some C is A.
15. Anything I possess is mine.
I possess your pen.
 $\therefore$ Your pen is mine.
16. All contracts are based upon an agreement between two parties.
The United Nations is based upon an agreement among several countries.
Therefore the United Nations can also be classified as a contract.
17. Because most Americans are industrious and all of them love freedom, most industrious people love freedom.
18. Since robins are two-legged creatures and since all birds are two-legged creatures, it follows that all robins are birds.
19. Since only radicals want to subvert the duly constituted government of a country, this man can't be a radical because he wants to preserve the government of the country.
20. Prabusks are certainly not panbuls. I know that because plocucks are panbuls and prabusks are plocucks.

THE ENTHYMEME

Our treatment of the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms was sketchy, but all the fundamentals were touched on. These fundamental principles should provide us with sufficient guidance for the construction or analysis of deductive reasoning according to the laws of formal logic. We have by no means exhausted all the facets and complexities of Aristotelian or scholastic logic, nor have we touched on symbolic logic, which has developed from the mathematical studies of men like Gottlob Frege, Alfred North

Whitehead, and Bertrand Russell and from studies in semantics by men like C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and Alfred Korzybski. But our primary concern is with rhetoric, and we can linger in the province of logic only long enough to gather some useful basic principles.

We turn now to a consideration of the enthymeme, which is the rhetorical equivalent of the syllogism. In modern times, the enthymeme has come to be regarded as an abbreviated syllogism—that is, an argumentative statement that contains a conclusion and one of the premises, the second premise being implied. A statement like this would be regarded as an enthymeme: “He must be a socialist because he favors a graduated income-tax.” Here the conclusion (He is a socialist) has been deduced from an expressed premise (he favors a graduated income-tax) and an implied premise (Anyone who favors a graduated income-tax is a socialist). Incidentally, the student who has developed some skill in analyzing the validity of syllogisms will detect here the fallacy of the undistributed middle term.

The modern notion of the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is probably implicit in Aristotle’s statement, “The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up normal syllogism” (*Rhetoric*, I, 2). But according to what Aristotle said in the *Prior Analytics* (Bk. II, Ch. 27), the essential difference is that the syllogism leads to a necessary conclusion from universally true premises but the enthymeme leads to a tentative conclusion from probable premises. In dealing with contingent human affairs, we cannot always discover or confirm what is the truth. Think of how difficult it often is to prove that the defendant is guilty of the crime with which he is charged; how much more difficult it is to prove the wisdom or advantage of a future course of action—for instance, that a proposed tax cut will contribute to the general prosperity of the country. But frequently, in the interests of getting on with the business of life, we have to make decisions on the basis of uncertainties or probabilities. The function of rhetoric is to persuade, where it cannot convince, an audience. And in matters where the truth cannot be readily ascertained, rhetoric can persuade an audience to adopt a point of view or a course of action on the basis of the merely probable—that is, on the basis of what usually happens or what people believe to be capable of happening.

We can illustrate the difference by looking at a syllogism and an enthymeme. Our model syllogism is a good example of the kind of deductive reasoning that can lead to an irresistible conclusion. The major premise of that syllogism—“All men are mortal”—states a universal truth. Both history and the evidence of our own senses tell us that all men must die. The minor premise—“Socrates is a man”—is a truth that can be unmistakably verified. From these two “truths” then we can arrive at the infallible conclusion that Socrates too will die.

But suppose someone argues this way: "John will fail his examination because he hasn't studied." Here we have an enthymeme, both in the sense of a truncated syllogism and in the sense of a deductive argument based on probable premises. The truth of the minor premise here—"John hasn't studied"—could be confirmed. The probable premise resides in the unexpressed proposition—"Anyone who doesn't study will fail his examination." We all know that the latter proposition is not universally true. But we also know that those who do not study usually fail their examinations. It is, in other words, probable that those who do not study will fail. For all practical purposes, that probability is enough to persuade us that next week we will see John's name on the Dean's list of failures.

Aristotle was shrewd enough to see that we base persuasive arguments not only on what usually or generally happens but also on what people believe to be true. For that reason, the man who seeks to persuade a select audience must apprise himself of the generally held opinions of that group. If it is known, for instance, that a certain group of people believe that the Fire God causes the rainfall, someone could use that received opinion to persuade his audience that it is their failure to propitiate the Fire God that is responsible for the protracted drought. Every civilization has a body of accepted opinions that influence the conduct of its affairs—a body of "truths" which have never really been demonstrated but in which the people have faith, almost to the point of accepting them as self-evident.

The enthymeme then—"a kind of syllogism," as Aristotle puts it—is the instrument of deductive reasoning peculiar to the art of rhetoric. It often suppresses some of the links in the chain of argument because the audience is impatient with, or incapable of attending to, the kind of closely reasoned, full-scale argument associated with formal logic. And the audience can be satisfied with probable conclusions because it recognizes the contingent nature of the things that rhetoric deals with.

Since the enthymeme partakes of the nature of the syllogism, its mode of inference is similar to that of the syllogism. One of the premises may be missing, but the missing premise is as readily supplied as the missing parts of an elliptical grammatical structure. When we are seeking to refute someone else's enthymeme, it may be the missing premise that we should attack, because the implied proposition may be the vulnerable spot in the other man's argument.

For instance, take the enthymeme, "He must be a Communist because he advocates civil rights for minority groups." We cannot really judge the validity of the conclusion ("He must be a Communist") until we look at the implied premise. We might *sense* that the conclusion is unwarranted, but until we exposed the implied proposition, we could not demonstrate that the conclusion was unwarranted. We cannot determine, in other words, whether

the conclusion follows logically until we study the conclusion in relation to the expressed premise *and* the implied premise.

What is the implied premise in this instance? In the discussion of the syllogism, we said that if we can determine which proposition in a deductive argument is the conclusion we can reconstruct the full syllogism. The minor term, we learned, is the subject of the conclusion; the major term is the predicate of the conclusion. Since "he" is the subject term of the conclusion, we know that the expressed premise (he advocates civil rights for minority groups) is the minor premise of the full syllogism. We also know that the major premise of the full syllogism will contain the predicate term of the conclusion ("a Communist"). But although we know that the implied premise will contain this term, we do not know for sure whether this major term is the subject term of the major premise or the predicate term of the major premise. The implied premise could take either of these forms:

All Communists are advocates of civil rights for minority groups.

All advocates of civil rights for minority groups are Communists.

It is important that we be able to determine which form the implied premise takes, because until we do so, we cannot determine whether and where the argument is vulnerable. If the person who advanced the enthymeme meant to imply that "all Communists advocate civil rights for minority groups," we would not have to spend our time discussing whether that proposition was true; we could very quickly point out that this argument is invalid because the middle term ("advocates of civil rights"), being the predicate term of two affirmative propositions, is undistributed. If our opponent did not understand what it meant to say that a term was "undistributed," we could point out to him that his argument had not established that only Communists advocate civil rights for minority groups. At bottom, this is the fallacy behind all assertions of guilt by association.

If, on the other hand, the implied premise is "All advocates of civil rights for minority groups are Communists," the reasoning will be valid, because now the middle term is distributed ("*All* advocates"). Hence we can impugn only the truth of the implied proposition. Is it true that anyone who advocates civil rights is a Communist? Whether we judged this proposition from the viewpoint of what is necessarily true (the province of strict logic) or from the viewpoint of what is probably true (the province of rhetoric), we would have to deny that this proposition is true. So although the argument in this case is valid, we would not grant the conclusion because the implied premise is patently false.

Aristotle said that the materials of enthymemes are *probabilities* and *signs*. We have already treated of the probable propositions, which constitute the premises of an enthymeme and which constitute, in Aristotle's eyes, the essen-

tial distinction between enthymemes and syllogisms. A sign is an indication or concomitant of something else; it may occur before or simultaneously with or after something else. Smoke, for instance, is a sign of fire; lightning is a sign that thunder is about to rumble; thunder is a sign that lightning has flashed. A sign is not a cause or reason for something else happening; it is merely an indication that something has happened, is happening, or will happen. Signs, like probabilities, can constitute the premises of an enthymeme.

Aristotle distinguished two kinds of signs that figure in an enthymeme—*infallible* and *fallible*. An infallible sign is that which invariably accompanies something else. It is said, for instance, that smoke invariably accompanies fire. Accordingly, whenever we see smoke or smell smoke we conclude that there is a fire someplace. And if it was really smoke we saw or smelled, there will of course *be* a fire someplace. Now, what makes a conclusion drawn from this kind of sign infallible is not only that smoke invariably accompanies fire but that smoke accompanies fire exclusively. If what we commonly know as smoke sometimes accompanied something else besides fire, we could not conclude infallibly that the presence of smoke was a sign of the presence of fire.

If a sign does not invariably and exclusively accompany something else, it is fallible—that is, any conclusion drawn from a sign of this kind will always be open to refutation. For instance, fast breathing is often a sign that a man has a fever. But because fast breathing does not always accompany a fever and because fast breathing sometimes attends other physical conditions, we cannot conclude infallibly that a man has a fever from the fact that he breathes rapidly. The condition of fast breathing would justify us in concluding that the man probably has a fever, but no more than that. The probability of his having a fever increases, of course, if the fast breathing is accompanied by other signs or symptoms of fever—high temperature, flushed cheeks.

Circumstantial evidence in a court trial is usually based on a series of fallible signs. The prosecuting lawyer reminds the jury of a number of suspicious circumstances: the accused was discovered with blood on his coat; his face was badly scratched; his shirt was torn; there was an ugly purplish bruise on his skin. “Are these not signs,” the prosecutor asks the jury, “of a fierce physical struggle?” The prosecutor hopes that the jury mentally answers “yes” to his rhetorical question. Circumstantial evidence can never prove absolutely that a man is guilty, and for this reason many states will not allow the death penalty to be imposed on a man convicted by this evidence alone. But circumstantial evidence, especially when it has acquired cumulative force from the citation of a large number of incriminating particulars, can have great persuasive power with a jury.

So the rhetorician will use infallible signs for his enthymemes whenever such signs are available to him. But he will also use fallible signs, because he knows that they can have persuasive force. He will remain aware, however, that arguments built upon fallible signs are always open to challenge. Fallible signs are like analogies: they never prove, but they can persuade.

Let us stress again two points about the use of the rhetorical enthymeme: (1) it is important to ascertain the implied premise of an enthymeme, because the implied premise or assumption may be the vulnerable spot in the argument; (2) the probable propositions and the fallible signs used in rhetorical enthymemes do not lead to necessarily and universally true conclusions, but they can be effectively persuasive.

How may the student recognize an enthymeme when he meets one in ordinary discourse? Fortunately, enthymemes assume a fairly common syntactic pattern accompanied by a limited number of function words. Enthymemes often take the form of a compound sentence, the two clauses being joined by co-ordinating conjunctions *for* or *so* or linked logically by such conjunctive adverbs as *therefore*, *hence*, *consequently*; or they take the form of a complex sentence, the clauses being joined by such subordinating conjunctions as *since* or *because*.

Let us illustrate the syntactic form of the enthymeme by taking two propositions and linking them grammatically in a variety of ways to form an enthymeme. These are the two propositions:

John Smith would not make a good governor. He has Communist leanings.

These two independent clauses, juxtaposed paratactically, could constitute an enthymeme. The context in which those two sentences occurred might suggest to the hearer or reader a logical relationship between the two statements: the second statement gives the grounds for the first assertion. An alert, sophisticated audience will readily detect the connection between these two statements. Rather than rely on the implied relationship, however, most speakers or writers will tie the two statements together explicitly. Note the various ways in which they could do this:

John Smith would not make a good governor, *for* he has Communist leanings.
because he has Communist leanings.
since he has Communist leanings.

John Smith has Communist leanings, *so* he would not make a good governor.

John Smith has Communist leanings; *therefore* he would not make a good governor.
consequently he would not make a good governor.
hence he would not make a good governor.

But not every sentence employing linking words like *for*, *because*, and *therefore* will constitute an enthymeme. Take, for instance, a statement like this: *He didn't go to the lecture last night, because he had a headache*. Here the *because*-clause merely gives a *reason* for his not going to the lecture; it is not a premise from which the conclusion is deduced. If we link the first statement with a different statement, however, we will have an enthymeme: *He didn't go to the lecture last night, so he must differ ideologically with the guest speaker*. Now the first statement becomes the ground or the premise for the inference stated in the second clause.

Sometimes there will be an ambiguity about the relationship of the clauses. Take this statement for instance: *He did not kill his mother because he loved her*. What is the import of this statement? Is this statement merely denying the reason given for the murder? It may mean something like this: he did not kill his mother because he loved her and wanted to relieve her of any further agony from her incurable disease; no, he killed her because he wanted to collect on her insurance. Or it may mean this: he loved his mother; therefore it is ridiculous to suggest that he killed her. If the statement means the latter, we would have a true enthymeme. The import of the statement depends upon whether the *because*-clause is *restrictive* or *non-restrictive*. If the clause is restrictive, we are denying the reason alleged for the crime. If the clause is non-restrictive, we are stating a premise upon which we have based our conclusion that he did not murder his mother. If we were speaking this sentence, we would indicate whether the clause was restrictive or nonrestrictive (and therefore the import of the entire statement) by some phonemic device of intonation. If we were writing that sentence, we could clarify the meaning by one of two courses: (1) recasting the sentence to remove the ambiguity; (2) putting a comma before *because* if the clause is non-restrictive or leaving the comma out if the clause is restrictive. Unless we *wanted* the statement to be ambiguous, it would probably be better to reword the sentence so that our meaning would be clear.

Speakers and writers will sometimes deliberately leave statements of this kind ambiguous. They sometimes seek to discredit someone by innuendo. If they render the relationship between statements vague, they may trap the audience into accepting an implication that is unwarranted by the facts. We must be alert enough to detect such chicanery and scrupulous enough not to

employ such devious means ourselves. This is not to deny that ambiguity can be an effective and legitimate literary device, as in a poem, for instance.

THE EXAMPLE

All knowledge is acquired and all proof is achieved through either deduction or induction. The syllogism is the formal device that Aristotle invented to analyze and systematize deductive reasoning. The enthymeme, as we have just seen, is a kind of imperfect syllogism, which produces, not the conclusive demonstration that we get in science and logic, but belief or persuasion.

Just as deductive reasoning has its rhetorical equivalent in the enthymeme, so inductive reasoning has its rhetorical equivalent in the *example*. In induction we proceed from the particular to the general. Hence in a scientific demonstration or in logic we arrive inductively at a generalization through observation of a series of particulars. The validity and truth of the generalization will be in direct proportion to the *number* of pertinent particulars studied. The generalization, "Women are more careful drivers than men," will be "truer" and will be more validly derived if it was based on a study of the driving habits of a million men and women than if it was based on a study of only 100,000 men and women—presuming, of course, that the same criteria for carefulness were used in both studies.

The reason for the greater reliability of the generalization made from a number of instances is that there is less of an "inductive leap." Both deduction and induction make use of inference. The difference is that deduction makes inferences from *statements*, while induction makes inferences from *verifiable phenomena*. Induction leaps from known, observed facts, over an area of unknown, unobserved instances, to a generalization. The more facts or instances that are observed, the narrower will be the gap of the unknown that has to be leaped and accordingly the more reliable will be the generalization.

Aristotle realized that an orator addressing an audience could not adduce a whole series of particular instances to substantiate his generalization. A scientist of course must offer the supporting evidence of hundreds, even thousands, of experiments if he is to convince his colleagues of the validity of his generalization. But an orator has only a limited amount of time, and a writer has only a limited amount of space, to present their case to an audience, and they cannot risk boring their audience with an exhaustive catalogue of supporting evidence. Normally they will offer only one or two cogent examples to support their generalizations.

Let us illustrate the use of the rhetorical example by imagining the kind of argument that a senator might employ in trying to persuade his colleagues not to declare war against a neighboring country. The point that

he wants to make, the generalization that he seeks to establish, is that waging war against a neighbor will prove disastrous for the country initiating the war. If he had time, he could recite from world history dozens of instances of how wars waged against neighbors proved to be disadvantageous to the country precipitating the conflict. Instead he cites a single example, analogous to the present situation, preferably one from American history and recent enough to be impressive. He might, for instance, cite the example of the Spanish-American War or the Mexican War. We can imagine his saying something like this:

Look, it's true that we won this war, but consider the price we paid for waging war on a neighboring country. We disrupted our economy by expending millions of dollars to finance the invasion. We sent ten thousand young men to an early death, at a time when the labor market at home was ominously sparse. Millions of dollars worth of American property was damaged or destroyed. Besides, we alienated the good will of the dominant European powers. And instead of retaining an unaggrieved buffer state on our southern border, we produced at our threshold a hostile, vindictive nation that at the first opportunity would gladly enter into an alliance with any major power that sought to invade us. The price we paid for that war far exceeded the benefits we reaped. Gentlemen, I tell you that a war now against neighboring —— would have equally disastrous consequences.

One of the strategies open to those senators who advocate going to war against the neighboring country would be to offer examples of other wars waged against neighbors which did *not* prove disastrous for the aggressor. Many considerations would determine which of these conflicting examples would produce more belief in the audience, but one of the considerations certainly would be the degree of similarity in the past and present situations.

An argument by example does not really prove anything, for like the rhetorical enthymeme, the example leads, most of the time, to a mere probability. But because a probability is what usually happens or what is believed to happen, the example has persuasive value. The example, of course, is always exposed to challenge and refutation. The opposition can counter with the reminder that on the grounds of strict logic a single example does not *prove* anything—no more than a single swallow makes a summer. Another way for the opposition to counteract the persuasive force of the example is, as we have pointed out, to cite another similar example where the outcome was just the opposite of the one cited. In such cases, the issue will be decided by a complex of attendant considerations: (1) the relative impressiveness and pertinence of the conflicting examples; (2) the persuasiveness of the other arguments offered in support of the contention; (3) the persuasiveness of the styles of the discourses; (4) the "ethical appeal" of the two men offer-

ing examples; (5) the force of the “emotional appeals”; (6) the emotional climate of the times.

THE FALLACIES

Before we quit this section on the logical modes of appeal, we should consider, at least briefly, the common fallacies in deductive and inductive reasoning. An awareness of these fallacies can be of help to us when we are seeking to refute arguments that oppose the position we maintain, and it can also prevent us from indulging in specious reasoning in our own discourses.

In common parlance, the word *fallacy* has two meanings: (1) a false, erroneous statement, an untruth; (2) invalid, specious, or deceptive reasoning. The first of these meanings has to do with the *matter* of the argument; the second, with the *form* or *mode* of argument. Formal logic is concerned primarily, although not exclusively, with the form of argument, but since *fallacy* denotes for most people a “false statement,” we should say a few words about fallacious matter.

Fallacies of Matter

A false statement can be detected and refuted only if one knows what the truth is. The claim that the earth was the center of our solar system was not detected as a falsehood until Copernicus discovered the corrective fact: that the sun was the center of our universe. We may suspect a statement—as Copernicus must have suspected the Ptolemaic view of the universe—but we cannot disprove the statement until we have discovered the facts. One of the cardinal principles of argument is that the burden of proof rests upon the one who challenges the generally accepted view of things. Since most astronomers hold that human life as we know it does not exist on the other planets in our solar system—in other words, since the testimony of experts concurs—the burden of proof that there *is* life on these other planets rests on those who make the counterclaim. Man’s exploration of outer space may turn up the “facts” that will either confirm or correct the generally received view.

Since truth is the only corrective of falsity, it is extremely important that all of us learn, through experience or education, as many facts about our world as are necessary for our effective and purposeful existence, or at least learn how and where to acquire facts. The man of inferior or inadequate knowledge will always be at a disadvantage in his dealings with other men. How often all of us have been frustrated in an argument by having to admit, “I can’t discredit your assertion because at the moment I don’t know the facts.” If in the course of an argument about the rate of economic growth someone makes the telling point that at least a third of the families in the

country have a total annual income of less than \$2000, we cannot discredit that claim by saying simply, "That's not so." We can call for and challenge the source of a man's information, but we will most effectively undermine an assertion by adducing evidence that a claim is false. The next best thing to having the refutative information at our fingertips is to know where we might find the facts that will discredit our opponent's statement.

One point needs to be made very strongly here: mere assertion, on either side of an argument, does not constitute proof. It is amazing how often argument is conducted solely with assertions and counterassertions. Conducting an argument in this fashion is like two young boys standing toe to toe and shouting at one another, "My pa can lick your pa," "No, he can't," "Yes, he can," "Oh, yeah!" An argument like this gets nowhere, but a surprising number of people seem to think that it does. (Just take a look at the letters-to-the-editor column of your local newspaper.)

This is not to say that every time we make a categorical statement we need to substantiate our statement. There are some statements that most men regard as being self-evident—e.g. a whole is equal to the sum of all of its parts. The writers of the Declaration of Independence made some statements in the opening paragraphs of that document that they asserted were self-evident: "that all men are created equal," "that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." A self-evident proposition has been defined as a statement that all men or most men would immediately assent to once they understand the terms of the statement. Being self-evident, such statements do not have to be proved.

Another kind of statement that normally does not have to be proved is the statement regarded as "true by definition": "Two plus two equals four"; "Democracy is government of the people, by the people, and for the people"; "A majority in any plurality in excess of 50 per cent of the total number." Such statements are "true" in the sense that a consensus has defined them. Sometime in the future, consensus could establish that a majority was a plurality of 60 per cent of the total number. Most laws and statutes, for instance, can be regarded as "true by definition."

The third kind of statement that does not demand proof is the statement about matters that even the minimally informed person should know: "There are fifty states in the United States"; "All wage-earning adults in America must file an income-tax report once a year"; "A vast body of water separates North America from Europe." The nature of the subject matter and the composition of the audience will largely determine which statements of this kind need to be substantiated. Many statements about physics that might need to be substantiated for an audience of laymen would not have to be proved for an audience of physicists.

Nor should we demand more precision and accuracy in statements than

the occasion demands. When our opponent claims that "150,000 home owners defaulted on their mortgage payments last year," we make ourselves appear silly by countering, "According to the Government Bureau of Statistics only 146,987 home owners defaulted on their mortgage payments last year." A corrective statement like this is mere punctilio and does nothing to advance our own argument or to weaken our opponent's argument. There are occasions, of course, when strict accuracy should be insisted on. When someone, in order to advance his argument, claims that the successful candidate for the office of the President received a clear majority of the electoral votes, it might be useful for our purposes to point out that the successful candidate had a margin of only 345,330 votes, a bare 0.1 per cent of the total popular vote, and that therefore he did not receive an overwhelming mandate from the people.

Beware also of the fallacy of the half-truth, which can be a particularly vicious but surprisingly effective tactic in argument. In the half-truth everything that is said is true, that is, verifiable as a fact; but because not enough is said, the total picture is distorted. Such omission of details conceals or distorts the context of a situation. Imagine someone seeking to impugn the loyalty of a nuclear scientist with a narrative like this: "For years Professor X carried on an active correspondence with top Soviet scientists. He subscribed to at least six Russian scientific journals. In 1956 he was observed having lunch in a New York restaurant with four Soviet scientists. In 1958 he took a trip to Moscow. A strange pattern of affinity with Soviet ideology, is it not?" Professor X did, and would admit that he did, everything ascribed to him here; but he would not admit the implications drawn from these facts. He would not admit the implications because a number of relevant facts that would put his relationship with Soviet scientists in the proper perspective have been omitted. He did correspond with Soviet scientists, but all of these letters were cleared by the State Department. He did subscribe to six Russian journals, but every scholar who wanted to keep up on the developments in science had to read the periodical literature from other countries. He did have lunch with four Russian scientists, but also present at that luncheon were four other American physicists, including Professor Y, whose loyalty no one called into question. The trip he took to Moscow in 1958 was sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission after he had been cleared by an intensive investigation by the FBI.

This is a bald example of the fallacy of the half-truth, but its very obviousness helps to illustrate how more subtle examples of this fallacy operate. It shows how what is left unsaid can distort the total picture. It is for this reason that witnesses in court are made to swear that they will tell "the *whole* truth and nothing but the truth."

Because every categorical statement is, in a sense, unique, we can hardly

do more here than lay down the general cautions and principles in regard to fallacies of matter. Each statement of a purported fact must be examined on its own terms and in its own context. The falsity of a statement—if the statement is false—can be detected and exposed only by one's knowledge of the facts. Mere assertion does not constitute proof, but not every statement needs to be substantiated. Nor should punctilious accuracy be insisted on where such precision is irrelevant or inconsequential. We should, however, bear in mind that by indulging in the half-truth we can, paradoxically, tell lies by speaking "nothing but the truth."

Fallacies of Reasoning


All fallacies of reasoning, whether inductive or deductive, could be classified as *non sequiturs*—that is, as conclusions or generalizations that "do not follow" from the premises. A logical fallacy is, at bottom, an instance of incoherence—the chain of reasoning does not link together.

Since we have dealt at length in previous sections with inductive and deductive *non sequiturs*, we will here merely list the fallacies, with a minimum of comment and with cross references to the sections where these fallacies have been elaborated on.

A. Fallacies of Reasoning in Deduction

1. *Equivocation*: This is the fallacy of using the same term with two or more meanings or referents. In syllogistic reasoning, equivocation introduces a fourth term into the process. No conclusion can be validly drawn from premises that have four terms. Equivocation could also invalidate inductive reasoning. If the referent of the term used to specify the particulars keeps shifting, no valid generalization can be made about the series of particulars. (See SYLLOGISM, pp. 54-5.)

2. *Undistributed Middle Term*: This common fallacy results basically from a failure to supply a link in the chain of arguments, a failure to establish that the major term and the minor term coincide. A diagram of one form of this fallacy will point up the missing link.



This arrangement of circles could be a schematic representation of an argument like the following:


All Communists are people.
 All Americans are people.
 Therefore, all Americans are Communists.

The B and C circles are shown to be comprehended within the larger A-circle, but the C-circle does not fall inside the B-circle, nor does it even overlap the B-circle. In other words, the two premises have not established that there is any connection between B and C. That failure to establish a connection is the missing link in this kind of argument, and until the link is supplied, we cannot arrive at any conclusion. (See SYLLOGISM, p. 56.)

3. *Illicit Process*: This is the fallacy in which a term in the conclusion has a wider extension than it has in the premises; or, to put it another way, a term is distributed or universal in the conclusion, but was undistributed or particular in the premise. It stands to reason that we cannot draw any conclusion about *all men* if in the premises we have been talking only about *some men*. Such a conclusion simply “does not follow.” (See SYLLOGISM, p. 56.)

4. *Conclusion from Two Negative Premises*: Because two negative premises establish no relationship among all three terms in a syllogistic chain of reasoning, no conclusion, either affirmative or negative, can be drawn. Negative premises exclude relationships. Unless one of the premises is affirmative so that it can include a relationship, we cannot validly arrive at any conclusion. (See SYLLOGISM, p. 54.)

5. *Affirmative Conclusion from a Negative Premise*: Since a negative premise excludes a relationship between two of the terms in a syllogism, the only kind of conclusion that can be arrived at logically is a proposition that excludes any relationship between one of these terms and a third term.



This is a diagrammatic representation of the following two premises, the X indicating the area specified by the second premise:

No Russians are free men.
Some Russians are atheists.

It should be apparent from the diagram that it is logically impossible to get the terms *free men* and *atheists* together in any kind of affirmative predication. There *may be* an affirmative relationship between *free men* and *atheists* (for instance, the area of the *atheist* circle that is outside the *Russian* circle could fall inside the *free men* circle). But that relationship has to be demonstrated; it cannot be inferred from this set of premises. From this set of premises, we can logically deduce only this conclusion: *Some atheists are not free men*. (Since the X-area is inside the *Russian* circle and since no part of the *Russian* circle is in the *free men* circle, it stands to reason that the X-area cannot be in the *free men* circle.) The moral of this explication: do not allow anyone, including yourself, to draw an affirmative conclusion from a negative proposition. (See SYLLOGISM, p. 54.)

6. *"Either/Or" Fallacy*: This is a common fallacy of those who tend to judge life by a two-valued rather than a multi-valued system. Psychologists designate this tendency as the "black-or-white syndrome." There are some either/or situations from which we may draw valid inferences; the condition for valid inference is that the alternatives be exhaustive. If we start from the premise, "Either he voted for the candidate or he didn't vote for him," we can legitimately infer one alternative from the proof or disproof of the other alternative. We can make this inference validly because one or the other of the situations *must* exist. As the premise is phrased, no other situation is possible. But if we start from the premise, "Either he voted for the candidate or he voted for the candidate's opponent," we have not posed alternatives which take all the possible actions in the case into account. Voting for this or that candidate is not the only possibility; the man might not have voted at all or might have voted for a third candidate. So if we prove that he didn't vote for the candidate, we may not infer that he must have voted for the candidate's opponent; we have to go on to prove that he voted for the candidate's opponent. (See DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM, p. 59.)

7. *Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent*: This is the fallacy occurring in deductive reasoning that starts out with a hypothetical proposition. For example:

If he makes concessions to the Russian ambassador, the prestige of the United States will decline.

The consequent is affirmed: "The prestige of the United States has declined." The fallacy now is the conclusion drawn from this affirmation of the consequent: "He must have made concessions to the Russian ambassador." That conclusion is clearly a *non sequitur*. (See HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM, pp. 58-9.)

8. *Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent*: This is another fallacy that can occur in reasoning from hypothetical propositions. For example:

If he captures the undecided votes, he will win the election.

The antecedent is denied: "He did not capture the undecided votes." The fallacy now is the conclusion drawn from this denial: "He did not win the election." This conclusion would follow if it had been established that the *only* way to win the election is to capture the undecided votes. We would have to start out with, and secure agreement on, this premise: "Only if he captures the undecided votes, will he win the election." (See HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM, pp. 58-9.)

B. *Fallacies of Reasoning in Induction*

1. *Faulty Generalization*: We are liable to this fallacy when we "jump to a conclusion" from inadequate evidence. Evidence can be inadequate in a number of ways: (1) the particulars may be irrelevant; (2) the particulars may be unrepresentative; (3) the particulars may not be numerous enough to warrant the conclusion. All of these inadequacies concern evidence gathered by observation or study. Sometimes our generalizations are based on evidence derived from authority. Generalizations based on evidence derived from authority can be faulty when the authority quoted is (1) biased or prejudiced, (2) incompetent, (3) outmoded. Even when the authority quoted is objective, competent, and reliable, a generalization from the evidence supplied by this authority can be faulty if the authority is (1) inaccurately quoted, (2) misinterpreted, (3) quoted out of context. (See COMMON TOPICS, pp. 125-6.)

2. *Faulty Casual Generalizations*: These are fallacies to which all cause-and-effect inferences are liable. These fallacies can occur when we argue (1) from an effect to a cause or (2) from a cause to an effect. We offend in the first way (1) when we assign an inadequate cause to an effect; (2) when we fail to take into account the fact that there could be more than one cause for the same effect. We offend in the second way (1) when we fail to establish that a potential cause of an effect could and did operate in a particular situation; (2) when we fail to take into account that the same cause can produce diverse effects. One of the commonest instances of faulty causal generalization is the fallacy commonly referred to as *post hoc, ergo propter*

hoc ("after this, therefore because of this"). This fallacy results from the assumption that because there is a temporal relationship between events (something happened *after* something else) there is also a causal relationship—e.g. "Our sales shot up 25 per cent after we started using that musical jingle in our advertising campaign." The use of the musical jingle *may* have been a cause for the increase in sales. But we may not assume that it was a cause; we must prove that it was a cause. (See COMMON TOPICS, pp. 112-13.)

3. *Faulty Analogy*: Argument by analogy is always the most vulnerable of all modes of argument. It is always exposed to the charge, "The analogy does not hold." But some analogies are more vulnerable than others. They are especially vulnerable when they concentrate on irrelevant, inconsequential similarities between two situations and overlook pertinent, significant dissimilarities. The analogical argument, "Where there is smoke, there is fire," commonly used to throw suspicion on someone's character or activity, is frequently open to the objection that the persuasiveness of the similarities is weakened, if not entirely nullified, by the dissimilarities. While it is true that argument by analogy always rests on shaky ground, it is possible for someone to become so niggling in his attitude toward all analogy that he is liable to strain at a gnat and swallow a camel. Perhaps we can avoid this carping habit by remembering that an analogy never proves anything; at best, it persuades someone on the grounds of probability. It is the *degree* of probability that will be susceptible to challenge.

C. Miscellaneous Fallacies

A number of fallacies will be grouped here under the heading "Miscellaneous" because they are not peculiar to either inductive or deductive reasoning and because they are a blend of material fallacies, formal fallacies, and emotional fallacies.

1. *Begging the Question*: This fallacy (labelled *petitio principii* by the Scholastic logicians) is found more often in deductive reasoning than in inductive reasoning. Basically, this is the fault of circular reasoning. In syllogistic reasoning, for instance, this fallacy occurs when we assume in the premise the conclusion that we are trying to prove. A lawyer would be guilty of "begging the question" if he pleaded before a jury, "My client would not steal because he is an honest man." We can more readily detect the *petitio principii* if we reconstruct the full chain of reasoning from the lawyer's enthymeme:

Any man who is honest will not steal.
My client is honest.
Therefore, my client would not steal.

The second premise and the conclusion say the same thing in different words, because of the tautological definition set up in the first premise. The argument eddies around in a circle; it doesn't go anywhere. We get this same kind of circular argument in a sequence like this: "God exists." "How do you know that God exists?" "The Bible says so." "Why should I put my credence in what the Bible says?" "Because it's the inspired word of God." God is worthy of a more cogent argument than this.

One of the commonest and subtlest forms of this fallacy is the question-begging epithet: "This *murderer* should be put away for life." "We don't want any *controversial* figures as lecturers in this state." "This *creeping socialism* won't fool the American people." The occurrence of certain formulas should alert us that an instance of question-begging may be lurking in the verbiage. We should be on our guard whenever we meet expressions like "obviously," "of course," "as everyone knows," "really," "unquestionably." (Whenever you see one of these expressions in this textbook, take another look at the sentence in which these expressions occur to see whether what the author has said *is* obvious or unquestionable.)

2. *Argument Ad Hominem ("to the man")*: This is a form of emotional argument, the fallacy of switching the argument from a discussion of issues to a discussion of personalities. If we find that we cannot refute a man's argument, we might attack his character. "My opponent's arguments are very impressive, but remember, this is the man who deserted his faithful wife and family after he had won his first political victory." Judged by its prevalence throughout history, this tendency to denigrate the character of one who espouses a cause or argument rather than to evaluate the cause or argument on its own merits seems to be natural to man. We sometimes see this sort of thing in literary criticism. Attention is diverted from the literary work itself to a discussion of the vicious character of the author; the work is assumed to be foul because the author is a notorious rake. As Alexander Pope said,

Some judge of authors' names, not work, and then
Nor praise nor blame the writings, but the men.

An Essay on Criticism, II, 412-13.

A man's character can have some relevance to an argument—when, for instance, we are attempting to assess the reliability of his testimony or the likelihood of his having done something—but a discussion of a man's character becomes an irrelevancy—and thereby a form of fallacy—when such a discussion is used merely to distract attention from the issue at hand. Beware of the "poisoned spring" tactic.

3. *Argument Ad Populum* ("to the people"): This is another devious emotional appeal, similar to the argument *ad hominem*. This is the tactic of appealing to irrational fears and prejudices in order to prevent audiences from squarely facing the issues. Honorific terms—*Americanism*, *patriotism*, *motherhood*, *rugged individualism*—are used to stir up a favorable emotional climate; pejorative terms—*socialism*, *godlessness*, *radical*, *reactionary*—are used to arouse hostile reactions. None of these terms are "good" or "bad" in themselves. They become "weasel words" when they so color the emotional atmosphere of a discussion that men are disposed to accept as proven what has only been asserted. Appeals to emotions are legitimate—in fact, rhetoricians maintained that men often could not be moved to action unless their emotions were touched—but appeals to emotions are reprehensible when they cloud the issue, when they anesthetize men's rational faculties, when they move men to do things or accept things which they would not do or accept if their conscience or reason were allowed to operate.

4. *The "Red Herring"*: This is another diversionary tactic. "Red herring" is a term adopted from hunting and refers to the practice of dragging a herring across the trace in order to lead the hounds astray from their pursuit of the prey. The classical term for this fallacy is *ignoratio elenchi* (literally, "ignorance of the refutation"). This is another device, like the *ad hominem* or *ad populum* arguments, of ignoring or avoiding the issue. Backed into a corner in an argument, all of us are prone to steer the discussion to a side issue. "You accuse me of cheating on my income tax, but doesn't everybody cheat a little bit?" "So what if the general did lose that battle? Think of all his glorious victories in the past." The disputant who allows his opponent to "change the subject," to dodge the main issue, may soon find himself losing the argument because his opponent has shifted his position to safer ground.

5. *The Complex Question*: An oft-quoted example of this is the question, "When did you stop beating your wife?" It is impossible to give a simple answer to such a question without incriminating oneself. What is wrong here is that a question like this has two parts. It combines these questions: "Do you beat your wife?" and "When did you stop beating her?" It is a form of question-begging. Just as a defending lawyer would jump to his feet to protest the prosecutor's question, "Why did you steal the diamond ring?" so anyone confronted with a two-pronged question should insist that the implicit question be dealt with first. "Wait a minute. Let's determine first whether I ever beat my wife." A familiar legislative practice is to attach

riders to an important bill. When the bill is brought up for a vote, the legislator is faced with a dilemma. He may favor the main bill but object to the riders, or vice versa. But he is now placed in a situation where he has to accept or reject the whole package. In an argument, fortunately, we can insist that a complex question be dealt with part by part.

The Ethical Appeal

In the previous section we dealt at some length with the logical *pisteis*, the materials and methods of proof or persuasion that appeal to the reason. Ideally, men should be able to conduct a discussion or argument exclusively on the level of reason. But the rhetoricians were realistic enough to recognize that men are creatures of passion and of will as well as of intellect. We have to deal with men as they are, not as they should be. If we conceive of rhetoric as the art of discovering all the available means of persuasion, we will be disposed to make use of whatever effective (and, one would hope, legitimate) means lie open to us. As was pointed out earlier, Aristotle recognized a second means in the ethical appeal, the persuasive value of the speaker's or writer's character.

The ethical appeal can be the most effective kind of appeal; even the cleverest and soundest appeal to the reason could fall on deaf ears if the audience reacted unfavorably to the speaker's character. The ethical appeal is especially important in rhetorical discourse, because here we deal with matters about which absolute certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. Quintilian felt that of the three kinds of rhetorical discourse, deliberative oratory had the most need for the ethical appeal (he called it *auctoritas*). As Quintilian said, "For he who would have all men trust his judgment as to what is expedient and honourable, should possess and be regarded as possessing genuine wisdom and excellence of character."—*Institutio Oratoria*, III, viii, 13.

The ethical appeal is exerted, according to Aristotle, when the speech itself impresses the audience that the speaker is a man of sound sense (*phronēsis*), high moral character (*aretē*), and benevolence (*eunoia*). Notice that it is *the speech itself* which must create this impression. Thus a man wholly unknown to his audience (and this is often the case when we listen to a speech or read an article in a magazine) could by his words alone inspire this kind of confidence. Some men, of course, already have a reputation familiar to an audience, and this reputation, if it is a good one, will favorably dispose an audience toward a man, even before he utters a word. In the last analysis, however, it is the discourse itself which must establish or

maintain the ethical appeal, for what a man says in any particular discourse could weaken or destroy his previously established reputation.

How does a man create the impression by his discourse that he is a man of sound sense, high moral character, and benevolence? The question is crucial; unfortunately, the answer must be couched in rather general terms. An obvious answer, of the general sort, is that a man must truly possess these qualities. "No one gives what he does not have," as the Latin maxim puts it. It is not the province of rhetoric, however, to form such a character—except perhaps in an indirect way. While it is true that the *whole* man is engaged in any communicative discourse, rhetoric can train only those faculties involved in the discovery, arrangement, and expression of ideas.

If we grant that a man strongly imbued with good sense, good moral fiber, and good will toward others will be disposed to conduct a discourse in a manner that will exert a strong ethical appeal, can we lay down any other positive precepts? Positive precepts, yes, but no more specific than the one just proposed. If a discourse is to exhibit a man's good sense, it must show that the speaker or writer has an adequate, if not a professionally erudite, grasp of the subject he is talking about, that he knows and observes the principles of valid reasoning, that he is capable of viewing a situation in the proper perspective, that he has read widely, and that he has good taste and discriminating judgment. If a discourse is to reflect a man's moral character, it must display a man's abhorrence of unscrupulous tactics and specious reasoning, his respect for the commonly acknowledged virtues, and his adamant integrity. If the discourse is to manifest a man's good will, it must display a man's sincere interest in the welfare of his audience and his readiness to sacrifice any self-aggrandizement that conflicts with the benefit of others.

It will help too if the discourse displays a man's sound knowledge of human psychology and his nice sense of appropriate style. He must be aware of the kind of *ēthos* that Aristotle talked about in Book II, Chapters 12-17 of the *Rhetoric*—the nature of various forms of government and the character of different periods of life (youth, middle age, old age) and of different conditions of life (wealth, poverty, education, illiteracy, health, sickness). Aware of the disposition of people at various ages and in various conditions of life, the speaker or writer will adapt his tone and his sentiments to fit his audience. Old men, for instance, do not think and act and view things in the same way that adolescents do. Young men are, by and large, quick-tempered, fickle, impetuous, idealistic; old men tend to be phlegmatic, conservative, deliberate, and pragmatic. Women react to certain things differently from men. Rich men and poor men view things in different ways. Men accustomed to a democratic way of life respond to certain sentiments and arguments in a different way from men brought up in a dictatorship.

The *whole* discourse must maintain the “image” that the speaker or writer seeks to establish. The ethical appeal, in other words, must be pervasive throughout the discourse. The effect of the ethical appeal might very well be destroyed by a single lapse from good sense, good will, or moral integrity. A note of peevishness, a touch of malevolence, a flash of bad taste, a sudden display of inaccuracy or illogic could jeopardize a man’s whole persuasive effort.

But although the ethical appeal must be maintained by the discourse as a whole, there may be places in the discourse where the author will make a special overt attempt to establish his credit with his audience or to ingratiate himself with his audience. The two places in the discourse where authors commonly make such explicit overtures are the introduction and the conclusion. The author does not explicitly call attention to the fact that he is seeking to impress or conciliate his audience, but his effort to impress his audience is nonetheless obvious and calculated. The following quotation, from the opening paragraph of one of Benjamin Franklin’s speeches, exemplifies just such an overt attempt:

It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one article of the plan, for which we are so much obliged to the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading, I have borne a good will to it, and, in general, wished it success. In this particular of salaries to the executive branch, I happen to differ; and, as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty, that I hazard it. The Committee will judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may possibly change mine. I think I see inconvenience in the appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the contrary great advantages.

From Benjamin Franklin, *Speech in the Constitutional Convention on the Subject of Salaries*, June 2, 1787.

Franklin is about to argue against a proposal made to the Constitutional Convention, but he must dispose his audience to listen to his counterarguments. So he tries to show that he harbors no ill will toward the man who made the proposal (“for which we are so much obliged to the honorable gentleman who laid it before us”; “I have borne good will to it”); that he is motivated in his objection, not by partisan considerations but by principle (“from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty”); that he is not so cocksure of his own views that he is impervious to correction (“their judgment may possibly change mine”). The overall impression created by this brief overture is that of a modest, magnanimous, open-minded gentleman. Even his opponents in the assembly would be disposed to listen to his counterarguments.

Here is an example of a special attempt to exert an ethical appeal in the closing paragraph of a discourse:

In this work, when it shall be found that much is omitted, let it not be forgotten that much likewise is performed; and though no book was ever spared out of tenderness to the author, and the world is little solicitous to know whence proceeded the faults of that which it condemns; yet it may gratify curiosity to inform it, that the *English Dictionary* was written with little assistance of the learned, and without any patronage of the great; not in the soft obscurities of retirement, or under the shelter of academic bowers, but amid inconvenience and distraction, in sickness and in sorrow. It may repress the triumph of malignant criticism to observe that if our language is not here fully displayed, I have only failed in an attempt which no human powers have hitherto completed. If the lexicons of ancient tongues, now immutably fixed, and comprised in a few volumes, be yet, after the toil of successive ages, inadequate and delusive; if the aggregated knowledge and cooperating diligence of the Italian academicians did not secure them from the censure of Beni; if the embodied critics of France, when fifty years had been spent upon their work, were obliged to change its economy and give their second edition another form, I may surely be contented without the praise of perfection, which, if I could obtain, in this gloom of solitude, what would it avail me? I have protracted my work till most of those whom I wished to please have sunk into the grave, and success and miscarriage are empty sounds: I therefore dismiss it with frigid tranquillity, having little to fear from censure or from praise.

From Samuel Johnson, Preface to the *English Dictionary*, 1755.

Here a good deal of the ethical appeal is being exerted by the style, for this is certainly a magnificent piece of English prose. But Dr. Johnson is also making a deliberate effort to say those things about himself and his work that will leave his audience with a favorable opinion of him. Throughout the long discourse that preceded this final paragraph, Johnson had been explaining what he hoped to do in his *Dictionary*, what difficulties he faced in effecting his purpose, and what his successes and failures were. That elaborate exposition itself helped to create the impression of an intelligent, self-sacrificing, high-minded scholar. Here now in this final paragraph he makes an overt effort to reinforce the impression of himself. What comes through to the audience is a suitable blend of modesty and confidence, of regrets and self-gratulations, of animus and forgiveness.

It would be easy to find illustrations, in contemporary speeches, articles, and letters, of discourse that failed to create favorable impressions of the men who composed them. But since there is something uncharitable about publicly

exposing someone, whether living or dead, as an example of an unprincipled, stupid, malevolent, or generally unprepossessing person, let us take as our example some fictitious person. Here is an excerpt from *Pride and Prejudice* in which Mr. Collins proposes marriage to Elizabeth Bennet:

"My reasons for marrying are, first, that I think it a right thing for every clergyman in easy circumstances (like myself) to set the example of matrimony in his parish; secondly, that I am convinced it will add very greatly to my happiness; and thirdly—which perhaps I ought to have mentioned earlier—that it is the particular advice and recommendation of the very noble lady whom I have the honor of calling patroness. Twice has she condescended to give me her opinion (unasked too!) on this subject; and it was but the very Saturday night before I left Hunsford—between our pools at quadrille, while Mrs. Jenkinson was arranging Miss de Bourgh's footstool, that she said, 'Mr. Collins, you must marry. A clergyman like you must marry. Choose properly, choose a gentlewoman for *my* sake; and for your *own*, let her be an active, useful sort of person, not brought up high, but able to make a small income go a good way. This is my advice. Find such a woman as soon as you can, bring her to Hunsford, and I will visit her.' Allow me, by the way, to observe, my fair cousin, that I do not reckon the notice and kindness of Lady Catherine de Bourgh as among the least of the advantages in my power to offer. You will find her manners beyond anything I can describe; and your wit and vivacity, I think, must be acceptable to her, especially when tempered with the silence and respect which her rank will inevitably excite. Thus much for my general intention in favor of matrimony; it remains to be told why my views were directed to Longbourn instead of my own neighbourhood, where I assure you there are many amiable young women. But the fact is that being, as I am, to inherit this estate after the death of your honoured father (who, however, may live many years longer), I could not satisfy myself without resolving to choose a wife from among his daughters, that the loss to them might be as little as possible, when the melancholy event takes place—which, however, as I have already said, may not be for several years. This has been my motive, my fair cousin, and I flatter myself it will not sink me in your esteem. And now nothing remains for me but to assure you in the most animated language of the violence of my affection. To fortune I am perfectly indifferent, and shall make no demand of that nature on your father, since I am well aware that it could not be complied with; and that one thousand pounds in the four per cents, which will not be yours till after your mother's decease, is all that you may ever be entitled to. On that head, therefore, I shall be uniformly silent; and you may assure yourself that no ungenerous reproach shall ever pass my lips when we are married."

From Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*, Chapter 19.

There is certainly a rhetorical situation set up here in this scene from an early nineteenth-century novel: a man seeking to induce a young woman to marry him. Though an appeal to reason is hardly negligible at a time like this, emotions probably play a more important part in bringing two people to such a decision. And if there is ever a time when a man's ethical appeal must be strong, it is the moment when he proposes. Presumably, a man has been exerting an ethical appeal throughout the relationship, but when he comes to the moment of actually proposing marriage he can hardly wish to say anything that will destroy the girl's good opinion of him.

This speech provides a classic example of a man who intends to convey a favorable impression of himself but succeeds only in discrediting himself by what he says and the manner in which he says it. There are two audiences for Mr. Collins's speech: Elizabeth and the reader. Jane Austen clearly intends to reveal Mr. Collins for the pompous, self-righteous, egocentric timeserver that he is, but we cannot presume that Elizabeth will react in exactly the same way as we do to Mr. Collins's speech. We must make some allowances for the mores of the age and for the kind of person Elizabeth herself is. A young girl of that time would expect a man to propose to her in the highly formal language that Mr. Collins uses, and she would probably not have been as unfavorably impressed as we are by Mr. Collins's mercenary considerations.

But even when all these allowances are made for the differences in the reactions of the two audiences for the speech, we cannot believe that after this exposure of Mr. Collins's motives Elizabeth could regard him as a man of "good sense, good will, and high moral character." She had developed an antipathy for him before this moment which this display of rhetoric could do nothing but confirm. Hence, we are not at all surprised at the firmness and forthrightness of her rejection of Mr. Collins: "I am perfectly serious in my refusal. You could not make *me* happy, and I am convinced that I am the last woman in the world who would make you so." And if we the readers needed any further confirmation of our unfavorable impression of him we could turn to that delightfully obnoxious letter of condolence that he sends to the Bennet family in Chapter 48 upon the occasion of Lydia's elopement.

There is no denying the role that the ethical appeal plays in the persuasive process. In a sense, the ethical appeal is the "hidden persuader." In our world, such enterprises as public relations, motivational psychology, market research, and advertising, are engaged in searching for effective stimuli and in creating the proper "image." The groundwork for all of this activity was laid by Aristotle two thousand years ago.

Aristotle discussed the ethical appeal, not only because he recognized how vital it was in persuasion but also because he wanted to answer the enemies of rhetoric, like Socrates, who complained that rhetoricians sanctioned any kind of shallow knowledge, sophistical reasoning, and unscrupulous tactics that would gain the end of persuasion. If persuasion depends greatly, even pre-eminently, on ethical appeal, the persuader cannot afford to create the impression by his discourse that he is superficial, immoral, or malicious. Cicero and Quintilian, with their insistence on "the good man speaking," may have given greater emphasis to the importance of the ethical image than Aristotle did, but they were not supplying a note that Aristotle had entirely neglected.

The Emotional Appeal

The third mode of persuasion specified by Aristotle and recognized by all later rhetoricians is the appeal to the emotions of the audience. People are rather sheepish about acknowledging that their opinions can be affected by their emotions. They have the uneasy feeling that there is something undignified about being stirred to action through the emotions. And indeed, in some cases, there is something undignified about a rational man being precipitated into action through the stimulus of his aroused passions. All of us at one time or another have been ashamed of something we did under the pressure of strong emotion. The source of our shame was not so much that we had been prompted to action by our emotions as that we had done something regrettable. We are not ashamed of falling in love, even though the act of falling in love is prompted by strong emotion. But we are ashamed of hurling a vase against the wall in a fit of anger. What makes the difference here is the consequences of our emotional stress. Because falling in love was "good," we felt no compunction; because smashing the vase was "evil," we were ashamed of our impulsive act.

There is nothing necessarily reprehensible about being moved to action through our emotions; in fact, it is perfectly normal. Since it is our will ultimately that moves us to action and since the emotions have a powerful influence on the will, many of our actions are prompted by the stimulus of our emotions. When it is not pure emotion that prompts our will, it is a combination of reason and emotion. This fact has a great bearing on the strategies of rhetoric. George Campbell, the eighteenth-century Scottish rhetorician, made a strong claim for the important part that emotions play in the persuasive process: "So far, therefore, is it from being an unfair method

of persuasion to move the passions, that there is no persuasion without moving them."—*Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Book I, Ch. VII.

Richard Whately, the nineteenth-century English rhetorician, analyzed the persuasive process this way: "For in order that the Will may be influenced, two things are requisite: (1) that the proposed Object should appear desirable; and (2) that the Means suggested should be proved to be conducive to the attainment of that object."—*Elements of Rhetoric*, Part II, Ch. I. It is argument (the appeal to the understanding) that produces conviction about the conduciveness of the means to the desired end; it is the appeal to the emotions that makes the end seem desirable. In order to whip up a people into a mood for war, one would have to do two things: (1) remind the people that the freedom and security of a nation is a desirable end; (2) convince them that going to war is the best means of securing this end. The order of these two activities can vary. Sometimes it will be better to excite the desire first and then show that there is some connection between the proposed action and the end; at other times, it will be more expedient to convince the understanding first and then stir up the emotions.

Do not some men play on people's emotions for unscrupulous purposes? Of course they do. All of us could tick off a half dozen examples from history without much strain on the memory. The fact that some men exploit the emotions for unscrupulous purposes may constitute a caution about the use of emotional appeal, but it does not constitute a condemnation of emotional appeal. Some men use sophistical arguments, but we do not therefore condemn all argument as a means of effecting conviction.

An important consideration for rhetoric is that our emotions are not under the direct control of volition. We cannot *will* ourselves into being angry against someone. On the other hand, our intellectual faculties, reason and memory, are under the direct control of our will. We can, by an act of the will, force ourselves to recall historical facts, to engage in calculation, to analyze a whole, or to synthesize parts.

There are two consequences for rhetoric from the fact that our will does not have direct control of our emotions. The first consequence is that it is perilous to announce to an audience that we are going to play on the emotions. As soon as we apprise an audience of such an intention, we jeopardize, if we do not entirely destroy, the effectiveness of the emotional appeal. It is not so with appeals to the understanding. It is frequently advantageous to announce to an audience that we are about to embark upon a course of reasoning. Accordingly, we have no hesitation about calling attention to the conclusion we hope to establish, to the steps we will take in proving our point, or to our method of arguing.

The second consequence for rhetoric is that we must get at the emotions

indirectly. We cannot arouse an emotion, either in ourselves or in others, by thinking about it. We arouse emotion by contemplating the object that stirs the emotion. So if we seek to arouse the anger of an audience, we must describe a person or a situation of a sort that will make the audience angry. The anger can be enkindled even when the description is quite dispassionate. Horace's precept that if you want me to feel an emotion, you must first feel that emotion yourself (*si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi*) is basically sound, but it is possible to feel an emotion without displaying it extravagantly. In fact, there will be times when the more dispassionate the emotion-provoking description is, the more intense will be the emotion aroused.

Here is a good example of how to stir an emotional response in the audience by describing a scene. Appealing to the patriotism of his English audience, Macaulay wants to arouse their righteous indignation against the arrogant, cruel, despotic Surajah Dowlah, so that he can subsequently justify the punitive expedition that Lord Clive led against the Indian colony. He might have described this same scene in such a way as to stir an Englishman's pride in the bravery of the colonial troops. But here he describes the scene in such a way as to arouse the audience's anger against the native troops and their commander. Here is Macaulay's account of the infamous episode of the Black Hole of Calcutta:

Then was committed that great crime, memorable for its singular atrocity, memorable for the tremendous retribution by which it was followed. The English captives were left to the mercy of the guards, and the guards determined to secure them for the night in the prison of the garrison, a chamber known by the fearful name of the Black Hole. Even for a single European malefactor, that dungeon would, in such a climate, have been too close and narrow. The space was only twenty feet square. The air-holes were small and obstructed. It was the summer solstice, the season when the fierce heat of Bengal can scarcely be rendered tolerable to natives of England by lofty halls and by the constant waving of fans. The number of the prisoners was one hundred and forty-six. When they were ordered to enter the cell, they imagined that the soldiers were joking; and, being in high spirits on account of the promise of the Nabob to spare their lives, they laughed and jested at the absurdity of the notion. They soon discovered their mistake. They expostulated; they entreated; but in vain. The guards threatened to cut down all who hesitated. The captives were driven into the cell at the point of the sword, and the door was instantly shut and locked upon them.

Nothing in history or fiction, not even the story which Ugolino told in the sea of everlasting ice, after he had wiped his bloody lips on the scalp of his murderer, approaches the horrors which were recounted by the few survivors of that night. They cried for mercy. They strove to

burst the door. Holwell, who, even in that extremity, retained some presence of mind, offered large bribes to the gaolers. But the answer was that nothing could be done without the Nabob's orders, that the Nabob was asleep, and that he would be angry if anybody woke him. Then the prisoners went mad with despair. They trampled each other down, fought for the places at the windows, fought for the pittance of water with which the cruel mercy of the murderers mocked their agonies, raved, prayed, blasphemed, implored the guards to fire among them. The gaolers in the meantime held lights to the bars, and shouted with laughter at the frantic struggles of their victims. At length the tumult died away in low gaspings and moanings. The day broke. The Nabob had slept off his debauch, and permitted the door to be opened. But it was some time before the soldiers could make a lane for the survivors, by piling up on each side the heaps of corpses on which the burning climate had already begun to do its loathsome work. When at length a passage was made, twenty-three ghastly figures, such as their own mothers would not have known, staggered one by one out of the charnel-house. A pit was instantly dug. The dead bodies, a hundred and twenty-three in number, were flung into it promiscuously and covered up.

From Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Lord Clive," *Critical and Historical Essays*, 1843.

The kind of description calculated to stir emotion in the audience must appeal to the imagination, and the imagination can be seized in this kind of word-painting by the use of sensory, specific detail. Macaulay makes generous use of sensory detail in his description, and characteristically, he dramatizes the scene in order to increase its emotional impact. But unfortunately he is not content to let a vivid reporting of the scene create the desired emotional effect. He tries to excite an extra pulse of emotion by editorializing on the scene ("Nothing in history or fiction . . .") and loading his description with hyperbolic, provocative words ("great crime," "singular atrocity," "loathsome work," "ghastly figures"). By contrast, note how Mark Antony speaking after Caesar's assassination arouses the anger of his audience:

You all do know this mantle. I remember
 The first time ever Caesar put it on.
 'Twas on a summer's evening, in his tent,
 That day he overcame the Nervii.
 Look, in this place ran Cassius' dagger through.
 See what a rent the envious Casca made.
 Through this the well-beloved Brutus stabbed,
 And as he plucked his cursed steel away,
 Mark how the blood of Caesar followed it,
 As rushing out of doors, to be resolved

If Brutus so unkindly knocked, or no.
For Brutus, as you know, was Caesar's angel.
Judge, O you gods, how dearly Caesar loved him!
This was the most unkindest cut of all,
For when the noble Caesar saw him stab,
Ingratitude, more strong than traitors' arms,
Quite vanquished him. Then burst his mighty heart,
And, in his mantle muffling up his face,
Even at the base of Pompey's statue,
Which all the while ran blood, great Caesar fell.

William Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, III, ii.

Mark Antony does not bid the mob, "Be angry, ye citizens of Rome!" Nor does he seek to arouse the anger of the mob by calling the assassins "scoundrels" and "traitors." Rather, he makes the people contemplate the bloody, dagger-rent mantle that Caesar wore the day he was killed. It is the sight of this object, dramatically displayed, its significance evoked by Antony's pathetic comments, and followed by Antony's incendiary comments on the brutality and ingratitude of the deed, that whips the people up into a frenzy of vindictive anger.

We have just seen two examples of how to arouse an emotional response in an audience by a vivid description of a scene. There's another method that speakers and writers use to stir emotions, which is not as dependable as the method we have been describing. This second method does not so much "earn" an emotional response as it "begs" for it. This is the method that relies for its effect mainly on the use of emotion-laden words. The author makes use of those honorific or pejorative terms, of those favorable or unfavorable connotations of words, that will touch an audience. Here is how Edmund Burke tried to stir his reader's resentment against the revolutionary mob that stormed the royal palace at Versailles at the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789 and seized the Queen, Marie Antoinette:

It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France, then the dauphiness, at Versailles; and surely never lighted on this orb, which she hardly seemed to touch, a more delightful vision. I saw her just above the horizon, decorating and cheering the elevated sphere she just began to move in—glittering like the morning-star, full of life, and splendor, and joy. Oh! what a revolution! and what a heart must I have, to contemplate without emotion that elevation and that fall! Little did I dream when she added titles of veneration to those of enthusiastic, distant, respectful love, that she should ever be obliged to carry the sharp antidote against disgrace concealed in that bosom; little did I dream that I should have lived to see such disasters fallen upon her in a nation of

gallant men, in a nation of men of honour and of cavaliers. I thought ten thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her with insult.—But the age of chivalry is gone.—That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever. Never, never more, shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom. The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise is gone! It is gone, that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness.

From Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, 1790.

Edmund Burke starts to picture the Queen so that the audience can contemplate her and feel the same emotion that he feels for her. But her picture never emerges through the blaze of Burke's "rhetoric." She glitters on the horizon "like the morning-star," but we never really get to see her. Instead, Burke takes over and stirs up our emotions with the grandiloquent rhythm of his prose and with his litany of honorific terms ("titles of veneration," "men of honour," "gallant men," "age of chivalry," "generous loyalty," "proud submission," "dignified obedience," "chastity of honor," etc.). It is somewhat unfair to pluck this purple patch out of its context, because when one sees it in its setting in the long pamphlet that Burke wrote, it does not strike the reader as being so blatantly sentimental as it appears in isolation. But the passage does illustrate very well what a man skilled in the choice and manipulation of words can do to the emotions of his audience.

When Aristotle turns to a consideration of the emotions in Book II, Chapters 2-17 of the *Rhetoric*, he intends to supply the student of rhetoric with topics for an appeal to the emotions of an audience. Taking some of the common emotions, in pairs of opposites—e.g. anger and meekness, love and hatred, fear and boldness, shame and shamelessness—he analyzes these emotions from three angles: (1) their nature; (2) their object—that is, the kind of people toward whom we experience the emotion; (3) their exciting causes. Aristotle claims that we must know all three things about an emotion if we hope to arouse it in others.

This analysis is one of the earliest attempts at psychology. Admittedly, Aristotle's psychology is primitive and inchoate. John Locke and such eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers as David Hume, Thomas Reid, Francis Hutcheson, and Lord Kames made great advances over Aristotle's primitive psychology; and of course the major modern advances in psychology were

begun by Sigmund Freud. But Aristotle's analysis of the emotions can be of value to the student who is not professionally trained in psychology, because his analysis was sound as far as it went and was based on the kind of commonsense observation of people that even the amateur is capable of making. From our knowledge of our own emotional mechanism and from our observation of the emotional reactions of others, we are familiar enough with the common emotions to be able to manipulate them for persuasive purposes.

The student should read Aristotle's analysis of the emotions in Book II of the *Rhetoric*. What we can do here is quote some excerpts from Aristotle's analysis of anger to show the elementary level and astuteness of Aristotle's non-professional observations about human emotions. As the student reads these excerpts, he should pause occasionally to ask himself how well these observations accord with his own observations of angry people.

Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one's friends. If this is a proper definition of anger, it must always be felt towards some particular individual, e.g. Cleon, and not 'man' in general. . . . It must always be attended by a certain pleasure—that which arises from the expectation of revenge. For since nobody aims at what he thinks he cannot attain, the angry man is aiming at what he can attain, and the belief that you will attain your aim is pleasant. . . . It is also attended by a certain pleasure because the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance, and the images then called up cause pleasure, like the images called up in dreams.

[A discussion of slighting follows, since it is the slight that excites anger.] Now slighting is the actively entertained opinion of something as obviously of no importance. . . . There are three kinds of slighting—contempt, spite, and insolence. (1) Contempt is one kind of slighting: you feel contempt for what you consider unimportant, and it is just such things that you slight. (2) Spite is another kind; it is a thwarting another man's wishes, not to get something yourself but to prevent his getting it. . . . (3) Insolence is also a form of slighting, since it consists in doing and saying things that cause shame to the victim, not in order that anything may happen to yourself, or because anything has happened to yourself, but simply for the pleasure involved. . . . The cause of the pleasure thus enjoyed by the insolent man is that he thinks himself greatly superior to others when ill-treating them. . . . A man expects to be specially respected by his inferiors in birth, in capacity, in goodness, and generally in anything in which he is much their superior: as where money is concerned a wealthy man looks for respect from a poor man; where speaking is concerned, the man with a turn for oratory looks for respect from one who cannot speak; the ruler demands the respect of the ruled,

and the man who thinks he ought to be a ruler demands the respect of the man whom he thinks he ought to be ruling. . . .

. . . The persons with whom we get angry are those who laugh, mock, or jeer at us, for such conduct is insolent. Also those who inflict injuries upon us that are marks of insolence. . . . Also those who speak ill of us and show contempt for us, in connexion with the things we ourselves most care about: thus those who are eager to win fame as philosophers get angry with those who show contempt for their philosophy; those who pride themselves upon their appearance get angry with those who show contempt for their appearance; and so on in other cases. . . . Again, we are angrier with our friends than with other people, since we feel that our friends ought to treat us well and not badly. We are angry with those who have usually treated us with honour or regard, if a change comes and they behave to us otherwise: for we think that they feel contempt for us or they would still be behaving as they did before. . . . Further, with those who slight us before five classes of people: namely, (1) our rivals, (2) those whom we admire, (3) those whom we wish to admire us, (4) those for whom we feel reverence, (5) those who feel reverence for us: if anyone slights us before such persons, we feel particularly angry. . . .

The persons with whom we feel anger, the frame of mind in which we feel it, and the reasons why we feel it, have now all been set forth. Clearly the orator will have to speak so as to bring his hearers into a frame of mind that will dispose them to anger, and to represent his adversaries as open to such charges and possessed of such qualities as do make people angry.

Rhetoric, Book II, Chapter 2, trans. W. Rhys Roberts. Reprinted by permission of the Clarendon Press, from *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. W. D. Ross, Volume XI.

The point to make about Aristotle's analysis of the emotions—or any other analysis of emotions for that matter—is that after the student has read the analysis he should “forget” about it. He should “forget” about it in the same sense that someone who has read a “how-to” book about batting should forget what he has read when he takes a bat in hand and starts swinging at the ball. The student will not really forget what he has read; he will unconsciously incorporate what he has learned about the emotions into his appeal. This is just another way of urging the student to “be natural.” All of us, to one degree or another, continually appeal to the emotions of others. From our dealings with our fellow men and from our experience with our own emotional reactions, we develop certain instincts about the emotions. It is upon these instincts that we draw when we make an emotional appeal.

Some people's instincts along these lines are more fully developed than other people's. When we say of someone that he has “quite a line” or that he is a “smooth operator,” we are probably paying tribute to his natural or developed talent for producing the right emotional touch at the right time.

Making a conscious study of the emotions and being aware that we are appealing to someone's emotions will not necessarily make us more adept at this kind of appeal. But a conscious knowledge of any art makes it more *likely* that we will practice the art skillfully. The man who learned to play the piano by ear will not be hurt by studying music; but he might very well be helped to play better.

To sum up what we have said about the emotional appeal: Be aware that the emotional appeal plays a vital part in the persuasive process; intellectual conviction is often not enough to move people's will to act. Be alert for emotional appeals from others; don't allow your heart to prompt you to do something that your reason or conscience would later regret. Be natural; let the nature of the subject matter, the occasion, or the audience elicit the appropriate kind and the right amount of emotional appeal. Remember that you cannot command yourself or others to feel emotions; you must conjure up the scene or situation or person that will make people experience the emotions you want to rouse in them. Be aware—as will be pointed out again in the chapter on Arrangement—that people sometimes have to be put into the right emotional mood before they will listen to appeals to reason; at other times it is better to start out with appeals to reason and then rouse the audience to the proper emotional pitch in a grandiloquent peroration.

The Topics

Once the student has a subject and has converted it into a sharply defined thesis, he is faced with the task of developing that subject. If he is engaged in persuasive discourse, he must find "arguments" to develop his subject. In the preceding section we saw that anyone bent on persuading others makes use of one or more of the three modes of appeal—the appeal to reason, the appeal to emotions, the appeal of character. If he decides to make use of the appeal to reason, he will develop his arguments inductively or deductively. If he argues deductively, he will resort to the syllogism or, more likely, the enthymeme. If he argues inductively, he will resort to full induction or the example. But for any of these modes of appeal, whether it be logical, emotional, or ethical, he must either *have* something to say or *find* something to say.

Sometimes, from his experience, his education, or his reading, the student will already have something to say. On many of the subjects he is asked to write about in college classes, the student is able to write a 500- to 800-word theme quite readily, for he has a sufficient stock of ideas on those subjects to be able to write, as it were, "off the top of his head." He is most likely to

have a great deal to say when he feels very strongly about something, for then ideas seem to come to him unbidden.

In this chapter, however, we are concerned with the problems of the student who does not have, or thinks he does not have, something to say on some given subject. A student can be said to have "nothing to say" when he has (1) no ideas at all on a subject, (2) only a few ideas or not enough ideas to develop a subject adequately, or (3) a mass of vague, jumbled, inaccurate, or untenable ideas. Such a student has to *find*, to *discover*, or, to use the rhetorical term, to *invent* his material. Some measure of *invention* will be involved in all four forms of discourse—exposition, argumentation, description, and narration. But invention figures most prominently in expository and argumentative discourse, because in description or narrative discourse the writer has more occasion to "create" his material than to "invent" it.

What are the student's resources when he has to find his material? His chief resources will always be the fruits of his education, his reading, his observation, and his reflection. Both Cicero and Quintilian maintained that the most valuable background for an orator was a liberal education, because they recognized that such a broad education was best calculated to aid a man faced with the necessity of inventing arguments on a wide variety of subjects.

But wide and varied experience, reflection, education, and reading come only with time and effort. What about the student who has not yet reaped the benefits of experience and study? Is he condemned to be inarticulate? Is there some system that can supply the deficiencies of his resources? The rhetoricians thought that there was such a system in the *topics*.

As we saw in the section of Chapter I devoted to definitions of key terms, the topics were the general heads under which were grouped arguments for a particular subject or occasion. They were the "regions," the "haunts," the "places" where certain categories of arguments resided. There was some sense to the attempt by Peter Ramus and his followers in the seventeenth century to relegate the topics to the province of logic, for the system of the topics is really an outgrowth of the study of how the human mind thinks. The human mind, of course, does think about particular things, but its constant tendency is to rise above the particulars and to abstract, to generalize, to classify, to analyze, and to synthesize. The topics represented the system that the classical rhetoricians built upon this tendency of the human mind.

The rhetoricians saw, for instance, that one of the tendencies of the human mind is to seek out the nature of things. So they set up the topic of Definition. Another tendency of the human mind is to compare things, and when things are compared, one discovers similarities or differences—and the differences will be in kind or in degree. When one is presented with a subject, one then looks at it to find out whether, for one's specific purpose, it presents an opportunity for definition or comparison.

Perhaps the student will gain a clearer notion of the function of the topics if he will think of the topics as "suggesters," as "prompters," as "initiators," as a "checklist," of ideas on some subject. Being general heads or categories, the topics "prime the pump," as it were; by suggesting general strategies of development, they help to overcome inertia. Just as the starter on an automobile turns the motor over until the compression system takes over, so the topics initiate a line of thought, which then moves forward on its own momentum.

One of the terms we used in the previous paragraph to clarify the function of the topics was "checklist." The term "checklist" suggests that one goes through the list of topics, one by one, asking oneself whether this particular topic will turn up any material for the development of our subject. In the beginning stages, the student may very well have to do just this. He will eventually discover, however, that some of the many available topics will not be suitable for certain situations. The football coach does not go to his bench indiscriminately when he needs a substitute. He calls from the bench the man who has been trained for a particular position and who can best serve the particular situation that has developed on the field. As Quintilian said, "I would also have students of oratory consider that all forms of argument which I have just set forth cannot be found in every case and that when the subject on which we have to speak has been propounded, it is no use considering each separate type of argument and knocking at the door of each with a view to discovering whether they may chance to serve to prove our point, except while we are in the position of mere learners."—*Instit. Orat.*, V, x, 122. Quintilian envisioned the time when, as the result of study and practice, the student would acquire that "innate penetration" and "power of rapid divination" which would lead him directly to those arguments suited to his particular case. Eventually, he would arrive at the happy condition in which the arguments would "spontaneously follow the thought."

In the remaining portion of this chapter, we are going to consider the aids to invention under three main heads: (1) the common topics; (2) the special topics; (3) external aids to invention. The common topics will provide the student with a stock of general lines of argument that can be used in the development of any subject. The special topics will provide him with lines of argument especially pertinent to the particular kind of persuasive discourse in which he is engaged—deliberative, judicial, or ceremonial. The external aids to invention will direct the student to some of the standard reference books which will provide him with the facts and figures he may need to substantiate his own arguments or to refute opposing arguments. These aids to invention, it will be noted, are arranged on an ascending scale of specialization: the common topics yield arguments on virtually any subject; the special topics yield arguments for a particular kind of discourse; and the external

aids to invention yield data for a specific case. As Aristotle pointed out, the common topics are the aids belonging most properly to rhetoric; as we move up the scale and rely on more specialized knowledge for our arguments, we are moving out of the province of rhetoric and invading the provinces of other disciplines, such as law, history, ethics, politics, science.

The Common Topics

Before we consider the common topics in detail, let us set forth, in outline form, the common topics and their sub-topics:

DEFINITION

- A. Genus
- B. Division

COMPARISON

- A. Similarity
- B. Difference
- C. Degree

RELATIONSHIP

- A. Cause and Effect
- B. Antecedent and Consequence
- C. Contraries
- D. Contradictions

CIRCUMSTANCE

- A. Possible and Impossible
- B. Past Fact and Future Fact

TESTIMONY

- A. Authority
- B. Testimonial
- C. Statistics
- D. Maxims
- E. Law
- F. Precedents

DEFINITION

We have already discussed definition at some length in an earlier section of this chapter, where we were reviewing some of the basic principles of logic. Here we will confine our discussion to the uses that rhetoricians made of the topic. Definition is a way of unfolding what is wrapped up in a subject being

examined. One of the rhetorical uses of this topic is to ascertain the specific issue to be discussed. Opponents in a dispute may be arguing at cross-purposes if they do not clearly establish just what the point at issue is. Therefore, after we have formulated our thesis, we may find it necessary to define the key terms in our thematic proposition so that our audience will clearly understand what we are talking about.

In law trials also it is frequently necessary to define the point at issue. In the court trial, for instance, held in London's Old Bailey in October, 1960, against Penguin Books Ltd. for publishing D. H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, it was extremely important that both the prosecution and defense determine at the outset just what was the issue at stake. Was Penguin Books being prosecuted for violating the provisions of the Obscene Publications Act of 1959? If so, in what way specifically had Penguin Books offended against this law? Had it offended by publishing an obscene book? If so, what was to be the definition of "obscene book" used in this trial? If an obscene book is one that tends to "corrupt or deprave those who read it," what is the meaning of the terms "corrupt" and "deprave"? And should there not be some determination of *who* it is that is likely to be depraved or corrupted? And did *Lady Chatterley's Lover* fall under the provisions of Section 4 of the Act, which exempt from the charge of obscenity any book judged to be in the interests of "science, literature, art, or learning"? (For the transcript of this interesting trial, see *The Trial of Lady Chatterley: Regina v. Penguin Books Limited*, ed. C. H. Rolph. A Penguin Special, 1961.)

All these questions of definition were important in the trial and had to be posed and resolved at the outset. The student can well imagine how many words were expended to settle these questions. He can learn from this example how useful the topic of definition can be to him when he is faced with the problem of developing a subject. Judging from the frequency with which students begin their themes with a definition from the dictionary ("As Webster says, . . ."), they would seem to realize instinctively the value of definition as a springboard for the development of a subject. The trouble with most "As Webster says" gambits in student themes, however, is that they serve no useful function. The definitions are there in the introduction because the student does not know how to get into his subject. They are a stalling tactic which the student uses while he is trying to work up momentum for the main push.

A definition becomes really functional when it is used as Matthew Arnold does in refutation of Thomas Henry Huxley's "Science and Culture," one of the essays reproduced among the readings at the end of this chapter.

Let us, I say, be agreed about the meaning of the terms we are using.
I talk of knowing the best which has been thought and uttered in the

world; Professor Huxley says this means knowing *literature*. Literature is a large word; it may mean everything written with letters or printed in a book. Euclid's *Elements* and Newton's *Principia* are thus literature. All knowledge that reaches us through books is literature. But by literature Professor Huxley means *belles lettres*. He means to make me say, that knowing the best which has been thought and said by the modern nations is knowing their *belles lettres* and no more. And this is no sufficient equipment, he argues, for a criticism of modern life. But as I do not mean, by knowing ancient Rome, knowing merely more or less of Latin *belles lettres*, and taking no account of Rome's military, and political, and legal, and administrative work in the world; and as, by knowing ancient Greece, I understand knowing her as the giver of Greek art, and the guide to a free and right use of reason and to scientific method, and the founder of our mathematics, and physics and astronomy and biology—I understand knowing her as all this, and not merely knowing certain Greek poems, and histories, and treatises, and speeches—so as to the knowledge of modern nations also.

When we are seeking to clarify some of the important terms in a discussion, we can quote definitions from a dictionary. But the dictionary definitions will suit our purpose only when these accepted definitions agree with our notions. Sometimes, however, we have to devise our own definitions, either because the accepted definitions are too vague or because we believe them to be erroneous or inadequate. In such cases, we *stipulate* the meaning we will attach to certain terms in our discussion. Because Coleridge found that existing definitions of a poem did not accord with his notions of this genre, he formulated a definition which he felt was accurate:

The final definition then, so deduced, may be thus worded. A poem is that species of composition which is opposed to works of science by proposing for its *immediate* object pleasure, not truth; and from all other species (having *this* object in common with it) it is discriminated by proposing to itself such delight from the *whole* as is compatible with a distinct gratification from each component *part*.

From Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, Chapter XIV, 1817.

Genus

The topic of definition can be used not only for clarifying the point at issue but also for suggesting a line of argument. In the *Apology*, which is reproduced among the readings at the end of this chapter, we see Socrates using the topic of definition to defend himself against the charge of being an atheist. Asking what was meant by the "divine," Socrates proposed that it must refer either to the gods or to the works or agencies of the gods. He then goes on to argue from this definition that he could not be considered an atheist:

But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I believe in spiritual agencies—so you swear in the affidavit; and yet if I believe in divine things, how can I help believing in spirits or demigods;—must I not? To be sure I must; and therefore I may assume that your silence gives consent. Now what are spirits or demigods? are they not either gods or the sons of gods?

In the last sentence of this quotation, Socrates is resorting to an argument based on the first sub-topic under definition—the sub-topic of genus. Whenever the predicate of a proposition puts the subject into a general class of things—"Americans are lovers of freedom," "Suicide is a crime against society"—the subject is, in a sense, being defined, because limits are being fixed to the term. But such propositions can also pose an argument. The rhetorical force of the topic of genus derives from the principle that what is true (or untrue) of the genus must be true (or untrue) of the species. If all men are mortal, then John Smith, if he is a man, must be mortal too. Cicero in his *Topica* gives this example of an argument from Genus. If a man, he says, bequeathed all the silver in his possession to his wife, a lawyer could argue that the man intended to leave his wife not only all his silver plates and statues and candlesticks but also all the coin in his coffers, for coin is just as much a species of silver as are plates and statues and candlesticks.

Simply predicating a genus of some subject term will constitute a "proof," however, only when the audience is disposed to grant the truth of the classification. The preacher who declares from the pulpit, "Murder is a grievous sin," can safely presume that his congregation will agree with him. Whenever a speaker or writer cannot presume such ready assent, he must, of course, go on to justify his classification.

Perhaps the commonest use of definitions in argument is as a premise for a further argument. One form of this is the proposal of a definition as a norm and then the demonstration that something else either conforms or does not conform to this standard. We see another form of this in *The Federalist*, No. 10, reproduced among the readings at the end of this chapter. In paragraph 13 of this discourse, James Madison defines "a pure democracy" as "a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person." After pointing out in the remainder of the paragraph the shortcomings of such a system of government, Madison goes on to indicate in the next two paragraphs the direction that his argument will take in the rest of the discourse:

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it

varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

Madison is going to use the differences between the nature of a republic and the nature of a pure democracy as the means of proving his thesis that a confederation of states is the best way to control factions.

Division

We do in effect define something when we enumerate the parts that go to make it up and when we designate the species of a genus. We would be illuminating the nature of the state if we were to designate, as Socrates did in the early books of *The Republic*, the various occupations needed to make it function. So too the analysis of government into its various species—monarchy, democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, etc.—helps to throw some light on the concept.

One rhetorical use of the topic of division is to lay out the organization of the exposition or argument that is to follow. We see an example of this in the opening paragraphs of Francis Bacon's discourse on the Idols of the Mind:

The idols and false notions which are now in possession of the human understanding and have taken deep root therein, not only beset men's minds that truth can hardly find entrance, but even after entrance obtained, they will again in the very instauration of the sciences meet and trouble us, unless men being forewarned of the danger fortify themselves as far as may be against their assaults.

There are four classes of Idols which beset men's minds. To these for distinction's sake I have assigned names, calling the first class *Idols of the Tribe*; the second, *Idols of the Cave*; the third, *Idols of the Marketplace*; the fourth, *Idols of the Theatre*.

From Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, 1620.

Bacon takes up each of these idols in turn, explains what they are, and shows how they inhibit clear thinking.

Besides this use of division as an organizing principle, it can also be used to establish the grounds for an argument. We see an example of this use in paragraph 13 of Matthew Arnold's essay reproduced among the readings at the end of this chapter:

Deny the facts altogether, I think, he hardly can. He can hardly deny that when we set ourselves to enumerate the powers which go to the

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From Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, 1620.

Bacon takes up each of these idols in turn, explains what they are, and shows how they inhibit clear thinking.

Besides this use of division as an organizing principle, it can also be used to establish the grounds for an argument. We see an example of this use in paragraph 13 of Matthew Arnold's essay reproduced among the readings at the end of this chapter:

Deny the facts altogether, I think, he hardly can. He can hardly deny that when we set ourselves to enumerate the powers which go to the

building up of human life, and say that they are the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, and the power of social life and manners—he can hardly deny that this scheme, though drawn in rough and plain lines enough, and not pretending to scientific exactness, does yet give a fairly true representation of the matter. Human nature is built up by these powers; we have the need for them all. When we have rightly met and adjusted the claims of them all, we shall then be in a fair way for getting soberness and righteousness with wisdom. This is evident enough, and the friends of physical science would admit it.

From Matthew Arnold, "Literature and Science."

Arnold then uses this division into four "powers" to argue that an education in the humanities is superior to an exclusively scientific education, because the humanities can administer to the development of all of these powers in man, whereas an education in the natural sciences alone cannot.

Division can also be used to set up an argument by elimination. One can set up alternatives—"A man is a citizen either by birth or by naturalization"—and then by proving (or disproving) one alternative, he disproves (or proves) the other. Or one can enumerate a series of possibilities and eliminate them one by one. For instance, a defense attorney might argue like this:

A man in these circumstances might steal for any one of these reasons: (A). . . ; (B). . . ; (C). . . ; (D). . . . Now, we have firmly established that A and B could not possibly have been my client's motives. Furthermore, not even the prosecution has suggested in this trial that C or D could have been my client's motives. Since none of the possible motives are applicable in this case, it is clear that my client is innocent of the charge of stealing.

If the defense attorney has taken care to consider *all* the possible motives for this crime, a jury would find this to be a rather persuasive argument.

We have shown how division can be useful as a principle of organization and as the basis for an argument. In conclusion, we might point out that since explanation is sometimes managed by analysis of a whole into its parts, division can be as useful in expository writing as in argumentative discourse.

COMPARISON

The second common topic that we will consider is comparison. For the purposes of learning, explaining, or arguing, we frequently resort to the strategy of bringing two or more things together to study them for similarities, differences, superiority, or inferiority. This tendency to compare things is as natural for man as the tendency to define things. Man in his most primitive

state must early have turned to comparison in an attempt to fathom the bewildering world about him and to establish a scale of values. He discovered that the familiar often helped him to understand the unfamiliar, and he learned that by measuring one thing against another he could discriminate the "more" from the "less." In this section we shall investigate some of the ways in which we can use the topic of comparison in order to discover something to say on a given subject.

Similarity

One possible result of comparing things is the detection of similarity, the likeness of two or more things. Similarity is the basic principle behind all inductive argument and all analogy. In induction, we note similarity among a number of instances and make an inference about a further unobserved or unconfirmed instance. Analogy argues that if two things are alike in one or two characteristics, they are probably alike in another characteristic. The rhetorical form of induction, as we have seen, is the example—drawing a probable conclusion from a single instance of similarity. Perhaps the simplest way to differentiate analogy from induction by example is to say that whereas analogy argues from the similarities of dissimilar things, example argues from the similarities of similar things.

The following is the simplest and commonest form of argument from similarity: "If self-control is a virtue, so is abstinence." Here, noting the similarity in kind between self-control and abstinence and observing that virtue can be predicated of self-control, one infers that abstinence too must be a virtue. The ordinary person resorts to this kind of argument every day: "The student who copies from his neighbor in an examination and the student who allows or encourages his neighbor to copy from him are equally culpable. Both actions are forms of cheating." "The last time we attempted prohibition of the sale of liquor all kinds of abuses resulted. If the present proposal to prohibit the sale of narcotics is passed, we'll experience the same kind of legal and moral chaos."

The student will find many arguments from similarity among the readings in this book. We will look at only one example—this one from the third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of Samuel Johnson's "The Liberty of the Pulpit," in which he is arguing in defense of the minister who denounced some of his parishioners from the pulpit:

The right of censure and rebuke seems necessarily appendant to the pastoral office. He, to whom the care of a congregation is entrusted, is considered as the shepherd of a flock, as the teacher of a school, as the father of a family. As a shepherd tending not his own sheep but those of his master, he is answerable for those that stray, and that lose themselves by straying. But no man can be answerable for losses which he has

not power to prevent, or for vagrancy which he has not authority to restrain.

As a teacher giving instruction for wages, and liable to reproach, if those whom he undertakes to inform make no proficiency, he must have the power of enforcing attendance, of awakening negligence, and repressing contradiction.

As a father, he possesses the paternal authority of admonition, rebuke, and punishment. He cannot, without reducing his office to an empty name, be hindered from the exercise of any practice necessary to stimulate the idle, to reform the vicious, to check the petulant, and correct the stubborn.

Here Johnson is basing his argument on a comparison between the minister and other men in various capacities—the shepherd, the teacher, the father. When we make our comparison between things that exist in different orders of being—as, for instance, when we compare the structure of a society to the organization of a beehive—we are moving over into the province of analogy.

We might have treated analogy along with some of the basic principles of logic, but analogy, like most rhetorical arguments, produces only probable proof. Hence we will give here some of the principles governing it. Analogy revolves around the principle that two things which resemble one another in a number of respects resemble one another in a further, unconfirmable respect. This principle might be graphically represented by this scheme:

$$\begin{array}{l} A \quad 1 \ 2 \ 3 \ 4 \longrightarrow 5 \\ B \quad 1 \ 2 \ 3 \ 4 \longrightarrow (5) \end{array}$$

Two things, A and B, resemble one another in four known, confirmable respects. From these points of resemblance, we argue that B resembles A in a fifth respect (5 being known and confirmable in the case of A but not in the case of B). As in inductive argument, there is a leap from the known to the unknown. It is because of this inductive leap that analogy achieves probability rather than certainty.

Let us look at an example of argument by analogy:

There is only one cure for the evils which newly acquired freedom produces; and that cure is freedom. When a prisoner first leaves his cell he cannot bear the light of day: he is unable to discriminate colours or recognise faces. But the remedy is, not to remand him into his dungeon, but to accustom him to the rays of the sun. The blaze of truth and liberty may at first dazzle and bewilder nations which have become half blind in the house of bondage. But let them gaze on, and they will soon be able to bear it. In a few years men learn to reason. The extreme violence of opinion subsides. Hostile theories correct each other. The scattered ele-

ments of truth cease to contend, and begin to coalesce. And at length a system of justice and order is educed out of the chaos.

From Thomas Babington Macaulay, *Essay on Milton*, 1825.

Macaulay states his thesis in the first sentence of this passage: he contends that the cure for the evils that attend newly won emancipation is freedom. Noting similarities in the condition of a nation which has won its independence and that of a man who has just been released from prison, he elaborates that similarity to support his contention.

As we have already pointed out, an analogy does not really prove anything, but it can have persuasive value. Sometimes the nature of one's audience will determine how effective an argument by analogy will be. In most cases, however, the persuasiveness of the analogy will depend largely on adherence to these two principles:

1. The similarities between two things must concern pertinent, significant aspects of the two things.
2. The analogy must not ignore pertinent dissimilarities between the two things being compared.

For instance, an anthropologist might try to prove that a certain island in the Pacific was once inhabited by comparing it with another Pacific island known to have been inhabited. He might point out that both islands had palm trees, sandy beaches, placid lagoons, mild climate, and shelter from high winds. However, by ignoring the fact that the questionable island had a very low annual rainfall and that the island was too far from any mainland or other island to make it likely that people could have reached it by sailboat or canoe, he would be ignoring factors that are important to the issue at hand—namely, could people have reached the island, and once they reached it, could they have survived? Most of the time when someone says, “Your analogy doesn’t hold,” he is exposing an analogy that has avoided consideration of important differences. For instance, in the example quoted above, Macaulay has pointed out a number of similarities between the situation of a released prisoner and the situation of an emancipated nation. But are there not some relevant dissimilarities between the two situations? Is there not a significant difference between a nation of people and a single person—a difference that might justify a difference of treatment?

Analogy is often used too for purposes of exposition. By comparing something unfamiliar or abstruse with something familiar, one can facilitate his explanation. There is an example of this use in paragraph 21 of Dr. Oppenheimer’s essay reproduced at the end of this chapter. Dr. Oppenheimer uses the analogy of a tree to show how knowledge tends to ramify:

How then does it go? In studying the different parts of nature, one explores with different instruments, explores different objects, and one gets a branching of what at one time had been common talk, common sense. Each branch develops new instruments, ideas, words suitable for describing that part of the world of nature. This tree-like structure, all growing from the common trunk of man's common primordial experience, has branches no longer associated with the same question, nor the same words and techniques. The unity of science, apart from the fact that it all has a common origin in man's ordinary life, is not a unity of deriving one part from another, nor of finding an identity between one part and another, between let us say, genetics and topology, to take two impossible examples, where there is indeed some connection.

From J. Robert Oppenheimer, "On Science and Culture."

In paragraph 19 of Edmund Burke's "Letter to a Noble Lord," reproduced among the readings in this chapter, we see another use being made of analogy. By comparing his present situation with that of a fallen oak tree, Burke is seeking to stir the emotions of his audience:

But a Disposer whose power we are little able to resist and whose wisdom it behooves us not at all to dispute, has ordained it in another manner and (whatever my querulous weakness might suggest) a far better. The storm has gone over me; and I am like one of those old oaks which the late hurricane has scattered about me. I am stripped of all my honours, I am torn up by the roots and lie prostrate on the earth! There, and prostrate there, I most unfeignedly recognize the Divine justice and in some degree submit to it.

Difference

Another possible result of comparing two or more things is a detection of differences. At some time in his academic career, the student must have been asked to answer an essay-question that begins with the formula, "Compare and contrast. . . ." The "compare" part of that formula is asking the student to set forth the similarities between things; the "contrast" part of the formula is asking the student to note the differences between things. In the eighteenth century, it was common for those critics who were influenced by John Locke's psychology of knowledge to define *wit*, the imaginative faculty, as the faculty that saw resemblances between things and to define *judgment*, the rational faculty, as the faculty that saw differences between things. Wit, in other words, was the synthetic faculty, and judgment was the analytic faculty. It would be well to develop both judgment and wit.

Rhetoricians made use of the topic of difference to gather arguments for confirmation or refutation. Edmund Burke's essay at the end of this chapter, "Letter to a Noble Lord," is a good essay for the student to study for an

illustration of the operation of the topic of difference. In this *apologia*, Burke bases most of his defense on difference. He spends a great deal of time, for instance, contrasting the pension that he has received from the government with the pension that the Duke of Bedford's family received many years ago. Here is just one example, from paragraph 3 of the essay, of Burke's argument from differences:

I really am at a loss to draw any sort of parallel between the public merits of his Grace, by which he justifies the grants he holds, and these services of mine, on the favorable construction of which I have obtained what his Grace so much disapproves. In private life, I have not at all the honour of acquaintance with the noble Duke. But I ought to presume, and it costs me nothing to do so, that he abundantly deserves the esteem and love of all who live with him. But as to public service, why truly it would not be more ridiculous for me to compare myself in rank, in fortune, in splendid descent, in youth, strength, or figure, with the Duke of Bedford, than to make a parallel between his services and my attempts to be useful to my country. It would not be gross adulation, but uncivil irony, to say that he has any public merit of his own to keep alive the idea of the services by which his vast landed pensions were obtained. My merits, whatever they are, are original and personal; his are derivative. It is his ancestor, the original pensioner, that has laid up this inexhaustible fund of merit, which makes his Grace so very delicate and exceptionous about the merit of all other grantees of the Crown. Had he permitted me to remain in quiet, I should have said, 'tis his estate; that's enough. It is his by law; what have I to do with it or its history? He would naturally have said on his side, 'tis this man's fortune.—He is as good now as my ancestor was two hundred and fifty years ago. I am a young man with very old pensions; he is an old man with very young pensions—that's all.

The student can study the topic of difference in some of the other readings reproduced at the end of this chapter. In paragraph 6, for instance, of Macaulay's "The Character of Boswell," he will note how the author attempts to influence our opinion of his subject by pointing out that whereas in the case of most writers we admire both the writer and his book, in the case of Boswell, we despise the writer and admire his book. In paragraph 15 of *The Federalist*, No. 10, James Madison, after defining the terms "pure democracy" and "republic," goes on to contrast the efficiency of these two forms of government. Matthew Arnold makes frequent use of the topic of difference in his essay "Literature and Science"; in paragraph 11 of that essay, to pick out only one example, we see Arnold marking the differences between the physical sciences ("knowledge of things") and the humanities ("knowledge of words"). In paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of "On Science and Culture," we see Dr. Oppenheimer contrasting the culture of former times, which tended to

preserve and consolidate the body of knowledge, with the culture of modern times, which tends to encourage and accelerate changes in knowledge. A study of these and other examples should convince the student of how common the topic of difference is in discourse and of how useful this topic can be for purposes of exposition or persuasion.

Degree

More and less—the topic to which we have attached the label “degree”—was one of the four common topics that Aristotle discussed in his *Rhetoric*. Aristotle perceived that in comparing things we sometimes discover, not a difference *in kind*, as in the previous topic, but a difference *in degree*. One thing will be better than another; or it will be worse. The relevance of this fact for rhetoric is that sometimes when we are seeking to persuade others to do something or to accept something, we have to show our audience that the choice before them is not between a good and an evil but between a greater good and a lesser good—or between a greater evil and a lesser evil.

Questions of degree are not easy to settle, mainly because judgments about such a difference are usually relative and subjective. To help orators find arguments to decide questions of degree, Aristotle provided a set of criteria in Book I, Chapter 7 of his *Rhetoric*. Here are some of his criteria:

1. A greater number of things can be considered more desirable than a smaller number of the same things.

Deciding questions of degree by numerical superiority must be attended with certain cautions. Numerical superiority, first of all, must be reckoned in regard to things of the same species. Ten one-dollar bills are obviously a greater good than five one-dollar bills; but ten one-dollar bills are not a greater good than five ten-dollar bills. Then too numerical superiority becomes a helpful determinant of degree only when all other things are equal. A congressman might argue that a tax bill which will bring in four billion dollars of revenue is a better proposal than the tax bill which will bring in only three billion dollars. But the congressman's argument will persuade his colleagues only if a number of other considerations are equal: if both bills are equally just; if both bills are equally enforceable; if both bills can be administered at relatively equal cost. Numerical superiority would also be qualified by the quality of the things involved. It might be argued, for instance, that the football coach who recruited twenty players had done a better job than the coach who recruited only fifteen players. But the coach who had recruited only fifteen players might actually have engaged a greater number of superior athletes or have recruited two or three players who are worth more to a team than the entire twenty players hired by the other coach.

2. That which is an *end* is a greater good than that which is only a *means*.

The principle underlying this criterion is that a *means* is desirable only for the sake of something else; but an *end* is desirable for its own sake. Health, for instance, is a greater good than exercise, because we indulge in exercise for the sake of acquiring or maintaining health. Exercise is a means to a good outside itself; but in relation to exercise, health is an end, something which is desirable for its own sake.

3. What is scarce is greater than what is abundant.

This principle is the basis of most monetary systems. Silver coins are of greater value than copper coins because silver is a scarcer metal than copper; gold is more valuable than silver for the same reason. We should be aware, however, that in some circumstances the opposite principle could be used as a criterion of superior value. We could argue that what is abundant is a greater good than what is scarce because the abundant is more useful. Thus although water is more abundant than gold, in some circumstances water would be judged the greater good because it was more useful.

4. What men of practical wisdom would choose is a greater good than what ignorant men would choose.

Plato's many arguments about the "one" and the "many" were examples of the application of this criterion. What is involved here is the impressiveness of authority. As a practical matter, we all rely on the judgments of experts. Where judgments about value conflict, the antecedent probability is that the judgment of the expert is more reliable than that of the amateur. Under the fifth of the common topics, we shall discuss at some length the part that testimony or informed opinion plays in exposition and argument.

5. What the majority of men would choose is better than what the minority would choose.

This criterion, the opposite of the previous one, smacks very much of the nose-counting method of determining worth. "If you want to find out what the most worthwhile current novels are, consult the best-seller lists." "The better candidate is the one the people elect." This criterion will have persuasive value with people who conceive of the *good* in the Aristotelian sense of that which is desirable for its own sake. Desirability is a quite different thing from worth. We all know that what all men or most men desire is not always a good in the moral or aesthetic sense. But if, in any given dis-

cussion, people are thinking of good in terms of what is desirable, then the preference of the majority will be persuasive.

Advertisers make great use of this criterion. "More people smoke Camels than any other cigarette." Sometimes of course what all men or most men choose *is* the worthiest good. There is a certain presumptive evidence that the product most people buy is the best product. Other factors, of course, influence the popularity of a product—its price, its prestige value, its advertising—but if there is any validity to the maxim "You can't fool all of the people all of the time," one is inclined to believe that it is the quality of the product that maintains sales at a high level.

6. What men would really like to possess is a greater good than what men would merely like to give the impression of possessing.

In *The Prince*, Machiavelli said that a reputation for virtue was so important to the image a ruler needs to create that if he was not *really* a virtuous man he must at least give the *appearance* of being a virtuous man. Tested by this sixth criterion, Machiavelli's view suggests that power is a greater good than virtue, because power is what the ruler really wants and in order to get it he is ready to assume a mask of virtue. Aristotle uses a similar example: one could argue that health is a greater good than justice, because while men can be content with the mere reputation for being just, men prefer being healthy to only seeming healthy.

7. If a thing does not exist where it is more likely to exist, it will not exist where it is less likely to exist.

This is a line of argument to which logicians commonly assign the Latin label *a fortiori* ("from the stronger"). John Donne, in the sonnet that depreciates the power and dreadfulness of death, used an *a fortiori* argument to develop his thesis. Here are the first six lines of that sonnet:

Death, be not proud, though some have called thee
Mighty and dreadful, for thou art not so,
For those, whom thou think'st thou dost overthrow,
Die not, poor Death, nor yet canst thou kill me.
From rest and sleep, which but thy pictures be,
Much pleasure, then from thee much more must flow,

A paraphrase of the elliptical syntax in lines 5 and 6 will clarify the *a fortiori* argument implicit in those lines. In line 5, Donne says that rest and sleep are like death, are "imitations" of death. We all know that we derive a great deal of pleasure from rest and sleep; therefore, we should derive even more pleasure from that which they imitate, from death. If so much pleasure from

the *lesser* thing, how much more pleasure from the *greater* thing. Therefore death cannot be as dreadful as we have been led to believe.

An *a fortiori* argument can work in two directions: (1) from the greater to the lesser, or (2) from the lesser to the greater. Donne starts out with a consideration of the lesser and then makes an inference about the greater. An *a fortiori* argument that works in the other direction would take a form like this: "If a man would steal from a friend, he would steal from a stranger."

An *a fortiori* argument sets up two possibilities, one of which will be more probable than the other. Whatever can be affirmed about the less probable can be affirmed with even greater force about the more probable. Like most rhetorical arguments, an *a fortiori* argument does not lead to certainty; it leads to a more or less strong probability.

A number of arguments from the topic of degree are pointed out in the analyses of whole essays in this and the following chapter. Here are two leads to arguments from degree in some of the readings that are not analyzed:

He charged his minister, in a publick paper, with scandal, defamation, and falsehood. The minister, thus reproached, had his own character to vindicate, upon which his pastoral authority must necessarily depend. To be charged with a defamatory lie is an injury which no man patiently endures in common life. To be charged with polluting the pastoral office with scandal and falsehood, was a violation of character still more atrocious, as it affected not only his personal but his clerical veracity.

From paragraph 14 of Samuel Johnson's "The Liberty of the Pulpit."

If then there is to be separation and option between humane letters on the one hand and the natural sciences on the other, the great majority of mankind, all who have not exceptional and over-powering aptitudes for the study of nature, would do well, I cannot but think, to choose to be educated in humane letters rather than in the natural sciences. Letters will call out their being at more points, will make them live more.

From final paragraph of Matthew Arnold's "Literature and Science."

RELATIONSHIP

Cause and Effect

The first sub-topic that we will consider under the general head of relationship is cause and effect. Just as men have always exhibited a desire to know the nature of things and a curiosity about likenesses and differences, so they have always felt the urge to discover the "why" of something. A child exhibits the first glimmerings of rationality when he passes from the stage of asking the question "what" about the world around him to the stage of ask-

ing the question "why." "What is that, Daddy?" "That's rain, son. It's water that falls from those dark clouds." "Why, Daddy?" Having noted an effect, the child begins to ask questions about the cause.

Men have traditionally accepted as axiomatic the principle that every effect must have a cause. Many of the arguments for the existence of God, for instance, have been based on this principle. Having observed the universe in its wonderful immensity, harmony, and complexity, men have postulated that this world had its beginnings in God, the Prime Mover, the Uncaused Cause.

Cause-and-effect relationships constitute one of the most fruitful sources of arguments. But before we explore the rhetorical uses of cause and effect, we should review a few principles governing this kind of reasoning.

First of all, we must recognize that an effect could have a number of possible causes. In the case of a broken window, for instance, we know that a number of things could account for that broken window. Someone could have thrown a rock at the window; the wind could have broken the window; tremors in the earth could have broken the window; a sonic boom from a passing jet airplane could have broken the window. Although these are all possible causes of the broken window, only one of these will be the cause of *this* broken window. The task is to determine *which* cause. Most detective stories start out with a murder. The detective must sort out, from all the possible or probable causes, *the* causes of this particular murder; he must discover the murderer.

Secondly, the cause that we assign for an effect must be capable of producing the effect. It must, in other words, be an *adequate* cause. If a detective discovers that a robust man was strangled to death, he immediately rules out as a suspect the little old maiden aunt, the twelve-year-old nephew of the deceased, and the 114-pound chambermaid. All of these people are capable of murdering someone, even by strangling a person, but they could not have strangled the powerful man stretched out on the carpet in the library. Now, there is the ju-jitsu artist who had been paying court to the victim's daughter....

Thirdly, once we have a probable and adequate cause for something, we must consider whether there are other adequate causes for the effect. Yes, there was that ju-jitsu artist, but there was also that tall, gangly butler and that wiry, irascible gardener. They too could have strangled the man.

Fourthly, we must consider whether the conditions or circumstances were such that the potential cause could operate. In a controlled experiment—like those that a chemist conducts in the laboratory—such conditions as time, temperature, humidity, proportions, can be stabilized or varied to test whether the hypothetical cause is the real cause. In the case of human beings acting

as efficient causes, such conditions as opportunity and motivation must be considered.

Lastly, we must also consider whether the hypothetical cause always produces an effect and whether it invariably produces the same effect. In short, we must establish not only that a putative cause *could* produce a particular effect but also that it *would* produce the effect.

One of the commonest errors in cause-and-effect reasoning is the fallacy usually referred to by the Latin label *post hoc ergo propter hoc* ("after this, therefore because of this"). This is the error of supposing that where there is a time relationship between two events there is also a cause-and-effect relationship. A number of supersititions are built upon this fallacy. John Smith got hit by a car at the intersection of Fifth and Main Streets because five minutes before, he had walked under a painter's ladder. It is understandable, of course, why men tend to suppose that when one event chronologically follows another event the later event was caused by the earlier event. But we must *prove* the cause-and-effect relationship; we cannot *presume* relationship. Try proving that John Smith's having walked under a ladder resulted in his being hit by a car. On the face of it, the action does not seem to be a suitable or adequate cause for the effect. His walking under the ladder could indicate general carelessness, and that carelessness could explain why he was hit while crossing a busy intersection. But there was no direct relationship between the two events.

The principles we have been reviewing in connection with cause-and-effect relationships are the principles normally discussed in a logic class. Nevertheless, a conscientious rhetorician must be aware of these principles too and must observe them in his presentation of arguments. He must be especially careful to observe these principles when he is addressing a sophisticated audience that will not accept slipshod causal reasoning.

In persuasive discourse, arguments based on causal relationships work in two directions. We can argue from an effect back to a cause, or we can start with a cause and argue that it will produce a particular effect or effects. We see an instance of an argument from cause to effect in Jonathan Swift's *A Modest Proposal*. After making his "modest proposal" that the poor people of Ireland should sell their year-old infants as table fare for the wealthy, he points out that the implementation of his proposal would have these effects:

I have too long digressed, and therefore shall return to my subject. I think the advantages by the proposal which I have made are obvious and many, as well as of the highest importance.

For first, as I have already observed, it would greatly lessen the number of Papists, with whom we are yearly overrun, being the principal breeders of the nation, as well as our most dangerous enemies. . . .

Secondly, the poorer tenants will have something valuable of their own, which by law may be made liable to distress and help to pay their landlords rent, their corn and cattle being seized, and *money a thing unknown*.

Thirdly, Whereas the maintenance of an hundred thousand children, from two years old, and upwards, cannot be computed at less than ten shillings a piece *per annum*, the nation's stock will be thereby increased fifty thousand pounds *per annum*, besides the profit of a new dish, introduced to the tables of all gentlemen of fortune in the kingdom, who have any refinement in taste, and the money will circulate among ourselves, the goods being entirely of our own growth and manufacture.

Swift goes on to name a fourth, fifth, and sixth effect of his proposal, but this is enough to illustrate our point. As any schoolboy knows who has read this famous ironical essay, Swift was not seriously offering a proposal that he expects the government to adopt, but the point is that he was using the terminology and the kind of argument that a hard-headed mercantilist of the eighteenth century might have used in trying to persuade others that "people represent the riches of a nation." If it is fairly self-evident, as in this instance, that the cause will produce the proposed effects and if the proposed effects seem desirable to the audience, the mere recital of the effects will be persuasive.

If, on the other hand, it is not self-evident that the proposed effects will follow from a particular cause, then one must prove his claims. Before Dr. Jonas Salk, for instance, won approval from the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to put his vaccine on the market, he had to present ample evidence that it would, as he claimed, prevent polio. With something as crucial as a vaccine one would have to present proof sufficient to create virtual certainty about its effects. In many affairs of state, however, such as a proposal that a reduction in occupation taxes would attract dozens of new industries to a community, a legislator would have to produce only a high degree of probability in order to persuade his colleagues.

The other way to argue causally is from effect back to a cause. We see James Madison arguing from effect to cause in paragraph 7 of *The Federalist*, No. 10:

But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors and those who are debtors fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfer-

ing interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

Again it may be well to point out that in human affairs it is not always necessary to demonstrate, with the same rigorous certainty that we expect in logic or science, that a particular effect was produced by a certain cause and no other. It is often sufficient that we produce a high degree of probability.

Antecedent and Consequence

Closely allied to the topic of cause and effect is the topic of antecedent and consequence. In fact, the latter may be regarded as merely a looser form of the cause-and-effect arguments practiced in logic. The etymology of the term *consequence* (the Latin verb *sequi*, to follow) is the key to an understanding of the way in which rhetoric used this topic. The persuader pursues this line of argument: given this situation (the antecedent), what follows (the consequence) from this? If he can detect a cause-and-effect relationship between the antecedent and consequence, he will avail himself of the relationship to strengthen his case. But he will also make use of less compelling kinds of consequences (things that follow). For instance, he might argue that since Jane Smith was not the legal wife of John Smith at the time of his death, it follows that she is not entitled to his possessions. Here there is no cause-and-effect relationship, but some judgment does follow from the existent situation.

We frequently use this kind of antecedent-consequence argument in our everyday affairs. "If girls are admitted to the university as full-time students, they must be accorded the same rights and privileges as the male students." "If these students violated the university's regulations about drinking at school-sponsored gatherings, they must be suspended." "If this man is a natural-born citizen, he has the right to vote." Sometimes the consequence follows from the definition of the antecedent term. For example, "If this figure is a square, it has four right-angles" or "If this creature is a man, he is a rational animal."

The student should note that there is usually an implied premise whenever an argument takes this form. When we say, "If girls are admitted to the university as full-time students, they must be accorded the same rights and privileges as the male students," we imply that all full-time students are entitled to the same rights and privileges. Oftentimes it is this unexpressed premise, this assumption, that is the vulnerable spot in an argument. So when one is looking for an opening to refute such an argument, he would do well to search for the assumption.

The student will recall that in the earlier section of this chapter, where some of the main principles of logic were reviewed, the antecedent-conse-

quence proposition often served as the major premise of the hypothetical syllogism. ("If this man is a natural-born citizen, he has the right to vote." "This man *is* a natural-born citizen." "Therefore, he has a right to vote.") The student should review the rules governing the validity of such deductive reasoning so that he may be guided in formulating his own antecedent-consequence arguments and in detecting fallacies in the arguments that others present.

Here are a few examples of arguments from antecedent and consequence from the readings at the end of this chapter:

We cannot know all the best thoughts and sayings of the Greeks unless we know what they thought about natural phenomena. We cannot fully apprehend their criticism of life unless we understand the extent to which that criticism was affected by scientific conceptions. We falsely pretend to be the inheritors of their culture, unless we are penetrated, as the best minds among them were, with an unhesitating faith that the free employment of reason, in accordance with scientific method, is the sole method of reaching truth.

From paragraph 30 of Thomas Henry Huxley, "Science and Culture."

Of all this there is possibility, and of all this there is danger. But if possibility of evil be to exclude good, no good ever can be done. If nothing is to be attempted in which there is danger, we must all sink into hopeless inactivity.

From paragraph 13 of Samuel Johnson, "The Liberty of the Pulpit."

There are several points to keep in mind. One would naturally think that if we are publishing so much, it must be trivial. I think that this is not true: any scientific community with sane people would protect itself against that, because we have to read what is published. The argument not to permit the accumulation of trivial, unimportant things which are not really new, which do not add to what was known before, is overwhelming.

From paragraph 16 of J. Robert Oppenheimer, "On Science and Culture."

Contraries

At first sight the topic of contraries may seem very much like the topic of difference. But there is a subtle difference between the two topics. Difference involves unlike or dissimilar things, things which differ *in kind*; contraries on the other hand, involve opposite or incompatible things of the same kind. Differences become apparent when we compare things: contraries become apparent when we relate things. *Liberty* and *license* would be an example of difference; *liberty* and *slavery* would be an example of contraries.

Before discussing the rhetorical uses of the topic of contraries, we will briefly consider some of the logical principles governing contraries. Contrary terms are terms opposed to one another in the same order or genus. *Cold* and *loud* are different terms, but they are not contrary terms, because *cold* concerns the order of temperature, and *loud* the order of sound. *Cold* and *hot*, and *loud* and *quiet*, would be contrary terms. So if one person said, "This book is red" and the other person said, "This book is green," we would say that the propositions are opposed as contraries.

These are the things we know about contrary propositions *a priori*—that is, before examination or analysis: (1) If one of the propositions is true, the other one is false; in other words, contrary propositions are incompatible; (2) If one of the propositions is false, the other one is not necessarily true; in other words, both of the propositions could be false. (See the "Square of Opposition" in the section on logic.)

In an argument, then, if it has been agreed upon that contrary assertions have been made about the same subject, one can discredit the other assertion by proving that his assertion is true; in that case, one doesn't have to *prove* that the other assertion is false (if I prove that the book is red, I don't have to prove that the book is not green). On the other hand, if one proves that his opponent's proposition is false, his own proposition is not automatically true; one must go on to *prove* that his own proposition is true. (If I prove that the book is not green, I cannot assume that the book is red; after all, the book might be blue.)

In rhetoric, arguments involving contraries or opposites sometimes take a form in which the subject terms and the predicate terms are both contrary. In Book II, Chapter 23, of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle gives an example of an argument based on the topic of contraries: "Self-control is beneficial because licentiousness is harmful." Here the subject terms *self-control* and *licentiousness* are contraries; and the predicate terms *beneficial* and *harmful* are contraries too. We establish the truth of the first proposition ("Self-control is beneficial") by showing that the opposite of *beneficial* (namely, *harmful*) can be predicated of the opposite of *self-control* (namely, *licentiousness*). If someone were to argue, "If war is the cause of our misery, peace is the way to promote our happiness," he would be advancing the same kind of argument, for he would in effect be saying, "Peace must be a good because war is an evil."

In the following excerpt, Henry David Thoreau argues from contraries—diligence (exertion) versus sloth (sluggishness), purity (chastity) versus impurity (sensuality), and wisdom versus ignorance—contending that whereas sloth makes a man ignorant and impure, diligence will make him wise and pure:

All sensuality is one, though it takes many forms; all purity is one. It is the same whether a man eat, or drink, or cohabit, or sleep sensually. They are but one appetite, and we only need to see a person do any one of these things to know how great a sensualist he is. The impure can neither stand nor sit with purity. When the reptile is attacked at one mouth of his burrow, he shows himself at another. If you would be chaste, you must be temperate. What is chastity? How shall a man know if he is chaste? He shall not know it. We have heard of this virtue, but we know not what it is. We speak conformably to the rumor which we have heard. From exertion come wisdom and purity; from sloth, ignorance and sensuality. In the student, sensuality is a sluggish habit of mind. An unclean person is universally a slothful one, one who sits by a stove, whom the sun shines on prostrate, who reposes without being fatigued. If you would avoid uncleanness and all the sins, work earnestly, though it be at cleaning a stable.

From "Higher Laws," *Walden*, 1854.

Contradictions

In the previous discussion, we saw that propositions like "the water is hot" and "the water is cold" are contrary propositions. Contradictory propositions would be opposed this way: "the water is hot"; "the water is not hot." In studying the square of opposition in the section on logic, we saw also that A and O propositions are contradictory—"all fathers are members of the male species" and "some fathers are not members of the male species"—and that E and I propositions are contradictory—"no fathers are members of the male species" and "some fathers are members of the male species." Contradiction is built on the principle that a thing cannot at the same time and in the same respect be and not be.

As in the case of contraries, there are some things we know *a priori* about contradictory propositions: (1) one of the propositions must be true, and the other must be false; (2) if one of the propositions is true, the other is false; (3) if one of the propositions is false, the other is true. So if one group of medical men says that cigarette-smoking causes lung cancer and another group says that it does not cause lung cancer, we know, before we ever investigate the facts, that one of these groups is right and the other is wrong. As we know from the heated controversy about this question in the press, it has been difficult for either group to prove conclusively that its claim is the correct one. But still we know that one of these groups has to be right, and someday scientists and doctors may be able to prove beyond doubt which group is right. Until such time, people will be guided in their decision about whether to smoke or not by the group which presents the most persuasive or probable arguments.

In preparing arguments, either for confirmation or for refutation, we will recognize contradictions as a helpful topic whenever we see two propositions related in such a way that the truth of one entails the falsity of the other. So we might begin a section of our discourse in this fashion: "Some people maintain that the Constitution guarantees the right of every citizen to vote; others maintain that the Constitution states no such right." From these two contradictory propositions, we could go on to argue for one or the other claim. Sometimes we will start out by setting up an either/or situation: "Either he is willing to take a loyalty oath, or he is not willing"; "One thing we know for certain is that this mysterious cousin of his in Australia is either a man or a woman." And if the alternatives in the disjunctive proposition are indeed mutually exclusive, we know that if we can prove one of the alternatives to be true we will have proved that the other is necessarily false. Sometimes the contradiction between two related statements is implicit rather than explicit, and in that case our line of argument will be to point up the inconsistency or, as we say, "the contradiction in terms." So we might launch a refutation in this fashion: "My opponent claims that he is a fervent advocate of democracy. But has he not made it abundantly clear that he would deny the vote to certain citizens solely on the basis of color?" By showing that the two positions are incompatible, we would in effect be proving that our opponent is *not* a fervent advocate of democracy.

CIRCUMSTANCE

The Possible and the Impossible

The first sub-topic to be considered under the general head of circumstance is the possible and the impossible. Often when we are seeking to persuade others to do something, we have to show them that the proposed course of action is possible; likewise, when we are seeking to discourage others from doing something, we may want to show them that the proposed course of action is impossible. Even when people recognize that a course of action is desirable, they will sometimes hesitate to embark on it because they doubt that it is feasible.

A common way to inspire an audience with confidence in the practicality of a proposed course of action is to cite examples of people who have accomplished a similar or identical thing. The examples will be persuasive in proportion to the similarity of the actions and the circumstances.

One can also argue deductively about the possible. In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle proposed some lines of arguments about the possible. He did not lay down another set of arguments for the impossible, but suggested at the end

of the action on the possible, "As for the impossible, the speaker will obviously have his stock of arguments in the opposites of the foregoing." The student will recognize that in arguing the possible one frequently employs some of the other topics that we have already discussed. Here are some of the lines of argument that Aristotle poses:

1. If one of a pair of contraries is possible, then the other is possible too.

The assumption here is that any two contraries, from their nature as contraries, are possible. For instance, if a man can get well, he can fall sick. It should be pointed out, however, that in some cases the pair of contraries may not be *equally* possible. For instance, in some cases we may not be able to argue that if a man can fall sick, he can get well, because he may be suffering from an incurable disease. As always in rhetoric, one must seize on the arguments that are available for the particular case in question.

2. If one of a pair of similar things is possible, the other thing is possible too.

For instance, if it is possible for a man to play an organ, it is possible for him to play a piano. The fact that men have always argued for the possibility of one thing by pointing to the possibility of a similar instance suggests that the principle involved here is self-evident.

3. If the more difficult of two things is possible, then the easier is possible too.

For instance, a spokesman for the National Aeronautic and Space Administration may one day be arguing before Congress that if it is possible to rocket a single man to Mars, it is possible to rocket several men to the moon. The student may recognize here the operation of the *a fortiori* argument that we discussed in connection with the topic of degree.

4. If something can have a beginning, it can have an end; and conversely, if something can have an end, it can have a beginning.

The principle upon which this argument is based is that no impossibility comes, or begins to come, into existence. Aristotle's classic example of an impossibility—of something that cannot have a beginning and therefore cannot have an end—is squaring a circle. Aristotle is not suggesting that everything that has a beginning will necessarily be finished. What he is suggesting is that every beginning implies an end and that every end implies a beginning. The man who uses this topic to win acceptance for his proposal is

arguing for the feasibility or facility of his plan rather than for its mere possibility. He argues, in effect, that "well begun is half done," that what has been begun can with faith, perseverance, and hard work be brought to fruition.

5. If the parts of a thing are possible, then the whole is possible; and conversely, if the whole is possible, the parts are possible.

One can imagine a group of space scientists using this line of argument to convince members of Congress that it is possible to put a man into orbit. By showing that all the component parts of a launching vehicle have been manufactured or can be manufactured, they could argue that a rocket capable of putting a man into space could, if adequate appropriations were made by Congress, be constructed. The writers of the *Federalist* papers used an argument like this when they proposed that a confederation of states was possible because the components of such a confederation already existed. The persuasiveness of an argument in the other direction—from whole to part—is self-evident. If a functioning unit exists, then all the parts necessary for that functioning unit must exist.

6. If a thing can be produced without art or preparation, it certainly can be done with the help of art or planning.

This is a kind of *a fortiori* argument, but it differs slightly from the line of argument suggested in (3) above. Principle (3) is concerned with an argument about whether a thing can be done at all; (6) is concerned with whether a thing can be done well.

In paragraph 24 of his essay "Literature and Science," Matthew Arnold asks, "Have humane letters, then, have poetry and eloquence, the power here attributed to them of engaging the emotions?" To substantiate his claim that the humanities *can* engage the emotions, he refers to the common experience of men. "The appeal," Arnold says, "is to experience. Experience shows that for the vast majority of men, for mankind in general, they have the power." The assumption behind all appeals to experience or historical example is that if something *has* been done, it can be done again.

One of the advantages that James Madison attaches to a confederation of states is that there is less chance of unworthy men seizing control of the government. He does not say that it is *impossible* for unworthy men to seize power in a confederation of states, but he does say that it is *more difficult* for such men to seize power. He puts it this way in paragraph 18 of *The Federalist*, No. 10:

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to center in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

The student will discover many other examples of arguments from the possible and impossible in the readings reproduced in this book.

Past Fact and Future Fact

The topic of past fact is concerned with whether something has or has not happened. In ancient rhetoric it played an important part in forensic oratory, since for the definition of the issue in a court trial it was important to determine whether an act had been done or not. Future fact—or, more accurately, future probability—was concerned with whether or not something would happen; this topic was used most often in deliberative oratory.

Wherever evidence or testimony is available to prove that something has happened, it should of course be presented to substantiate the claims that have been made about past events. But frequently in human affairs it is not easy, sometimes impossible, to discover the evidence or testimony that could confirm the occurrence of an event. In such cases, one must resort to arguing the *probability* of something having occurred. As we have said repeatedly, the *probable* is the main province in which the rhetorician operates; after all, there can be no room for argument about what is certain.

Where past fact cannot be established empirically, deductive reasoning takes over and, arguing from probable premises, draws more or less probable conclusions. Here are some lines of arguments that one can use to persuade others about a past fact:

1. If the less probable of two events has occurred, the more probable event is likely to have occurred too.

Here is the *a fortiori* argument again. Statisticians, among others, make use of this line of argument to establish the probability of past occurrences. If a number of triplets have been born, then a proportionate number of twins have been born too. Imagine a prosecuting lawyer using this line of argument to persuade a jury about the guilt of the defendant: "If, as has been admitted, this man has been guilty of stealing money from his father, do you find it too far-fetched to believe that he was capable of embezzling money from his employer?" The degree of probability would increase of course with the frequency of occurrence.

2. If something that naturally follows something else has occurred, then that something else has happened too; and conversely, if the antecedents were present, then the natural consequences occurred too.

Men instinctively reason this way. If we hear thunder, we presume that lightning has flashed, even though we may never have seen the flash of lightning. Or if lightning flashed, then thunder followed. If a man has forgotten something, we presume that he once knew it. If a man has a fever, we suppose that he has been seized by some illness. If a man shows up with a black eye and a swollen lip, the natural supposition is that he has been in a fight or walked into a door.

3. If someone had the power and the desire and the opportunity to do something, then he has done it.

The principle supporting the probability here is that men will gratify their desires when they have the chance, either through lack of self-control or through a natural appetite for what they perceive as a good. Prosecuting lawyers have employed this line of argument in trying to convince a jury that the defendant was guilty. Such arguments of course can legally establish nothing more than a strong suspicion of guilt, but combined with other incriminating evidence, they do have great persuasive power.

Arguments *against* the probability of something having occurred can be found in the opposites of the foregoing lines of argument.

One must more often rely on probable arguments to establish future fact than to establish past fact, because where something has occurred there is always the chance of discovering the proof that it has indeed occurred; but there is always a note of uncertainty about future events. Here are some suggestive lines of argument for persuading others about the likelihood of a future event:

1. If the power and the desire to do something are present, then that something will be done.

One of the strong arguments that have been advanced in support of nuclear disarmament is that the mere possession of atomic weapons poses a constant temptation to a nation to use them against an enemy. Some pacifists go so far as to argue that the use of the nuclear bomb is not only probable but inevitable.

2. If the antecedents of something are present, then the natural consequences will occur.

"If dark clouds have gathered, it is going to rain." (Even the weatherman will admit that this event is just a probability.) "If a raging mob has gathered

in the public square, violence will follow." Some consequences, of course, occur so regularly, that high probability verges on virtual certainty. When a tightly closed room is filled with gas fumes, it is virtually certain that if someone strikes a match in that room an explosion will occur.

3. If the means are available, the end will be accomplished.

The odds-makers at Las Vegas are certainly going to pick as the winner of the World Series the baseball team that appears to be stronger on paper. But as everyone knows, the team with the "best means" does not always win the World Series. This line of argument is a familiar one in political debate. Now that the legal machinery has been set up to protect civil rights, it appears likely that some time in the near future everyone in the United States will enjoy the rights and privileges of first-class citizenship.

The main burden of the argument in the editorial about the Sacco-Vanzetti trial printed at the end of this chapter is that the execution of the defendants should be stayed because grave doubts exist about the evidence presented in the trial to establish a past fact. In paragraph 3 of the editorial, the writer cites those doubts to establish a future probability too:

These elemental conditions have not been fulfilled, we submit, in the cases of Sacco and Vanzetti. There remains in the minds of uncounted multitudes the gravest doubt as to whether they have had an absolutely unprejudiced trial on all the available evidence. . . . There can be no question, therefore, that if Sacco and Vanzetti die on Monday night multitudes will regard their death not as a just penalty for a brutal crime but as a martyrdom.

In paragraph 18 of "On Science and Culture," Dr. Oppenheimer argues about a future fact:

A third point: if one looks to the future of something that doubles every ten years, there must come a time when it stops, just as *The Physical Review* cannot weigh more than the earth. We know that this will saturate, and probably at a level very much higher than today; there will come a time when the rate of growth of science is not such that in every ten years the amount that is known is doubled; but the amount that is added to knowledge then will be far greater than it is today.

TESTIMONY

Under the general head of testimony, we shall consider six sub-topics—authority, testimonial, statistics, maxims, law, precedent. Unlike the other topics, which derive their material from the nature of the question under discussion,

testimony derives its material from external sources. In the next section of this chapter, entitled "External Aids to Invention," the student will be advised about some of the standard reference works that can provide additional supporting material for exposition or argumentation.

Authority

The first sub-topic to be considered under the topic of testimony is authority. It is probably true that informed opinion or authority carries less weight today than it once did. In an age characterized by a scientific attitude and a democratic spirit, men are temperamentally not as disposed as they once were to be impressed and swayed by the voice of authority and the pronouncements of men "in the know." In situations where facts are recoverable—and modern technology has greatly extended the realm of the empirical—men prefer facts to opinions. They are not as ready to accept something as true merely because someone says it is true. For them, it is "facts" which carry the persuasive force.

Although modern man is not as disposed to accept authority as his grandfather was, he is frequently forced by circumstances to rely on authority. Informed opinion does indeed still play a prominent part in the conduct of human affairs. For one thing, knowledge is so diversified and specialized in our age that no man can claim, as Francis Bacon once did, to take all knowledge for his province, and since the day-to-day affairs of a society cannot wait for all its citizens to catch up with the latest discoveries, men are obliged to take the "word" of some expert about the facts. For another thing, since men dispute mainly about uncertain, unpredictable matters, they frequently must turn to informed opinion to guide them in settling issues or making decisions.

Although informed opinion is not infallible, it has great persuasive force. We tend to grant more credence to the testimony of experts than to the testimony of amateurs; we place more faith in the opinions of those who pronounce on matters connected with their field of knowledge than in the opinions of those speaking outside their field of competence. A Congressional committee investigating the potential danger from nuclear fall-out will pay more attention to the renowned physicist than to the ordinary citizen, however interested and well-read the citizen may be. There have been instances, of course, where the expert turned out to be wrong and the amateur to be right, but there is always greater probability that the expert will be right.

Sometimes experts offer conflicting opinions. In evaluating conflicting testimony from equally competent experts, we must rely on other criteria in deciding which opinion to accept. In such cases, we ask questions like these:

1. Is there anything inconsistent, contradictory, or illogical in the expression of the opinion itself?

2. Do the experts harbor any prejudices that might influence or color the proffered opinion?
3. Do any of the experts have an axe to grind? an advantage to gain? a score to settle?
4. Is one expert's opinion based on more recent, more reliable information than the other's is?
5. Is one expert's opinion accepted by more experts? by the more authoritative experts?
6. What are the basic assumptions behind the expressions of opinion? Are any of these assumptions vulnerable? Does the exposure of these assumptions reveal that the conflict between the experts is more apparent than real because they are viewing the same matter from different points of view?

Answers to probing questions like these will determine which of the conflicting opinions will have the greater persuasive force for a particular occasion and a particular audience.

Testimonial

Similar to the topic of authority is the strategy of the testimonial, which takes many forms: the letter of recommendation, the advertising "puff," the "blurb," the character-witness appraisal, the opinion-poll, the best-seller list, the audience-rating. All of these represent attempts to influence opinion, action, or acceptance. The testimonial does not have to come from an impartial, expert source to be persuasive. Sometimes the persuasive force of a testimonial stems from the esteem we have for the person or the achievements of the one offering the recommendation. "Roger Ruth smokes Olympic cigarettes." An advertising slogan like that could influence thousands of people to buy Olympic cigarettes because Roger Ruth is a renowned athlete. What a slogan like this attempts to do is to transfer the esteem we have for the person to the product he recommends. In rhetorical terminology, the testimonial has "ethical appeal"—the kind of appeal that Aristotle says is often more effective in persuading an audience than appeals to reason or appeals to emotions. People tend to forget that Roger Ruth's skill as a ballplayer does not especially qualify him to be a good judge of cigarettes; that Roger Ruth is being paid to give his recommendation; that Roger Ruth's testimonial does not necessarily prove anything about the quality of Olympic cigarettes.

Two general observations can be made: (1) the testimonial can be remarkably persuasive in certain circumstances and with certain audiences; (2) the testimonial is remarkably vulnerable to refutation. Not every testimonial, of course, is to be discounted as dishonest, insincere, or irrelevant. The important caution is that the testimonial must not be used or accepted uncritically.

Statistics

Similar to the testimonial is the citation of statistics. "Five million people last year bought Humbug Products." "Fifty-eight per cent of the new homes built last year were equipped with Leakproof Appliances." Sometimes this strategy is referred to as the "bandwagon technique." Everybody's doing it, so it must be good. Now, there is no denying that the preference for one product over another could be an indication that the preferred product is superior in quality to the other products. Most people have faith that superior quality, all other things being equal, will in the long run win out over the second-rate and the meretricious. So statistics can be a useful and an effective topic in many discussions.

What we must guard against in the use of statistics is making unwarranted inferences. Statistics, if accurate and if legitimately gathered, confirm a fact; but they do not always support an inference made from that fact. The fact that a book has been at the top of the best-seller list for twelve months or more supports the fact that many people have bought this book. That fact, however, will not necessarily justify the further assertion, "This best-selling novel is the best novel published last year" or "You too will thrill to the drama of this runaway best-seller."

In the previous paragraphs we have been considering comparative statistics—pairs or groups of figures and percentages which help to decide questions of *more* and *less*. But statistics can be used in argument for purposes other than deciding superiority. Statistics can be used, for instance, to settle contrary and contradictory assertions. Suppose that one party in a dispute maintains, "Most Americans own their homes," and that the other party maintains, "Most Americans do not own their homes." If the two disputants agree upon the meaning of *own*, these two statements are directly contradictory. As we saw in the discussion of the topic of contradiction, one of these statements is true, and the other is false. An obvious way to determine which assertion is true is to cite statistics: "The 1960 Census reveals that (number) Americans or _____ per cent of citizens over twenty-one years of age have completely paid off the mortgage on the house in which they dwell."

Statistics can be used to support or discredit all kinds of assertion. The chief caution to be observed in regard to the use of this topic is that one should not accept statistics uncritically. Statistics are always liable to the challenge of questions like these:

1. What is the source of these statistics?
2. Is this a qualified, unbiased source?
3. How were these figures arrived at?
4. Was the sampling a reliably representative survey?

5. When were these figures gathered?
6. Are these figures contradicted or superseded by figures from other sources?

Polls and surveys are playing an increasingly prominent role in modern life. The better polling agencies, by devising scientific formulas for extrapolating sample findings, have achieved an amazing record of accuracy. Electronic computing machines too have increased the reliability of the interpretations and predictions made from statistics. We should be aware, however, that polling techniques, especially those that depend for their findings on personal interviews with people, have certain built-in limitations. The wording of a question put to the man in the street influences his response. Any time a question-begging word gets into a question the response will be biased. The responses to a question like "Do you favor the abolition of excessive taxes?" cannot be interpreted to mean that most people favor the abolition of taxes. Sometimes the juxtaposition of questions can bias the responses. If the question "Should subversive organizations be outlawed in America?" were followed by the question "Should the Communist Party be outlawed in America?" the response to the second question would undoubtedly be prejudiced by the response to the first question.

Another weakness inherent in the personal interview stems from two assumptions that pollsters make: (1) that people always know their own mind on questions put to them; (2) that people will give truthful answers to questions put to them. Does the man in the street always know, at any given stage in a presidential campaign, which candidate he favors? If he is undecided or confused, he will sometimes give an answer, any answer, because he is ashamed to admit to the pollster that he does not really know which candidate he favors at the moment. When the question concerns a matter that is more complex, the likelihood increases that the interviewee does not know his own mind. Pollsters make provision for this uncertain state of mind by permitting the interviewee to answer "Undecided," but sometimes a person is undecided even about whether he is undecided. As for the other assumption, for one reason or another, some people deliberately mislead the questioner, by not giving a truthful answer. Recognizing this fact, pollsters include a discount-factor in their formulas for extrapolating the information they have gathered.

All of the above observations about the cogency and weaknesses of statistics suggest the ways in which we can use statistics to support our own arguments or to refute the arguments advanced by the opposition. Employed discreetly, statistics can be a valuable topic in expository and argumentative writing.

Maxims

We shall use the term *maxims* (Greek, *gnomai*; Latin, *sententiae*) to cover precepts, proverbs, famous sayings, epigrammatic pronouncements, self-evident truths, sententious generalizations—all kinds of charismatic statements that people introduce into an argument. In the *Rhetoric*, Book II, Chapter 21, Aristotle treated maxims as a prelude to his discussion of the enthymeme, because, as he observed, maxims often constitute one of the premises of a syllogistic argument. For instance, in an argument about financial matters, one can imagine a disputant saying, “A fool and his money are soon parted.” The full argument suggested by this proverb would run something like this:

A fool and his money are soon parted.

John Smith is undeniably a fool when it comes to money matters.

John Smith is sure to lose out on his investment.

Maxims are statements, not about particular matters, but about universal matters. So the statement “Yon Cassius has a lean and hungry look” would not be a maxim, but it would take on the air of a maxim if it were changed to “One should be wary of lean and hungry men.” It is not all general statements, however, that can be considered maxims. “A straight line is the shortest distance between two points” would not be one. Maxims are general statements about human actions, about things that are to be chosen or avoided in human action.

The value of maxims, according to Aristotle, is that they invest a discourse with “moral character,” with that ethical appeal so important in persuading others. Because maxims touch upon universal truths about life, they win ready assent from the audience, and because of their air of hoary wisdom, they are endowed with a peculiar sanctity. Because maxims strike this note of ancient, sanctified wisdom, they are more appropriate, as Aristotle observed, when they come from the lips of older, experienced men. A maxim is just as true when uttered by a young man as when uttered by an older man, but, in certain circumstances, a maxim issuing from a callow youth will sound pretentious, even ridiculous. Alexander Pope was fortunate that many of his readers did not know that the author of the collection of wise and witty precepts in *The Essay on Criticism* was barely twenty-one years of age.

Maxims should not be avoided merely because they are well known. Their very familiarity may be an asset. The familiar often seems self-evident and for that reason wins an uncritical acceptance. Herein lies a danger however. The familiar quotation, the slogan, the platitude, the bromide have a way of acquiring immunity from criticism. For this reason, we often resort to the sanctified truism when we are seeking acceptance for our cause. Instead of

earning assent, we bribe it. Besides running the danger of being unethical, such a practice can induce lazy habits. When the maxim upon which we are basing an argument is challenged, we may be unprepared to defend its truth. Sometimes too we wrongly concede an argument because we have not taken the trouble to question the apparently "truthful" premise.

These reminders are not intended to discourage the use of the topic of maxims; they are intended merely to alert us to the dangers of uncritical acceptance of "what oft was thought." The student should bear in mind Plato's salutary observation, "The unexamined life is not worth living."

Law

Under the topic law will be comprehended all statutes, contracts, testaments, records, and documents which can be drawn on to substantiate or refute a claim. Recorded evidence has a compelling force in any argument. An argument about the date of a man's birth, for instance, can usually be settled summarily by a birth certificate or a baptismal record. Producing a bona fide will can silence rival claimants to a man's inheritance. When a critic adduces a statement from diaries or letters about an author's intention in a literary work, he does not necessarily clinch his interpretation, but he certainly strengthens it.

People have a great awe of the written or printed word. How often we have heard the statement, "But it says so, right here in the book." Respect for the recorded word is in many ways a good thing. We could hardly conduct the affairs of daily life if society did not maintain respect for what is recorded "in black and white." Without deeds and contracts, all property rights, for one thing, would be tenuous. A verbal contract between a car-owner and a dealer will not stand up in court; but a written warranty, duly signed by both parties, gives a judge something concrete and definite upon which to decide a litigation.

What we must remember, however, is that documentary evidence does not necessarily foreclose all further debate; recorded words are open to challenge and to interpretation. We can protest, for instance, that a document produced in evidence is not an authentic document. Challenges like the following can also be brought forward to test the authenticity of a document:

1. There is no proof that the document in question actually issued from the hand of the alleged author.
2. The document was not duly witnessed.
3. This document is only a transcription or reproduction of an allegedly extant original.
4. In the process of transmission, the wording of the document was altered.

5. Those authorities who could attest to the authenticity of the document are not available.
6. Another or a later document invalidates this one.

Then too the wording of documents is always open to interpretation. The Constitution of the United States, for instance, is the bona fide document upon which our government is based. But one of the chief functions of the Supreme Court is to interpret the already authenticated wording of the Constitution. In our own time, we have seen what heated disputes have developed over the doctrine of separation of church and state in Article 1 of the Bill of Rights ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof") and over the doctrine of states' rights in Article 10 of the Bill of Rights ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."). The meaning of statute laws too is constantly being argued in courts.

Precedent

The last of the sub-topics to be considered under testimony is precedent, which is most common in law trials conducted before a judge. Because judges are often guided by previous decisions, lawyers, in preparing briefs for a case, will search out decisions that other judges have made in similar cases. The task of the lawyer is to convince the judge that the case under consideration is similar to the previous case. In effect, the lawyer's argument runs something like this:

Your honor, I have shown that the case under consideration has a precedent in the case of New York vs. John Smith, No. 2435, tried on October 29, 1919 before Judge Harry Snodgrass. In that case, Judge Snodgrass returned a judgment that the defendant did not have to pay taxes to the plaintiff on property that had been confiscated before the due date of the tax payments. The judge ruled that although John Smith continued to occupy the property for three months, he ceased to be the owner of the property on the date that he signed the confiscation papers, and he was no longer liable for taxes once he transferred ownership, even though he continued, per agreement, to occupy the property rent-free for three months. Since the circumstances of this case are similar to those in the New York case and since the tax laws in this state are similar to those that prevailed in New York at that time, I respectfully propose that a similar ruling be made in this case.

The opposing lawyer, of course, will try to prove that the two cases are not similar or that an important difference has been overlooked or that an important consideration has been distorted. Or he will cite, if available, other

precedents in which a quite different judgment was returned. When opposing precedents are presented, the lawyers will contend that one precedent should supersede the other. Each lawyer will try to show that his precedent is more relevant or more logical or more recent or more reliable (because it comes from a more reputable source) or more cogent (because there are more precedents of this kind than of the other kind).

So far we have dealt only with the use of precedent in judicial rhetoric, but precedent can play a part too in arguments about other matters. When there is a dispute, for instance, about how to finance the building of a bridge, the parties in the dispute will cite examples of how other states voted to finance such a project and how successful the method proved to be. The inference to be drawn from the analogous cases is that such-and-such a method of financing will be equally successful or unsuccessful in the case under consideration. The use of precedents of this kind is very much like example, which Aristotle designated as the rhetorical form of induction. We can say, in general, that precedent is the strategy of bringing to bear on a present case what has been done in a similar case in the past.

It happens that the topics we have considered under testimony do not figure prominently in the readings at the end of this chapter; nevertheless, the student must not suppose that the topic of testimony is not an important or frequent resource in argument. It will be a rare persuasive discourse that will not make some use of one of these six topics.

The editorial about the Sacco-Vanzetti case at the end of this chapter, for instance, bases a great deal of its argument for its main thesis on the testimony presented in court about Sacco's cap. Dr. Johnson in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 of his "The Liberty of the Pulpit" uses the precedent of the practices in the primitive Church as the basis for one of his arguments; and Edmund Burke, in paragraph 19 of his "Letter to a Noble Lord," uses the precedent of the Biblical Job to justify his answering the charges made against him. In paragraph 33 of "On Science and Culture," Dr. Oppenheimer paraphrases a statement of one of the greatest scientists of this century: "Einstein once said that a physical theory was not determined by the facts of nature, but was a free invention of the human mind." This is not so much an example of the topic of authority as it is an example of the topic of maxim.

Students will find other examples of the common topic of testimony when they study the readings closely. And, of course, in some articles or essays that they read in this book and elsewhere, testimony will be the most frequently used topic.

Special Topics

As pointed out in the introductory remarks of the previous section, rhetoricians commonly divided the topics into two general kinds—common topics and special topics. Common topics were depositories of general arguments that one could resort to when discussing virtually any subject. Special topics on the other hand, were more particular lines of argument that one could resort to when discussing some particular subject. In the three main kinds of rhetorical activity—deliberative, judicial, and ceremonial—we tend to rely, fairly regularly, on certain topics which are more particular than common topics and yet more general than specialized knowledge. In a case at law, for instance, the teacher of rhetoric could not be expected to instruct his students in the points of law peculiar to this case; but he could point out to his students that most law cases turned on a limited number of recurring topics.

The value of the special topics in the composition process is that once the student has determined which of the three kinds of rhetorical discourse he is committed to, he knows immediately what his general objective is and also the more or less special kinds of arguments that he must pursue to attain that objective. His composition will not therefore write itself, but he has in the special topics a springboard to launch him in the right direction. And once he has his general direction fixed, he will more readily detect which of the common topics and what specialized knowledge are pertinent and therefore especially useful.

Let us look now at the special topics for each of the three kinds of persuasive discourse.

SPECIAL TOPICS FOR DELIBERATIVE DISCOURSE

Are there some common denominators among the appeals that we use when we are engaged in exhorting someone to do or not to do something, to accept or to reject a particular view of things? There are indeed. When we are trying to persuade someone to do something, we try to show him that what we want him to do is either good or advantageous. All of our appeals in this kind of discourse can be reduced to these two heads: (1) the worthy (*dignitas*) or the good (*bonum*) and (2) the advantageous or expedient or useful (*utilitas*). The English terms do not express fully and precisely what the Latin terms denoted, but perhaps the English terms do convey the general idea of “what is good in itself” (and therefore worthy of being pursued for its own sake) and “what is good for us” (a relative good, if you will, one

that would be expedient for us to pursue because of what it can do for us or what we can do with it). John Henry Newman used somewhat the same distinctions in his *Idea of a University* when he was trying to show us the difference between "liberal knowledge" and "useful knowledge." There are some subjects or disciplines, Newman maintained, that we cultivate for their own sakes, irrespective of the power they give us or the use to which they can be put. There are other subjects or disciplines that we cultivate primarily, if not exclusively, for the use to which we can put them.

If we were trying to convince someone to study poetry, for instance, we might urge that the cultivation of poetry is a good in itself and therefore worthy of pursuit for its own sake and that it is no depreciation of the worth of poetry to admit that the study of poetry cannot be put to any practical uses. On the other hand, we might conduct our appeal on a less exalted level by showing that the study of poetry can produce practical results. The study of poetry can teach us, for instance, how to be more intensive readers, how to be more precise writers, how to be keener observers of the world about us.

Whether we lean heaviest on the topic of the worthy or the topic of the advantageous will depend largely on two considerations: (1) the nature of our subject, (2) the nature of our audience. It should be obvious that some things are intrinsically more worthy than others. It is easier to demonstrate, for instance, that the study of poetry is a good in itself than to demonstrate that the building of a bridge is a good in itself. In the latter case, it would be the wiser course—because it is the easier and more cogent course—to exploit the topic of the advantageous. When one is trying to convince a group of taxpayers that they should vote for a bond issue to finance the building of a bridge, one is more likely to impress the taxpayers by demonstrating the usefulness of such a bridge than by showing its aesthetic value.

So too the nature of our audience will influence our decision about the special topic to emphasize in a particular deliberative discourse. Because the audience is the chief determinant of the best means to effect a given end, we should have at least a general sense of the temper, interests, mores, and educational level of our audience. If we discern that our audience will be more impressed by appeals based on the topic of the worthy, then our knowledge of the audience will have to be a little fuller and a little more accurate, because now we must have, in addition to a general sense of the temper of the audience, some knowledge of just what things are regarded as "good" by this audience and what the hierarchy of good things is. Men being what they are, however, it is probably true, as Cicero and the author of the *Ad Herennium* observed, that the topic of advantage will appeal more frequently to more people than will the topic of worth.

All deliberative discourses are concerned with what we should choose or what we should avoid. Aristotle observed that the end which determines

what men choose and what they avoid is happiness and its constituents. Happiness then may be looked upon as the ultimate special topic in deliberative discourses, since we seek the worthy and the advantageous because they are conducive to our happiness. Unquestionably, men differ in their concept of happiness. Aristotle presented some of the commonly accepted definitions:

We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one's property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees.

Rhetoric, I, 5.

Even today, most people, if asked, would say that happiness was one or other of these conditions or perhaps some combination or modification of these.

They would probably agree too with Aristotle's specifications of the constituent parts of happiness: "good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, together with fame, honor, good luck, and virtue." One of the recurring themes in fantasies is the situation in which a good fairy allows a man three wishes. Presented with that opportunity, the man chooses the three things which he believes will make him happiest; and usually his choices will be some of those things enumerated in Aristotle's list. The student might ask himself what *he* would specify if he were allowed three choices. His choices would reveal not only a great deal about his scale of values but also how little his view of what constitutes happiness differs from the views that men have held down through the ages.

In summary then, let us say that when we are engaged in any kind of deliberative discourse, we are seeking to convince someone to adopt a certain course of action because it is conducive to his happiness or to reject a certain course of action because it will lead to unhappiness. The two main special topics under the general head of happiness are the worthy and the advantageous. In developing these special topics, we will sometimes have occasion to use some of the common topics, such as the possible and the impossible (when urging the advantage, for instance, of a certain course of action, we may have to show that the course we are advocating is practicable or easy) and the topic of more and less (when seeking to direct a choice from among a number of goods, for instance, we have need of criteria to help us discriminate degrees of good). In developing the special topics, we will also need a fund of specialized knowledge pertinent to the subject we are debat-

ing. In discussing matters of public polity, for instance, we need a great deal of accurate and specific knowledge about kinds of government, the laws and constitution of a state, the mechanism of legislation. In addition, we must have at our fingertips, or know where to find, a sufficient number of facts, precedents, or statistics to support our assertions. It is not the special province of rhetoric to supply this specialized knowledge, but a rhetoric text like this can direct the student to the sources of such information. In a later section of this chapter, the student will be apprised of the standard reference works which can supply him with the specialized knowledge he may need to develop his discourse.

For an analysis of the special topics, as well as common topics, in a deliberative discourse, see the analysis of "Xenophon Talks to the Soldiers" at the end of this chapter.

SPECIAL TOPICS FOR JUDICIAL DISCOURSE

Anyone reading the classical rhetorics soon discovers that the branch of rhetoric that received the most attention was the judicial, the oratory of the courtroom. Litigations in court in Greece and Rome were an extremely common experience for even the ordinary free citizen, and it was a rare citizen who did not go to court at least a half dozen times during the course of his adult life. Moreover, the ordinary citizen was often expected to serve as his own advocate before a judge or jury. The ordinary citizen did not possess the comprehensive knowledge of the law and its technicalities that the professional lawyer did, but it was greatly to his advantage to have a general knowledge of the strategies of defense and prosecution. As a result, the schools of rhetoric did a flourishing business in training the layman to defend himself in court or to prosecute his offending neighbor. In defending the usefulness of the art of rhetoric, Aristotle said, "It is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs."—*Rhetoric*, I, 1.

In our time, the majority of citizens—except perhaps for traffic offenses—rarely if ever make an appearance in court. If they do have to go to court, they may, technically, serve as their own counsel, but usually they will hire a professional lawyer to serve them. Some of the students who are reading this text will become lawyers, and before they graduate from law school, they will have received an intensive training in the technicalities of the law and in the conduct of trials. For most men today, however, there is no need to become conversant with the subtleties of the law or to train themselves to become shrewd, eloquent pleaders before a judge or jury.

Training in this kind of rhetoric is, however, not entirely dispensable. All of us have occasion to indulge in this kind of persuasive discourse. We may never have to face the full panoply of the courtroom, but we do sometimes have to defend our actions or views, to impugn the actions of others, or to dispute the wording, interpretation, and application of texts of all kinds.

The special topics for judicial discourse developed from the efforts to ascertain the *status* of a case. As we saw in the initial section of this chapter devoted to the formulation of the thesis, the rhetoricians set up a useful formula for determining precisely the issue that was to be discussed. In order to pinpoint the issue or thesis, they asked three questions about the general subject: whether a thing is (*an sit*), what it is (*quid sit*), of what kind it is (*quale sit*).

Once the issue has been settled—and only then—the pleader, either for the defense or for the prosecution, can determine the special topics that will be pertinent to the development of the case. The ultimate special topics for all judicial discourse are justice and injustice. The terms right and wrong can serve as substitute terms if we take them in their legal, not moral sense.

The sub-topics that can be used to develop the special topics of justice and injustice may be grouped under the three questions which serve to establish the issue:

A. Whether Something Happened

The major sub-topic here is *evidence*.

In developing this topic we pursue questions like these:

1. What is the evidence?
2. How, when, where, and by whom was the evidence gathered?
3. What about the reliability of the evidence?
 - a. Is it accurate?
 - b. Is it relevant?
 - c. Is it consequential?
 - d. Is it merely circumstantial?
4. What about the credibility of the witnesses adducing the evidence?
 - a. Are they prejudiced?
 - b. Are they reliable?
 - c. Are they competent?
 - d. Are they consistent?
5. What about the conflicting evidence?

B. What It Is

The major sub-topic here is *definition*.

In developing this topic we pursue questions like these:

1. What specifically is the charge being made?

2. What is the legal definition of the alleged injustice?
3. What law is supposedly violated?
 - a. a written, promulgated law?
 - b. an unwritten, natural law?
 (E.g. in Sophocles' play, Antigone pleads that although she had violated the written law of the community by burying her brother Polynices she was thereby obeying a higher law.)
4. Who was harmed by the alleged injustice?
 - a. an individual?
 - b. the community?
5. Did the victim suffer the harm against his will?
6. What was the extent of the harm?

C. The Quality of What Happened

The major sub-topic here is *motives* or *causes of action*.

In developing this topic we pursue questions like these:

1. Was the alleged injustice done intentionally or unintentionally?
2. If unintentionally, what was the cause of action?
 - a. chance?
 - b. compulsion?
 - c. natural inclination?
3. If intentionally, what was the cause of action?
 - a. habit?
 - b. deliberation?
 - c. passion?
 - d. appetite?
4. If intentionally, what was the wrong-doer's motive?
 - a. profit?
 - b. revenge?
 - c. punishment?
 - d. pleasure?
5. What kind of person was the doer of the act?
6. What kind of person was the victim of the alleged injustice?
7. Were there extenuating circumstances?

The topics we have just reviewed are the things that we invariably discuss when we are seeking to exculpate ourselves or to inculpate someone else. These topics are especially useful in courtroom trials, involving felonies and other violations of civil law. But they are useful also in discussions of the justice and injustice of human acts which are something less than crimes—misdemeanors, errors of judgment, incompetency, neglect of duties, malevo-

lence, etc. The questions set down under the various sub-topics can serve as “suggesters” or “prompters” of the direction our discussion might take when we are engaged in this kind of persuasive activity. For the development of the special topics, pertinent common topics will present themselves as other resources. The nature of the case under consideration will in every instance determine which of the special topics and common topics are relevant.

For an analysis of the special topics, as well as the common topics, in a judicial discourse, see the analysis of Socrates’ *Apology* at the end of this chapter.

SPECIAL TOPICS FOR CEREMONIAL DISCOURSE

The nature of ceremonial discourse is perhaps easier to grasp than its distinction from the other two kinds. Ceremonial discourse sometimes shades off into deliberative discourse, sometimes into judicial. The ceremonial orator did indeed seem to be more intent on impressing the audience with the eloquence of his laudatory efforts than he did on persuading his audience to adopt a certain course of action. But in praising a great man, he was suggesting, indirectly at least, that his audience go and do likewise; and in thus suggesting a course of action he was moving over into the realm of deliberative discourse. Likewise, when he praised or censured a man, he encroached on the province of judicial discourse, because like the lawyer in the courtroom he seemed to be engaged in exonerating or discrediting someone.

Ceremonial discourse differs from deliberative discourse in that its primary object is to praise or censure someone, not to persuade men to do or not to do something. It differs from judicial discourse in that it does not deal primarily or exclusively with the characters of men charged with crime or misconduct. Unless we recognize this third category, we have no place to put such discourses as Fourth of July speeches, funeral orations, nominating speeches at political conventions, sermons, memoirs, obituaries, profiles, letters of reference, citations, and those remarks that masters of ceremony make in introducing a featured speaker. These forms are clearly distinct from deliberative or judicial discourse.

What then are the special topics relevant to this kind of discourse? All the rhetoricians agreed that the general aim of ceremonial discourse is praise or censure of someone. This being the aim, the obvious special topics would be virtue and vice or, more generally, the noble and the base. We praise a man because of his good qualities; we censure him because of his bad qualities. Whereas judicial discourse is concerned primarily with a man’s *legal*

innocence or guilt, ceremonial discourse is concerned primarily with a man's *moral* goodness or badness.

Although there are some virtues, like justice and courage, which have been universally acknowledged and esteemed by all people in all ages, certain other virtues enjoy a higher esteem in one civilization than they do in others. Humility, for instance, seemed not to have been a prized virtue in the civilization that Homer portrayed in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*; but in most Christian cultures, humility is regarded as one of the supreme virtues. So once again we are reminded of the importance of the audience as a determinant of what is done in a persuasive discourse. The age and sex of an audience, its economic and educational level, its political and religious affinities, its interests and its values—all of these will have a great influence on the virtues that we tend to stress for a particular audience. A man's gentleness might be a virtue to stress before an audience made up exclusively of women; a man's courage might be the virtue to stress before an audience of laboring men.

The following are the virtues that people commonly discuss when they are seeking to praise someone (in parentheses are the corresponding vices—those bad qualities that people mention when they are seeking to discredit someone):

1. *Courage (Cowardice)*:—*fortitude* is sometimes used as a synonym for this virtue, but fortitude is a broader term, signifying imperturbability in the face not only of dangerous situations but of all trying situations.
2. *Temperance (Incontinence)*:—the virtue (and vice) connected with physical pleasures of all kinds.
3. *Justice (Injustice)*:—these terms are to be taken in a somewhat narrower sense than they had as special topics in judicial discourse. For example, we might define justice as the virtue that respects the natural and legal rights of other men.
4. *Liberality (Illiberality)*:—*generosity* or even *charity* might be other words for the virtue which disposes us to expend time, money, or effort for the good of others.
5. *Magnanimity (Meanness of spirit)*:—akin to liberality but carries the implication of good one does for others on a large scale or in reversal of expectations.
6. *Prudence (Rashness)*:—an intellectual virtue which disposes a man to make wise decisions about means and ends.
7. *Gentleness (Brutality)*:—*kindness*, because a broader, might be a better term.

This list does not exhaust the virtues (and vices) by any means. It will merely suggest the sort of qualities of character that people of all ages and cultures value in a man and that contribute to the esteem in which a man is held. In general, those virtues which produce benefits for others will be more highly regarded than the virtues which are good mainly for the person who possesses them. It is noteworthy that many of the Beatitudes that Christ mentioned in his famous Sermon on the Mount are social virtues—virtues that result in benefits for others. It is true that we do laud a man for his personal saintliness (and personal sanctification must be each man's primary goal), but it is easier to praise the man whose virtues benefit others besides himself. It was for this reason that St. Paul designated charity as the greatest of the virtues.

While virtue is the special topic that we most exploit in praising a man, there are other attributes and circumstances that we mention when we are seeking to convince others of a man's worthiness. For instance:

1. *Physical attributes*—agility, strength, beauty, health
2. *External circumstances*—family background, education, economic status, political, social, religious affiliations
3. *Actions and achievements*
4. *Sayings*
5. *Testimony of others*

The student may have noted how many of the resources that one uses in ceremonial discourse are the devices that novelists, dramatists, and short-story writers use to characterize the people in their fictions. The writer of narrative uses dialogue (what a man says and how he says it), action (what a man does and how he does it), descriptions of physical appearance, testimony of other characters in the story, and straight exposition of personality to give his readers an idea of the characters that figure in his story. The narrative writer has one more resource, however, that is not available to the writer or speaker engaged in praising or censuring someone: he can reveal the *thoughts* of his characters—the truest index of a man's moral bent.

Aristotle observed that the common topic of amplification and depreciation is most suitable for ceremonial discourse, for when we seek to praise a man it is natural that we should try to magnify or amplify his virtues and to minimize or extenuate his vices; and when we intend to censure a man, we do just the opposite—we magnify his vices and minimize his virtues. Aristotle pointed out some of the useful ways of heightening the effect of praise:

1. Show that a man is the first one or the only one or almost the only one to do something.

2. Show that a man has done something better than anyone else, for superiority of any kind is thought to reveal excellence.
3. Show that a man has often achieved the same success, for this will indicate that his success was due not to chance but to his own powers.
4. Show the circumstances under which a man accomplished something, for it will redound more to his credit if he has accomplished something under adverse conditions.
5. Compare him with famous men, for the praise of a man will be magnified if we can show that he has equalled or surpassed other great men.

Variations of these points can be used to *depreciate* a man. If we can show, for instance, that many men have done the same thing, we can minimize a man's achievements.

For an analysis of the special topics, as well as common topics, in a ceremonial discourse, see the analysis of Pericles' "Funeral Oration" at the end of this chapter.

In this section, we have reviewed the topics that we usually resort to when we are seeking to convince an audience that a man is great or noble or virtuous or competent (or the opposite—that he is insignificant or base or vicious or inept). Not all of these topics will be available to us on every occasion. If a man does not possess a particular virtue or does not possess it to a pre-eminent degree, we cannot, obviously, extol that virtue in the man. If a particular virtue has no special appeal for a particular audience, it would be unwise of us to dwell on it. And if a particular virtue is not especially pertinent to the occasion, we do little to enhance the praise of a man by expatiating on that attribute. As in most rhetorical activities, we must develop instincts for what is most appropriate and most effective. Because such instincts are among "the nameless graces beyond the reach of art," rhetoric cannot equip the student with those instincts; it can only point the way.

External Aids to Invention

We have been considering the *topics*, those "places" to which the writer can resort for help in inventing or discovering arguments. The topics might be termed the "artistic means of persuasion" (*technoi pisteis*), because they are the means taught by the art of rhetoric. In addition to these, Aristotle spoke of the "non-artistic means of persuasion" (*atechnoi pisteis*)—"non-artistic"

in the sense that these resources did not belong specifically to the art of rhetoric; the information came from "outside."

If reference books had been abundant in fifth-century Athens, Aristotle would certainly have encouraged his students to consult them as external aids to invention. Because of the need for a plentiful stock of special knowledge, Cicero and Quintilian maintained that a broad liberal education was the best background for an orator. While acquiring this broad background, students can compensate for their deficiencies by knowing about and resorting to the standard reference books. Although most college libraries are well stocked with reference works, many students do not know that they exist, or do not know what kind of information is contained in them, or do not know how to use them to find the information they contain.

Since encyclopedias are the reference works that students are most familiar with, the more prominent ones will be merely mentioned here. Most students have at one time or other consulted either the *Encyclopedia Americana* (New York: Encyclopedia Americana Corporation, 1949, 30 volumes) or the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1949, 24 volumes), but they should be reminded to make more use of the Index (the last volume in each set) and the yearbooks, and they should not neglect the long scholarly articles written by noted British authors in the ninth and eleventh editions of the *Britannica*. The articles in *Collier's Encyclopedia* (New York: P. F. Collier & Son Corporation, 1950, 20 volumes) are written on a level between that of the juvenile encyclopedias students may have used at home and that of the adult encyclopedias just mentioned. Students should become familiar with the new edition of the famous *Chambers's Encyclopaedia* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 15 volumes), the most respected of the general reference works published in England. Of more specialized interest are the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1930-35, 15 volumes), the *Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1901-06, 12 volumes) or the more up-to-date *Universal Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York: Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, Inc., 1939-44, 10 volumes), and the *Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: Catholic Encyclopedia, 1907-14, 16 volumes), which will soon be superseded by a new edition.

But if students are to mature intellectually, they must learn that encyclopedias, valuable as they are, are not their first and last resource. Accordingly, the following section will discuss a number of reference works, readily available in public or college libraries, that students can consult to find material on whatever subject they are writing about. The exposition will point out the kind of information that can be found in these works and then explain the organization and use of the work. For information about

reference works not covered in this section, students can consult guides like the following:

Isadore Mudge, *A Guide to Reference Books*, 6th ed. (Chicago: American Library Association, 1936).

Constance M. Winchell, *Guide to Reference Books*, 7th ed. (Chicago: American Library Association, 1951). Supplements in 1954, 1956, 1960, 1963.

Arthur J. Walford, *Guide to Reference Materials* (New York: R. R. Bowker Co., 1959). Supplement, 1963.

BIOGRAPHY

DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, ed. Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee. Originally published in 63 volumes by Smith, Elder & Co., 1885-1900; reissued in 21 volumes by Macmillan, 1908-09.

A cyclopedia of British biography on the plan and scope of some of the other European biographical collections (the French, 40 volumes, 1843-63; the Dutch, 24 volumes, 1852-78; the Austrian, 60 volumes, 1856-91; the German, 55 volumes, 1875-1900). On January 1, 1885, the first volume appeared, containing 505 biographies written by 87 contributors. Within fifteen years, this monumental 63-volume work, containing 29,120 biographies, was completed. In the autumn of 1901, three supplementary volumes were published, containing about 800 biographical sketches of noteworthy Englishmen who had died while the work was in progress and about 200 memoirs of prominent people who had been overlooked in the original master-list. (This became Volume XXII of the Macmillan re-issue.) In 1912 Macmillan issued three more volumes to cover the years 1901-11. The Oxford University Press has been publishing the supplementary volumes, each covering a decade.

According to the original prospectus, the *Dictionary of National Biography* (*DNB*) was designed to provide "full, accurate, and concise biographies of all noteworthy inhabitants of the British Islands and the Colonies (exclusive of living persons) from the earliest historical period to the present time." The lives are arranged alphabetically according to surnames. If the student seeks the biography of a British subject who died in the twentieth century, he should consult the appropriate supplementary volume.

The value of the *DNB* is that it is often the only source of biographical information about British men and women who were prominent enough to have merited mention in newspapers and histories but not prominent enough to have merited a full-length biography or even a biographical sketch in an encyclopedia. The *DNB* is also helpful to someone seeking relatively brief but authoritative biographies of prominent statesmen, generals, clergymen, scientists, writers, painters, etc. The longest biography in the *DNB* is the 49-page memoir that Sidney Lee wrote on Shakespeare. Although many of

the biographees are given less than a page, most of the prominent ones receive an extended but compact treatment. Additional sources of biographical information, whenever available, are listed in the bibliography at the end of each article.

DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, ed. Allen Johnson and others (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-36), 20 vols.; Volume XXI, Supplement One; Volume XXII, Supplement Two.

This collection of American biographies, initiated by the American Council of Learned Societies in 1922, was patterned on the *Dictionary of National Biography*. The editorial committee set down these negative restrictions: (1) no living persons; (2) no persons who had not lived in the territory known as the United States; (3) no British officers serving in America after the colonies had declared their independence. The positive qualification for inclusion was stated in rather general terms: "those who have made some significant contribution to American life." These criteria permitted the admission into the *DAB* of people who are not, strictly speaking, Americans: Lafayette, for instance.

The original twenty volumes contained 13,633 biographical articles. Supplement One (to December 31, 1935), published in 1944, added 652 memoirs. Supplement Two (to December 31, 1940), published in 1958, added 585 biographies.

Like the *DNB*, the *DAB* is often the only source of biographical information about deceased, relatively obscure Americans; but the *DAB* also provides compact biographical sketches of prominent Americans. The memoir of Benjamin Franklin, for instance, occupies twenty-five full columns in Volume VI. James Franklin (1696/7-1735), his half-brother, rates only a column and a half in the same volume. The biographies are based on reliable, original sources of information, many of which are listed in the carefully selected bibliographies at the end of each article. The biographies are arranged alphabetically according to the last name of the subject.

WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA: A Biographical Dictionary of Notable Living Men and Women (Chicago: A. N. Marquis Co., 1899-).

This is a valuable source of biographical data about prominent *living* Americans. Begun in 1899, this work is revised and re-issued every two years. The introduction to Volume XXX gives the criteria for inclusion:

The standards of admission divide the eligible into two classes: (1) those selected on account of special prominence in creditable lives of effort, making them the subjects of extensive interest, inquiry, or discussion;

(2) those included arbitrarily on account of position—civil, military, religious, educational, corporate, or organizational.

Among those in the second category are all members of congress and the cabinet, federal judges, governors of states, heads of the larger universities, military officers above the rank of brigadier general, members of the National Academy, bishops and chief ecclesiastics of the larger religious denominations. Insisting that its biographees lead "creditable lives," the Marquis Company automatically drops from later volumes any biographee who has been convicted of a major crime or felony.

Most of the biographees supply their own biographical information. Although the *kinds* of information sought are fixed by the editors, the *amount* of information supplied is left largely up to the biographee. In Volume XXX, for instance, President Eisenhower has only 19 lines; his brother Milton, the president of Johns Hopkins University, has 52 lines.

The student should remember that this is a reference source for *living Americans* only. When a person dies, he may then be relegated to another Marquis publication, *Who Was Who in America*. The three volumes of this work now available draw from the entire span of *Who's Who in America* Volumes I-XXXI. In order to find information on his subject, the student must remember to consult those volumes covering the years when the subject was in the public eye.

WHO'S WHO (London: Adam and Charles Black; New York: Macmillan, 1848-).

Who's Who, the older British work, first published in 1848, served as the pattern for the American biographical dictionary. It supplies biographical information about noteworthy living British subjects, and its criteria of eligibility are much the same as those in the American dictionary.

Each volume of *Who's Who* begins with an obituary of the prominent people who have died since the last volume appeared. Once deceased, these people appear in a later volume of a companion work called *Who Was Who*. Five volumes of *Who Was Who* have now been published, covering the period 1897-1960.

The term "Who's Who" has become as much of a household word as "Webster's," and people often use the term indiscriminately to refer to both the American and the British works.

INTERNATIONAL WHO'S WHO (London: Europe Publications, 1935-).

The biographies in this annual compilation are very brief, but a great many notable people throughout the world are covered. Many of the people covered

in this work are included in the various national biographical dictionaries, but this is a convenient reference work for those who cannot afford to buy several of the national dictionaries. Another valuable feature of the work is that notable people from smaller countries whose biographies are not available in the usual sources are included.

CURRENT BIOGRAPHY (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1940-).

Current Biography, published annually, is another valuable source of biographical information about prominent contemporary people. It is different in many ways from *Who's Who in America* and *Who's Who*: the 1941 volume of *Current Biography*, for instance, contains only 991 biographical sketches, but it is world wide in its scope. The biographical sketches in *Current Biography* are composed by members of the editorial staff, not supplied by the biographees.

Here is the typical organization of a volume of *Current Biography*:

1. The biographical section, arranged alphabetically according to last names. This section comprises full biographies (usually two or three pages) of the prominent living persons selected for that particular year and short obituary notices of some prominent persons who have died that year.
2. A necrology—a list of *all* the prominent people who have died that year.
3. Index to biographies (in that particular volume) by profession.
4. A cumulative index of biographees. If the student does not find in this volume a biography of the subject he is seeking, this section will refer him to any earlier volume in which this subject is included.

Now that more than twenty volumes have appeared, *Current Biography* has become a valuable source of biographical information about world figures. Although each volume has an index of previously published biographies, the student will save time in finding the volume and pages if he will consult the two volumes that carry the cumulative indexes for the entire twenty-year span of this reference work. The 1950 volume provides a cumulative index for 1940-1950; the 1960 volume, the cumulative index for 1951-1960.

CHAMBERS'S BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, ed. J. O. Thorne, new ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961).

WEBSTER'S BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1943).

DICTIONARY OF CATHOLIC BIOGRAPHY, ed. John J. Delaney and James Edwin Tobin (New York: Doubleday, 1961).

The most famous of these one-volume reference works is *Chambers's Biographical Dictionary*. First published in 1897, it has recently appeared in a new edition of 1,432 double-column pages containing some 15,000 biographical articles. It treats of the famous men and women of all periods, all countries, and all occupations and professions. The amount of coverage varies with the prominence of the biographee. The present editor has adopted this standard sequence of basic information: (1) surname, (2) Christian names and titles, (3) pronunciation (of difficult or unusual names), (4) date of birth and death, (5) nationality and main occupation, (6) birthplace (if known). At the end of the articles on the major figures there is a list of works where additional information may be found. A unique feature of this work is the subject index of some 6,000 items through which biographees may be traced through titles of works, events, places, campaigns, nicknames, etc.

Webster's Biographical Dictionary presents about 40,000 brief biographies of historical and contemporary figures in 1,732 pages. Published in 1943, this work is not as up-to-date on living men and women as the new edition of *Chambers's*. It is, however, a handy, surprisingly comprehensive source of biographical information about a large number of world figures.

As its title indicates, *The Dictionary of Catholic Biography* is a reference work of more limited scope. It does not cover living men and women, but the biographies of the 3,000 Catholics that it does supply in its 1,260 double-column pages are usually more extensive than those in the other two one-volume biographical dictionaries. In the appendix there is a list of patron saints and a 14-page chart correlating the reigns of popes and world rulers.

BIOGRAPHY INDEX: A Cumulative Index to Biographical Material in Books and Magazines (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1946-).

The *Biography Index* is a helpful guide to biographical material in currently published, English-language books and pamphlets, in over 1,500 periodicals, in some legal and medical journals, and in the obituary notices of the *New York Times*. All types of biographical material are indexed: "pure biography, critical material of biographical significance, autobiography, letters, diaries, memoirs, journals, genealogies, fiction, drama, poetry, bibliographies, obituaries, pictorial works, and juvenile literature."

The *Biography Index* has two main parts: (1) the subject index, arranged alphabetically by last name; (2) the index to professions and occupations (large categories, like Authors, are listed by nationality—American, Australian, British, etc.). The value of the latter section is that it can direct the inquirer to all the biographical material written, in some specific year, about men associated with some profession. A student assigned to do a paper on.

say, atomic physicists since World War II could collect a bibliography in short order by consulting this section.

As evidence of the amazing comprehensiveness of this work, the first bound volume of *Biography Index* (January 1946 to July 1949) contains the names of over 40,000 biographees, classified into some 1,000 categories in the index to professions and occupations. Paperbound supplements are published quarterly and are bound in a separate volume, with a cumulative index, each year. Subsequently, a three-year cumulation is published and bound in a separate volume.

CONCORDANCES AND BOOKS OF QUOTATIONS

BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A Collection of Passages, Phrases, and Proverbs Traced to Their Sources in Ancient and Modern Literature by John Bartlett, 12th ed., rev. and enl. by Christopher Morley and Louella D. Everett (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948); 13th ed. (Centennial), 1955.

Bartlett's Familiar Quotations is the best known and perhaps the most frequently used reference guide to quotations. John Bartlett, a New England publisher, compiled his first book of quotations in 1855, and continued to edit it through its ninth edition in 1891. In 1914 Nathan Haskell Dole edited the tenth edition. Christopher Morley and Louella D. Everett edited the book in its eleventh (1937), twelfth (1948), and thirteenth (1955) editions.

All of us, at some time or another, have needed an apt quotation to illustrate, enhance, or substantiate something we have written, or the exact wording of a quotation, or the author of the quotation, or the name of the work in which the quotation first appeared, or the exact place in a work (e.g. the specific line-number in a poem) where the quotation appeared. If we can remember any key-word in the quotation, it is likely that we can find the answer to such questions in *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*.

Let us suppose that we want to discover the source of the quotation, "Hope springs eternal in the human breast." Since quotations are not indexed under prepositions, pronouns, conjunctions, articles, and common words, like *is* and *was*, we can find this quotation indexed under any one of five key words: *Hope*, *springs*, *eternal*, *human*, *breast*. The number of entries listed under each of the five key-words is as follows: *Hope*, 156; *springs*, 20; *eternal*, 70; *human*, 190; *breast*, 59. The student who looked for this quotation under the word *springs* would probably have found the quotation sooner than the student who looked under the word *human*.

The twelfth, and notably enlarged, edition of *Bartlett's* is a book of more than 1,800 pages, 1,254 pages of which are given over to the quotations, to-

gether with footnotes that explain, amplify, or correlate the quotations, and 574 pages of which are given over to the index, which contains about 124,000 entries. The thirteenth (Centennial) edition is somewhat smaller; its index lists 113,000 entries. The twelfth and thirteenth editions have added many quotations from our contemporaries.

When *Bartlett's* fails us, we can sometimes trace the elusive quotation by consulting one of the other concordances to quotations:

THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, ed. Bernard Darwin, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).

HOYT'S NEW CYCLOPEDIA OF PRACTICAL QUOTATIONS, ed. Jehiel Keeler Hoyt, new ed. (New York: Somerset Books, 1947).

A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN SOURCES, ed. H. L. Mencken (New York: Knopf, 1942).

HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN, ed. Burton Egbert Stevenson, 5th ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1947).

John Bartlett, NEW AND COMPLETE CONCORDANCE OR VERBAL INDEX TO WORDS, PHRASES, AND PASSAGES IN THE DRAMATIC WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY CONCORDANCE TO THE POEMS (London: Macmillan, 1894).

In English, a concordance is available for all the major poets—Beowulf, Chaucer, Spenser, Milton, Pope, Wordsworth, Byron, Keats, Browning, Tennyson, and many other "greats." Among the concordances available for the lesser poets are those for Thomas Wyatt, Robert Herrick, Thomas Gray, Oliver Goldsmith, Robert Burns, and A. E. Housman. Although handbooks are frequently prepared as a helpful guide for the reading of prose writers, concordances to prose works are a rarity. Occasionally, however, as in the case of James Joyce, concordances are published for individual prose works.

As might be expected, many concordances have been prepared for Shakespeare's works. The best and the most comprehensive of these is the one compiled by the same John Bartlett who published *Familiar Quotations*.

This concordance works in the same way as the others we have considered. All of the lines in Shakespeare's poems and plays are indexed under all of the significant words in the line. Bartlett uses the act, scene, and line numbering as given in the 1891 Globe Edition of Shakespeare, and he always prints the entire line in his index, not just a portion of it.

Some people use a concordance like this as the basis for a stylistic study of an author or, more specifically, for a study of his diction. Did Shakespeare

ever use such-and-such a word? How many times did he use a particular word? What about the range and variety of his vocabulary? A study of Shakespeare's imagery could also be worked out with the aid of a concordance.

Biblical Concordances

James Strong, *THE EXHAUSTIVE CONCORDANCE OF THE BIBLE* (the Authorized and Revised versions of the King James text) (Nashville: Abingdon, 1894, 1947).

Newton Wayland Thompson and Raymond Stock, *COMPLETE CONCORDANCE TO THE BIBLE* (Douay Version) (St. Louis: Herder, 1942, rev. ed., 1945).

NELSON'S COMPLETE CONCORDANCE OF THE REVISED STANDARD VERSION OF THE BIBLE, Compiled by Univac Under the Supervision of John W. Ellison (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1957).

Only three of the many biblical concordances are listed above—one for the King James or Authorized Version of the Bible; one for the Douay or Roman Catholic version; and one for the Revised Standard Version completed in 1952. Every college library of any size is sure to have one or more of the biblical concordances on its reference shelves. It took James Strong some thirty years to compile his concordance; it took Remington Rand's Univac only about 1000 hours to index more than 350,000 biblical contexts from the RSVB. When the Cambridge and Oxford University Presses complete their publication of the *New English Bible*, someone will undoubtedly prepare a concordance, probably with the aid of an electronic computing machine, for this latest English translation.

The index system of a biblical concordance works in much the same way as it does in *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*, but whereas *Bartlett's* reproduces the quotations it indexes, the biblical concordances do not include the text of the Bible.

A complete concordance indexes *all* passages from the Bible, not just the familiar quotations from it. If one can remember any key word in a quotation (quotations are not indexed under articles, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, or auxiliary or linking verbs), he can find what he is looking for.

There are other uses for a concordance too. One could use the concordance to find out, for instance, whether the word *sacrament* ever occurred in the Old or New Testaments. One could find out when such a word as *bishop* became a part of ecclesiastical terminology, whether the Old Testament prophets ever used the word, whether Christ ever used the word in the Gos-

pels, or whether it is found only in the Acts of the Apostles or in the Epistles. The concordance can serve too as a kind of *harmony*—that is, as a reference guide to various passages in the Bible where parallel or identical ideas or wordings occur.

INDEXES TO PERIODICALS

THE READERS' GUIDE TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1900-).

Of all the periodical indexes, the *Readers' Guide* is the one the student has most likely used during his high-school years. It is an extremely useful reference guide to articles, stories, poems, and plays published in more than one hundred American magazines during the twentieth century. Since March, 1935, it has been appearing twice a month. The indexing is cumulated, first in annual volumes and then in two-year volumes which contain in one alphabetical listing all entries for the period covered.

The Readers' Guide is primarily a subject and author index, but short stories, poems, plays, and motion pictures are listed by title as well as under the author's name. When entries appear under a person's name in two different listings, the first group of articles refers to articles *by* that person as an author; the second group of articles refers to articles *about* that person as a subject. Here are examples, first of an author entry, then of a subject entry:

WALKER, John S.

Thermonuclear reactions: can they be used for man's benefit?

For Affairs 33:605-14 Jl '55

The first thing that appears under the author's name is the title of his article (usually only the first word is capitalized). Then appears the name of the magazine, in abbreviated form (at the front of each volume a key to abbreviations is given). This article appeared in *Foreign Affairs*. Following the title of the magazine is a series of numbers specifying the issue of the magazine in which this article appeared. The number before the colon is the volume number of the periodical (the bound volume of the periodical in the library usually carries this same volume number). After the colon are the page numbers of the article. A + sign after a page number indicates that the article is continued on other pages toward the back of the magazine. Then the date of the issue is given in abbreviated form. If the magazine is a monthly, as in this case, only the month (July) and the year (1955) are given; if the magazine is a weekly (see below), the month (March), day (12), and year (1955) are given. If the student is compiling a list of articles for later investigation, he should be careful to record the exact volume number and date of the

magazine, because the librarian will need this information on the call-slip that the student submits.

CENSORSHIP

Art of censorship. H. Smith. Sat R 38:24 Mr 12 '55

Light in San Diego. Nation 180:389 My 7 '55

Minnesota menaced by vigilante censors. Christian Cent 72:468-9

Ap 20 '55

The second item is a subject heading (Censorship). All the articles published on that subject during the period covered by this particular volume will be listed, and often there will be "see also" references to other subject headings. In the subject entries, the titles of articles are given first. Then the name of the author is given (in subject entries the author's first name is represented by the initial capital only). The absence of a name after the title of the article indicates an anonymous or unsigned article.

INTERNATIONAL INDEX (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1907-).

The *International Index* is a useful supplementary index to periodical literature. During the first fifty years of its coverage, the *International Index* covered foreign-language periodicals as well as English-language periodicals. With the volume for 1955-7, however, the title of this reference work was changed from *International Index to Periodicals* to *International Index, A Guide to Periodical Literature in Social Sciences and Humanities*. With this change of title, the coverage of scientific and foreign-language periodicals was curtailed in favor of concentration on the more scholarly English-language journals throughout the world which deal with the social sciences and the humanities. At present the *International Index* indexes about 175 journals. Published quarterly in paperback editions, it eventually appears as a bound volume with a two-year cumulation. A subject and author index, it uses the same style of notation as the *Readers' Guide*. Students seeking a full bibliography of magazine articles on some subject should consult the *International Index* in addition to the *Readers' Guide*. For certain subjects (e.g. topics of more scholarly interest), the *International Index* is a more useful reference guide than the *Readers' Guide*.

THE 19TH CENTURY READERS' GUIDE, 1890-99, 2 vols. (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1944).

The *Readers' Guide* and the *International Index* cover the periodical literature of the twentieth century; the *19th Century Guide* covers the last decade of the nineteenth century. Published in two volumes, this periodical guide

indexes material in fifty-one English and American magazines that were being published late in the last century. In some cases, the indexing has been extended beyond the limits specified by the title. *The National Geographic Magazine*, for instance, is indexed from 1888, the year it began publication, to December 1908, when it begins to be indexed by the *Readers' Guide*. The British *Cornhill Magazine*, a periodical that published contributions from such distinguished writers as Thackeray, Ruskin, Arnold, and Trollope, is indexed from January 1890, to December 1922, when it was picked up by the *International Index*. The *19th Century Guide* adopts the standard list of subject headings and cross references used by the other periodical guides, has author entries, and gives title indexes to short stories, novels, plays, and poems.

POOLE'S INDEX TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE, ed. William Frederick Poole and William I. Fletcher, 6 vols. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1882-1907).

Poole's Index is the only index to English-language periodicals of the nineteenth century up to 1890. It was initiated by William F. Poole, librarian at the Mercantile Library of Boston, the public libraries in Cincinnati and Chicago, and, at the time of his death in 1894, the famous Newberry Library in Chicago. His colleague William Fletcher had a hand in the preparation of all the volumes and after Poole's death was assisted by Franklin O. Poole and Mary Poole. *Poole's Index* with its five supplements covered 479 different periodicals and included more than 590,000 references.

Poole's Index is a subject index only. Writers are entered only when they are treated as subjects. Thus Thomas Babington Macaulay's contributions to the *Edinburgh Review* are entered not under Macaulay's name but under the subjects he wrote about—Milton, church and state, Clive, Machiavelli, etc. Critical articles on poetry, the drama, and prose fiction appear under the name of the author whose work is being criticized. Hence a critical article on *Dombey and Son* would appear under "Charles Dickens."

Poole did not supply the date of the magazine in his references. A typical reference following the title of an article looks like this: Fortn 29:816. The Table of Abbreviations in the front of the volume shows that "Fortn" is the abbreviation for *Fortnightly Review*. The number before the colon is the volume number; the number after the colon is the first page of the article. By consulting the chronological conspectus at the front of the volume, the student would discover that volume 29 of the *Fortnightly Review* appeared in 1878. The chronological conspectus also indicates the volume numbers of the same date in other periodicals, so that from this table the student could trace the discussion of a subject in several contemporary periodicals.

A paperbound volume, *Poole's Index: Date and Volume Key*, by Marion V. Bell and Jean C. Bacon (Chicago: Association of College and Reference Libraries, 1957), usually found on the shelves alongside *Poole's Index*, arranges the 479 periodical titles in a single alphabetical listing, with the year supplied for each volume of each periodical.

OTHER INDEXES

Here is a list, with brief descriptions, of some other periodical indexes, which can usually be found on the reference shelves of public and college libraries. (All of them, except the *Catholic Periodical Index*, are published by the H. W. Wilson Company of New York):

AGRICULTURAL INDEX (1916-to date)—Published monthly. Later published in bound volumes in annual and two-year cumulations. A subject index to anything connected with agriculture in periodicals, pamphlets, and bulletins and in documents published by federal and state agricultural agencies.

THE ART INDEX (1929-to date)—Published quarterly. Later cumulated in annual and two-year volumes. A subject and author index to periodicals and museum bulletins in the fields of archaeology, architecture, ceramics, ornament, engraving, graphic arts, landscaping, painting, sculpture.

THE EDUCATION INDEX (1929-to date)—Published monthly, except in June and August, with annual and two-year cumulations. A subject and author index to periodicals, books, monographs, bulletins, and reports on anything connected with education.

INDUSTRIAL ARTS INDEX (1913-1957)—Published monthly. Later cumulated in annual bound volumes. This is a subject index only to periodical literature on business, finance, applied science, and technology. In 1958, this reference guide was divided into two separate publications: *The Applied Science and Technology Index* (covering aeronautics, automation, chemistry, construction, electrical communication, engineering, geology, metallurgy, physics, and transportation) and the *Business Periodicals Index* (covering accounting, insurance, public administration, taxation, and other allied subjects).

CATHOLIC PERIODICAL INDEX (1930-to date)—Published quarterly by the Catholic Library Association of Washington, D.C., this periodical guide eventually appears in a bound volume with a two-year cumulation. It indexes about 200 Catholic periodicals published in various parts of the world, many of which are not included in the *Readers' Guide* or the *International Index*.

ESSAY AND GENERAL LITERATURE INDEX (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1934-).

This is an author and subject index (with title entries where needed) to collections of essays, articles, and miscellaneous works of some reference value. The first five cumulative volumes cover the period from 1900 through 1959. Supplements appear semi-annually and annually, and eventually the cumulations appear in a bound volume that covers about a five-year period.

The special value of the *Essay and General Literature Index* is that this reference work can guide the student to collections that print essays, articles, stories, poems, etc. which have been long out of print or which are not readily available in earlier editions or in bound periodicals. Sometimes the student knows of or discovers through the periodical guides an essay or article that would be extremely useful for a paper he is writing, but in checking the library he learns to his dismay that this library does not have the book or the bound periodical in which this piece originally appeared. He should not, however, abandon all hope of getting a copy of this piece. The *Essay and General Literature Index* may indicate that it has been printed in a collection or anthology, of which the library has a copy. At the back of each bound volume is a list of all the books indexed in that volume, and many librarians put a check mark opposite the titles that the library has in the stacks. The essays and articles reprinted in the "readers" that the student may have bought for some of his college courses are, or will be, indexed in this reference work.

NEW YORK TIMES INDEX (New York: New York Times Index, 1913-).

TIMES OFFICIAL INDEX (London: Times Office, 1906-).

Some public and university libraries keep a file of the local newspapers and provide some kind of index to these newspapers. They are more likely, however, to maintain files of some of the great newspapers, like the *London Times* and the *New York Times*, both of which publish annual indexes to their copy.

Formerly, libraries and newspaper "morgues" retained copies of the newspapers, but these stacks were awkward to store, difficult to handle, and susceptible to slow decay. Now, thanks to the microfilming process, an entire year's issue of a newspaper can be included on a few rolls of film. Using a microfilm reader, the researcher can quickly turn to the particular issue and feature he is interested in and can take notes from the enlarged reproduction of the newspaper type.

Obviously, an index to a newspaper can save the researcher hours of time.

The London *Times* is indexed from 1906 to the present in quarterly accumulations. The *New York Times Index* has been appearing since 1913 in quarterly, monthly, or fortnightly issues. But each year these separate issues are cumulated and bound into a single volume that libraries retain on their reference shelves.

The *New York Times Index* is a subject index only. Articles and features are not entered by the titles or headlines they had in the newspaper. Instead, the compilers supply a phrase or sentence which concisely describes the substance of the piece. For each entry under the subject heading, the date, page number, and column are given (for Sunday issues the section-number of the paper is also supplied)—e.g. Je 8, III, 3:4 (June 8—the year is supplied by the particular annual volume being used—section 3, page 3, column 4).

If the student is tracing a news item that was covered over several days, he can, by turning the microfilm reader to earlier or later issues, find additional material. The *New York Times Index* can also serve as an informal index to other newspapers, for major news events will most likely be covered in local newspapers on the same date as they were covered in the *New York Times*.

HANDBOOKS

WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS (New York: New York World-Telegram and Sun Corporation, 1868—to date).

INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC (1947—to date; various publishers, currently Simon and Schuster, New York).

These almanacs are such rich storehouses of miscellaneous information that every student should buy one or the other. A large portion of each edition of the almanacs is reprinted every year without any changes, because certain kinds of data, like the names of the presidents and vice-presidents of the United States or the capitals of each state of the Union, are not subject to change. For that kind of information, a 1940 almanac is just as useful to the student as a 1962 almanac. Other kinds of information, however, do change from year to year. If the student is seeking statistics on the federal tax revenue for 1960, he must consult the almanac covering that year. The student should browse through one of these volumes in a bookstore to get an adequate notion of the great variety of useful information supplied.

The *Information Please Almanac* contains more signed articles than does the *World Almanac*, and its coverage of foreign countries is more extensive. Because of the miscellaneous nature of the information, neither almanac arranges its material in alphabetical order. Instead, extremely detailed indexes to the material in each volume are provided. Frequent cross-references point to additional material.

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH LITERATURE, ed. Sir Paul Harvey, 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946).

THE NEW CENTURY HANDBOOK OF ENGLISH LITERATURE, ed. Clarence L. Barnhart (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956).

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LITERATURE, ed. James D. Hart, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

THE READER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LITERATURE, ed. Max J. Herzberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1962).

AMERICAN AUTHORS AND BOOKS, ed. W. J. Burke and Will D. Howe, aug. and rev. by Irving Weiss (New York: Crown, 1962).

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO FRENCH LITERATURE, ed. Sir Paul Harvey and J. E. Heseltine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958).

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE THEATRE, ed. Phyllis Hartnoll, 2d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).

All of these handbooks supply the same kind of information about literature and the arts. Their scope is defined by their titles. Here is the kind of information that can be found in these alphabetically arranged handbooks:

1. Short biographical sketches of poets, novelists, short-story writers, playwrights, essayists, artists, musicians.
2. Short biographical sketches of statesmen, scientists, philosophers, historians, actors, military men—especially those who have some relation to literature.
3. Plot summaries of novels, plays, operas, and long narrative poems.
4. Résumés of major lyric, didactic, and satirical poems.
5. Identification of major characters in novels, plays, operas, and narrative poems.
6. Explanations of Biblical, classical, and mythological allusions.
7. Definitions of literary terms—e.g. heroic couplet, Shakespearean sonnet, pathetic fallacy.
8. Short essays on literary trends and movements—realism, existentialism, New Criticism.
9. Explanations of historical and geographical references which have some pertinence to literature and the arts—e.g. Gunpowder Plot, Fleet Street, Waterloo.
10. Short essays on famous musical compositions and works of art which have had some influence on literature—e.g. Elgin Marbles, Mona Lisa, Mozart's *Don Giovanni*.

Some of this information will be found in any one of the seven handbooks listed at the head of this article. But the student seeking information about an American author or an American novel would probably find the most complete information in one of the handbooks devoted exclusively to American literature. For anything connected with the theater, the articles in the *Oxford Companion to the Theatre* are likely to be fuller and more satisfactory than those in the other handbooks. The student should understand, however, that all of these handbooks supply only the essential facts; for studies in depth he will have to turn to other sources.

CASSELL'S ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF WORLD LITERATURE, ed. S. H. Steinberg, 2 vols. (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1954).

THE READER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA, ed. William Rose Benét (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1948).

Whereas the previously mentioned handbooks dealt with the literature and art of particular countries or a special art form, these two handbooks provide the same kinds of information about world literature and art. William Rose Benét's handbook covers the major world literatures—English, French, German, Italian, Russian, Greek, and Latin. *Cassell's* covers these literatures and, in addition, such minor ones as Armenian, Basque, Breton, Eskimo, Polynesian, Yiddish—cultures usually neglected by English-language reference works. In its two volumes of 2086 double-column pages, *Cassell's* treats of some eighty literatures. The articles in *Cassell's* are arranged alphabetically in three different sections:

- Part I Histories of the Literatures of the World and General Literary Subjects, pp. 1-574.
- Part II Biographies of Authors Who Died Before 1 August 1914.
- Part III Biographies of Authors Who Were Living on 1 August 1914 or Who Were Born after That Date.

Part I contains about 550 articles ranging in length from two lines to the 10,000 words it devotes to the Bible. In addition to long articles on such subjects as printing and publishing (35 columns), biography (12 columns), English literature (26 columns), and Russian literature (12 columns), there are shorter articles on such topics as epigrams, rhetoric, alliterative verse, *com-media dell'arte*. Major articles and biographies are followed by brief bibliographies.

While William Rose Benét's *Reader's Encyclopedia* is not as comprehensive and expansive as *Cassell's*, it is a handy one-volume source of essential information about world literature and the arts.

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO CLASSICAL LITERATURE, ed. Sir Paul Harvey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955).

THE NEW CENTURY CLASSICAL HANDBOOK, ed. Catherine B. Avery (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962).

Both of these handbooks are rich mines of classical lore. They (1) identify the figures of myth and legend; (2) provide biographies of dramatists, poets, sculptors, painters, philosophers, generals, and statesmen; (3) give résumés of such epics as the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and *Aeneid* and of the dramas of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes; (4) supply information about places of mythological, historical, and archaeological interest; (5) have articles on rivers, mountains, shrines, ancient works of art, ruins, and monuments; (6) define classical terms. *The New Century Classical Handbook* has a great many illustrations and photographs and spells out phonetically Anglicized pronunciations of classical proper names—an especially helpful feature. Some information about classical subjects can be found in the handbooks of English, American, and world literature, but since these handbooks concentrate on classical lore, their coverage is more extensive and expansive.

GRANGER'S INDEX TO POETRY, 5th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

This famous reference guide to poetry has been in existence now for over half a century. This latest edition has four kinds of indexes to poems collected in over 500 of the most important anthologies published through June 30, 1960: (1) title index; (2) author index; (3) first-line index; (4) subject index. If the student can remember anything about the poem that he is trying to recover, he should be able to trace it with the aid of this reference guide. The subject index can also be used to find several poems dealing with a particular topic. The student will have to resort to an index of quotations, like *Bartlett's*, if all he can remember of a poem is a line other than the first line.

GROVE'S DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS, 4th ed. by H. C. Colles, 6 vols.; 5th ed. by Eric Blom, 9 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1940, 1954).

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MUSIC, ed. Percy A. Scholes, 9th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955).

Sir George Grove published the first edition of this famous reference work in 1879, contributing to it major articles on Beethoven, Mendelssohn, and Schubert, which were not dropped until the fifth edition. Grove arbitrarily set the beginning date of his coverage at A.D. 1450, but with the recent growth

of knowledge about ancient music, especially about medieval plain-song, later editors included articles about the music of much earlier eras. An American Supplement, first added in the third edition, has been retained and amplified in the fourth and fifth. Approximately a half of the total contents of the fifth edition, some four million words, is new. Hundreds of expert contributors have written articles on such subjects as these: (1) definitions of musical terms; (2) explanations of the forms and methods of musical composition; (3) studies of the origin, development, and structure of musical instruments; (4) histories of various musical societies; (5) notices of composition, production, and contents of important works; (6) lists of the principal published collections of music; (7) biographies of composers, singers, players, patrons, etc.

The Oxford Companion to Music makes no pretense of rivaling *Grove's Dictionary*, but the 1133 double-column pages in the 1955 edition provide a wealth of information about music and musicians. Throughout the text there are over 1100 portraits and pictures, and at the back of the book there is a pronouncing glossary of some 7000 terms and names that appear in the articles.

AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY: ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, AND MODERN, CHRONOLOGICALLY ARRANGED, ed. William L. Langer, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952).

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, ed. Richard B. Morris, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1961).

The Langer book is a reworking of the *Epitome of History* that the German professor Dr. Karl Ploetz prepared and that William H. Tillinghast translated into English in 1883. In this revised edition, the coverage of this rich storehouse of historical facts has been brought down to the end of World War II in 1945. If the student has trouble locating the information he is seeking by following the geographical and chronological indicators at the top of each page, he can consult the highly detailed index. The historical narrative is interspersed with many black-and-white maps and almost a hundred genealogical tables of the major ruling families, and the Appendix provides lists of the Roman and Byzantine emperors, the popes, and the British, French, and Italian ministries.

The Morris book is a comparable handbook for American history. It has three main divisions: Part I, chronologically arranged, which presents major political and military events of the nation from the pre-Columbian era to the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy in January 1961; Part II, topically organized, which presents such non-political aspects of American

history as constitutional developments, westward expansion, and economic, scientific, and cultural trends; Part III, alphabetically arranged, which presents brief biographical sketches of some 400 notable Americans. Scattered throughout the more than 800 double-column pages of the text are charts, tables, and historical maps. An extremely detailed Index serves as a key to the wealth of information in this handbook.

DICTIONARIES, ATLASES, AND GAZETTEERS

A good desk dictionary, like *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, the *New World Dictionary*, the *American College Dictionary*, or Funk and Wagnalls' *Standard College Dictionary*, will supply the routine information that a student seeks about the spelling, syllabification, pronunciation, and meaning of words, as well as providing some brief information about many proper names. Occasionally, however, a student may have to consult unabridged and other special dictionaries, and therefore he should become familiar with the special dictionaries that are usually available on the reference shelves of libraries.

THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES, ed. James A. H. Murray, Henry Bradley, William A. Craigie, and C. T. Onions, 10 vols. and supplement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884-1928). Supplement, 1933.

The greatest dictionary of the English language—in fact, the greatest dictionary ever compelled for any language—is the *New English Dictionary* (*NED*) or, as it has been referred to since about 1895, the *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*). The idea for this comprehensive dictionary originated in a suggestion that Richard Chevenix Trench, then Dean of Westminster, made to the Philological Society of England in 1857. It was decided right from the start that this dictionary would provide a historical study of the language, and several hundred readers were engaged to select and transcribe quotations which would be the basis of the historical conspectus. Some 1300 additional readers, most of them non-professional students of the language, culled three and a half million quotation slips from more than 5000 authors of all periods.

The first volume of the *OED* was published in 1884; the tenth volume was published in 1928—forty-four years after the first volume appeared and seventy years after the Philological Society passed the resolution to publish the dictionary. In 1933 a 336-page supplement was published to cover the recent additions to the language (either new words or new senses) and some words that had been overlooked in the main dictionary. The ten volumes of

"the Principal Dictionary" have a total of 15,487 pages with 1,827,306 illustrative quotations.

In the preface to the first volume, the editors stated, "The aim of this Dictionary is to furnish an adequate account of the meaning, origin, and history of English words now in general use, or known to have been in use at any time during the last seven hundred years." In accordance with this objective, the *OED* supplies (1) the variant spellings a word has had down through the years; (2) the etymology of the word, established by the methods of modern philological science; (3) the pronunciation of the word (usually the pronunciation that prevailed at the time that particular volume was published); (4) the various meanings a word has had; (5) quotations illustrating the spellings and meanings, ranging from the first known occurrence of the word in printed works to the recent occurrences of the word in modern texts. Each illustrative quotation is preceded by the date of the occurrence, the name of the author, a short-title reference to the source, and the page number in the source. It should be emphasized that the earliest date supplied is not necessarily the date when the word was first used; this date indicates the earliest discovered written record of the use of the word.

A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES, ed. Sir William A. Craigie and James R. Hulbert, 4 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938-44).

A DICTIONARY OF AMERICANISMS ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES, ed. Mitford M. Mathews, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

William A. Craigie, one of the editors of the *OED*, worked with Professor James R. Hulbert of the University of Chicago to produce a historical dictionary of American English. As the editors said in their preface, this dictionary would include "not only words and phrases which are clearly or apparently of American origin or have greater currency here than elsewhere, but also every word denoting something which has a real connection with the development of the country and the history of its people." Using the historical principle that informed the *OED* and supplying the same kind of information, Craigie and Hulbert aimed to show how American English was distinguished from the languages of England and other English-speaking countries. The short-title references used in the citations are expanded in the 23-page bibliography. The end of the nineteenth century was arbitrarily chosen as the cut-off point for the admission of words to the lexicon, but many of the illustrative quotations are taken from works published during the first twenty-five years of the twentieth century.

In January of 1944, the year in which the last volume of the *DAE* was published, Mitford M. Mathews and his staff began preparation for *A Dictionary of Americanisms* (abbreviated *DA*). The *DA* would seem to be superfluous, but Professor Mathews felt that the *DAE* had marked as Americanisms many terms which he had reasons to reject and that the *DAE* had omitted some terms that were clearly Americanisms. The narrower scope of the *DA* is due to Mathew's definition of "Americanism": "a word or expression that originated in the United States." This criterion admitted into the word-list "outright coinages," as *appendicitis*, *hydrant*, *tularemia*; such words as *adobe*, *campus*, *gorilla*, which first became English in the United States; and terms such as *faculty*, *fraternity*, *refrigerator*, when used in senses first given them in American usage." A 33-page bibliography gives the full titles of works cited in the illustrative quotations.

For many kinds of historical, cultural, and linguistic information about Americanisms, the student should consult one of these two dictionaries.

THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA, ed. William Dwight Whitney and Benjamin E. Smith, 12 vols. (New York: The Century Company, 1889-1914).

The Century Dictionary is generally regarded as the best multi-volume unabridged dictionary ever produced by a commercial publisher in America. Under the general editorship of William Dwight Whitney, the first edition appeared between 1889 and 1891. A cyclopedia of names appeared in 1894, an atlas in 1897, and two supplementary volumes in 1909. The final edition in 1914 was produced in a 12-volume set. The total number of words and names in the completed work was more than 500,000. Since about 1920, this great dictionary, which typographically is the most attractive and readable dictionary ever produced, has been out of print. Most college libraries, however, have a set on the reference shelves, and occasionally one can find a set in a secondhand bookstore.

This dictionary was designed to be as complete a record of *literary* English as possible. One of its values for the student of literature is the generous coverage given to obsolete words and forms, such as the Middle English of Chaucer's time. Moreover, the words and idioms of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature are more adequately covered than in any other American dictionary. The *Century Dictionary* gives illustrative quotations, presents full and accurate etymological information, lists synonyms for about 7000 words, and for many of the words adds a short informative essay.

The sub-title of the *Cyclopedia of Names* reveals the scope of this volume: *A Pronouncing and Etymological Dictionary of Names in Geography, Biography, Mythology, History, Ethnology, Art, Archaeology, Fiction, Etc.* This

valuable dictionary of proper names has been made available in a separate publication: *The New Century Cyclopedia of Names*, in 3 vols. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954).

Among the 305 highly detailed colored maps in the world atlas are forty historical maps. There is an index, containing 170,000 names of towns, villages, cities, mountains, rivers, etc., with indications of where to locate them on the maps printed in the atlas.

Other Atlases and Gazetteers

GOODE'S WORLD ATLAS, 11th ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1960).

THE TIMES'S ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 5 vols. (London: The Times Office, 1955-60).

HAMMOND'S AMBASSADOR WORLD ATLAS, 2d ed. (Maplewood, N.J.: C. S. Hammond & Co., 1961).

PRENTICE-HALL'S WORLD ATLAS (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958).

HISTORICAL ATLAS, ed. William R. Shepherd, 8th ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1956).

ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY, ed. R. R. Palmer (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1957).

COLUMBIA LIPPINCOTT GAZETTEER OF THE WORLD, ed. Leon E. Seltzer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952).

WEBSTER'S GEOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY: A DICTIONARY OF NAMES OF PLACES WITH GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL INFORMATION AND PRONUNCIATIONS (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1955).

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, ed. Philip B. Gove (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster Company, 1961).

Most college students at one time or another have consulted the second edition of this unabridged dictionary, which was published in 1934. From now on, they will be consulting the third edition. The second was advertised as containing 600,000 entries, including the proper names in its biographical and gazetteer sections. The third edition is advertised as containing among its 450,000 entries 100,000 new words or meanings. Although the third edition has dropped the biographical and gazetteer sections, the Merriam-Webster Company publishes them as separate, portable dictionaries.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary is the most complete, up-to-date record of American English now in existence. It covers the thousands of technical terms that have inundated the language in the last twenty-five years as well as the slang and colloquial idioms that have been added to the language. Most of the entries are illustrated by quotations, many of them from contemporary prose.

ORIGINS: A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH, ed. Eric Partridge (New York: Macmillan, 1958).

Among the useful dictionaries compiled by Eric Partridge are *A Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English* (now in its fifth edition), *A Dictionary of the Underworld, British and American*, and *Shakespeare's Bawdy: A Study and a Glossary*. For anyone who delights in the study of words, *Origins* is the most fascinating of Partridge's dictionaries.

Unlike the other dictionaries that we have looked at in this section, *Origins* does not give the pronunciation or meanings of words. It confines itself to the etymology of some 12,000 of the commonest words in modern English. But the 15-page section on prefixes, the 22-page section on suffixes, and the 100-page section on compound-forming elements will help the student with thousands of learned and technical words in the language. The medical student, for instance, who detects some form of the element *glosso-* (from the Greek word meaning "tongue") can guess at the meaning of words like *glossograph*, *glossology*, *glossotomy*, *glottiscope*, *glottogenic*.

Although a number of abbreviations are used, the etymologies are traced in discursive prose that can be readily understood by the ordinary layman. A valuable feature of this dictionary is that all cognates are gathered under one heading and their etymologies traced in that section. Under the word *light*, for instance, more than fifty cognates are grouped—words like *leven*, *enlighten*, *Lucy*, *lucid*, *lucubration*, *luminary*, *lunatic*, *sublunary*, *luster*, *luxury*, *elucidate*, *illuminate*, *illustrate*, *leukemia*. The bonus for the student from such an arrangement is that while looking up the etymology of the word *light* he is made aware of many related and derivative words.

Any of the dictionaries mentioned in this section will supply etymological information about words, but for more extensive information about the history of words, the student should turn to *Origins* or to one of the following:

AN ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, ed. Walter W. Skeat, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).

A CONCISE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH, ed. Ernest Weekley, rev. ed. (London: Secker & Warburg, 1952).

Other Specialized Dictionaries

The titles of the following dictionaries indicate the nature and scope of their coverage:

A DICTIONARY OF SLANG AND UNCONVENTIONAL ENGLISH, ed. Eric Partridge, 5th ed., 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1961).

DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG, ed. Harold Wentworth and Stuart Berg Flexner (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1960).

THE AMERICAN THESAURUS OF SLANG, ed. Lester V. Berrey and M. Van den Bark, 2d ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1953).

A DICTIONARY OF THE UNDERWORLD, BRITISH AND AMERICAN, ed. Eric Partridge (New York and London: Macmillan, 1950).

DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN UNDERWORLD LINGO, ed. Hyman E. Goldin, Frank O'Leary, and Morris Lipsius (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1950).

ENGLISH DIALECT DICTIONARY, ed. Joseph Wright, 6 vols. (London: H. Frowde; New York: G. P. Putnam, 1898-1905).

A PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH, ed. John S. Kenyon and Thomas A. Knott (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1944).

BIBLIOGRAPHIES

A bibliography is a list of books and articles on a certain subject or author. A bibliography of an author lists works *by* that author and/or works *about* him. Each field of study has standard reference works directing the student to the published material in that discipline, and as the student progresses in his field of specialization, he will become familiar with the standard bibliographical guides in his specialized study. Here we will treat of two general guides to bibliographies in all fields and then of the principal bibliographical guides for English and American literature.

A WORLD BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BIBLIOGRAPHIES, ed. Theodore Besterman, 3d ed., 4 vols. (Geneva, 1955-56).

This reference work, which was first published privately by its editor in 1939-40, is the most notable of the English-language bibliographies of bibliographies. The phrase "bibliography of bibliographies" may sound like double

talk, but it is simply the term for a reference work that provides all the publication information about printed bibliographies on a variety of subjects. Someone assigned to do a term paper on witchcraft might want to discover whether a bibliography has ever been compiled on this subject. Besterman's work would not list the titles of works on witchcraft; it would simply give the titles of any *bibliographies* that had been compiled of such works. If the library had copies of those bibliographies, then the student would be able to assemble a list of books and articles pertinent to the subject he has been assigned to write on. Besterman's work would be a logical starting place for anyone launching upon a major piece of research.

As the title suggests, Besterman's work is international in its scope. It covers bibliographies in the humanities, the sciences, and technology, but it is limited to separately published bibliographies—that is, to books, monographs, or pamphlets which are devoted exclusively or primarily to bibliography. Hence the bibliographies given at the end of chapters or at the back of a book would not be listed in Besterman.

The bibliographies are arranged alphabetically according to subjects. An author index refers the student to the volume and pages of this work where a particular author's bibliography is listed. Since the searcher for a bibliography does not usually know the name of the compiler, he will probably have to consult the subject index. Frequent cross-references direct the student to bibliographies on allied subjects.

THE CUMULATIVE BOOK INDEX (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1933—to date).

Published every month except August, the *Cumulative Book Index* is an author, title, and subject catalogue of new books published in English in all countries of the world. These monthly issues are cumulated (at irregular intervals) and published in huge bound volumes, which are usually kept in the librarian's workroom but are available to the student for consultation.

Every published book is catalogued at least three times in a single alphabetical listing: once under the author's last name; once under the first significant word in the title; and at least once under a subject heading (there are frequent cross-references to other subject headings). The author entry supplies the fullest information about a book: (1) full name of the author (including pseudonym, if any); (2) complete title of the book; (3) name of publisher (or source from which the book may be obtained); (4) date of publication; (5) paging; (6) price of the book; (7) the Library of Congress catalogue card number.

The student can use the *Cumulative Book Index* as a bibliographical aid by consulting the subject headings. If he were doing a paper, for instance,

on "Linguistics in the Curriculum," he could, by consulting the subject heading "Linguistics" or some sub-division of that heading in all the published volumes of the *Cumulative Book Index*, collect a complete bibliography of all the English-language books published on linguistics since 1928. From that complete list, he would then have to select the books that had a special pertinence to the subject of his paper.

THE CAMBRIDGE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE, ed. F. W. Bateson, 5 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1941). Vol. V, Supplement, 1957).

The *CBEL* is commonly acknowledged to be the standard bibliography of English language and literature. It is a descendant of the 15-volume *Cambridge History of English Literature*, ed. A. W. Ward and A. R. Waller, 1907-16, which included a selected bibliography at the end of each chapter. The province of the *CBEL* is all writings (whether in English or in Latin) of literary interest by natives of what is now the British Commonwealth up to the year 1900. Although no English writer who achieved prominence after 1900 is included, critical articles published as late as 1940 are admitted. Volume V, the supplement, records the more scholarly publications that appeared between 1940 and the beginning of 1955.

The *CBEL* is arranged chronologically rather than alphabetically. The quickest way for a student to locate the bibliography for an author or subject is to consult Volume IV, the index. Consulting the index under "Boswell," the student would find this kind of entry:

Boswell, James (1740-1795), II, 55, 92, **65of**, 903.

Printed in bold type, the **65of** indicates the main bibliographical entry in Volume II for the biographer of Samuel Johnson. The other numbers direct the student to pages in Volume II where other scholarly works pertinent to Boswell are listed. The general introduction in Volume I includes bibliographies on a number of subjects that could not be conveniently distributed among the various periods—e.g. bibliographies, histories, prosody, anthologies.

In the author entries, the works *by* an author are listed first, then the works *about* an author. The former listing follows this arrangement: (1) bibliographies and concordances (if any) published about the author; (2) the works of the author, published separately or in collections during his lifetime; (3) the modern editions of the author's works. Under the works *about* an author are listed biographical and critical studies of the author beginning with his contemporaries.

English majors may want to buy the one-volume condensation of the *CBEL* for their private reference library: *The Concise Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature, 600-1950*, ed. George Watson (1958).

LITERARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, ed. Robert E. Spiller, Willard Thorp, Thomas H. Johnson, Henry Seidel Canby, and others, 3 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948).

The first two volumes of the *LHUS* present a fairly complete history of the literature of the United States. Volume III is devoted exclusively to a bibliography of American literature, divided into four main sections:

- I. Guide to Resources (e.g. Bibliographical Centers, Published Catalogs and Directories, Union Lists and Collections, etc.)
- II. Bibliographies: Literature and Cultures (the subdivisions of this section are arranged according to periods and types of literature)
- III. Bibliographies: Movements and Influences
- IV. Bibliographies: Individual Authors

Whereas the bibliographies in the *CBEL* are disposed chronologically, the 207 American authors covered in the third volume of the *LHUS* are arranged alphabetically. Because of this arrangement, the student does not have to consult the index at the back of the volume in order to locate the bibliographies of individual authors, but he can consult the index for page numbers in the first two volumes where the author is discussed and for page numbers for bibliographies and studies of subjects. The bibliographies for authors include editions and studies published by the end of 1946 (a few 1947 publications are included). The author entries include notices of bibliographies, concordances, separate and collected works, edited texts and reprints, biography and criticism, and location of important manuscript copies.

Annual Bibliographies

Any bibliography begins to date as soon as it is published. It continues to be useful, of course, as a record of the books and articles published during the period that it covers, but the record necessarily stops shortly before the date of publication. Several of the literary journals keep the scholar informed about all the important work that has been done on language and literature during the previous year. The most comprehensive annual bibliography of literature is that published every spring in a special supplement of *PMLA*. This bibliography covers all periods of the major Western languages—English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Scandinavian, Dutch, and about ten East European languages. Some of the other literary journals

publish annual bibliographies of a specific period: Medieval Period—*Speculum*; Renaissance—*Studies in Philology*; Restoration and Eighteenth Century—*Philological Quarterly* (July issue); Romantic Period—*Philological Quarterly* (April issue); Victorian Period—*Victorian Studies*; Modern Period—*Twentieth-Century Literature*; American Literature (all periods)—*American Literature*.

SYNTOPICON

THE GREAT IDEAS: A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World, ed. Mortimer J. Adler and William Gorman, 2 vols. (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952).

The Syntopicon, Volumes 2 and 3 of the 54-volume set of *The Great Books of the Western World*, is such a unique and valuable reference work that it merits a fuller exposition than we gave the other reference works. The term *syntopicon* is a coinage signifying "collection of topics." As a collection of topics, the Syntopicon is a reference resource that the ancient rhetoricians might have wished were available in their time as a guide to the relatively more specialized knowledge that a speaker or writer needs when he has to develop a particular subject. Mortimer J. Adler said of this mammoth index that it is "the exact reverse of the giant comptometers which are fed data and do the thinking for the people; the Syntopicon feeds people the data—the issues and the various positions taken on them—and lets the human mind do its own thinking."

Some 443 works of seventy-four authors are printed in Volumes 4 to 54 of the Great Books, and Professor Adler had to decide on a basic list of great ideas which would serve as a detailed index to the topics discussed in the selected "great books" and in the Bible, the text of which is not presented in the set. Professor Adler pared his list of great ideas down to a manageable one hundred and two, including such topics as aristocracy, beauty, democracy, evolution, fate, good and evil, love, nature, pleasure and pain, rhetoric, sign and symbol, time, wealth. A staff of indexers launched upon a series of readings of the Great Books to gather references to discussions of these ideas by the great authors. Eventually, the basic ideas were subdivided into 3000 topics.

Each of the 102 chapters of the Syntopicon consists of five parts:

- I. Introduction. This is an essay summarizing the history of the discussion of the idea treated in that chapter. The various interpretations of the idea are reviewed, and the problems and controversies raised by the continual "conversation" about the idea are discussed.

- II. Outline of the Topics. This section sets forth in outline form the major themes of the discussion about the idea. Although there is an average of thirty topics to each chapter, the actual number varies from as few as six topics in a chapter to as many as seventy-six.
- III. References. This section, arranged topically, is the heart of the Syntopicon. Under each topic the exact location is indicated of all passages in the Great Books set related to that topic. Here is a typical entry:

35 Locke *Human Understanding* Bk. II, ch. xxi, 178a-200d

The inquirer is here referred to Volume 35 of the Great Books set, where John Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding* is reprinted in its entirety. The "Bk. II, ch. xxi" is a reference to the author's division of his treatise, which also enables the inquirer to find the relevant passage in some other edition of the author's work. The "178a-200d" cites the first and last page, together with page section, of the relevant passage in Volume 35. The order in which the references are arranged enables the inquirer to pursue the discussion of some theme in a historical sequence or in a select group of authors or in a particular period. References to the Bible, if any, are always listed first.

- IV. Cross-References. This section directs the inquirer to other chapters in the Syntopicon where similar or related topics are treated. In addition to directing the inquirer to allied material, the cross-references make him aware of the interrelationships among the great ideas.
- V. Additional Readings. This section refers the reader to other works not reprinted in the Great Books set. These bibliographies are divided into two sections: (1) works written by authors represented in Volumes 4-54 of *Great Books of the Western World*; (2) works by authors not included in the Great Books set. In this section, the additional readings are listed only by author and title, but in the Bibliography of Additional Readings at the back of the second volume of the Syntopicon, the full bibliographical information about each work is supplied.

Another valuable reference feature of the Syntopicon is the inventory of terms. This section serves as a kind of table of contents for the Syntopicon. Mortimer Adler remarks about this section in his introduction: "The person who wishes to use the Syntopicon as a reference book, in order to learn what the great books have to say on a particular subject, must be able to find that subject among the 3000 topics. The primary function of the Inventory of Terms is to enable him to find the topic or topics which either clearly express or approximately represent the subject of his inquiry."

For example, one of the terms that is likely to be involved in a discussion of Rhetoric is *persuasion*. Consulting the term *persuasion* in the inventory of terms, the inquirer would find this notation:

Persuasion: see RHETORIC, 1-5/b see also DIALECTIC 5; EMOTION 5d; INDUCTION 4b; LANGUAGE 8; OPINION 2c; PLEASURE AND PAIN 10b; REASONING 5d.

The terms printed in block-capitals refer the inquirer to one of the 102 alphabetically arranged chapters in the Syntopicon; the numbers and lowercase letters refer the inquirer to the particular sub-division of the references section of that chapter. This section will in turn direct the inquirer to the passages in the Great Books where the term *persuasion* is a major term of the discussion.

No exposition can adequately convey an idea of the wealth of information to be found in the pages of this unique reference work or make entirely clear how it works. The student should browse through it to discover for himself the nature, scope, and method of this valuable guide to the wisdom of the ages.

EXERCISE

Since no amount of lecturing will do as much to acquaint students with reference works as will consulting the works to find answers to specific questions, this exercise is designed to get students to use the reference works discussed in the section on external aids to invention.

The answers to a few of the following questions could be found in one of the standard encyclopedias, the card catalogue in the library, or a desk dictionary. In every case, the student should consult the reference work where he is *most likely* to find the information. For instance, if the student wanted the date of publication of the novel *Vanity Fair*, he might find this information in a handbook of world literature, like William Rose Benét's *The Reader's Encyclopedia*; but since William Makepeace Thackeray, the author of *Vanity Fair*, is an English novelist, it is *more likely* that the student will find this information in a handbook devoted exclusively to English literature, like the *Oxford Companion to English Literature* or *The New Century Handbook of English Literature*.

In doing this exercise, the student should (1) write out the problem as it is stated below; (2) write out the answer to the problem (sometimes this will involve copying the answer as it appears in the reference work; in this case it should be copied exactly and put in quotation marks); (3) designate

the source of the information—title of the reference work (underlined), edition of the work (if the work consulted is an edition later than the first—e.g. revised, second, etc.), the volume number (only in the case of a multi-volume reference work), the exact page number on which the answer was found. The following is a format that the student might observe in doing this exercise:

Problem: Who established the American string quartet known as the Flonzaley Quartet?

Answer: Edward J. De Coppet of New York City established the Flonzaley Quartet.

Source: *Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, 3d ed., II, 254.

You Want to Find:

1. When Sir Robert Peel, the man responsible for the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1842, became Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow.
2. In which of Frank Norris's novels the character Curtis Jadwin appeared.
3. Whether the *Dictionary of American English* and *The Dictionary of Americanisms* agree on the *date* when "O.K." or "okay" was first used as a verb in the sense of "to approve." (Give date and source of first occurrence as given in each dictionary.)
4. When and where Sir Harold Nicolson, the noted contemporary biographer, was born.
5. Whether the term *bishop* ever occurs in the New Testament (if so, cite the passages where the term occurs).
6. Some magazine articles on the subject of censorship of moving pictures that appeared in English-language publications published outside the United States during the years 1955-1958.
7. When and where Arkady A. Sobalev, chief of the Soviet Union's permanent delegation at the United Nations, was born and in what field he took his university degree.
8. In what year John Hancock was elected to be the first governor of the state of Massachusetts.
9. During what years Ignazio Raimondi, the Neapolitan violinist and composer, served as director of concerts at Amsterdam.
10. At least six articles that appeared in American magazines in 1958 on the subject of foreign students in the United States.
11. Whether there is any collected edition of the works of Thomas Babington Macaulay.
12. Why Juan Luis Vives, the Spanish humanist and teacher of rhetoric, was imprisoned by Henry VIII.
13. A copy of Eileen Duggan's poem "Victory."

14. The meaning of the allusion, in a book about the Greeks, "battle of Leuctra."
15. Whether Frederick Jackson Turner's essay "The Frontier in American History" was reprinted in any collection or anthology published between 1948 and 1954.
16. In what novel by Dostoyevsky the character Nikolay Vsyevolodovich Stavrogin appeared.
17. At least three book-length biographical studies of the poet Emily Dickinson.
18. The earliest recorded use of the word *knight* as a designation of an order or rank and then the earliest recorded use of the word, in the same sense, spelled as we spell the word today.
19. The names of some contemporary puppeteers (like Burr Tillstrom) and then some biographical articles on these puppeteers in periodicals and newspapers between 1949 and 1952.
20. The source of the quotation, "There is no grievance that is a fit object of redress by mob law."
21. How many years Walter Paul Paepcke served as president of the Container Corporation of America.
22. What title Juan Bautista Diamante, the seventeenth-century Spanish dramatist, gave to his adaptation of Corneille's play *Le Cid*.
23. Whether the *Oxford English Dictionary* and the *Century Dictionary* agree that the word *romp*, as a noun meaning "a merry, lively girl who indulges in boisterous play," first came into use during the early years of the eighteenth century.
24. At least six articles on the Corn Laws that appeared at any time during the first seventy-five years of the nineteenth century.
25. Whether a bibliography has ever been compiled on the subject of witchcraft (if so, list two or three).
26. What the literary term "Spenserian stanza" means.
27. Whether Shakespeare ever used the word *rhetoric* in his plays (and if so, where).
28. The meaning of the term *astronaut*.
29. Six magazine articles that appeared in 1893 on the subject of the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago.
30. When Pierre Lambert Goossens, Catholic archbishop of Mechlin in Belgium, was made a cardinal.

Readings

The following readings have been provided to serve as texts for the study of the principles of logic and rhetoric that have been discussed in this chapter. Theory exemplifies and proves itself in these readings. Many of the authors represented here were aware of, if they were not thoroughly schooled in, rhetorical principles. Those authors who were not conscious of the rhetorical tradition confirm, by their practice, the soundness and workability of the principles that the rhetoricians had arrived at inductively.

While the readings can be used for the study of many of the things discussed in this chapter—inductive and deductive reasoning, the ethical appeal, the emotional appeal, the external aids to invention—they are designed primarily as working texts for the analysis of the common topics and the special topics. In the process of composition, the topics serve as the initiators of a line of development; in analyzing these texts for evidence of the operation of the topics, the student is working backward from the finished text to what was, consciously or unconsciously, the beginning of the process. The student may realize two benefits from this exercise: he will see that the topics are indeed aids to the discovery of “the available means of persuasion in any given case”; and he will develop another technique for the close reading of texts. Once a reader begins to approach a text from the point of view of the topics, it is surprising how soon he develops an “eye” for the topics in any expository or argumentative prose that he reads.

The first three readings, taken from Greek literature, are examples of, respectively, deliberative discourse, judicial discourse, and ceremonial discourse. Extended analyses of these three readings have been provided to serve as models for the student’s analyses of the other readings. Among these are more examples of deliberative, judicial, and ceremonial discourses. The student should begin his analysis by classifying the text according to type, since such a classification will alert him to the special topics that will be operating in the text. The student will also find it useful to make an outline of the major divisions of the text he is analyzing.

The last three readings—by Thomas Henry Huxley, Matthew Arnold, and J. Robert Oppenheimer, respectively—all treat a common subject, the relation between science and the humanities. Arnold’s essay is a direct reply to the arguments that Huxley presented in his essay, both written in the nineteenth century. Oppenheimer’s essay presents a modern discussion of the same subject.

In addition to the student’s own analyses of the readings, another exercise can be worked off the selections. The sample analyses have made little or

no attempt to assess the validity of the arguments and the effectiveness of the rhetoric. Taking up where these analyses leave off, the student can evaluate these readings and the others that follow.

To facilitate reference to the parts of the texts, numbers have been appended to each paragraph.

XENOPHON TALKS TO THE SOLDIERS

1 Dawn was just breaking when the new officers were chosen, and they came to the centre of the camp and decided to post sentries and call the soldiers to a meeting. When the rest of the army was assembled, Chirisophus stood up first and spoke as follows: "Soldiers, our position is undoubtedly difficult. We have lost some very able generals and captains and soldiers, and in addition to that even Ariaeus's men, who used to be on our side, have turned traitor to us. All the same what we have to do is to surmount our difficulties like brave men, not to give in, but to try, if we can, to win honour and safety by victory. And if that is beyond us, then at least let us die with honour, and never, so long as we live, come into the power of our enemies. For if we do, we shall have to suffer, I imagine, the sort of fate which I pray the gods will bring upon our opponents."

2 Next Cleanor of Orchomenus stood up and spoke as follows: "You can see with your own eyes, soldiers, how perjured and godless the King is. You can see the treachery of Tissaphernes. He it was who said that he was a neighbour of Greece, and that he would attach the greatest importance to saving our lives. On this understanding he swore an oath to us in person, he in person gave us his right hand, and in person he deceived our generals and made prisoners of them, showing so little respect for Zeus, the guardian of hospitality, that he actually shared a meal with Clearchus and then used this very fact to entrap and destroy our officers. Then there is Ariaeus, whom we were prepared to make King, and with whom we exchanged guarantees that neither would betray the other: he too, showing no fear of the gods or respect for the memory of the dead Cyrus, though he was treated with the utmost distinction by Cyrus when he was alive, has now left us and joined Cyrus's bitterest enemies, with whom he is attempting to injure us, who were Cyrus's friends. Well, I pray that the gods will give these men what they deserve. As for us, who see all this, we must never again be deceived by them, but must fight as hard as we can, and bear whatever is the will of heaven."

3 After him Xenophon stood up. He had put on the best-looking uniform

Xenophon, *The Persian Expedition* [*Anabasis*], trans. Rex Warner, The Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1949), Bk. III, Ch. 2, pp. 105-12. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

that he could, thinking that, if the gods granted victory, victory deserved the best-looking armour, or if he was to die, then it was right for him to put on his best clothes and be wearing them when he met his death. He began his speech as follows: "Cleanor has spoken of the natives' perjury and treachery, and I feel sure that you agree with what he has said. If, then, we want to make friends with them again, we shall have to be very downhearted indeed, when we consider what happened to our generals, who, because they trusted in their good faith, put themselves into their hands. But if our purpose is to take our arms in our hands and to make them pay for what they have done and for the future to fight total war against them, then, with the help of heaven, we have many glorious hopes of safety."

4 Just as he was saying this, someone sneezed, and, when the soldiers heard it, they all with one accord fell on their knees and worshipped the god who had given this sign. Xenophon went on: "I think, soldiers, that, since an omen from Zeus the Saviour appeared just when we were speaking about safety, we ought to make a vow that we will give thank-offerings to the god for our safety in the place where we first reach friendly soil, and we should also vow to offer sacrifices to the other gods to the best of our ability. Whoever agrees with this, put up his hand."

5 Then they all raised their hands, and afterwards they made their vows and sang the paean.

5 The claims of religion having been thus satisfied, Xenophon started again and spoke as follows: "I was just saying that we had many glorious hopes of safety. First of all, we have kept our oaths to the gods, while our enemies have broken theirs, and in addition to this perjured themselves in transgressing the truce. This being so, it is reasonable to suppose that the gods will be against our enemies, but will fight on our side; and they are capable of quickly making even the strong weak, and of saving the weak easily, when such is their will, even if they are in the midst of danger. And next I shall remind you of the dangers which our fathers also have been through, so that you may realise that it is right for you to be brave men and that, with the help of the gods, the brave find safety even from the worst of difficulties. Remember how the Persians and their friends came with an enormous army, thinking that they would wipe Athens off the face of the earth; but the Athenians had the courage to stand up to them by themselves, and they defeated them. On that occasion they had made a vow to Artemis that they would sacrifice to her a goat for every one of their enemies whom they killed, but, since they could not get hold of enough goats, they decided to sacrifice five hundred every year, and they are still sacrificing them today. Then, when Xerxes later on collected his innumerable army and came against Greece, there was another occasion when your fathers defeated the fathers of these people both on land and on sea. You can find proof of all this in

the trophies we have, but the greatest piece of evidence of all is the freedom of the cities in which you have been born and brought up. For you worship no man as a master, but only the gods. These were the men whose sons you are; and I shall certainly not say that you dishonour your fathers. Not many days ago you were in battle order against the children of our old enemies, and, though they were many times your number, you, with the help of the gods, defeated them. And on that occasion you showed yourselves brave men in order to get Cyrus a kingdom; but now the fight is on for your own safety, and therefore I am sure it is right to expect from you much greater courage and a much greater will to victory. Then, too, you ought to feel much greater confidence against the enemy. On the last occasion you had no experience of them and you could see their prodigious numbers, but all the same in the spirit of your fathers you had the courage to set about them. Now, however, when you know from experience that, even if they are many times your number, they are not anxious to face you, what reason have you to be afraid of them any longer? Do not imagine that we are any the worse off because the native troops who were previously in our ranks have now left us. They are even greater cowards than the natives whom we have beaten, and they made this clear by deserting us and fleeing to the other side. It is far better to see people who want to be the first to run away standing in one's enemy's army than in one's own ranks.

7 "If any of you feel disheartened because of the fact that we have no cavalry, while the enemy have great numbers of them, you must remember that ten thousand cavalry only amount to ten thousand men. No one has ever died in battle through being bitten or kicked by a horse; it is men who do whatever gets done in battle. And then we are on a much more solid foundation than cavalrymen, who are up in the air on horseback, and afraid not only of us but of falling off their horses: we, on the other hand, with our feet planted on the earth, can give much harder blows to those who attack us and are much more likely to hit what we aim at. There is only one way in which cavalry have an advantage over us, and that is that it is safer for them to run away than it is for us.

8 "You may, of course, be quite confident about the fighting, but upset by the fact that Tissaphernes will no longer show you the way, nor will the King provide opportunities of buying food. If this is so, then consider whether it is better to have Tissaphernes to guide us, a man who is quite clearly working against us, or to have prisoners whom we shall order to show us the way and who will know that, if they make any mistakes which affect us, they will be mistakes that will also affect their own persons and their own lives. And on the question of supplies, is it better to buy in the markets which they provide, where we have to pay a lot to buy a little (and we have no longer even got the money), or is it better to beat them in battle and

then take our supplies for ourselves, each man taking the quantity he feels like having?

9 "You may realise that these alternatives are the better ones, but still think that the rivers are an insuperable obstacle and regard yourselves as having been led properly into a trap by crossing them. If so, then I will ask you to consider whether the natives have not done here a very stupid thing. For all rivers, however impassable they may be at a distance from their springs, can be forded, and without so much as getting one's knees wet, if one follows them up towards their sources. And even if we cannot get across the rivers, even if no one comes forward to show us the way, even then we have no reason to get downhearted. We would not call the Mysians better men than we are, yet we know that they hold many large and prosperous cities in the King's country and against the King's will. We know that the same is true of the Pisidians, and we saw with our own eyes how the Lycæonians have seized the fortified positions in the plains and enjoy the profit of the land that belongs to these natives. Now in our case I should say that we ought not to make it obvious that we are setting off home, but we should make our dispositions as though we had the idea of settling here. I am certain that the King would offer the Mysians all the guides they wanted, and would give them numbers of hostages to guarantee his good faith in sending them out of the country, and would actually build roads for them, even though they wanted to go away in four-horse chariots. And I am certain that we would be three times as pleased to do all this for us, if he saw that we were planning to stay here. No, what I am really afraid of is that, if we once learn to live a life of ease and luxury, enjoying the company of these fine great women, the wives and daughters of the Medes and Persians, we might be like the Lotus-eaters and forget about our road home. So I think that it is right and reasonable for us to make it our first endeavour to reach our own folk in Greece and to demonstrate to the Greeks that their poverty is of their own choosing, since they might see people who have a wretched life in their own countries grow rich by coming out here. Soldiers, I need not elaborate the point. It is obvious that all these good things come to the conquerors.

10 "I must, however, deal with these questions—how we can make our march as free from danger as possible, and how, if we have to fight, we can fight to the best advantage. The first suggestion I shall make to you is to set fire to all the waggons we have, so that we may not be led by our animals but may be able to march wherever the interest of the army dictates. Then we should set fire to our tents as well: they too cause difficulties in transport, and are no use either for fighting or for getting provisions. Then let us get rid of all inessentials in the rest of our equipment, only keeping what we have for the purpose of fighting and eating or drinking, so that as many

of us as possible may carry arms and as few as possible carry baggage. When people are defeated, as you know, all their property changes hands; and if we win, we must look upon our enemies as if they were carrying baggage for us.

11 "It remains for me to mention what I think is the most important point of all. You can see what our enemies thought about it. They did not dare to make war on us until they had made prisoners of our generals, and this was because they thought that, so long as we had commanders and we were obedient to them, we were capable of coming out on top in the fighting; but once they had seized our commanders they thought that we would collapse through lack of control and lack of discipline. It is therefore necessary that the generals we have now should take much greater care than those we had before, and that those in the ranks should be much better disciplined and much more ready to obey their officers now than they were before. In cases of disobedience, we ought to vote that whichever of you happens to be on the spot should join with the officers in enforcing punishment. That would be the bitterest disappointment to our enemies; for, on the day that this is voted, they will see not one Clearchus but ten thousand, each one intolerant of any unsoldierly action.

12 "But it is time for me to make an end. It may be that the enemy will be upon us at once. If you agree with the suggestions I have made, then let us have them passed officially as soon as possible, so that they may be put into practice. If anyone knows a better way of going about things than the one I have outlined, then let him have the courage to tell us of it, even if he is only a common soldier. The safety which we are looking for is everyone's concern."

13 Afterwards Chirisophus spoke. "If we want," he said, "to pass any other measure in addition to those which Xenophon suggests, we can do so in a moment or two. I propose that, with no delay, we should vote that what he has just suggested is the best course to pursue. Will those who agree put up their hands?"

14 They all put their hands up, and Xenophon got up again and spoke as follows: "Soldiers, listen to the additional proposals which I have to make. Obviously we must march somewhere where we can get provisions, and I gather that there are some fine villages not more than two miles away from here. But I should not be surprised if the enemy, like cowardly dogs that run after and try to bite anyone who goes past them, but run away from anyone who chases them,—I should not be surprised if they too follow in our tracks as we go away. Perhaps then it would be safer for us to march with the hoplites forming a hollow square, so that the baggage and the general crowd may be more secure inside. If, then, we were told now who should be in the front of the square and organise the leading detachments,

and who should be on the two flanks, and who should be responsible for the rear, we should not have to plan all this when the enemy are approaching us, but could immediately make use of those who have been specially detailed for the job. If anyone has a better suggestion to make, let us adopt it. If not, then I propose that Chirisophus should lead the square: he has the additional advantage of being a Spartan. Two generals, the oldest ones, should look after the two flanks; and the youngest of us, that is Timasion and myself, should be responsible for the rear. I suggest this as a temporary measure. Later on we shall have tried out this order of march, and we can decide on what seems best as different circumstances arise. If anyone has a better suggestion to make, I should like him to put it forward."

15 Then, as nobody raised any objections, Xenophon said, "Will those who agree with this put up their hands?" And the proposal was carried.

16 "Now then," he continued, "we must leave the meeting and put into operation what we have decided. Whoever wants to see his own people again must remember to be a brave soldier: that is the only way of doing it. Whoever wants to keep alive must aim at victory. It is the winners who do the killing and the losers who get killed. And those who want money must try to win battles. The winners can not only keep what they have themselves, but can take what belongs to the losers."

ANALYSIS OF THE TOPICS

IN "XENOPHON TALKS TO THE SOLDIERS"

Xenophon's address to the Greek army is clearly an example of deliberative oratory. Xenophon is concerned with convincing the soldiers to adopt a certain course of action. That the decision about the course of action is not made by the officers and imposed on the soldiers is evidenced by the fact that at the end of Xenophon's speech the question is put to the vote of the entire army. Moreover, the question is debatable, since there are alternatives to the course of action that Xenophon proposes.

The Greeks are in desperate straits at this point. Hired by Cyrus to overthrow his brother King Artaxerxes, the Greeks had clashed with the Persian forces at Cunaxa, near the site of ancient Babylon. Although the Greeks won this battle, Cyrus was killed by a stray javelin, and subsequently his native troops deserted, leaving the Greeks without any supporting cavalry. During a truce that followed the battle, Tissaphernes invited the Greek commanders to a conference and then treacherously slew them. Not only are the Greeks at this point without their experienced generals and without cavalry troops, but they are surrounded by hostile people, deprived of native guides, and cut off from their homeland, a thousand miles away, by seemingly impassable rivers. The 10,000 men with their cumbersome baggage trains have a

crucial decision to make. What do they do now? Having disclosed his plan of action to the officers in the preceding chapter, Xenophon now assembles the soldiers and talks to them.

This passage, which constitutes the whole of the second chapter of Book III of the *Anabasis*, falls into five main parts:

1. Introduction, in which the men are put into the proper mood by two brief speeches and by a religious omen (paragraphs 1-5).
2. Xenophon's arguments to convince the men that they have a chance to win their way to safety (paragraph 6).
3. Xenophon's answers to the counter-arguments that might be proposed (paragraphs 7-9).
4. Xenophon's practical proposals for effectuating his plan (paragraphs 10-11).
5. Conclusion, in which the matter is put to a vote and Xenophon makes some additional proposals and a final plea for his cause (paragraphs 12-16).

The narrative framework can be regarded as providing the Introduction and Conclusion of Xenophon's speech; the speech itself has only three parts: the argument, the refutation, and the plan of action.

The brief speeches of Chirisophus (paragraph 1) and Cleanor (paragraph 2) and the omen of the sneeze which interrupts Xenophon's opening remarks (paragraphs 3-5) can be said to put the men into the proper emotional disposition for Xenophon's address. By reminding the soldiers of the gravity of the situation, Chirisophus is playing on the emotion of fear and indirectly stirring up their sense of honor. By reminding the soldiers of the treachery of the Persians, Cleanor is arousing their resentment and anger against the enemy. The sneeze comes fortuitously, but Xenophon shrewdly takes advantage of the accident to lend a religious sanction to the Greek cause. The Greeks are in a favorable mood now, but they still have to be persuaded.

The deliberative orator commonly exploits the special topics of the *worthy* (the good) and/or the *advantageous*. In other words, when the deliberative orator is seeking to persuade someone, he must show that what he proposes is worthy of pursuit for its own sake or is conducive to the well-being or happiness of the audience. In developing these special topics, the orator will have recourse to many of the common topics. Let us see what use Xenophon makes of the topics in his speech.

In paragraph 6, Xenophon advances a number of arguments to stir up the soldier's will and courage to fight their way through to safety. The first argument that he advances is designed to show that fighting (the alternative is surrendering) is a worthy course of action. The argument takes the form of an enthymeme: since we have kept our oaths, while the enemy have

broken theirs, it is reasonable to suppose that the gods will support us against our enemies. The full syllogistic argument, which in this case leads to a probable conclusion, might run something like this:

The gods will support those who keep their oaths.

We have kept our oaths.

The gods will support us.

The orator is arguing a future fact here and using an antecedent-consequent topic to develop his argument: being faithful to our oaths (antecedent) will lead to the support of the gods (consequent).

The second argument that Xenophon advances in this paragraph is also calculated to convince the men of the worthiness of bravery. In support of this contention, Xenophon makes use of the common topic of precedent, reminding the men of how bravely their forefathers fought against Persian invasions of the homeland. As signs that such brave fighting was a good, he cites the many trophies the Greeks gained and the present freedom of their cities.

In the next argument, Xenophon makes use of the common topic of comparison to advance the topic of the possible. He compares the situation at the battle of Cunaxa with the situation now. At Cunaxa, the men proved that they could fight as bravely and effectively as their fathers once fought. But at Cunaxa, the men were fighting for Cyrus, a foreigner; now they are fighting for their own safety. By using an *a fortiori* argument, Xenophon is trying to convince them of what is possible now. If they fought so effectively for a foreigner, how much more effectively they should be able to fight when they are fighting for themselves. In other words, if the more difficult task is possible, the less difficult is even more possible.

As another argument in support of what is feasible now, Xenophon reminds the soldiers that they are more experienced troops now than they were at the battle of Cunaxa. The consequence of more experience is greater confidence and therefore greater chance of success.

Xenophon next assures the Greeks that the loss of Cyrus's mercenaries is really a gain, for cowards can never be an asset to one's side. Implicit in this enthymeme is the suggestion that the defection of the cowardly mercenaries will prove to be an advantage to the Greeks. What was possible for the Greeks to accomplish when their forces were filled out with cowardly, unreliable troops will be even more possible when the army is made up exclusively of troops motivated by a cohesive loyalty.

Having advanced arguments to support his contention that fighting, rather than surrendering, is the more worthy and advantageous course of action, Xenophon in the next three paragraphs (7, 8, 9) anticipates and answers some of the counter-arguments.

First of all, he allays the soldiers' apprehensions about the enemy's cavalry by minimizing the effectiveness of cavalry in battle. Resorting to the common topic of comparison, Xenophon recognizes that there is a difference between fighting on foot and fighting on horses, but he argues that the difference gives the Greeks an advantage. It is men, after all, rather than horses that deal the death blow; and as far as men go, we can match them man for man. Then too a soldier can deal a more effective blow when his feet are planted on solid ground than when he is on a precarious perch in the saddle. There is, however, one advantage to fighting on horses: men on horseback can run away faster. The humorous irony of this last gibe was calculated to inspire the men.

In paragraph 8, Xenophon attempts to allay the soldiers' misgivings about losing Tissaphernes as a guide through this hostile, unknown country and about losing the opportunity to buy food from the natives. In resorting again to the common topic of comparison, this time to contrast the situation then with the situation now, Xenophon makes effective use of the sub-topic of degree (more and less). Tissaphernes was a good guide through this country, but a captured guide will be even better. Since, as we now know, Tissaphernes was secretly working against us, he could not really be relied on as a guide; but a native guide that we capture will prove to be more reliable because he knows that we will kill him if he dares to mislead us. Likewise, we have an advantage now in the procurement of supplies. Until now we have had to purchase our supplies in the market place. Now that a breach has developed in our pact with the Persians, we no longer have to live up to this gentleman's agreement; we can take by force what we no longer have the obligation or the money to buy. In both cases, then, we are better off now than we were before.

In paragraph 9, Xenophon allays the soldiers' anxieties about being trapped in a hostile country. In reply to the argument that the rivers are impassable, Xenophon resorts to the topic of contradiction. He seems to be arguing in this way: rivers are either passable or not passable (a contradictory disjunctive proposition); but these rivers are passable (if we cannot ford them at their deepest part, we can always ford them near their sources, where they are shallow); so it is false to propose that these rivers are impassable. But suppose, he then suggests, that we grant the impossibility of fording the rivers. What then? Xenophon assures the soldiers that they need not feel downhearted at this prospect. Resorting to an *a fortiori* argument again, he points out to them that if the Mysians, Pisidians, and Lycaonians, who are decidedly lesser men than the Greeks, can seize and hold large, prosperous cities in this kingdom against the will of the Persians, surely the Greeks can do the same thing.

Xenophon then resorts to the topic of future fact, to suggest the more

likely eventuality. If we made it appear that we intended to settle down in this country the king would do everything in his power to facilitate our departure from his kingdom. To support this argument from future fact, Xenophon is using the principle that where the desire or the opportunity to do something exists, the thing will be done. The clinching argument now in Xenophon's refutation takes a subtle turn. His principal fear, he tells the soldiers, is that they will become so enamored of the life of luxury that it is possible to enjoy in this country that they, like Homer's Lotus Eaters, will not want to go home. He is holding out to them the prospect of the *goods* that can be theirs if they decide to stay, or are forced to stay, in this country—"a life of ease and luxury," "the company of these fine great women." As Xenophon says at the end of this paragraph, "All these good things come to the conquerors." The subtlety of this argument resides in the suggestion that even if they cannot fight their way out of this country the prospect of a forced sojourn here is far from bleak. So in any case it is better to fight than to lay down their arms. By fighting, they either win their way to the safety of their homeland or win for themselves a life of ease and luxury.

Having argued that fighting bravely is both a worthy and an advantageous course of action and having refuted the counter-arguments, Xenophon now lays down some practical suggestions for the campaign ahead (paragraph 10-11). It is not enough that he convince the men that this is the course of action to follow; he must show them how it can be pursued successfully. In the first sentence of paragraph 10, Xenophon discloses the purpose of what he is now about to do: "I must, however, deal with these questions—how we can make our march as free from danger as possible, and how, if we have to fight, we can fight to the best advantage." As Aristotle said in Book I, Chapter 7, of the *Rhetoric*, "Things are 'practicable' in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them." By proposing some practical suggestions for the march that lies ahead of the men, Xenophon can show them that it is possible or easy to implement the ideal of fighting bravely. Accordingly, he makes two practical suggestions: (1) they must jettison non-essential baggage so that they will have greater mobility; (2) they must tighten up the discipline of the army.

In the final paragraph (16), Xenophon suggests that the soldiers may have one or more of the following *ends* in view: (1) to see their people again; (2) to stay alive; (3) to make money. Then he reminds them that these three ends can be effected only by fighting bravely. He has posed an either/or situation for them: either you fight, or you fail to realize whatever end you have in view. A close examination of this disjunctive proposition would reveal a logical flaw, but at this point, the soldiers are in no mood to take a close look at the logic. By using some clever rhetorical strategies, Xenophon has persuaded them that their situation, which before had seemed so des-

perate, is hopeful. Future events proved Xenophon to be right (the famed 10,000 fought and marched their way over 1500 foot-weary miles to the coast of the Black Sea), but, of course, the eventuality cannot be used to assess the effectiveness of this deliberative speech. The speech must be assessed on its immediate persuasiveness.

SOCRATES' APOLOGY

1 How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accusers, I cannot tell; but I know that they almost made me forget who I was—so persuasively did they speak; and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. But of the many falsehoods told by them, there was one which quite amazed me;—I mean when they said that you should be upon your guard and not allow yourselves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To say this, when they were certain to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and proved myself to be anything but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameful—unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth; for if such is their meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have scarcely spoken the truth at all; from me you shall hear the whole truth, but not delivered after their manner in a set oration duly ornamented with fine words and phrases. No, by heaven! I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the moment, for I am confident in the justice of my cause;¹ at my time of life I ought not to be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the character of a boy inventing falsehoods—let no one expect it of me. And I must particularly beg of you to grant me this favour:—If I defend myself in my accustomed manner, and you hear me using the words which many of you have heard me using habitually in the agora, at the tables of the money-changers, and elsewhere, I would ask you not to be surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first time before a court of law, I am quite a stranger to the language of the place; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country:—Am I making an unfair request of you? Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good; but think only of the truth of my words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak truly and the judge decide justly.

2 And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers,

From *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 4th ed. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1953), Vol. I, pp. 341-53. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹ Or, I am certain that I am right in taking this course.

and then I will go on to the later ones. For of old I have had many accusers, who have accused me falsely to you during many years; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous, too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are the others, who began when most of you were children, and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause. The men who have besmeared me with this tale are the accusers whom I dread; for their hearers are apt to fancy that such inquirers do not believe in the existence of the gods. And they are many, and their charges against me are of ancient date, and they were made by them in the days when some of you were more impressible than you are now—in childhood, or it may have been in youth—and the cause went by default, for there was none to answer. And hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of my accusers; unless in the chance case of a comic poet. All who from envy and malice have persuaded you—some of them having first convinced themselves—all this class of men are most difficult to deal with; for I cannot have them up here, and cross-examine them, and therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my own defence, and argue when there is no one who answers. I will ask you then to take it from me that my opponents are of two kinds; one recent, the other ancient: and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first, for these accusations you heard long before the others, and much oftener.

3 Well, then, I must make my defence, and endeavour to remove from your minds in a short time, a slander which you have had a long time to take in. May I succeed, if to succeed be for my good and yours, or likely to avail me in my cause! The task is not an easy one; I quite understand the nature of it. And so leaving the event with God, in obedience to the law I will now make my defence.

4 I will begin at the beginning, and ask what is the accusation which has given rise to the slander of me, and in fact has encouraged Meletus to prefer this charge against me. Well, what do the slanderers say? They shall be my prosecutors, and this is the information they swear against me: 'Socrates is an evil-doer; a meddler who searches into things under the earth and in heaven, and makes the worse appear the better cause, and teaches the afore-said practices to others.' Such is the nature of the accusation: it is just what you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes,¹ who has introduced a man whom he calls Socrates, swinging about and saying that he walks on air, and talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know either much or little—not that I mean to speak disparagingly of anyone who is a student of natural philosophy. May Meletus

¹ Aristoph. *Clouds*, 225 foll.

never bring so many charges against me as to make me do that! But the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do with physical speculations. Most of those here present are witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I appeal. Speak then, you who have heard me, and tell your neighbours whether any of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or in many upon such matters. . . . You hear their answer. And from what they say of this part of the charge you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest.

5 As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher, and take money; this accusation has no more truth in it than the other. Although, if a man were really able to instruct mankind, this too would, in my opinion, be an honour to him. There is Gorgias of Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, who go the round of the cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave their own citizens by whom they might be taught for nothing, and come to them whom they not only pay, but are thankful if they may be allowed to pay them. There is at this time a Parian philosopher residing in Athens, of whom I have heard; and I came to hear of him in this way:—I came across a man who has spent more money on the sophists than the rest of the world put together, Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and knowing that he had sons, I asked him: ‘Callias,’ I said, ‘if your two sons were foals or calves, there would be no difficulty in finding someone to put over them; we should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer probably, who would improve and perfect them in the appropriate virtue and excellence; but as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of placing over them? Is there anyone who understands human and civic virtue? You must have thought about the matter, for you have sons; is there anyone?’ ‘There is,’ he said. ‘Who is he?’ said I; ‘and of what country? and what does he charge?’ ‘Evenus the Parian,’ he replied; ‘he is the man, and his charge is five minas.’ Happy is Evenus, I said to myself, if he really has this wisdom, and teaches at such a moderate charge. Had I the same, I should have been very proud and conceited; but the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind.

6 I dare say, Athenians, that someone among you will reply, ‘Yes, Socrates, but what *is* your occupation? What is the origin of these accusations which are brought against you; there must have been something strange which you have been doing? All these rumours and this talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, what is the cause of them, for we should be sorry to judge hastily of you.’ Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I will endeavour to explain to you the reason why I am called wise and have such an evil fame. Please to attend then. And although some of you may think I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as may perhaps be attained by man, for to that extent

I am inclined to believe that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a kind of superhuman wisdom, which I know not how to describe, because I have it not myself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit; that witness shall be the god of Delphi—he will tell you about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the recent exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether—as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt—he actually asked the oracle to tell him whether anyone was wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying.

7 Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that would be against his nature. After long perplexity, I thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, 'Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.' Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed him—his name I need not mention, he was a politician; and in the process of examining him and talking with him, this, men of Athens, was what I found. I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and still wiser by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really worth knowing, I am at least wiser than this fellow—for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In this one little point, then, I seem to have the advantage of him. Then I went to another who had still higher pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same. Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him.

8 Then I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was

laid upon me,—the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first. And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians,—for I must tell you the truth—the result of my mission was just this: I found that the men most in repute were nearly the most foolish; and that others less esteemed were really closer to wisdom. I will tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the ‘Herculean’ labours, as I may call them, which I endured only to find at last the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be instantly detected; now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them—thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe me? I am ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. So I learnt that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to be much in the same case; and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to them for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians.

9 At last I went to the artisans, for I was conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine things; and here I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets;—because they were good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom; and therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both; and I made answer to myself and to the oracle that I was better off as I was.

10 This inquisition has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given rise also to many imputations, including the name of ‘wise’; for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others. But the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; although speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient to the god, and search and make inquiry into the wisdom of anyone, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be

wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have had no time to do anything useful either in public affairs or in any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god.

11 There is another thing:—young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear people examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to do some examining themselves; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth!—and then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practise or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretence of knowledge has been detected—which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and speak vehemently with persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumny all in a moment. And this, O men of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth; I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet, I feel sure that my plainness of speech is fanning their hatred of me, and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth?—Hence has arisen the prejudice against me; and this is the reason of it, as you will find out either in this or in any future inquiry.

12 I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my accusers; I turn to the second class. They are headed by Meletus, that good man and true lover of his country, as he calls himself. Against these, too, I must try to make a defence:—Let their affidavit be read: it contains something of this kind: It says that Socrates is a doer of evil, inasmuch as he corrupts the youth, and does not receive the gods whom the state receives, but has a new religion of his own. Such is the charge; and now let us examine the particular counts. He says that I am a doer of evil, and corrupt the youth; but I say, O men of Athens, that Meletus is a doer of evil, in that he is playing a solemn farce, recklessly bringing men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about matters in which he really never had the smallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavour to prove to you.

13 Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You attach great importance to the improvement of youth?

14 Yes, I do.

15 Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you take such interest in the subject, and have discovered their corrupter, and are citing and accusing me in this court. Speak, then, and tell the judges who is the improver of youth:—Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say. But is this not rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is.

16 The laws.

17 But that, my good sir, is not my question: Can you not name some person—whose first qualification will be that he knows the laws?

18 The judges, Socrates who are present in court.

19 What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youth?

20 Certainly they are.

21 What, all of them, or some only and not others?

22 All of them.

23 Truly, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the audience,—do they improve them?

24 Yes, they do.

25 And the senators?

26 Yes, the senators improve them.

27 But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them?—or do they too improve them?

28 They improve them.

29 Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception of myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm?

30 That is what I stoutly affirm.

31 I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a question: Is it the same with horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good? Is not the exact opposite the truth? One man is able to do them good, or at least very few;—the trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good, but the ordinary man does them harm if he has to do with them? Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or of any other animals? Most assuredly it is; whether you and Anytus say yes or no. Happy indeed would be the condition of youth if they had one corrupter only, and all the rest of the world were their benefactors. But you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young: your carelessness is plainly seen in your not caring about the very things which you bring against me.

32 And now, Meletus, I adjure you to answer me another question: Which

is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer, friend, I say; the question is one which may be easily answered. Do not the good do their neighbours good, and the bad do them evil?

33 Certainly.

34 And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to answer—does anyone like to be injured?

35 Certainly not.

36 And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?

37 Intentionally, I say.

38 But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbours good, and the evil do them evil. Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet I corrupt him, and intentionally, too—so you say, although neither I nor any other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. But either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally; and on either view of the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had had instruction, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally—beyond doubt I should; but you would have nothing to say to me and refused to teach me. And now you bring me up in this court, which is a place not of instruction, but of punishment.

39 It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying, that Meletus has never had any care, great or small, about the matter. But still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young. I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead. These are the lessons by which I corrupt the youth, as you say.

40 Yes, that I say emphatically.

41 Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! for I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge some gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, and am not an entire atheist—this you do not lay to my charge,—but only you say that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes—the charge is that they are different gods. Or, do you mean that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism?

42 I mean the latter—that you are a complete atheist.

43 What an extraordinary statement! Why do you think so, Meletus? Do you mean that I do not believe in the god-head of the sun or moon, like the rest of mankind?

44 I assure you, judges, that he does: for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth.

45 Friend Meletus, do you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras? Have you such a low opinion of the judges, that you fancy them so illiterate as not to know that these doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, which are full of them? And so, forsooth, the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when they can be bought in the book-market for one drachma at most; and they might pay their money, and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father these extraordinary views. And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god?

46 I swear by Zeus that you verily believe in none at all.

47 Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am pretty sure that you do not believe yourself. I cannot help thinking, men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and impudent, and that he has brought this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has he not compounded a riddle, thinking to try me? He said to himself:—I shall see whether the wise Socrates will discover my facetious self-contradiction, or whether I shall be able to deceive him and the rest of them. For he certainly does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment as much as if he said that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in them—but this is not like a person who is in earnest.

48 I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I must remind the audience of my request that they would not make a disturbance if I speak in my accustomed manner:

49 Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of human beings? ... I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and not be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and not in flute-players? My friend, no man ever did; I answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself. But now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in the existence of things spiritual and divine, and not in spirits or demigods?

50 He cannot.

51 How lucky I am to have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court! But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual things (new or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I believe in spiritual things,—so you say and swear in the affidavit; and yet if I believe in them, how can I help believing in spirits or demigods;—must I

not? To be sure I must; your silence gives consent. Now what are spirits or demigods? are they not either gods or the sons of gods?

52 Certainly they are.

53 But this is what I call the facetious riddle invented by you: the demigods or spirits are gods, and you say first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in demigods. For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by nymphs, or by other mothers, as some are said to be—what human being will ever believe that there are no gods when there are sons of gods? You might as well affirm the existence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses. Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been intended by you to make trial of me. You have put this into the indictment because you could think of nothing real of which to accuse me. But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever be convinced by you that a man can believe in the existence of things divine and superhuman, and the same man refuse to believe in gods and demigods and heroes.

54 I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate defence is unnecessary. You know well the truth of my statement that I have incurred many violent enmities; and this is what will be my destruction if I am destroyed;—not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the world, which has been the death of many good men, and will probably be the death of many more; there is no danger of my being the last of them.

ANALYSIS OF THE TOPICS IN “SOCRATES’ APOLOGY”

Although only about half of Socrates’ *Apology* is reproduced here, there is a fair enough sample for analysis of this classic example of judicial rhetoric. Judicial rhetoric is exercised most frequently in the courtroom, but this kind of persuasive discourse comprehends as well all extra-courtroom defenses of actions and character. If we understand the term *apologize* in its Greek sense of “to defend” and the term *categorize* in its Greek sense of “to accuse,” we have two terms which most aptly describe the basic functions of judicial discourse. This term can comprehend works as various as Newman’s *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, Zola’s *J’accuse*, Pope’s *Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot*, and the catalogue of charges against the king of England in the *Declaration of Independence*. If we are haled into court today we would probably entrust our defense to a lawyer. But there may be many occasions in life when we will be called upon to justify our conduct outside the courtroom.

Socrates’ defense is a serious affair, for Socrates is liable to the death sentence if the jury returns a verdict of guilty. As every schoolboy knows, Socrates lost his case and was made to drink the fatal “cup of hemlock.” Almost everyone today who reads the *Apology* feels that Socrates had suc-

cessfully answered the charges against him. The jury that heard Socrates' eloquent plea in the Athenian assembly was not more obtuse than modern readers; it happened that a number of extra-legal considerations played a part in their verdict. We will ignore here these extra-legal considerations that prejudiced the decision and concentrate on the speech itself.

As we have seen, the special topics that figure in judicial discourse are justice and injustice (or right and wrong, understood in their legal sense). In pursuing these special topics, the judicial speaker or writer is concerned primarily with one of these three questions: (1) whether the charge is so (*an sit*); (2) what the nature of the charge is (*quid sit*); (3) how serious the charge is (*quale sit*). In the course of a trial, the court may consider all three of these questions, but ultimately it must decide which one of these questions is at issue in a particular case. If *an sit* is the point at issue, evidence will be the main special topic; if *quid sit*, definition; if *quale sit*, motives or causes of action. In pursuit of the issue, the judicial pleader will pursue several of the common topics too. Let us see how the various topics operate in the *Apology*.

First of all, let us look at a general outline of the portion of the *Apology* that is reproduced here:

1. Socrates' introductory remarks to the assembly (paragraph 1).
2. *Narratio*—the statement of the charges (paragraph 2).
3. Refutation of the old charges (paragraphs 4-12).
4. Refutation of the recent charges—Socrates' cross-examination of Meletus (paragraphs 13-53).
5. Concluding remarks (paragraph 54).

In the opening paragraph, Socrates is setting the tone of the ethical appeal that he hopes his entire speech will exert. With typical ironic modesty, Socrates praises the eloquence of his accusers and depreciates his own skill as an orator. Lacking rhetorical skill, he will place his confidence in the justice of his cause, trusting that the recital of the truth and the whole truth will exonerate him. The reminder that he is seventy years old might be viewed as an emotional appeal for the sympathy or mercy of the court, but since Socrates nowhere else in the speech sounds this note, he seems to be reluctant to entrust his vindication to the emotional response of his hearers. Strategically, this avoidance of emotional appeal may have been a mistake, but distrust of emotion was typical of Socrates.

Resorting to the common topic of division in the second paragraph, Socrates divides the charges into two general classes, the ancient and the recent, and announces that he will answer the two groups of charges in turn. He does not specify the charges under these two general heads, being content here to indicate the general organization of his defense.

In paragraph 4 (after the transitional third paragraph) Socrates specifies the ancient charges. According to the "affidavit," he is charged with (1) being a student of natural philosophy; (2) making the worse appear the better cause; (3) being a teacher of these doctrines and taking money for his teaching. Pursuing the question of whether the first charge is true (*an sit*), Socrates denies the charge, maintaining that he has never engaged in speculations about physical matters. For confirmation of his claim, he calls for the testimony of those present. "Speak then," he says, "you who have heard me, and tell your neighbours whether any of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or in many upon such matters." This invitation meets with a stony silence from the audience. The implication of this silence is that there is no evidence to substantiate this ancient charge. It is simply not true. Since it is not true, Socrates does not have to go on to consider the nature of the offense and the seriousness of the offense.

Nor is there any evidence to substantiate the charge that he is a teacher and accepts money for his services. One wonders why no one in the assembly challenged Socrates' denial that he was a teacher. Socrates is certainly known to us, as he must have been to his contemporaries, as a teacher. Probably what is involved here is a matter of definition. What Socrates may be implying here—and he seems to be arguing this point in the next paragraph where he pursues the question of whether he is a wise man—is that technically he does not and cannot qualify as a teacher. After denying the charge, Socrates touches for a moment on the *quale sit* of the charge. Even if he were a qualified teacher who took money for his services, as do the sophists Gorgias and Prodicus and Hippias and Evenus, he would not consider this a crime. Resorting to analogy, Socrates reminds his audience that just as we would not consider it a crime if a trainer took a fee for improving foals or calves, so we should not consider it a crime if a teacher takes money for improving the minds of young people.

Socrates does not confront the charge that he makes the worse appear the better cause, but a denial of this charge seems to be implicit in his denial of the other two charges, and this charge is refuted really by some of the later arguments.

In paragraph 6, Socrates moves on to consider the reason why these false charges were levelled against him. Surely there must be some grounds for these charges. Their origin, Socrates thinks, lies in the pronouncement by the Delphic Oracle, "Socrates is the wisest man." When this Delphic pronouncement was reported to Socrates, he reasoned in the form of an enthymeme: "The god must be right, because a god cannot lie." But in what sense can the god be right in claiming that Socrates is the wisest of men?

In seeking an answer to this question, Socrates turns, in paragraph 7, to the common topic of definition. He recounts (in paragraphs 7, 8, 9) his experiences with politicians, poets, and artisans. He visited these men because

they were supposedly wise and he wanted to find out why they were wise. But these so-called wise men disillusioned him. They were not really wise at all, and what was worse, they did not acknowledge or even recognize that they were ignorant. As a result of these inquiries, Socrates discovered the sense in which it could be said that he was the wisest of men: he alone knew that he did not know.

It is this rather paradoxical superiority that accounts for the animosity against Socrates. Moreover, the young people, who by nature relish the exposure of pretenders, began to imitate Socrates by examining charlatans. The pretenders to knowledge, disgruntled by their exposure, resorted to the standard but unproven charges made against all philosophers—that they teach things up in the clouds, that they have no gods, and that they make the worse appear the better cause. Prejudice, then, has motivated the wild, indiscriminate charges. Prejudice has prompted not only the old accusers but the recent accusers as well. Meletus is responding on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians; Lycon, on behalf of rhetoricians. Socrates concludes this part of his defense with an appeal to some rather dubious logic: “and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth?” Socrates regards *hatred* as a sign. By the rules of strict logic, this sign cannot lead to an infallible conclusion. But the student may remember that Aristotle also recognized the effectiveness, for rhetorical purposes, of signs which lead only to probable conclusions. This kind of sign, as in the case of all probabilities, can produce only belief, not conviction.

In paragraph 12, Socrates specifies the charges made by the second group of accusers: (1) that I am a doer of evil; (2) that I corrupt the youth; (3) that I do not believe in the gods of the state; (4) that I set up other gods. Socrates reverses the first charge on Meletus; he will endeavor to show that it is *Meletus* who is the doer of evil, because he is not really serious about these matters. This reversing of the charge is a device recommended by all the classical rhetoricians. It puts the accuser on the defensive, and if the counter-charge can be substantiated, it takes the pressure off the defender.

In paragraphs 13-53, as we saw in the outline, Socrates cross-examines Meletus. Socrates shifts here from the discursive method of the early part of his defense to the question-and-answer style of dialectic. But although he has shifted his method, he does not abandon recourse to the special and common topics.

In paragraphs 18-38 of this section, Socrates examines the justice of the charge that he is a corrupter of the youth. At the outset of this cross-examination, Socrates resorts to the common topic of contraries. He says, in effect, “If I am a corrupter of youth, there must be some people whom Meletus regards as being improvers of youth.” Who are these improvers of

youth? Socrates gets Meletus to affirm that the judges, the audience, the senators, the members of the assembly—in fact, all Athenians except Socrates—improve the youth. Socrates proceeds to reduce this claim to absurdity by resorting to an analogy (the topic of similarity). Just as horses are improved, not by everyone but by the one man who is an excellent horse-trainer, so youth are improved not by the many but by the one. So Meletus' claim that Socrates alone corrupts the youth and that all other men improve the youth is manifestly absurd. (Note that there is an implied *a fortiori* argument in Socrates' application of the analogy.)

In paragraphs 32-8, Socrates approaches the same charge from another tack. First of all, he prompts Meletus to agree to the truth of three propositions: (1) the good do good to their neighbors; the evil do evil; (2) everyone would rather be benefited than injured by another; (3) I corrupt the youth either intentionally or unintentionally. Having secured agreement on these three propositions, Socrates uses the third of them as the starting point of his refutation. As we saw in the exposition of contradiction under the common topic of comparison, contradictory propositions are incompatible—that is, they cannot both be true. And we saw also that if one proposition is proved to be false, the other is automatically true. Socrates' strategy is to show that the proposition "Socrates corrupts the youth intentionally" is false. Note how cleverly he makes use of the other two propositions that Meletus has agreed to:

But how could I corrupt the youth intentionally? If I corrupt them, they become evil. Once they become evil, they are liable to harm me (because, as we agreed, the evil do evil). But since I—like everyone else—would rather be benefited than injured by my neighbor, it is not likely that I would intentionally produce the kind of person who would injure me. So we can dismiss the charge that I corrupt the youth intentionally.

The argument has been reduced now to two possibilities (and we can regard these as contraries): either I do not corrupt the youth, or I corrupt them *unintentionally*. Socrates now deals with these contraries in this fashion:

Let's arbitrarily rule out the first possibility, since you have formally accused me of corrupting the youth. That leaves us with the possibility that I corrupt the youth unintentionally. But if I corrupt the youth *unintentionally*, I am not subject to the law, and I should not be in this courtroom at all.

By demonstrating the absurdity of Meletus' charge, Socrates has been indirectly proving what he said he would prove: that Meletus could not have made these charges seriously and that therefore he is the real doer of evil.

In paragraphs 39-53, Socrates demonstrates the inconsistency of the charge

that he is an atheist. He detects in items 3 and 4 of this indictment a flagrant contradiction: item 3 claims that he does not believe in the gods; item 4 implies that he does believe in the gods. To prove that item 3 is untrue, Socrates makes use of the common topics of similarity and genus and species. He gets Meletus to admit that one cannot believe in humanity without believing in human beings, in horsemanship without believing in horses, in flute-playing without believing in flute-players; in other words, one cannot believe in the genus without believing in the species. Similarly, one cannot believe in divine agencies (as item 4 claims) without believing in spirits and demi-gods. So the charge that Socrates does not believe in the gods is utterly false. By the principle of contradiction, if one proposition in a contradictory opposition is false, the other proposition is true. Therefore Socrates *does* believe in the gods.

In paragraph 54, the last paragraph in the selection reproduced here, Socrates points out that he has successfully answered the charges levelled by Meletus and Anytus. He recognizes, however, that during his lifetime he has incurred the enmity of many people and that it is this enmity, rather than the indictments, that will eventually prove to be his undoing. Throughout this half of the *Apology*, Socrates has employed a negative strategy—the strategy of refutation—but from this point on Socrates will be advancing positive arguments for his innocence.

It might be pointed out finally that a great part of Socrates' strategy throughout this section was an effort to minimize Meletus' ethical appeal. At the same time that he is refuting Meletus' charges he is showing indirectly that Meletus is not a man of good sense, good character, and good will. Meletus' ethical appeal is further diminished by his frequent reluctance to answer Socrates' pointed questions. The crowning touch was the incremental irony of Socrates' repeated reference to Meletus as "my friend"—an irony that becomes as damaging as Mark Antony's use of the epithet "honorable men" in the famous "Friends, Romans, countrymen" speech in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*.

PERICLES' FUNERAL ORATION

1 In the same winter the Athenians, following their annual custom, gave a public funeral for those who had been the first to die in the war. These funerals are held in the following way: two days before the ceremony the bones of the fallen are brought and put in a tent which has been erected, and people make whatever offerings they wish to their own dead. Then there is a funeral procession in which coffins of cypress wood are carried on

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1954), Bk. II, Ch. 4, pp. 115-23. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

wagons. There is one coffin for each tribe, which contains the bones of members of that tribe. One empty bier is decorated and carried in the procession: this is for the missing, whose bodies could not be recovered. Everyone who wishes to, both citizens and foreigners, can join in the procession, and the women who are related to the dead are there to make their laments at the tomb. The bones are laid in the public burial-place, which is in the most beautiful quarter outside the city walls. Here the Athenians always bury those who have fallen in war. The only exception is those who died at Marathon, who, because their achievement was considered absolutely outstanding, were buried on the battlefield itself.

2 When the bones have been laid in the earth, a man chosen by the city for his intellectual gifts and for his general reputation makes an appropriate speech in praise of the dead, and after the speech all depart. This is the procedure at these burials, and all through the war, when the time came to do so, the Athenians followed this ancient custom. Now, at the burial of those who were the first to fall in the war Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, was chosen to make the speech. When the moment arrived, he came forward from the tomb and, standing on a high platform, so that he might be heard by as many people as possible in the crowd, he spoke as follows:

3 "Many of those who have spoken here in the past have praised the institution of this speech at the close of our ceremony. It seemed to them a mark of honour to our soldiers who have fallen in war that a speech should be made over them. I do not agree. These men have shown themselves valiant in action, and it would be enough, I think, for their glories to be proclaimed in action, as you have just seen it done at this funeral organized by the state. Our belief in the courage and manliness of so many should not be hazarded on the goodness or badness of one man's speech. Then it is not easy to speak with a proper sense of balance, when a man's listeners find it difficult to believe in the truth of what one is saying. The man who knows the facts and loves the dead may well think that an oration tells less than what he knows and what he would like to hear: others who do not know so much may feel envy for the dead, and think the orator over-praises them, when he speaks of exploits that are beyond their own capacities. Praise of other people is tolerable only up to a certain point, the point where one believes that one could do oneself some of the things one is hearing about. Once you get beyond this point, you will find people becoming jealous and incredulous. However, the fact is that this institution was set up and approved by our forefathers, and it is my duty to follow the tradition and do my best to meet the wishes and the expectations of every one of you.

4 "I shall begin by speaking about our ancestors, since it is only right and proper on such an occasion to pay them the honour of recalling what they did. In this land of ours there have always been the same people living from

generation to generation up till now, and they, by their courage and their virtues, have handed it on to us, a free country. They certainly deserve our praise. Even more so do our fathers deserve it. For to the inheritance they had received they added all the empire we have now, and it was not without blood and toil that they handed it down to us of the present generation. And then we ourselves, assembled here today, who are mostly in the prime of life, have, in most directions, added to the power of our empire and have organized our State in such a way that it is perfectly well able to look after itself both in peace and in war.

5 "I have no wish to make a long speech on subjects familiar to you all: so I shall say nothing about the warlike deeds by which we acquired our power or the battles in which we or our fathers gallantly resisted our enemies, Greek or foreign. What I want to do is, in the first place, to discuss the spirit in which we faced our trials and also our constitution and the way of life which has made us great. After that I shall speak in praise of the dead, believing that this kind of speech is not inappropriate to the present occasion, and that this whole assembly, of citizens and foreigners, may listen to it with advantage.

6 "Let me say that our system of government does not copy the institutions of our neighbours. It is more the case of our being a model to others, than of our imitating anyone else. Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people. When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses. No one, so long as he has it in him to be of service to the state, is kept in political obscurity because of poverty. And, just as our political life is free and open, so is our day-to-day life in our relations with each other. We do not get into a state with our next-door neighbour if he enjoys himself in his own way, nor do we give him the kind of black looks which, though they do no real harm, still do hurt people's feelings. We are free and tolerant in our private lives; but in public affairs we keep to the law. This is because it commands our deep respect.

7 "We give our obedience to those whom we put in positions of authority, and we obey the laws themselves, especially those which are for the protection of the oppressed, and those unwritten laws which it is an acknowledged shame to break.

8 "And here is another point. When our work is over, we are in a position to enjoy all kinds of recreation for our spirits. There are various kinds of contests and sacrifices regularly throughout the year; in our own homes we find a beauty and a good taste which delight us every day and which drive

away our cares. Then the greatness of our city brings it about that all the good things from all the world flow in to us, so that to us it seems just as natural to enjoy foreign goods as our own local products.

9 "Then there is a great difference between us and our opponents in our attitude towards military security. Here are some examples: Our city is open to the world, and we have no periodical deportations in order to prevent people observing or finding out secrets which might be of military advantage to the enemy. This is because we rely, not on secret weapons, but on our own real courage and loyalty. There is a difference, too, in our educational systems. The Spartans, from their earliest boyhood, are submitted to the most laborious training in courage; we pass our lives without all these restrictions, and yet are just as ready to face the same dangers as they are. Here is proof of this: When the Spartans invade our land, they do not come by themselves, but bring all their allies with them; whereas we, when we launch an attack abroad, do the job ourselves, and, though fighting on foreign soil, do not often fail to defeat opponents who are fighting for their own hearths and homes. As a matter of fact, none of our enemies has ever yet been confronted with our total strength, because we have to divide our attention between our navy and the many missions on which our troops are sent on land. Yet, if our enemies engage a detachment of our forces and defeat it, they give themselves credit for having thrown back our entire army; or, if they lose, they claim that they were beaten by us in full strength. There are certain advantages, I think, in our way of meeting danger voluntarily, with an easy mind, instead of with a laborious training, with natural rather than with state-induced courage. We do not have to spend our time practising to meet sufferings which are still in the future; and when they are actually upon us show ourselves just as brave as these others who are always in strict training. This is one point in which, I think, our city deserves to be admired. There are also others:

10 "Our love of what is beautiful does not lead to extravagance; our love of the things of the mind does not make us soft. We regard wealth as something to be properly used, rather than as something to boast about. As for poverty, no one need be ashamed to admit it: the real shame is in not taking practical measures to escape from it. Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well: even those who are mostly occupied with their own business are extremely well-informed on general politics—this is a peculiarity of ours: we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all. We Athenians, in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper discussions: for we do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly

debated. And this is another point where we differ from other people. We are capable at the same time of taking risks and of estimating them beforehand. Others are brave out of ignorance; and, when they stop to think, they begin to fear. But the man who can most truly be accounted brave is he who knows the meaning of what is sweet in life and of what is terrible, and then goes out undeterred to meet what is to come.

11 "Again, in questions of general good feeling there is a great contrast between us and most other people. We make friends by doing good to others, not by receiving good from them. This makes our friendship all the more reliable, since we want to keep alive the gratitude of those who are in our debt by showing continued goodwill to them: whereas the feelings of one who owes us something lack the same enthusiasm, since he knows that, when he repays our kindness, it will be more like paying back a debt than giving something spontaneously. We are unique in this. When we do kindnesses to others, we do not do them out of any calculations of profit or loss: we do them without afterthought, relying on our free liberality. Taking everything together then, I declare that our city is an education to Greece, and I declare that in my opinion each single one of our citizens, in all the manifold aspects of life, is able to show himself the rightful lord and owner of his own person, and do this, moreover, with exceptional grace and exceptional versatility. And to show that this is no empty boasting for the present occasion, but real tangible fact, you have only to consider the power which our city possesses and which has been won by those very qualities which I have mentioned. Athens, alone of the states we know, comes to her testing time in a greatness that surpasses what was imagined of her. In her case, and in her case alone, no invading enemy is ashamed at being defeated, and no subject can complain of being governed by people unfit for their responsibilities. Mighty indeed are the marks and monuments of our empire which we have left. Future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now. We do not need the praises of a Homer, or of anyone else whose words may delight us for the moment, but whose estimation of facts will fall short of what is really true. For our adventurous spirit has forced an entry into every sea and into every land; and everywhere we have left behind us everlasting memorials of good done to our friends or suffering inflicted on our enemies.

12 "This, then, is the kind of city for which these men, who could not bear the thought of losing her, nobly fought and nobly died. It is only natural that every one of us who survive them should be willing to undergo hardships in her service. And it was for this reason that I have spoken at such length about our city, because I wanted to make it clear that for us there is more at stake than there is for others who lack our advantages; also I wanted my words of praise for the dead to be set in the bright light of

evidence. And now the most important of these words has been spoken. I have sung the praises of our city; but it was the courage and gallantry of these men, and of people like them, which made her splendid. Nor would you find it true in the case of many of the Greeks, as it is true of them, that no words can do more than justice to their deeds.

13 "To me it seems that the consummation which has overtaken these men shows us the meaning of manliness in its first revelation and in its final proof. Some of them, no doubt, had their faults; but what we ought to remember first is their gallant conduct against the enemy in defence of their native land. They have blotted out evil with good, and done more service to the commonwealth than they ever did harm in their private lives. No one of these men weakened because he wanted to go on enjoying his wealth: no one put off the awful day in the hope that he might live to escape his poverty and grow rich. More to be desired than such things, they chose to check the enemy's pride. This, to them, was a risk most glorious, and they accepted it, willing to strike down the enemy and relinquish everything else. As for success or failure, they left that in the doubtful hands of Hope, and when the reality of battle was before their faces, they put their trust in their own selves. In the fighting, they thought it more honourable to stand their ground and suffer death than to give in and save their lives. So they fled from the reproaches of men, abiding with life and limb the brunt of battle; and, in a small moment of time, the climax of their lives, a culmination of glory, not of fear, were swept away from us.

14 "So and such they were, these men—worthy of their city. We who remain behind may hope to be spared their fate, but must resolve to keep the same daring spirit against the foe. It is not simply a question of estimating the advantages in theory. I could tell you a long story (and you know it as well as I do) about what is to be gained by beating the enemy back. What I would prefer is that you should fix your eyes every day on the greatness of Athens as she really is, and should fall in love with her. When you realize her greatness, then reflect that what made her great was men with a spirit of adventure, men who knew their duty, men who were ashamed to fall below a certain standard. If they ever failed in an enterprise, they made up their minds that at any rate the city should not find their courage lacking to her, and they gave to her the best contribution that they could. They gave her their lives, to her and to all of us, and for their own selves they won praises that never grow old, the most splendid of sepulchres—not the sepulchre in which their bodies are laid, but where their glory remains eternal in men's minds, always there on the right occasion to stir others to speech or to action. For famous men have the whole earth as their memorial: it is not only the inscriptions on their graves in their own country that mark them out; no, in foreign lands also, not in any visible form but in people's

hearts, their memory abides and grows. It is for you to try to be like them. Make up your minds that happiness depends on being free, and freedom depends on being courageous. Let there be no relaxation in face of the perils of the war. The people who have most excuse for despising death are not the wretched and unfortunate, who have no hope of doing well for themselves, but those who run the risk of a complete reversal in their lives, and who would feel the difference most intensely, if things went wrong for them. Any intelligent man would find a humiliation caused by his own slackness more painful to bear than death, when death comes to him unperceived, in battle, and in the confidence of his patriotism.

15 "For these reasons I shall not commiserate with those parents of the dead, who are present here. Instead I shall try to comfort them. They are well aware that they have grown up in a world where there are many changes and chances. But this is good fortune—for men to end their lives with honour, as these have done, and for you honourably to lament them: their life was set to a measure where death and happiness went hand in hand. I know that it is difficult to convince you of this. When you see other people happy you will often be reminded of what used to make you happy too. One does not feel sad at not having some good thing which is outside one's experience: real grief is felt at the loss of something which one is used to. All the same, those of you who are of the right age must bear up and take comfort in the thought of having more children. In your own homes these new children will prevent you from brooding over those who are no more, and they will be a help to the city, too, both in filling the empty places, and in assuring her security. For it is impossible for a man to put forward fair and honest views about our affairs if he has not, like everyone else, children whose lives may be at stake. As for those of you who are now too old to have children, I would ask you to count as gain the greater part of your life, in which you have been happy, and remember that what remains is not long, and let your hearts be lifted up at the thought of the fair fame of the dead. One's sense of honour is the only thing that does not grow old, and the last pleasure, when one is worn out with age, is not, as the poet said, making money, but having the respect of one's fellow men.

16 "As for those of you here who are sons or brothers of the dead, I can see a hard struggle in front of you. Everyone always speaks well of the dead, and, even if you rise to the greatest heights of heroism, it will be a hard thing for you to get the reputation of having come near, let alone equalled, their standard. When one is alive, one is always liable to the jealousy of one's competitors, but when one is out of the way, the honour one receives is sincere and unchallenged.

17 "Perhaps I should say a word or two on the duties of women to those among you who are now widowed. I can say all I have to say in a short

word of advice. Your great glory is not to be inferior to what God has made you, and the greatest glory of a woman is to be least talked about by men, whether they are praising you or criticizing you. I have now, as the law demanded, said what I had to say. For the time being our offerings to the dead have been made, and for the future their children will be supported at the public expense by the city, until they come of age. This is the crown and prize which she offers, both to the dead and to their children, for the ordeals they have faced. Where the rewards of valour are the greatest, there you will find also the best and bravest spirits among the people. And now, when you have mourned for your dear ones, you must depart."

ANALYSIS OF THE TOPICS IN "PERICLES' FUNERAL ORATION"

Pericles' noble utterance is the prototype of all memorial addresses. The death of loved ones or of heroes invariably calls forth generous tributes, heartfelt sentiments, and noble resolutions. This most emotional of all human events usually manages to escape the blight of sentimentality, probably because we the survivors feel that no expression of sentiment, however extravagant, can be in excess of the occasion that prompts it. There is danger, of course, that when time removes us from emotional involvement with the occasion and the deceased, elegies will strike us as being maudlin. It is the perspective of time that separates the deathless prose from the perishable. Lincoln's *Gettysburg Address* and Pericles' *Funeral Oration* are two of the epideictic utterances that impress us as being as eloquent and genuine now as they were the day they were delivered from the podium.

In the first two paragraphs of the selection, Thucydides gives us the background for Pericles' speech. The statement that the city fathers expected "an appropriate speech in praise of the dead" indicates that the speech is to be of the epideictic variety—or, as we have chosen to call it, *ceremonial*. This is to be a speech of display in which a man or group of men is to be praised or censured. The audience does not have to be persuaded, as in the case of deliberative and forensic discourse, to make a decision; the audience has merely to be convinced—or at least to be confirmed in its belief—that a man or group of men is deserving of praise or censure. There is, of course, a certain indirect deliberative purpose to such a speech; if the audience can be convinced that the men are deserving of praise it may be induced to go and be likewise.

We may divide Pericles' oration into four parts:

1. Introduction (paragraphs 3-5).
2. Praise of the Athenian people (paragraphs 6-12).
3. Praise of the dead heroes (paragraphs 13-16).
4. Conclusion (paragraph 17).

It might strike the student as odd that Pericles should devote more of his speech to the praise of the Athenian people, past and present, than to the praise of the war heroes. Pericles accounts for this proportion in paragraph 12, where he says, "And it was for this reason that I have spoken at such length about our city, because I wanted to make it clear that for us there is more at stake than there is for others who lack our advantages; also I wanted my words of praise for the dead to be set in the bright light of evidence." In other words, praise of the Athenian people reflects praise on the men who died in their cause, who sacrificed their own enjoyment of this way of life so that others could enjoy it. "The people who have the most excuse for despising death," Pericles says (paragraph 14), "are not the wretched and unfortunate, who have no hope of doing well for themselves, but those who run the risk of a complete reversal in their lives, and who feel the difference most intensely, if things went wrong for them." (Note how the common topic of more and less is operating here.)

The special topics for ceremonial discourse are the virtues, physical attributes, actions and achievements, and sayings of the men being praised; another resort is the testimony of others. Throughout the speech, Pericles touches on several of the virtues that characterize the Athenian people and the dead heroes. In reference to the former he mentions the following virtues:

1. *Justice* (respect for the natural and legal rights of men).
In our democratic government, we allow for and encourage the free exercise of the rights of citizenship (paragraph 6). In private disputes, everyone is equal before the law (paragraph 6). Our day-to-day relations with one another are free and equal (paragraph 6). We obey those we have invested with authority, and we respect both written and unwritten law (paragraph 7).
2. *Wisdom* (an intellectual virtue).
We cultivate beauty and the things of the mind (paragraphs 8 and 10). We have an enlightened attitude toward wealth and poverty (paragraph 10). We believe that all citizens should be well-informed about political affairs (paragraph 10).
3. *Prudence* (another intellectual virtue).
We have a superior policy on military security and training (paragraph 9). We have a penchant for deliberation before rushing into action (paragraph 10). We are capable not only of taking risks but of estimating them beforehand (paragraph 10).
4. *Magnanimity* and *Liberality*.
We are fond of doing good to others (paragraph 11). And we do good to others, not out of any calculation of profit and loss to us

but out of a generous disposition (paragraph 11). We make friends by doing good to others, not by receiving good from them (paragraph 11).

As might be expected, the virtue that Pericles stresses as belonging to the soldiers in paragraphs 13-16 is courage. He also touches on their honorableness (gallantry), loyalty, and unselfishness. But as Pericles indicated in paragraph 3, he is more disposed to entrust the glorification of the soldiers to the record of their actions and achievements than to the qualities of the speeches made over them. As he says, "Our belief in the courage and manliness of so many should not be hazarded on the goodness or badness of one man's speech." All references in these paragraphs to the soldiers' actions and achievements are variations on the double theme that they fought gallantly and that they made the supreme sacrifice, their lives. There is no recital of the physical attributes of the men (with the possible exception of the mention of their manliness) or of their sayings. And the only recourse to the testimony of others is Pericles' reminder that these men have established their memorial in people's hearts.

Ceremonial discourse offers more opportunity for the use of the topics of amplification and depreciation than the other two kinds of discourse. Frequently throughout the speech Pericles attempts to magnify the deeds and virtues of the Athenians by mentioning that the deeds and virtues were *unique* or were *better* or were more *frequent* or were produced under more *adverse circumstances*. The common topic of comparison is frequently resorted to in the speech. The most pronounced example of this topic is found in paragraph 9, where Pericles contrasts the military policies of Athens with those of other countries (Pericles is thinking mainly of Sparta). This comparison reveals marked differences, and in arguing where the advantage lies in these differences, Pericles resorts to some of the criteria that help one decide questions of more and less (the topic of degree). In the words addressed to the parents, the wives, the sons and brothers, of the dead men, he makes great use of the common topics of future fact. He seems to be suggesting that if the survivors do *this* and *this*, *this* will come to pass (future fact, in other words, is being argued with the topic of antecedent-consequent). The past facts are all confirmed by the prosperity, stature, and esteem presently enjoyed by the Athenian people.

Pericles' oration is a classic example of how one proceeds when one seeks to praise someone, whether that praise be in a formal address like this, in a toastmaster's introductory remarks about a featured speaker, in a letter of reference, in a citation, in an obituary, in a memoir. One expatiates on those virtues, attributes, deeds, achievements, testimonies which reflect credit on the man being extolled. The same basic strategy is used when one seeks

to discredit someone. In ceremonial discourse, perhaps more than in the other two kinds, the nature of the subject will be the major factor determining what can be said, for the success of this kind of discourse depends mainly on the truth or credibility of what is said. In paragraph 3, Pericles adverted to the difficulty in executing this kind of discourse successfully:

Then it is not easy to speak with a proper sense of balance, when a man's listeners find it difficult to believe in the truth of what one is saying. The man who knows the facts and loves the dead may well think that an oration tells less than what he knows and what he would like to hear; others who do not know so much may feel envy for the dead, and think the orator over-praises them, when he speaks of exploits that are beyond their own capacities. Praise of other people is tolerable only up to a certain point, the point where one believes that one could do oneself some of the things one is hearing about. Once you get beyond this point, you will find people becoming jealous and incredulous.

The student might well take these judicious words—and the example of the speech itself—as his guide in the preparation of any discourse designed to praise or censure his fellow man.

THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY: THE CHARACTER OF BOSWELL

1 The *Life of Johnson* is assuredly a great, a very great work; Homer is not more decidedly the first of heroic poets, Shakespeare is not more decidedly the first of dramatists, Demosthenes is not more decidedly the first of orators, than Boswell is the first of biographers. He has no second. He has distanced all his competitors so decidedly that it is not worth while to place them. Eclipse is first, and the rest nowhere.

2 We are not sure that there is in the whole history of the human intellect so strange a phenomenon as this book. Many of the greatest men that ever lived have written biography. Boswell was one of the smallest men that ever lived, and he has beaten them all. He was, if we are to give any credit to his own account or to the united testimony of all who knew him, a man of the meanest and feeblest intellect. Johnson described him as a fellow who had missed his only chance of immortality by not having been alive when the *Dunciad* was written. Beauclerk used his name as a proverbial expression for a bore. He was the laughing-stock of the whole of that brilliant society which has owed to him the greater part of its fame. He was always laying himself at the feet of some eminent man and begging to be spit upon and

From Macaulay's review in the *Edinburgh Review*, September 1831, of John Wilson Croker's edition of Boswell's *Life of Samuel Johnson*; reprinted in the first collected edition of Macaulay's *Essays*, 3 vols., 1843.

trampled upon. He was always earning some ridiculous nickname and then "binding it as a crown unto him," not merely in metaphor but literally. He exhibited himself at the Shakespeare Jubilee, to all the crowd which filled Stratford-on-Avon, with a placard round his hat bearing the inscription of Corsica Boswell. In his *Tour*, he proclaimed to all the world that at Edinburgh he was known by the appellation of Paoli Boswell. Servile and impertinent, shallow and pedantic, a bigot and a sot; bloated with family pride and eternally blustering about the dignity of a born gentleman, yet stooping to be a tale-bearer, an eavesdropper, a common butt in the taverns of London; so curious to know everybody who was talked about, that, Tory and High Churchman as he was, he manoeuvred, we have been told, for an introduction to Tom Paine; so vain of the most childish distinctions that when he had been to Court, he drove to the office where his book was printing without changing his clothes and summoned all the printer's devils to admire his new ruffles and sword; such was this man, and such he was content and proud to be. Everything which another man would have hidden, everything the publication of which would have made another man hang himself, was matter of gay and clamorous exultation to his weak and diseased mind. What silly things he said, what bitter retorts he provoked; how at one place he was troubled with evil presentiments which came to nothing; how at another place, on waking from a drunken doze, he read the prayer-book and took a hair of the dog that had bitten him; how he went to see men hanged and came away maudlin; how he added five hundred pounds to the fortune of one of his babies because she was not scared at Johnson's ugly face; how he was frightened out of his wits at sea, and how the sailors quieted him as they would have quieted a child; how tipsy he was at Lady Cork's one evening, and how much his merriment annoyed the ladies; how impertinent he was to the Duchess of Argyll, and with what stately contempt she put down his impertinence; how Colonel Macleod sneered to his face at his impudent obtrusiveness; how his father and the very wife of his bosom laughed and fretted at his fooleries; all these things he proclaimed to all the world, as if they had been subjects for pride and ostentatious rejoicing. All the caprices of his temper, all the illusions of his vanity, all his hypochondriac whimsies, all his castles in the air, he displayed with a cool self-complacency, a perfect unconsciousness that he was making a fool of himself, to which it is impossible to find a parallel in the whole history of mankind. He has used many people ill; but assuredly he has used nobody so ill as himself.

3 That such a man should have written one of the best books in the world is strange enough. But this is not all. Many persons who have conducted themselves foolishly in active life and whose conversation has indicated no superior powers of mind have left us valuable works. Goldsmith was very

justly described by one of his contemporaries as an inspired idiot, and by another as a being

Who wrote like an angel, and talked like poor Poll.

La Fontaine was in society a mere simpleton. His blunders would not come in amiss among the stories of Hierocles. But these men attained literary eminence in spite of their weaknesses. Boswell attained it by reason of his weaknesses. If he had not been a great fool, he would never have been a great writer. Without all the qualities which made him the jest and the torment of those among whom he lived, without the officiousness, the inquisitiveness, the effrontery, the toad-eating, the insensibility to all reproof, he never could have produced so excellent a book. He was a slave, proud of his servitude; a Paul Pry, convinced that his own curiosity and garrulity were virtues; an unsafe companion who never scrupled to repay the most liberal hospitality by the basest violation of confidence; a man without delicacy, without shame, without sense enough to know when he was hurting the feelings of others or when he was exposing himself to derision; and because he was all this, he has, in an important department of literature, immeasurably surpassed such writers as Tacitus, Clarendon, Alfieri, and his own idol Johnson.

4 Of the talents which ordinarily raise men to eminence as writers, Boswell had absolutely none. There is not in all his books a single remark of his own on literature, politics, religion, or society, which is not either commonplace or absurd. His dissertations on hereditary gentility, on the slave-trade, and on the entailing of landed estates, may serve as examples. To say that these passages are sophistical would be to pay them an extravagant compliment. They have no pretence to argument or even to meaning. He has reported innumerable observations made by himself in the course of conversation. Of those observations we do not remember one which is above the intellectual capacity of a boy of fifteen. He has printed many of his own letters, and in these letters he is always ranting or twaddling. Logic, eloquence, wit, taste, all those things which are generally considered as making a book valuable, were utterly wanting to him. He had, indeed, a quick observation and a retentive memory. These qualities, if he had been a man of sense and virtue, would scarcely of themselves have sufficed to make him conspicuous; but because he was a dunce, a parasite, and a coxcomb, they have made him immortal.

5 Those parts of his book which, considered abstractedly, are most utterly worthless, are delightful when we read them as illustrations of the character of the writer. Bad in themselves, they are good dramatically, like the non-sense of Justice Shallow, the clipped English of Dr. Caius, or the misplaced

consonants of Fluellen. Of all confessors, Boswell is the most candid. Other men who have pretended to lay open their own hearts—Rousseau, for example, and Lord Byron—have evidently written with a constant view to effect and are to be then most distrusted when they seem to be most sincere. There is scarcely any man who would not rather accuse himself of great crimes and of dark and tempestuous passions than proclaim all his little vanities and wild fancies. It would be easier to find a person who would avow actions like those of Caesar Borgia or Danton, than one who would publish a day-dream like those of Alnaschar and Malvolio. Those weaknesses which most men keep covered up in the most secret places of the mind, not to be disclosed to the eye of friendship or of love, were precisely the weaknesses which Boswell paraded before all the world. He was perfectly frank, because the weakness of his understanding and the tumult of his spirits prevented him from knowing when he made himself ridiculous. His book resembles nothing so much as the conversation of the inmates of the Palace of Truth.

6 His fame is great, and it will, we have no doubt, be lasting; but it is fame of a peculiar kind and indeed marvellously resembles infamy. We remember no other case in which the world has made so great a distinction between a book and its author. In general, the book and the author are considered as one. To admire the book is to admire the author. The case of Boswell is an exception, we think the only exception, to this rule. His work is universally allowed to be interesting, instructive, eminently original; yet it has brought him nothing but contempt. All the world reads it; all the world delights in it; yet we do not remember ever to have read or ever to have heard any expression of respect and admiration for the man to whom we owe so much instruction and amusement. While edition after edition of his book was coming forth, his son, as Mr. Croker tells us, was ashamed of it and hated to hear it mentioned. This feeling was natural and reasonable. Sir Alexander saw that in proportion to the celebrity of the work was the degradation of the author. The very editors of this unfortunate gentleman's books have forgotten their allegiance, and, like those Puritan casuists who took arms by the authority of the king against his person, have attacked the writer while doing homage to the writings. Mr. Croker, for example, has published two thousand five hundred notes on the life of Johnson and yet scarcely ever mentions the biographer whose performance he has taken such pains to illustrate, without some expression of contempt.

7 An ill-natured man Boswell certainly was not. Yet the malignity of the most malignant satirist could scarcely cut deeper than his thoughtless loquacity. Having himself no sensibility to derision and contempt, he took it for granted that all others were equally callous. He was not ashamed to exhibit himself to the whole world as a common spy, a common tattler, a

humble companion without the excuse of poverty, and to tell a hundred stories of his own pertness and folly, and of the insults which his pertness and folly brought upon him. It was natural that he should show little discretion in cases in which the feelings or the honour of others might be concerned. No man, surely, ever published such stories respecting persons whom he professed to love and revere. He would infallibly have made his hero as contemptible as he has made himself, had not his hero really possessed some moral and intellectual qualities of a very high order. The best proof that Johnson was really an extraordinary man is that his character, instead of being degraded, has, on the whole, been decidedly raised by a work in which all his views and weaknesses are exposed more unsparingly than they ever were exposed by Churchill or by Kenrick.

THOMAS JEFFERSON:

ON THE CHARACTER OF GEORGE WASHINGTON

A letter, dated Monticello, January 2, 1814, to Walter Jones.

Dear Sir,—

1 Your favor of November the 25th reached this place December the 21st, having been near a month on the way. How this could happen I know not, as we have two mails a week both from Fredericksburg and Richmond. It found me just returned from a long journey and absence, during which so much business had accumulated, commanding the first attentions, that another week has been added to the delay.

2 I deplore, with you, the putrid state into which our newspapers have passed, and the malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those who write for them; and I enclose you a recent sample, the production of a New England judge, as a proof of the abyss of degradation into which we are fallen. These ordures are rapidly depraving the public taste and lessening its relish for sound food. As vehicle of information and a curb on our functionaries, they have rendered themselves useless, by forfeiting all title to belief. That this has, in a great degree, been produced by the violence and malignity of party spirit, I agree with you; and I have read with great pleasure the paper you enclosed me on that subject, which I now return. It is at the same time a perfect model of the style of discussion which candor and decency should observe, of the tone which renders difference of opinion even amiable, and a succinct, correct, and dispassionate history of the origin and progress of party among us. It might be incorporated as it stands, and without changing a word, into the history of the present epoch, and would give to posterity a fairer view of the times than they will probably derive from other sources. In reading it with great satisfaction, there was but a single passage where I

wished a little more development of a very sound and catholic idea; a single intercalation to rest it solidly on true bottom. It is near the end of the first page, where you make a statement of genuine republican maxims; saying, "that the people ought to possess as much political power as can possibly exist with the order and security of society." Instead of this I would say, "that the people, being the only safe depository of power, should exercise in person every function which their qualifications enable them to exercise, consistently with the order and security of society; that we now find them equal to the election of those who shall be invested with their executive and legislative powers, and to act themselves in the judiciary, as judges in question of fact; that the range of their powers ought to be enlarged," etc. This gives both the reason and exemplification of the maxim you express, "that they ought to possess as much political power," etc. I see nothing to correct either in your facts or principles.

3 You say that in taking General Washington on your shoulders, to bear him harmless through the federal coalition, you encounter a perilous topic. I do not think so. You have given the genuine history of the course of his mind through the trying scenes in which it was engaged, and of the seductions by which it was deceived, but not depraved. I think I knew General Washington intimately and thoroughly; and were I called on to delineate his character, it should be in terms like these.

4 His mind was great and powerful, without being of the very first order; his penetration strong, though not so acute as that of a Newton, Bacon, or Locke; and as far as he saw, no judgment was ever sounder. It was slow in operation, being little aided by invention or imagination, but sure in conclusion. Hence the common remark of his officers, of the advantage he derived from councils of war, where hearing all suggestions, he selected whatever was best; and certainly no general ever planned his battles more judiciously. But if deranged during the course of the action, if any member of his plan was dislocated by sudden circumstances, he was slow in re-adjustment. The consequence was that he often failed in the field, and rarely against an enemy in station, as at Boston and York. He was incapable of fear, meeting personal dangers with the calmest unconcern. Perhaps the strongest feature in his character was prudence, never acting until every circumstance, every consideration, was maturely weighed; refraining if he saw a doubt, but, when once decided, going through with his purpose, whatever obstacles opposed. His integrity was most pure, his justice the most inflexible I have ever known, no motive of interest or consanguinity, of friendship or hatred, being able to bias his decision. He was, indeed, in every sense of the word, a wise, a good, and a great man. His temper was naturally high toned; but reflection and resolution had obtained a firm and habitual ascendancy over it. If ever, however, it broke its bonds, he was most tremendous in his wrath. In his

expenses he was honorable, but exact; liberal in contributions to whatever promised utility; but frowning and unyielding on all visionary projects and all unworthy calls on his charity. His heart was not warm in its affections; but he exactly calculated every man's value and gave him a solid esteem proportioned to it. His person, you know, was fine, his stature exactly what one would wish, his deportment easy, erect, and noble; the best horseman of his age and the most graceful figure that could be seen on horseback. Although in the circle of his friends, where he might be unreserved with safety, he took a free share in conversation, his colloquial talents were not above mediocrity, possessing neither copiousness of ideas, nor fluency of words. In public, when called on for a sudden opinion, he was unready, short, and embarrassed. Yet he wrote readily, rather diffusely, in an easy and correct style. This he had acquired by conversation with the world, for his education was merely reading, writing, and common arithmetic, to which he added surveying at a later day. His time was employed in action chiefly, reading little, and that only in agriculture and English history. His correspondence became necessarily extensive, and, with journalising his agricultural proceedings, occupied most of his leisure hours within doors. On the whole, his character was, in its mass, perfect, in nothing bad, in few points indifferent; and it may truly be said that never did nature and fortune combine more perfectly to make a man great and to place him in the same constellation with whatever worthies have merited from man an everlasting remembrance. For his was the singular destiny and merit of leading the armies of his country successfully through an arduous war, for the establishment of its independence; of conducting its councils through the birth of a government, new in its forms and principles, until it had settled down into a quiet and orderly train; and of scrupulously obeying the laws through the whole of his career, civil and military, of which the history of the world furnishes no other example.

5 How, then, can it be perilous for you to take such a man on your shoulders? I am satisfied the great body of republicans think of him as I do. We were, indeed, dissatisfied with him on his ratification of the British treaty. But this was short-lived. We know his honesty, the wiles with which he was encompassed, and that age had already begun to relax the firmness of his purposes; and I am convinced he is more deeply seated in the love and gratitude of the republicans than in the pharisaical homage of the federal monarchists. For he was no monarchist from preference of his judgment. The soundness of that gave him correct views of the rights of man, and his severe justice devoted him to them. He has often declared to me that he considered our new Constitution as an experiment on the practicability of republican government, and with what dose of liberty man could be trusted for his own good; that he was determined the experiment should have a fair trial, and would lose the last drop of his blood in support of it. And these declarations

he repeated to me the oftener and more pointedly, because he knew my suspicions of Colonel Hamilton's views, and probably had heard from him the same declarations which I had, to wit, "that the British constitution, with its unequal representation, corruption, and other existing abuses, was the most perfect government which had ever been established on earth, and that a reformation of those abuses make it an impracticable government." I do believe that General Washington had not a firm confidence in the durability of our government. He was naturally distrustful of men and inclined to gloomy apprehensions; and I was ever persuaded that a belief that we must at length end in something like a British constitution had some weight in his adoption of the ceremonies of levees, birthdays, pompous meetings with Congress, and other forms of the same character, calculated to prepare us gradually for a change which he believed possible, and to let it come on with as little shock as might be to the public mind.

6 These are my opinions of General Washington, which I would vouch at the judgment seat of God, having been formed on an acquaintance of thirty years. I served with him in the Virginia legislature from 1769 to the Revolutionary war, and again a short time in Congress, until he left us to take command of the army. During the war and after it we corresponded occasionally, and in the four years of my continuance in the office of Secretary of State, our intercourse was daily, confidential, and cordial. After I retired from that office, great and malignant pains were taken by our federal monarchists, and not entirely without effect, to make him view me as a theorist, holding French principles of government, which would lead infallibly to licentiousness and anarchy. And to this he listened the more easily, from my known disapprobation of the British treaty. I never saw him afterwards, or these malignant insinuations should have been dissipated before his just judgment, as mists before the sun. I felt on his death, with my countrymen, that "verily a great man hath fallen this day in Israel."

7 More time and recollection would enable me to add many other traits of his character; but why add them to you who knew him well? And I cannot justify to myself a longer detention of your paper.

Vale, proprieque tuum, me esse tibi persuadeas.

SAMUEL JOHNSON: THE LIBERTY OF THE PULPIT

1 During my stay in London this spring, I solicited his attention to another law case, in which I was engaged. In the course of a contested election for the Borough of Dumfermline, which I attended as one of my friend Colonel (afterwards Sir Archibald) Campbell's counsel; one of his political agents,

From [James] *Boswell's Life of Johnson*, new ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 757-62 (May 1776).

who was charged with having been unfaithful to his employer, and having deserted to the opposite party for a pecuniary reward—attacked very rudely in a news-paper the Reverend Mr. James Thomson, one of the ministers of that place, on account of a supposed allusion to him in one of his sermons. Upon this the minister, on a subsequent Sunday, arraigned him by name from the pulpit with some severity; and the agent, after the sermon was over, rose up and asked the minister aloud, “What bribe he had received for telling so many lies from the chair of verity.” I was present at this very extraordinary scene. The person arraigned, and his father and brother, who had also had a share both of the reproof from the pulpit, and in the retaliation, brought an action against Mr. Thomson, in the Court of Session, for defamation and damages, and I was one of the counsel for the reverend defendant. The *Liberty of the Pulpit* was our great ground of defense: but we argued also on the provocation of the previous attack, and on the instant retaliation. The Court of Session, however, the fifteen Judges, who are at the same time the Jury, decided against the minister, contrary to my humble opinion; and several of them expressed themselves with indignation against him. He was an aged gentleman, formerly a military chaplain, and a man of high spirit and honour. Johnson was satisfied that the judgement was wrong, and dictated to me the following argument in confutation of it:—

- 2 “Of the censure pronounced from the pulpit, our determination must be formed, as in other cases, by a consideration of the action itself, and the particular circumstances with which it is invested.
- 3 “The right of censure and rebuke seems necessarily appendant to the pastoral office. He, to whom the care of a congregation is entrusted, is considered as the shepherd of a flock, as the teacher of a school, as the father of a family. As a shepherd tending not his own sheep but those of his master, he is answerable for those that stray, and that lose themselves by straying. But no man can be answerable for losses which he has not power to prevent, or for vagrancy which he has not authority to restrain.
- 4 “As a teacher giving instruction for wages, and liable to reproach, if those whom he undertakes to inform make no proficiency, he must have the power of enforcing attendance, of awakening negligence, and repressing contradiction.
- 5 “As a father, he possesses the paternal authority of admonition, rebuke, and punishment. He cannot, without reducing his office to an empty name, be hindered from the exercise of any practice necessary to stimulate the idle, to reform the vicious, to check the petulant, and correct the stubborn.
- 6 “If we enquire into the practice of the primitive Church, we shall, I believe, find the ministers of the word exercising the whole authority of this complicated character. We shall find them not only encouraging the good by exhortation, but terrifying the wicked by reproof and denunciation. In

the earliest ages of the Church, while religion was yet pure from secular advantages, the punishment of sinners was publick censure, and open penance; penalties inflicted merely by ecclesiastical authority, at a time while the Church had yet no help from the civil power; while the hand of the magistrate lifted only the rod of persecution; and when governours were ready to afford a refuge to all those who fled from clerical authority.

7 "That the Church, therefore, had once a power of publick censure is evident, because that power was frequently exercised. That it borrowed not its power from the civil authority, is likewise certain, because civil authority was at that time its enemy.

8 "The hour came at length, when after three hundred years of struggle and distress, Truth took possession of imperial power, and the civil laws lent their aid to the ecclesiastical constitutions. The magistrate from that time co-operated with the priest, and clerical sentences were made efficacious by secular force. But the State, when it came to the assistance of the Church, had no intention to diminish its authority. Those rebukes and those censures which were lawful before, were lawful still. But they had hitherto operated only upon voluntary submission. The refractory and contemptuous were at first in no danger of temporal severities, except what they might suffer from the reproaches of conscience, or the detestation of their fellow Christians. When religion obtained the support of law, if admonitions and censures had no effect, they were seconded by the magistrates with coercion and punishment.

9 "It therefore appears from ecclesiastical history, that the right of inflicting shame by publick censure, has been always considered as inherent in the Church; and that this right was not conferred by the civil power; for it was exercised when the civil power operated against it. By the civil power it was never taken away; for the Christian magistrate interposed his office, not to rescue sinners from censure, but to supply more powerful means of reformation; to add pain where shame was insufficient; and when men were proclaimed unworthy of the society of the faithful, to restrain them by imprisonment, from spreading abroad the contagion of wickedness.

10 "It is not improbable that from this acknowledged power of publick censure, grew in time the practice of auricular confession. Those who dreaded the blast of publick reprehension, were willing to submit themselves to the priest, by a private accusation of themselves; and to obtain a reconciliation with the Church by a kind of clandestine absolution and invisible penance; conditions with which the priest would in times of ignorance and corruption easily comply, as they increased his influence, by adding the knowledge of secret sins to that of notorious offences, and enlarged his authority, by making him the sole arbiter of the terms of reconciliation.

11 "From this bondage the Reformation set us free. The minister has no

longer power to press into the retirement of conscience, to torture us by interrogatories, or put himself in possession of our secrets and our lives. But though we have thus controlled his usurpations, his just and original power remains unimpaired. He may still see, though he may not pry: he may yet hear, though he may not question. And that knowledge which his eyes and ears force upon him it is still his duty to use, for the benefit of his flock. A father who lives near a wicked neighbour, may forbid a son to frequent his company. A minister who has in his congregation a man of open and scandalous wickedness, may warn his parishioners to shun his conversation. To warn them is not only lawful, but not to warn them would be criminal. He may warn them one by one in friendly converse, or by a parochial visitation. But if he may warn each man singly, what shall forbid him to warn them altogether? Of that which is to be made known to all, how is there any difference whether it be communicated to each singly, or to all together? What is known to all, must necessarily be publick. Whether it shall be publick at once, or publick by degrees, is the only question. And of a sudden and solemn publication the impression is deeper, and the warning more effectual.

12 "It may easily be urged, if a minister be thus left at liberty to delate sinners from the pulpit, and to publish at will the crimes of a parishioner, he may often blast the innocent, and distress the timorous. He may be suspicious, and condemn without evidence; he may be rash, and judge without examination; he may be severe, and treat slight offences with too much harshness; he may be malignant and partial, and gratify his private interest or resentment under the shelter of his pastoral character.

13 "Of all this there is possibility, and of all this there is danger. But if possibility of evil be to exclude good, no good ever can be done. If nothing is to be attempted in which there is danger, we must all sink into hopeless inactivity. The evils that may be feared from this practice arise not from any defect in the institution, but from the infirmities of human nature. Power, in whatever hands it is placed, will be sometimes improperly exerted; yet courts of law must judge, though they will sometimes judge amiss. A father must instruct his children, though he himself may often want instruction. A minister must censure sinners, though his censure may be sometimes erroneous by want of judgement, and sometimes unjust by want of honesty.

14 "If we examine the circumstances of the present case, we shall find the sentence neither erroneous nor unjust; we shall find no breach of private confidence, no intrusion into secret transactions. The fact was notorious and indubitable; so easy to be proved, that no proof was desired. The act was base and treacherous, the perpetration insolent and open, and the example naturally mischievous. The minister however, being retired and recluse, had not yet heard what was publickly known throughout the parish; and on occasion of a publick election, warned his people, according to his duty,

against the crimes which publick elections frequently produce. His warning was felt by one of his parishioners, as pointed particularly at himself. But instead of producing, as might be wished, private compunction and immediate reformation, it kindled only rage and resentment. He charged his minister, in a publick paper, with scandal, defamation, and falsehood. The minister, thus reproached, had his own character to vindicate, upon which his pastoral authority must necessarily depend. To be charged with a defamatory lie is an injury which no man patiently endures in common life. To be charged with polluting the pastoral office with scandal and falsehood, was a violation of character still more atrocious, as it affected not only his personal but his clerical veracity. His indignation naturally rose in proportion to his honesty, and with all the fortitude of injured honesty, he dared this calumniator in the church, and at once exonerated himself from censure, and rescued his flock from deception and from danger. The man whom he accuses pretends not to be innocent; or at least only pretends; for he declines a trial. The crime of which he is accused has frequent opportunities and strong temptations. It has already spread far, with much depravation of private morals, and much injury to publick happiness. To warn the people, therefore, against it was not wanton and officious, but necessary and pastoral.

15 "What then is the fault with which this worthy minister is charged? He has usurped no dominion over conscience. He has exerted no authority in support of doubtful and controverted opinions. He has not dragged into light a bashful and corrigible sinner. His censure was directed against a breach of morality, against an act which no man justifies. The man who appropriated this censure to himself, is evidently and notoriously guilty. His consciousness of his own wickedness incited him to attack his faithful reprover with open insolence and printed accusations. Such an attack made defence necessary; and we hope it will be at last decided that the means of defence were just and lawful."

JAMES MADISON: THE FEDERALIST, NO. 10

1 Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the ad

versaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operations of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

2 By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

3 There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

4 There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

5 It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

6 The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which

the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

7 The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for their own common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors and those who are debtors fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

8 No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most

numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

9 It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

10 The inference to which we are brought is that the *causes* of faction cannot be removed and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its *effects*.

11 If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

12 By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy

in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

13 From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

14 A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

15 The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

16 The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:

17 In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the con-

fusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

18 In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to center in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

19 It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.

20 The other point of difference is the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

21 Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy in controlling the effects of faction is enjoyed by a large over a small republic—is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local preju-

dices and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.

22 The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular country or district than an entire State.

23 In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.

PUBLIUS (1787)

EDMUND BURKE: LETTER TO A NOBLE LORD

1 The Duke of Bedford conceives that he is obliged to call the attention of the House of Peers to his Majesty's grant to me, which he considers excessive and out of all bounds.

2 I know not how it has happened, but it really seems that, whilst his Grace was meditating his well-considered censure upon me, he fell into a sort of sleep. Homer nods; and the Duke of Bedford may dream; and as dreams (even his golden dreams) are apt to be ill-pieced and incongruously put together, his Grace preserved his idea of reproach to *me*, but took the subject-matter from the Crown grants to *his own family*. This is "the stuff of which his dreams are made." In that way of putting things together his Grace is perfectly in the right. The grants to the house of Russell were so enormous, as not only to outrage economy, but even to stagger credulity. The Duke of Bedford is the leviathan among all the creatures of the Crown. He tumbles about his unwieldy bulk; he plays and frolics in the ocean of the royal bounty.

Huge as he is, and whilst "he lies floating many a rood," he is still a creature. His ribs, his fins, his whalebone, his blubber, the very spiracles through which he spouts a torrent of brine against his origin and covers me all over with the spray—everything of him and about him is from the throne. Is it for *him* to question the dispensation of the royal favour?

3 I really am at a loss to draw any sort of parallel between the public merits of his Grace, by which he justifies the grants he holds, and these services of mine, on the favourable construction of which I have obtained what his Grace so much disapproves. In private life, I have not at all the honour of acquaintance with the noble Duke. But I ought to presume, and it costs me nothing to do so, that he abundantly deserves the esteem and love of all who live with him. But as to public service, why truly it would not be more ridiculous for me to compare myself in rank, in fortune, in splendid descent, in youth, strength, or figure, with the Duke of Bedford, than to make a parallel between his services and my attempts to be useful to my country. It would not be gross adulation, but uncivil irony, to say that he has any public merit of his own to keep alive the idea of the services by which his vast landed pensions were obtained. My merits, whatever they are, are original and personal; his are derivative. It is his ancestor, the original pensioner, that has laid up this inexhaustible fund of merit, which makes his Grace so very delicate and exceptionous about the merit of all other grantees of the Crown. Had he permitted me to remain in quiet, I should have said, 'tis his estate; that's enough. It is his by law; what have I to do with it or its history? He would naturally have said on his side, 'tis this man's fortune.—He is as good now as my ancestor was two hundred and fifty years ago. I am a young man with very old pensions; he is an old man with very young pensions,—that's all.

4 Why will his Grace, by attacking me, force me reluctantly to compare my little merit with that which obtained from the Crown those prodigies of profuse donation, by which he tramples on the mediocrity of humble and laborious individuals? I would willingly leave him to the herald's college, which the philosophy of the *sans culottes* (prouder by far than all the Garters, and Norroys, and Clarencieux, and Rouge Dragons, that ever pranced in a procession of what his friends call aristocrats and despots) will abolish with contumely and scorn. These historians, recorders, and blazoners of virtues and arms, differ wholly from that other description of historians, who never assign any act of politicians to a good motive. These gentle historians, on the contrary, dip their pens in nothing but the milk of human kindness. They seek no further for merit than the preamble of a patent or the inscription on a tomb. With them every man created a peer is first a hero ready made. They judge of every man's capacity for office by the offices he has filled; and the more offices the more ability. Every general officer with them

is a Marlborough; every statesman a Burleigh; every judge a Murray or a Yorke. They who, alive, were laughed at or pitied by all their acquaintance, make as good a figure as the best of them in the pages of Guillim, Edmondson, and Collins.

5 To these recorders, so full of good nature to the great and prosperous, I would willingly leave the first Baron Russell, and Earl of Bedford, and the merits of his grants. But the aulnager, the weigher, the meter of grants, will not suffer us to acquiesce in the judgment of the prince reigning at the time when they were made. They are never good to those who earn them. Well then; since the new grantees have war made on them by the old, and that the word of the sovereign is not to be taken, let us turn our eyes to history, in which great men have always a pleasure in contemplating the heroic origin of their house.

6 The first peer of the name, the first purchaser of the grants, was a Mr. Russell, a person of an ancient gentleman's family raised by being a minion of Henry the Eighth. As there generally is some resemblance of character to create these relations, the favourite was in all likelihood much such another as his master. The first of those immoderate grants was not taken from the ancient demesne of the Crown, but from the recent confiscation of the ancient nobility of the land. The lion having sucked the blood of his prey, threw the offal carcass to the jackal in waiting. Having tasted once the food of confiscation, the favourites became fierce and ravenous. This worthy favourite's first grant was from the lay nobility. The second, infinitely improving on the enormity of the first, was from the plunder of the church. In truth his Grace is somewhat excusable for his dislike to a grant like mine, not only in its quantity, but in its kind so different from his own.

7 Mine was from a mild and benevolent sovereign; his from Henry the Eighth.

8 Mine had not its fund in the murder of any innocent person of illustrious rank or in the pillage of any body of unoffending men. His grants were from the aggregate and consolidated funds of judgments iniquitously legal and from possessions voluntarily surrendered by the lawful proprietors, with the gibbet at their door.

9 The merit of the grantee whom he derives from was that of being a prompt and greedy instrument of a *levelling* tyrant, who oppressed all descriptions of his people, but who fell with particular fury on everything that was *great and noble*. Mine has been, in endeavouring to screen every man, in every class, from oppression, and particularly in defending the high and eminent, who in the bad times of confiscating princes, confiscating chief governors, or confiscating demagogues, are the most exposed to jealousy, avarice, and envy.

10 The merit of the original grantee of his Grace's pensions was in giving;

his hand to the work and partaking the spoil with a prince, who plundered a part of the national church of his time and country. Mine was in defending the whole of the national church of my own time and my own country, and the whole of the national churches of all countries, from the principles and the examples which lead to ecclesiastical pillage, thence to a contempt of *all* prescriptive titles, thence to the pillage of *all* property, and thence to universal desolation.

11 The merit of the origin of his Grace's fortune was in being a favourite and chief adviser to a prince, who left no liberty to their native country. My endeavour was to obtain liberty for the municipal country in which I was born and for all descriptions and denominations in it. Mine was to support with unrelaxing vigilance every right, every privilege, every franchise, in this my adopted, my dearer, and more comprehensive country; and not only to preserve those rights in this chief seat of empire, but in every nation, in every land, in every climate, language, and religion, in the vast domain that is still under the protection, and the larger that was once under the protection, of the British Crown.

12 His founder's merits were, by arts in which he served his master and made his fortune, to bring poverty, wretchedness, and depopulation on his country. Mine were, under a benevolent prince, in promoting the commerce, manufacture, and agriculture of his kingdom; in which his Majesty shows an eminent example, who even in his amusements is a patriot, and in hours of leisure an improver of his native soil.

13 His founder's merit was the merit of a gentleman raised by the arts of a court, and the protection of a Wolsey, to the eminence of a great and potent lord. His merit in that eminence was, by instigating a tyrant to injustice, to provoke a people to rebellion. My merit was, to awaken the sober part of the country, that they might put themselves on their guard against any one potent lord, or any greater number of potent lords, or any combination of great leading men of any sort, if ever they should attempt to proceed in the same courses, but in the reverse order; that is, by instigating a corrupted populace to rebellion and, through that rebellion, introducing a tyranny yet worse than the tyranny which his Grace's ancestor supported and of which he profited in the manner we behold in the despotism of Henry the Eighth.

14 The political merit of the first pensioner of his Grace's house was that of being concerned as a counsellor of state in advising, and in his person executing, the conditions of a dishonourable peace with France; the surrendering the fortress of Boulogne, then our out-guard on the Continent. By that surrender, Calais, the key of France and the bridle in the mouth of that power, was, not many years afterwards, finally lost. My merit has been in resisting the power and pride of France, under any form of its rule; but in opposing it with the greatest zeal and earnestness, when that rule appeared

in the worst form it could assume; the worst indeed which the prime cause and principle of all evil could possibly give it. It was my endeavour by every means to excite a spirit in the House where I had the honour of a seat, for carrying on, with early vigour and decision, the most clearly just and necessary war, that this or any nation ever carried on; in order to save my country from the iron yoke of its power and from the more dreadful contagion of its principles; to preserve, while they can be preserved, pure and untainted, the ancient, inbred integrity, piety, good nature, and good humour of the people of England, from the dreadful pestilence, which, beginning in France, threatens to lay waste the whole moral, and in a great degree the whole physical, world, having done both in the focus of its most intense malignity.

15 The labours of his Grace's founder merited the curses, not loud but deep, of the Commons of England, on whom *he* and his master had effected a *complete parliamentary reform*, by making them, in their slavery and humiliation, the true and adequate representatives of a debased, degraded, and undone people. My merits were, in having had an active, though not always an ostentatious, share, in every one act, without exception, of undisputed constitutional utility in my time, and in having supported, on all occasions, the authority, the efficiency, and the privileges of the Commons of Great Britain. I ended my services by a recorded and fully reasoned assertion on their own journals of their constitutional rights and a vindication of their constitutional conduct. I laboured in all things to merit their inward approbation, and (along with the assistance of the largest, the greatest, and best of my endeavours) I received their free, unbiased, public, and solemn thanks.

16 Thus stands the account of the comparative merits of the Crown grants which compose the Duke of Bedford's fortune as balanced against mine. In the name of common sense, why should the Duke of Bedford think that none but of the House of Russell are entitled to the favour of the Crown? Why should he imagine that no king of England has been capable of judging of merit but King Henry the Eighth? Indeed, he will pardon me; he is a little mistaken; all virtue did not end in the first Earl of Bedford. All discernment did not lose its vision when his Creator closed his eyes. Let him remit his rigour on the disproportion between merit and reward in others, and they will make no inquiry into the origin of his fortune. They will regard with much more satisfaction, as he will contemplate with infinitely more advantage, whatever in his pedigree has been dulcified by an exposure to the influence of heaven in a long flow of generations, from the hard, acidulous, metallic tincture of the spring. It is little to be doubted that several of his forefathers in that long series have degenerated into honour and virtue. Let the Duke of Bedford (I am sure he will) reject with scorn and horror the counsels of the lecturers, those wicked panders to avarice and ambition, who would tempt him, in the troubles of his country, to seek another enormous

fortune from the forfeitures of another nobility and the plunder of another church. Let him (and I trust that yet he will) employ all the energy of his youth and all the resources of his wealth to crush rebellious principles which have no foundation in morals and rebellious movements that have no provocation in tyranny.

17 Then will be forgot the rebellions, which, by a doubtful priority in crime, his ancestor had provoked and extinguished. On such a conduct in the noble Duke, many of his countrymen might, and with some excuse might, give way to the enthusiasm of their gratitude and, in the dashing style of some of the old declaimers, cry out that if the fates had found no other way in which they could give a Duke of Bedford and his opulence as props to a tottering world, then the butchery of the Duke of Buckingham might be tolerated; it might be regarded even with complacency, whilst in the heir of confiscation they saw the sympathizing comforter of the martyrs who suffered under the cruel confiscation of this day; whilst they behold with admiration his zealous protection of the virtuous and loyal nobility of France and his manly support to his brethren, the yet standing nobility and gentry of his native land. Then his Grace's merit would be pure, and new, and sharp, as fresh from the mint of honour. As he pleased he might reflect honour on his predecessors or throw it forward on those who were to succeed him. He might be the propagator of the stock of honour, or the root of it, as he thought proper.

18 Had it pleased God to continue to me the hopes of succession, I should have been, according to my mediocrity and the mediocrity of the age I live in, a sort of founder of a family; I should have left a son, who, in all the points in which personal merit can be viewed, in science, in erudition, in genius, in taste, in honour, in generosity, in humanity, in every liberal sentiment and every liberal accomplishment, would not have shown himself inferior to the Duke of Bedford or to any of those whom he traces in his line. His Grace very soon would have wanted all plausibility in his attack upon that provision which belonged more to mine than to me. He would soon have supplied every deficiency and symmetrized every disproportion. It would not have been for that successor to resort to any stagnant wasting reservoir of merit in me or in any ancestry. He had in himself a salient, living spring of generous and manly action. Every day he lived he would have repurchased the bounty of the Crown and ten times more, if ten times more he had received. He was made a public creature; and had no enjoyment whatever but in the performance of some duty. At this exigent moment, the loss of a finished man is not easily supplied.

19 But a Disposer whose power we are little able to resist and whose wisdom it behooves us not at all to dispute, has ordained it in another manner and (whatever my querulous weakness might suggest) a far better. The storm has gone over me; and I lie like one of those old oaks which the late hurri-

cane has scattered about me. I am stripped of all my honours, I am torn up by the roots and lie prostrate on the earth! There, and prostrate there, I most unfeignedly recognize the Divine justice and in some degree submit to it. But whilst I humble myself before God, I do not know that it is forbidden to repel the attacks of unjust and inconsiderate men. The patience of Job is proverbial. After some of the convulsive struggles of our irritable nature, he submitted himself and repented in dust and ashes. But even so, I do not find him blamed for reprehending, and with a considerable degree of verbal asperity, those ill-natured neighbours of his, who visited his dunghill to read moral, political, and economical lectures on his misery. I am alone. I have none to meet my enemies in the gate. Indeed, my Lord, I greatly deceive myself, if in this hard season I would give a peck of refuse wheat for all that is called fame and honour in the world. This is the appetite but of a few. It is a luxury, it is a privilege, it is an indulgence for those who are at their ease. But we are all of us made to shun disgrace, as we are made to shrink from pain and poverty and disease. It is an instinct; and under the direction of reason, instinct is always in the right. I live in an inverted order. They who ought to have succeeded me are gone before me. They who should have been to me as posterity are in the place of ancestors. I owe to the dearest relation (which ever must subsist in memory) that act of piety, which he would have performed to me; I owe it to him to show that he was not descended, as the Duke of Bedford would have it, from an unworthy parent.

20 The Crown has considered me after long service; the Crown has paid the Duke of Bedford by advance. He has had a long credit for any services which he may perform hereafter. He is secure, and long may he be secure, in his advance, whether he performs any services or not. But let him take care how he endangers the safety of that constitution which secures his own utility or his own insignificance; or how he discourages those who take up, even puny arms, to defend an order of things which, like the sun of heaven, shines alike on the useful and the worthless. His grants are ingrafted on the public law of Europe, covered with the awful hoar of innumerable ages. They are guarded by the sacred rules of prescription, found in that full treasury of jurisprudence from which the jejuneness and penury of our municipal law has, by degrees, been enriched and strengthened. This prescription I had my share (a very full share) in bringing to its perfection. The Duke of Bedford will stand as long as prescriptive law endures; as long as the great stable laws of property, common to us with all civilized nations, are kept in their integrity and without the smallest intermixture of laws, maxims, principles, or precedents of the grand Revolution. They are secure against all changes but one. The whole revolutionary system, institutes, digest, code, novels, text, gloss, comment, are not only the same but they are the very reverse, and the reverse fundamentals, of all the laws on which civil

life has hitherto been upheld in all the governments of the world. The learned professors of the rights of man regard prescription, not as a title to bar all claim, set up against all possession—but they look on prescription as itself a bar against the possessor and proprietor. They hold an immemorial possession to be no more than a long-continued and therefore an aggravated injustice.

21 Such are *their* ideas; such *their* religion, and such *their* law. But as to *our* country and *our* race, as long as the well-compacted structure of our church and state, the sanctuary, the holy of holies of that ancient law, defended by reverence, defended by power, a fortress at once and a temple, shall stand inviolate on the brow of the British Sion—as long as the British monarchy, not more limited than fenced by the orders of the state, shall, like the proud Keep of Windsor, rising in the majesty of proportion and girt with the double belt of its kindred and coeval towers, as long as this awful structure shall oversee and guard the subjected land—so long the mounds and dykes of the low, fat Bedford level will have nothing to fear from all the pickaxes of all the levellers of France. As long as our sovereign lord the king and his faithful subjects, the Lords and Commons of this realm—the triple cord which no man can break; the solemn, sworn, constitutional frank-pledge of this nation; the firm guarantees of each other's beings and each other's rights; the joint and several securities, each in its place and order, for every kind and every quality of property and of dignity; as long as these endure, so long the Duke of Bedford is safe: and we are all safe together—the high from the blights of envy and the spoliations of rapacity; the low from the iron hand of oppression and the insolent spurn of contempt....

DOUBT THAT WILL NOT DOWN

On August 19, 1927, The World newspaper of New York City printed a full-page editorial on the case of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, who had been convicted of murdering Frederick A. Parmenter and Alessandro Barardelli during a holdup of a shoe factory in South Braintree, Massachusetts, on April 15, 1920. The editorial was probably written by Walter Lippmann, who was at the time the chief editorial-writer for The World. Despite the storm of controversy that raged for seven years over this celebrated case, Sacco and Vanzetti were executed on August 23, 1927. This excerpt is quoted from Commonwealth vs. Sacco and Vanzetti, ed. Robert P. Weeks, pp. 240-46, (c) 1958, by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

1 Although the courts have yet to rule on all phases of the Sacco-Vanzetti case, we respectfully remind the Governor of Massachusetts once more that nothing which has been decided by the courts or by his Advisory Committee automatically fixes the sentence of death as the only possible conclusion. The

exaction of the death penalty is not finally a judicial question, but a question of public policy which has to be settled within the discretion of the Executive. The jury at the original trial brought in a verdict of guilty. The presiding judge at that trial has repeatedly denied motions for a new trial. The Appellate Courts have decided that the rulings of this judge were according to law. The Advisory Committee concluded that the two men are guilty. But no one has yet passed finally on the question as to whether the highest interests of the State demand that the two men be executed or that they be imprisoned for life. That is a question for the Governor, which he must decide not on the basis of whether he thinks the men are guilty but on the basis of whether he thinks, given all the circumstances, that an irrevocable sentence of death is wise.

2 Gov. Fuller has stated publicly in another connection that he regards the death penalty as the one form of punishment most calculated to deter the professional criminal. With that opinion we for our part are in sympathy, and it is not our practice in clear cases of premeditated murder to plead for clemency. But because we share Gov. Fuller's opinion as to the theory of capital punishment we recognize that certain conditions must be fulfilled before the exaction of the penalty can have the deterrent effect which it ought to have. There must be no doubt in the minds of the community that the condemned had an absolutely unprejudiced trial. There must be no doubt that the condemned is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Above all, the circumstances must be such that the condemned dies in the role of a convicted criminal, and not in the role of a martyr.

3 These elemental conditions have not been fulfilled, we submit, in the case of Sacco and Vanzetti. There remains in the minds of uncounted multitudes the gravest doubt as to whether they have had an absolutely unprejudiced trial on all the available evidence. This doubt, far from being reduced, has been augmented by the findings of the Advisory Committee that the presiding judge, who was also the reviewing judge, committed a grave breach of official decorum. The inquiry by the committee, which we were among the first to recognize as disinterested in its purposes, has plainly failed to carry conviction. There can be no question, therefore, that if Sacco and Vanzetti die on Monday night multitudes will regard their death not as a just penalty for a brutal crime but as a martyrdom. No one who believes in the deterrent effect of the death penalty can say that such an execution is calculated to produce the effect for which it is designed.

4 We recognize perfectly well that no government can with self-respect yield to the clamor of ignorance and sentimentality and partisanship. We realize perfectly well how much more difficult it is for the Governor to commute these sentences in the face of organized threats and of sporadic outrages. It will take greatness of mind and heart for the Governor and his

Council to choose the wiser course. It will take that kind of greatness which lifts men above the passions of the moment, makes them impervious to the threats of their enemies and the outcry of their own partisans, and arms them with a resolution to take that course which the sober judgment of history will vindicate.

5 If Gov. Fuller commutes these sentences the Communists and Anarchists will shout that they coerced him. They will make the most of it for a day, a week, a month. The extremists on the other side will call him a weakling, and sneer. But in the meantime moderate and disinterested opinion, which is never very talkative, will mobilize behind him and will recognize that he did a wise and a brave thing which can have no other result in the long run than to protect the prestige of the State and to deepen the confidence of the people in its wisdom.

6 Therefore we plead with the Governor to see this matter in the light not of to-day and to-morrow but of the years to come. We plead with him to stay the execution because it will defeat the only purpose for which the death penalty can be exacted. We plead with him to remember that, however certain he may be in his own mind that the two men are guilty, no such certainty exists in the minds of his fellow-citizens. They are in doubt. They are troubled. We feel sure we speak for a multitude whose loyalty and disinterestedness are beyond all question when we say that the guilt of Sacco and Vanzetti has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

[The editorial-writer first considers the doubts raised by the testimony concerning the guns allegedly used in the murder, and then he considers one of the most crucial items in the trial—Sacco's cap.]

7 To the question of Sacco's cap the Lowell committee attaches great importance. To the same point great importance was attached by the prosecution at the original trial. For when the prosecuting attorney summed up his case he said to the jury of this cap:

It is absolutely condemnatory of this defendant. No, not absolutely, but it clinches on top of all the other circumstances.

8 Now the Lowell committee itself says, reviewing "the chief circumstances" in the case against Sacco:

A cap is found on the ground near the body of the man he is accused of killing which bears a resemblance in color and general appearance to those he was in the habit of wearing, and when tried on in court it fitted—that is, his head was the size of one of the men who did the shooting.

Let us see.

9 The question of identifying this cap as one of Sacco's caps came up three times in the trial, and only three. It came up once more in testimony before the Lowell committee. Anything the Lowell committee knows about this cap, anything anybody knows about this cap, must be drawn from these four sources. For there is no other evidence, and never has been.

10 First, the three references to the cap during the trial:

11 Mrs. Sacco, wife of the defendant, takes the stand. The prosecuting attorney asks her (Record, p. 1085) if her husband ever had a cap like this cap that was found at the murder scene. She says:

My husband never wore caps with anything around for his ears, never, because he never liked it and because, besides that, never, he never wore them because he don't look good in them, positively.

12 The prosecuting attorney goes on to point out marks on the cap and holes in the lining (Record, p. 1085).

Q. Did you ever see a mark like this (*indicating*), you might or might not, but did you ever see a hole like that (*indicating*) in your husband's cap?

A. Not that I remember. I never seen holes in my husband's cap like that.

This ends Mrs. Sacco's evidence about the cap.

13 Then there is Sacco himself on the witness-stand. His attorney asks him (Record, p. 908) if this is his cap. He answers, "No, sir." His attorney asks him (Record, p. 909) if he ever had a cap of any color made in the form of this cap with a fur lining, and he answers, "Never in my life." He is asked to try the cap on (Record, p. 909), does try it on, and says, "Could not go in. My size is 7½." He is asked (Record, p. 909) if he knows anything about the history of this cap, and replies, "No, sir."

14 Then the prosecuting attorney takes Sacco for cross-examination. He is asked again to try putting the cap on (Record, p. 978), tries putting it on, and the following passage occurs in the testimony:

A. Can't go in.

Q. Can't go in?

A. No.

Q. Try and pull it down in back and see if it can't go in?

A. Oh, but it is too tight.

15 The prosecuting attorney goes on to point out holes in the lining of the cap. He establishes the fact (Record, p. 979) that Sacco was in the habit of hanging his own cap on a nail in the factory where he worked. But when he asks Sacco (Record, p. 979) if his own cap had a hole in it Sacco replies

that he is "pretty sure" it didn't. And this ends Sacco's evidence about the cap.

16 Now, it can be said that neither Sacco nor his wife would be anxious to help the State prove its case. This is manifestly true. But the point is that if the Lowell committee believes it has found evidence that this cap was Sacco's, and that it fitted Sacco's head, it cannot have in mind Sacco's evidence or his wife's evidence; for if that evidence proves anything it proves that the cap was not Sacco's and did *not* fit his head.

17 The committee, therefore, must have some other evidence in mind. There is only one other piece of evidence for it to have in mind. For in the whole course of the trial only one other witness was ever questioned about identifying this cap as Sacco's. This witness was George T. Kelley, superintendent of the factory in which Sacco worked.

18 Kelley takes the stand. He is asked by the prosecuting attorney (Record, p. 449) if he has ever noticed anything in respect to the cap that Sacco wears. He replies, "Nothing more than coming in to work and hanging it up on a nail." He is shown the cap found at the murder scene and asked (Record, p. 450) if this cap is like the one worn by Sacco. He replies:

The only thing I could say about the cap, Mr. Williams, from hanging up on a nail in the distance, it was similar in color. As far as details are concerned, I could not say it was.

19 He is asked (Record, p. 450) if he ever saw a tear in the lining of Sacco's cap. He answers, "No, sir." He is again asked (Record, p. 452) if the cap found at the murder scene is "alike in appearance to the cap worn by Sacco," and again replies, "In color only." The following colloquy then occurs:

The Court—That is not responsive to the question. I wish you would answer it, if you can.

The Witness—I can't answer it when I don't know right down in my heart that that is the cap.

The Court—I don't want you to. I want you should answer according to what is in your heart.

The Witness—General appearance, that is all I can say. I never saw that cap so close in my life as I do now.

20 Later in the trial Kelley is recalled to the witness-stand by the defense and in the course of cross-examination is asked this question (Record, p. 1046) by the prosecuting attorney: "Did you realize the importance if your testimony identified that cap as Sacco's cap?" To which Kelley answers: "I did not think I had identified it, Mr. Katzmman."

21 The cap appears once more, in the testimony of one Jeremiah F. Gallivan, Chief of Police of South Braintree, before the Lowell committee. Galli-

van testifies that the holes in the lining of the cap found at the murder scene—the holes which the prosecution had attempted to prove were made by the nail where Sacco hung his cap—had been made by the police themselves in an effort to find some identification mark: the lining being intact at the time of the delivery of the cap to Gallivan.

22 This is the end of the cap. And we are left with the extraordinary conclusion:

That the Lowell committee has decided that the cap found at the murder scene was Sacco's cap, on the basis of—

1. Mrs. Sacco's denial of the fact.
2. Sacco's denial of the fact, and his statement that he could not pull the cap down on his head.
3. Kelley's testimony that Sacco's cap, which he had only seen "hanging up on a nail in the distance," was like the murder cap "in color only," in "general appearance."

Kelley denied that he had identified the cap. Then who did identify it?

23 Who satisfied the Lowell committee so completely regarding the identity of this cap that the Lowell committee is ready to use this cap as one of the six links that justify Sacco's execution?

24 When there is no other evidence in the record it is no wonder that thoughtful men are puzzled.

25 From the foregoing it can be seen that the evidence is far from conclusive. And no undue weight should be attached to it on the theory that our criminal system does not make mistakes. It makes many mistakes. In the well-authenticated records of criminal proceedings in this country there are a great number of cases which cast the gravest doubt upon all evidence which rests on snap identification, the testimony of rifle experts and such things. Dozens of cases are known where the evidence seemed conclusive, where juries convicted and where subsequent events proved that the accused was innocent.

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26 The Sacco-Vanzetti case is clouded and obscure. It is full of doubt. The fairness of the trial raises doubt. The evidence raises doubt. The inadequate review of the evidence raises doubt. The Governor's inquiry has not appeased these doubts. The report of his Advisory Committee has not settled these doubts. Everywhere there is doubt so deep, so pervasive, so unsettling, that it cannot be denied and it cannot be ignored. No man, we submit, should be put to death where so much doubt exists.

27 The real solution of this case would be a new trial before a new judge under new conditions. Ferently we hope that the Supreme Judicial Court

of Massachusetts will decide that under the law such a new trial can be held. But if it does not, then to the Governor, to his Council and to his friends of justice in Massachusetts we make this plea:

Stay the execution. Wait. The honor of an American Commonwealth is in your hands. Listen, and do not put an irrevocable end upon a case that is so full of doubt. It is human to err, and it is possible in the sight of God that the whole truth is not yet known.

THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY: SCIENCE AND CULTURE

1 I hold very strongly by two convictions:—The first is that neither the discipline nor the subject-matter of classical education is of such direct value to the student of physical science as to justify the expenditure of valuable time upon either; and the second is that for the purpose of attaining real culture, an exclusively scientific education is at least as effectual as an exclusively literary education.

2 I need hardly point out to you that these opinions, especially the latter, are diametrically opposed to those of the great majority of educated Englishmen, influenced as they are by school and university traditions. In their belief, culture is obtainable only by a liberal education; and a liberal education is synonymous, not merely with education and instruction in literature, but in one particular form of literature, namely, that of Greek and Roman antiquity. They hold that the man who has learned Latin and Greek, however little, is educated; while he who is versed in other branches of knowledge, however deeply, is a more or less respectable specialist, not admissible into the cultured caste. The stamp of the educated man, the University degree, is not for him.

3 I am too well acquainted with the generous catholicity of spirit, the true sympathy with scientific thought, which pervades the writings of our chief apostle of culture, to identify him with these opinions; and yet one may cull from one and another of those epistles to the Philistines, which so much delight all who do not answer to that name, sentences which lend them some support.

4 Mr. Arnold tells us that the meaning of culture is "to know the best that has been thought and said in the world." It is the criticism of life contained in literature. That criticism regards "Europe as being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation, bound to a joint action and working to a common result; and whose members have, for their common outfit, a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity, and of one another. Special, local, and temporary advantages being put out of account, that modern nation will in the intellectual and spiritual sphere make most

progress, which most thoroughly carries out this programme. And what is that but saying that we too, all of us, as individuals, the more thoroughly we carry it out, shall make the more progress?"

5 We have here to deal with two distinct propositions. The first, that a criticism of life is the essence of culture; the second, that literature contains the materials which suffice for the construction of such a criticism.

6 I think that we must all assent to the first proposition. For culture certainly means something quite different from learning or technical skill. It implies the possession of an ideal and the habit of critically estimating the value of things by comparison with a theoretic standard. Perfect culture should supply a complete theory of life, based upon a clear knowledge alike of its possibilities and of its limitations.

7 But we may agree to all this and yet strongly dissent from the assumption that literature alone is competent to supply this knowledge. After having learnt all that Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity have thought and said and all that modern literatures have to tell us, it is not self-evident that we have laid a sufficiently broad and deep foundation for that criticism of life which constitutes culture.

8 Indeed, to any one acquainted with the scope of physical science, it is not at all evident. Considering progress only in the "intellectual and spiritual sphere," I find myself wholly unable to admit that either nations or individuals will really advance, if their common outfit draws nothing from the stores of physical science. I should say that an army, without weapons of precision and with no particular base of operations, might more hopefully enter upon a campaign on the Rhine, than a man, devoid of a knowledge of what physical science has done in the last century, upon a criticism of life.

9 When a biologist meets with an anomaly, he instinctively turns to the study of development to clear it up. The rationale of contradictory opinions may with equal confidence be sought in history.

10 It is, happily, no new thing that Englishmen should employ their wealth in building and endowing institutions for educational purposes. But five or six hundred years ago, deeds of foundation expressed or implied conditions as nearly as possible contrary to those which have been thought expedient by Sir Josiah Mason. That is to say, physical science was practically ignored, while a certain literary training was enjoined as a means to the acquirement of knowledge which was essentially theological.

11 The reason of this singular contradiction between the actions of men alike animated by a strong and disinterested desire to promote the welfare of their fellows is easily discovered.

12 At that time, in fact, if any one desired knowledge beyond such as could be obtained by his own observation or by common conversation, his first

necessity was to learn the Latin language, inasmuch as all the higher knowledge of the western world was contained in works written in that language. Hence, Latin grammar, with logic and rhetoric, studied through Latin, were the fundamentals of education. With respect to the substance of the knowledge imparted through this channel, the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, as interpreted and supplemented by the Romish Church, were held to contain a complete and infallibly true body of information.

13 Theological dicta were, to the thinkers of those days, that which the axioms and definitions of Euclid are to the geometers of these. The business of the philosophers of the middle ages was to deduce, from the data furnished by the theologians, conclusions in accordance with ecclesiastical degrees. They were allowed the high privilege of showing, by logical process, how and why that which the Church said was true, must be true. And if their demonstrations fell short of or exceeded this limit, the Church was maternally ready to check their aberrations,—if need were, by the help of the secular arm.

14 Between the two, our ancestors were furnished with a compact and complete criticism of life. They were told how the world began and how it would end; they learned that all material existence was but a base and insignificant blot upon the fair face of the spiritual world and that nature was, to all intents and purposes, the playground of the devil; they learned that the earth is the centre of the visible universe and that man is the cynosure of things terrestrial; and more especially was it inculcated that the course of nature had no fixed order, but that it could be, and constantly was, altered by the agency of innumerable spiritual beings, good and bad, according as they were moved by the deeds and prayers of men. The sum and substance of the whole doctrine was to produce the conviction that the only thing really worth knowing in this world was how to secure that place in a better, which, under certain conditions, the Church promised.

15 Our ancestors had a living belief in this theory of life and acted upon it in their dealings with education, as in all other matters. Culture meant saintliness—after the fashion of the saints of those days; the education that led to it was, of necessity, theological; and the way to theology lay through Latin.

16 That the study of nature—further than was requisite for the satisfaction of everyday wants—should have any bearing on human life was far from the thoughts of men thus trained. Indeed, as nature had been cursed for man's sake, it was an obvious conclusion that those who meddled with nature were likely to come into pretty close contact with Satan. And if any born scientific investigator followed his instincts, he might safely reckon upon earning the reputation, and probably upon suffering the fate, of a sorcerer.

17 Had the western world been left to itself in Chinese isolation, there is no saying how long this state of things might have endured. But happily it was not left to itself. Even earlier than the thirteenth century, the development of Moorish civilization in Spain and the great movement of the Crusades had introduced the leaven which, from that day to this, has never ceased to work. At first, through the intermediation of Arabic translations, afterwards by the study of the originals, the western nations of Europe became acquainted with the writings of the ancient philosophers and poets and, in time, with the whole of the vast literature of antiquity.

18 Whatever there was of high intellectual aspiration or dominant capacity in Italy, France, Germany, and England, spent itself for centuries in taking possession of the rich inheritance left by the dead civilizations of Greece and Rome. Marvelously aided by the invention of printing, classical learning spread and flourished. Those who possessed it prided themselves on having attained the highest culture then within the reach of mankind.

19 And justly. For, saving Dante on his solitary pinnacle, there was no figure in modern literature, at the time of the Renaissance, to compare with the men of antiquity; there was no art to compete with their sculpture; there was no physical science but that which Greece had created. Above all, there was no other example of perfect intellectual freedom—of the unhesitating acceptance of reason as the sole guide to truth and the supreme arbiter of conduct.

20 The new learning necessarily soon exerted a profound influence upon education. The language of the monks and schoolmen seemed little better than gibberish to scholars fresh from Vergil and Cicero, and the study of Latin was placed upon a new foundation. Moreover, Latin itself ceased to afford the sole key to knowledge. The student who sought the highest thought of antiquity found only a second-hand reflection of it in Roman literature and turned his face to the full light of the Greeks. And after a battle, not altogether dissimilar to that which is at present being fought over the teaching of physical science, the study of Greek was recognized as an essential element of all higher education.

21 Thus the Humanists, as they were called, won the day; and the great reform which they effected was of incalculable service to mankind. But the Nemesis of all reformers is finality; and the reformers of education, like those of religion, fell into the profound, however common, error of mistaking the beginning for the end of the work of reformation.

22 The representatives of the Humanists, in the nineteenth century, take their stand upon classical education as the sole avenue to culture, as firmly as if we were still in the age of Renaissance. Yet, surely, the present intellectual relations of the modern and the ancient worlds are profoundly different from those which obtained three centuries ago. Leaving aside the existence

of a great and characteristically modern literature, of modern painting, and, especially, of modern music, there is one feature of the present state of the civilized world which separates it more widely from the Renaissance than the Renaissance was separated from the middle ages.

23 This distinctive character of our own times lies in the vast and constantly increasing part which is played by natural knowledge. Not only is our daily life shaped by it, not only does the prosperity of millions of men depend upon it, but our whole theory of life has long been influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the general conceptions of the universe which have been forced upon us by physical science.

24 In fact, the most elementary acquaintance with the results of scientific investigation shows us that they offer a broad and striking contradiction to the opinion so implicitly credited and taught in the middle ages.

25 The notions of the beginning and the end of the world entertained by our forefathers are no longer credible. It is very certain that the earth is not the chief body in the universe and that the world is not subordinated to man's use. It is even more certain that nature is the expression of a definite order with which nothing interferes and that the chief business of mankind is to learn that order and govern themselves accordingly. Moreover, this scientific "criticism of life" presents itself to us with different credentials from any other. It appeals not to authority, nor to what anybody may have thought or said, but to nature. It admits that all our interpretations of natural fact are more or less imperfect and symbolic, and bids the learner seek for truth not among words but among things. It warns us that the assertion which outstrips evidence is not only a blunder but a crime.

26 The purely classical education advocated by the representatives of the Humanists in our day gives no inkling of all this. A man may be a better scholar than Erasmus and know no more of the chief causes of the present intellectual fermentation than Erasmus did. Scholarly and pious persons, worthy of all respect, favour us with allocutions upon the sadness of the antagonism of science to their mediaeval way of thinking, which betray an ignorance of the first principles of scientific investigation, an incapacity for understanding what a man of science means by veracity and an unconsciousness of the weight of established scientific truths, which is almost comical.

27 There is no great force in the *tu quoque* argument, or else the advocates of scientific education might fairly enough retort upon the modern Humanists that they may be learned specialists, but that they possess no such sound foundation for a criticism of life as deserves the name of culture. And, indeed, if we were disposed to be cruel, we might urge that the Humanists have brought this reproach upon themselves, not because they are too full of the spirit of the ancient Greek, but because they lack it.

28 The period of the Renaissance is commonly called that of the "Revival of Letters," as if the influences then brought to bear upon the mind of Western Europe had been wholly exhausted in the field of literature. I think it is very commonly forgotten that the revival of science, effected by the same agency, although less conspicuous, was not less momentous.

29 In fact, the few and scattered students of nature of that day picked up the clue to her secrets exactly as it fell from the hands of the Greeks a thousand years before. The foundations of mathematics were so well laid by them that our children learn their geometry from a book written for the schools of Alexandria two thousand years ago. Modern astronomy is the natural continuation and development of the work of Hipparchus and of Ptolemy; modern physics of that of Democritus and of Archimedes; it was long before modern biological science outgrew the knowledge bequeathed to us by Aristotle, by Theophrastus, and by Galen.

30 We cannot know all the best thoughts and sayings of the Greeks unless we know what they thought about natural phenomena. We cannot fully apprehend their criticism of life unless we understand the extent to which that criticism was affected by scientific conceptions. We falsely pretend to be the inheritors of their culture, unless we are penetrated, as the best minds among them were, with an unhesitating faith that the free employment of reason, in accordance with scientific method, is the sole method of reaching truth.

31 Thus I venture to think that the pretensions of our modern Humanists to the possession of the monopoly of culture and to the exclusive inheritance of the spirit of antiquity must be abated, if not abandoned. But I should be very sorry that anything I have said should be taken to imply a desire on my part to depreciate the value of a classical education, as it might be and as it sometimes is. The native capacities of mankind vary no less than their opportunities; and while culture is one, the road by which one man may best reach it is widely different from that which is most advantageous to another. Again, while scientific education is yet inchoate and tentative, classical education is thoroughly well organized upon the practical experience of generations of teachers. So that, given ample time for learning and destination for ordinary life or for a literary career, I do not think that a young Englishman in search of culture can do better than follow the course usually marked out for him, supplementing its deficiencies by his own efforts.

32 But for those who mean to make science their serious occupation or who intend to follow the profession of medicine or who have to enter early upon the business of life,—for all these, in my opinion, classical education is a mistake; and it is for this reason that I am glad to see "mere literary education and instruction" shut out from the curriculum of Sir Josiah Mason's

College, seeing that its inclusion would probably lead to the introduction of the ordinary smattering of Latin and Greek.

33 Nevertheless, I am the last person to question the importance of genuine literary education or to suppose that intellectual culture can be complete without it. An exclusively scientific training will bring about a mental twist as surely as an exclusively literary training. The value of the cargo does not compensate for a ship's being out of trim; and I should be very sorry to think that the Scientific College would turn out none but lopsided men.

34 There is no need, however, that such a catastrophe should happen. Instruction in English, French, and German is provided, and thus the three greatest literatures of the modern world are made accessible to the student. French and German, and especially the latter language, are absolutely indispensable to those who desire full knowledge in any department of science. But even supposing that the knowledge of these languages acquired is not more than sufficient for purely scientific purposes, every Englishman has, in his native tongue, an almost perfect instrument of literary expression; and, in his own literature, models of every kind of literary excellence. If an Englishman cannot get literary culture out of his Bible, his Shakespeare, his Milton, neither, in my belief, will the profoundest study of Homer and Sophocles, Vergil and Horace, give it to him.

35 Thus, since the constitution of the College makes sufficient provision for literary as well as for scientific education and since artistic instruction is also contemplated, it seems to me that a fairly complete culture is offered to all who are willing to take advantage of it.

36 But I am not sure that at this point the "practical" man, scotched but not slain, may ask what all this talk about culture has to do with an Institution, the object of which is defined to be "to promote the prosperity of the manufactures and the industry of the country." He may suggest that what is wanted for this end is not culture, not even a purely scientific discipline, but simply a knowledge of applied science.

37 I often wish that this phrase, "applied science," had never been invented. For it suggests that there is a sort of scientific knowledge of direct practical use, which can be studied apart from another sort of scientific knowledge, which is of no practical utility and which is termed "pure science." But there is no more complete fallacy than this. What people call applied science is nothing but the application of pure science to particular classes of problems. It consists of deductions from those general principles, established by reasoning and observation, which constitute pure science. No one can safely make these deductions until he has a firm grasp of the principles; and he can obtain that grasp only by personal experience of the operations of observation and of reasoning on which they are founded.

38 Almost all the processes employed in the arts and manufactures fall within the range either of physics or of chemistry. In order to improve them, one must thoroughly understand them; and no one has a chance of really understanding them unless he has obtained that mastery of principles and that habit of dealing with facts, which is given by long-continued and well-directed purely scientific training in the physical and the chemical laboratory. So that there really is no question as to the necessity of purely scientific discipline, even if the work of the College were limited by the narrowest interpretation of its stated aims.

39 And as to the desirableness of a wider culture than that yielded by science alone, it is to be recollected that the improvement of manufacturing processes is only one of the conditions which contribute to the prosperity of industry. Industry is a means and not an end; and mankind work only to get something which they want. What that something is depends partly on their innate, and partly on their acquired, desires.

40 If the wealth resulting from prosperous industry is to be spent upon the gratification of unworthy desires, if the increasing perfection of manufacturing processes is to be accompanied by an increasing debasement of those who carry them on, I do not see the good of industry and prosperity.

41 Now it is perfectly true that men's views of what is desirable depend upon their characters and that the innate proclivities to which we give that name are not touched by any amount of instruction. But it does not follow that even mere intellectual education may not, to an indefinite extent, modify the practical manifestation of the characters of men in their actions, by supplying them with motives unknown to the ignorant. A pleasure-loving character will have pleasure of some sort; but, if you give him the choice, he may prefer pleasures which do not degrade him to those which do. And this choice is offered to every man who possesses in literary or artistic culture a never-failing source of pleasures, which are neither withered by age, nor staled by custom, nor embittered in the recollection by the pangs of self-reproach.

MATTHEW ARNOLD: LITERATURE AND SCIENCE

I I am going to ask whether the present movement for ousting letters from their old predominance in education and for transferring the predominance in education to the natural sciences—whether this brisk and flourishing movement ought to prevail and whether it is likely that in the end it really will prevail. An objection may be raised which I will anticipate. My own studies have been almost wholly in letters, and my visits to the field of the natural sciences have been slight and inadequate, although those sciences have always strongly moved my curiosity. A man of letters, it will perhaps be said, is not

competent to discuss the comparative merits of letters and natural science as means of education. To this objection I reply, first of all, that his incompetence, if he attempts the discussion but is really incompetent for it, will be abundantly visible; nobody will be taken in; he will have plenty of sharp observers and critics to save mankind from that danger. But the line I am going to follow is, as you will soon discover, so extremely simple, that perhaps it may be followed without failure even by one who for a more ambitious line of discussion would be quite incompetent.

2 Some of you may possibly remember a phrase of mine which has been the object of a good deal of comment; an observation to the effect that in our culture, the aim being *to know ourselves and the world*, we have, as the means to this end, *to know the best which has been thought and said in the world*. A man of science, who is also an excellent writer and the very prince of debaters, Professor Huxley, in a discourse at the opening of Sir Josiah Mason's college at Birmingham, laying hold of this phrase, expanded it by quoting some more words of mine, which are these: "The civilized world is to be regarded as now being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation, bound to a joint action and working to a common result; and whose members have for their proper outfit a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity, and of one another. Special local and temporary advantages being put out of account, that modern nation will in the intellectual and spiritual sphere make most progress which most thoroughly carries out this programme."

3 Now on my phrase, thus enlarged, Professor Huxley remarks that when I speak of the above-mentioned knowledge as enabling us to know ourselves and the world, I assert *literature* to contain the materials which suffice for thus making us know ourselves and the world. But it is not by any means clear, says he, that after having learnt all which ancient and modern literatures have to tell us, we have laid a sufficiently broad and deep foundation for the criticism of life, that knowledge of ourselves and the world, which constitutes culture. On the contrary, Professor Huxley declares that he finds himself "wholly unable to admit that either nations or individuals will really advance, if their outfit draws nothing from the stores of physical science. An army without weapons of precision, and with no particular base of operations, might more hopefully enter upon a campaign on the Rhine, than a man, devoid of a knowledge of what physical science has done in the last century, upon a criticism of life."

4 This shows how needful it is for those who are to discuss any matters together, to have a common understanding as to the sense of the terms they employ—how needful and how difficult. What Professor Huxley says, implies just the reproach which is so often brought against the study of *belles lettres*, as they are called: that the study is an elegant one, but slight and

ineffectual; a smattering of Greek and Latin and other ornamental things, of little use for any one whose object is to get at truth and to be a practical man. So, too, M. Renan talks of the "superficial humanism" of a school-course which treats us as if we were all going to be poets, writers, preachers, orators, and he opposes this humanism to positive science or the critical search after truth. And there is always a tendency in those who are remonstrating against the predominance of letters in education to understand by letters *belles lettres* and by *belles lettres* a superficial humanism, the opposite of science or true knowledge.

5 But when we talk of knowing Greek and Roman antiquity, for instance, which is the knowledge people have called the humanities, I for my part mean a knowledge which is something more than a superficial humanism, mainly decorative. "I call all teaching *scientific*," says Wolf, the critic of Homer, "which is systematically laid out and followed up to its original sources. For example: a knowledge of classical antiquity is scientific when the remains of classical antiquity are correctly studied in the original languages." There can be no doubt that Wolf is perfectly right; that all learning is scientific which is systematically laid out and followed up to its original sources and that a genuine humanism is scientific.

6 When I speak of knowing Greek and Roman antiquity, therefore, as a help to knowing ourselves and the world, I mean more than a knowledge of so much vocabulary, so much grammar, so many portions of authors in the Greek and Latin languages—I mean knowing the Greeks and Romans, and their life and genius, and what they were and did in the world; what we get from them and what is its value. That, at least, is the ideal; and when we talk of endeavouring to know Greek and Roman antiquity, as a help to knowing ourselves and the world, we mean endeavouring so to know them as to satisfy this ideal, however much we may still fall short of it.

7 The same also as to knowing our own and other modern nations, with the like aim of getting to understand ourselves and the world. To know the best that has been thought and said by the modern nations is to know, says Professor Huxley, "only what modern *literatures* have to tell us; it is the criticism of life contained in modern literature." And yet "the distinctive character of our times," he urges, "lies in the vast and constantly increasing part which is played by natural knowledge." And how, therefore, can a man, devoid of knowledge of what physical science has done in the last century, enter hopefully upon a criticism of modern life?

8 Let us, I say, be agreed about the meaning of the terms we are using. I talk of knowing the best which has been thought and uttered in the world; Professor Huxley says this means knowing *literature*. Literature is a large word; it may mean everything written with letters or printed in a book. Euclid's *Elements* and Newton's *Principia* are thus literature. All knowledge

that reaches us through books is literature. But by literature Professor Huxley means *belles lettres*. He means to make me say, that knowing the best which has been thought and said by the modern nations is knowing their *belles lettres* and no more. And this is no sufficient equipment, he argues, for a criticism of modern life. But as I do not mean, by knowing ancient Rome, knowing merely more or less of Latin *belles lettres* and taking no account of Rome's military and political and legal and administrative work in the world; and as, by knowing ancient Greece, I understand knowing her as the giver of Greek art and the guide to a free and right use of reason and to scientific method, and the founder of our mathematics and physics and astronomy and biology—I understand knowing her as all this and not merely knowing certain Greek poems and histories and treatises and speeches—so as to the knowledge of modern nations also. By knowing modern nations, I mean not merely knowing their *belles lettres*, but knowing also what has been done by such men as Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Darwin. "Our ancestors learned," says Professor Huxley, "that the earth is the centre of the visible universe and that man is the cynosure of things terrestrial; and more especially was it inculcated that the course of nature had no fixed order, but that it could be, and constantly was, altered." But for us now, continues Professor Huxley, "the notions of the beginning and the end of the world entertained by our forefathers are no longer credible. It is very certain that the earth is not the chief body in the material universe and that the world is not subordinated to man's use. It is even more certain that nature is the expression of a definite order, with which nothing interferes." "And yet," he cries, "the purely classical education advocated by the representatives of the humanists in our day gives no inkling of all this!"

9 In due place and time I will just touch upon that vexed question of classical education; but at present the question is as to what is meant by knowing the best which modern nations have thought and said. It is not knowing their *belles lettres* merely which is meant. To know Italian *belles lettres* is not to know Italy, and to know English *belles lettres* is not to know England. Into knowing Italy and England there comes a great deal more, Galileo and Newton amongst it. The reproach of being a superficial humanism, a tincture of *belles lettres*, may attach rightly enough to some other disciplines; but to the particular discipline recommended when I proposed knowing the best that has been thought and said in the world, it does not apply. In that best I certainly include what in modern times has been thought and said by the great observers and knowers of nature.

10 There is, therefore, really no question between Professor Huxley and me as to whether knowing the great results of the modern scientific study of nature is not required as a part of our culture, as well as knowing the products of literature and art. But to follow the processes by which those results

are reached, ought, say the friends of physical science, to be made the staple of education for the bulk of mankind. And here there does arise a question between those whom Professor Huxley calls with playful sarcasm "the Levites of culture," and those whom the poor humanist is sometimes apt to regard as its Nebuchadnezzars.

11 The great results of the scientific investigation of nature we are agreed upon knowing, but how much of our study are we bound to give to the processes by which those results are reached? The results have their visible bearing on human life. But all the processes, too, all the items of fact, by which those results are reached and established, are interesting. All knowledge is interesting to a wise man, and the knowledge of nature is interesting to all men. It is very interesting to know that from the albuminous white of the egg the chick in the egg gets the materials for its flesh, bones, blood, and feathers, while from the fatty yolk of the egg it gets the heat and energy which enable it at length to break its shell and begin the world. It is less interesting, perhaps, but still it is interesting, to know that when a taper burns, the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water. Moreover, it is quite true that the habit of dealing with facts, which is given by the study of nature, is, as the friends of physical science praise it for being, an excellent discipline. The appeal, in the study of nature, is constantly to observation and experiment; not only is it said that the thing is so, but we can be made to see that it is so. Not only does a man tell us that when a taper burns the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water, as a man may tell us, if he likes, that Charon is punting his ferry-boat on the river Styx, or that Victor Hugo is a sublime poet, or Mr. Gladstone the most admirable of statesmen; but we are made to see that the conversion into carbonic acid and water does actually happen. This reality of natural knowledge it is which makes the friends of physical science contrast it, as a knowledge of things, with the humanist's knowledge, which is, say they, a knowledge of words. And hence Professor Huxley is moved to lay it down that "for the purpose of attaining real culture, an exclusively scientific education is at least as effectual as an exclusively literary education." And a certain President of the Section for Mechanical Science in the British Association is, in Scripture phrase, "very bold," and declares that if a man, in his mental training, "has substituted literature and history for natural science, he has chosen the less useful alternative." But whether we go these lengths or not, we must admit that in natural science the habit gained of dealing with facts is a most valuable discipline and that everyone should have some experience of it.

12 More than this, however, is demanded by the reformers. It is proposed to make the training in natural science the main part of education, for the great majority of mankind at any rate. And here, I confess, I part company with the friends of physical science, with whom up to this point I have been

agreeing. In differing from them, however, I wish to proceed with the utmost caution and diffidence. The smallness of my own acquaintance with the disciplines of natural science is ever before my mind, and I am fearful of doing these disciplines an injustice. The ability and pugnacity of the partisans of natural science make them formidable persons to contradict. The tone of tentative inquiry, which befits a being of dim faculties and bounded knowledge, is the tone I would wish to take and not to depart from. At present it seems to me that those who are for giving to natural knowledge, as they call it, the chief place in the education of the majority of mankind, leave one important thing out of their account: the constitution of human nature. But I put this forward on the strength of some facts not at all recondite, very far from it; facts capable of being stated in the simplest possible fashion, and to which, if I so state them, the man of science will, I am sure, be willing to allow their due weight.

13 Deny the facts altogether, I think, he hardly can. He can hardly deny that when we set ourselves to enumerate the powers which go to the building up of human life, and say that they are the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, and the power of social life and manners—he can hardly deny that this scheme, though drawn in rough and plain lines enough, and not pretending to scientific exactness, does yet give a fairly true representation of the matter. Human nature is built up by these powers; we have the need for them all. When we have rightly met and adjusted the claims of them all, we shall then be in a fair way for getting soberness and righteousness with wisdom. This is evident enough, and the friends of physical science would admit it.

14 But perhaps they may not have sufficiently observed another thing: namely, that the several powers just mentioned are not isolated, but there is, in the generality of mankind, a perpetual tendency to relate them one to another in divers ways. With one such way of relating them I am particularly concerned now. Following our instinct for intellect and knowledge, we acquire pieces of knowledge; and presently, in the generality of men, there arises the desire to relate these pieces of knowledge to our sense for conduct, to our sense for beauty—and there is weariness and dissatisfaction if the desire is balked. Now in this desire lies, I think, the strength of that hold which letters have upon us.

15 All knowledge is, as I said just now, interesting; and even items of knowledge which from the nature of the case cannot well be related, but must stand isolated in our thoughts, have their interest. Even lists of exceptions have their interest. If we are studying Greek accents, it is interesting to know that *pais* and *pas*, and some other monosyllables of the same form of declension, do not take the circumflex upon the last syllable of the genitive plural, but vary, in this respect, from the common rule. If we are studying

physiology, it is interesting to know that the pulmonary artery carries dark blood and the pulmonary vein carries bright blood, departing in this respect from the common rule for the division of labour between the veins and the arteries. But every one knows how we seek naturally to combine the pieces of our knowledge together, to bring them under general rules, to relate them to principles; and how unsatisfactory and tiresome it would be to go on forever learning lists of exceptions or accumulating items of fact which must stand isolated.

16 Well, that same need of relating our knowledge, which operates here within the sphere of our knowledge itself, we shall find operating also outside that sphere. We experience, as we go on learning and knowing—the vast majority of us experience—the need of relating what we have learnt and known to the sense which we have in us for conduct, to the sense which we have in us for beauty.

17 A certain Greek prophetess of Mantinea in Arcadia, Diotima by name, once explained to the philosopher Socrates that love and impulse and bent of all kinds is, in fact, nothing else but the desire in men that good should forever be present to them. This desire for good, Diotima assured Socrates, is our fundamental desire, of which fundamental desire every impulse in us is only one particular form. And therefore this fundamental desire it is, I suppose—this desire in men that good should be forever present to them—which acts in us when we feel the impulse for relating our knowledge to our sense for conduct and to our sense for beauty. At any rate, with men in general the instinct exists. Such is human nature. And the instinct, it will be admitted, is innocent, and human nature is preserved by our following the lead of its innocent instincts. Therefore, in seeking to gratify this instinct in question, we are following the instinct of self-preservation in humanity.

18 But, no doubt, some kinds of knowledge cannot be made to directly serve the instinct in question, cannot be directly related to the sense of beauty, to the sense for conduct. These are instrument-knowledges; they lead on to other knowledges which can. A man who passes his life in instrument-knowledges is a specialist. They may be invaluable as instruments to do something beyond, for those who have the gift thus to employ them; and they may be disciplines in themselves wherein it is useful for everyone to have some schooling. But it is inconceivable that the generality of men should pass all their mental life with Greek accents or with formal logic. My friend Professor Sylvester, who is one of the first mathematicians in the world, holds transcendental doctrines as to the virtue of mathematics, but those doctrines are not for common men. In the very Senate House and heart of our English Cambridge I once ventured, though not without an apology for my profaneness, to hazard the opinion that for the majority of mankind a little of mathematics, even, goes a long way. Of course this is quite consistent

with their being of immense importance as an instrument to something else; but it is the few who have the aptitude for using them, not the bulk mankind.

19 The natural sciences do not, however, stand on the same footing with these instrument-knowledges. Experience shows us that the generality of men will find more interest in learning that, when a taper burns, the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water, or in learning the explanation of the phenomenon of dew, or in learning how the circulation of the blood is carried on, than they find in learning that the genitive plural of *pais* and *pas* does not take the circumflex on the termination. And one piece of natural knowledge is added to another, and others are added to that, and at last we come to propositions so interesting as Mr. Darwin's famous proposition that "our ancestor was a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in his habits." Or we come to propositions of such reach and magnitude as those which Professor Huxley delivers, when he says that the notions of our forefathers about the beginning and the end of the world were all wrong and that nature is the expression of a definite order with which nothing interferes.

20 Interesting indeed, these results of science are, important they are, and we should all of us be acquainted with them. But what I now wish you to mark is that we are still, when they are propounded to us and we receive them, we are still in the sphere of intellect and knowledge. And for the generality of men there will be found, I say, to arise, when they have duly taken in the proposition that their ancestor was "a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in his habits," there will be found to arise an invincible desire to relate this proposition to the sense in us for conduct and to the sense in us for beauty. But this the men of science will not do for us and will hardly even profess to do. They will give us other pieces of knowledge, other facts, about other animals and their ancestors, or about plants, or about stones, or about stars; and they may finally bring us to those great "general conceptions of the universe, which are forced upon us all," says Professor Huxley, "by the progress of physical science." But still it will be *knowledge* only which they give us; knowledge not put for us into relation with our sense for conduct, our sense for beauty, and touched with emotion by being so put; not thus put for us, and therefore, to the majority of mankind, after a certain while, unsatisfying, wearying.

21 Not to the born naturalist, I admit. But what do we mean by a born naturalist? We mean a man in whom the zeal for observing nature is so uncommonly strong and eminent that it marks him off from the bulk of mankind. Such a man will pass his life happily in collecting natural knowledge and reasoning upon it, and will ask for nothing, or hardly anything, more. I have heard it said that the sagacious and admirable naturalist whom we lost not very long ago, Mr. Darwin, once owned to a friend that for his part he did not

experience the necessity for two things which most men find so necessary to them—religion and poetry; science and the domestic affections, he thought, were enough. To a born naturalist, I can well understand that this should seem so. So absorbing is his occupation with nature, so strong his love for his occupation, that he goes on acquiring natural knowledge and reasoning upon it, and has little time or inclination for thinking about getting it related to the desire in man for conduct, the desire in man for beauty. He relates it to them for himself as he goes along, so far as he feels the need; and he draws from the domestic affections all the additional solace necessary. But then Darwins are extremely rare. Another great and admirable master of natural knowledge, Faraday, was a Sandemanian. That is to say, he related his knowledge to his instinct for conduct and to his instinct for beauty by the aid of that respectable Scottish sectary, Robert Sandeman. And so strong, in general, is the demand of religion and poetry to have their share in a man, to associate themselves with his knowing, and to relieve and rejoice it, that, probably, for one man amongst us with the disposition to do as Darwin did in this respect, there are at least fifty with the disposition to do as Faraday.

22 Education lays hold upon us, in fact, by satisfying this demand. Professor Huxley holds up to scorn mediaeval education with its neglect of the knowledge of nature, its poverty even of literary studies, its formal logic devoted to “showing how and why that which the Church said was true must be true.” But the great mediaeval Universities were not brought into being, we may be sure, by the zeal for giving a jejune and contemptible education. Kings have been their nursing fathers, and queens have been their nursing mothers, but not for this. The mediaeval Universities came into being because the supposed knowledge, delivered by Scripture and the Church, so deeply engaged men’s hearts, by so simply, easily, and powerfully relating itself to their desire for conduct, their desire for beauty. All other knowledge was dominated by this supposed knowledge and was subordinated to it, because of the surpassing strength of the hold which it gained upon the affections of men, by allying itself profoundly with their sense for conduct, their sense for beauty.

23 But now, says Professor Huxley, conceptions of the universe fatal to the notions held by our forefathers have been forced upon us by physical science. Grant to him that they are thus fatal, that the new conceptions must and will soon become current everywhere, and that every one will finally perceive them to be fatal to the beliefs of our forefathers. The need of humane letters, as they are truly called, because they serve the paramount desire in men that good should be forever present to them—the need of humane letters, to establish a relation between the new conceptions and our instinct for beauty, our instinct for conduct, is only the more visible. The Middle Age could do without humane letters, as it could do without the study of nature, because

its supposed knowledge was made to engage its emotions so powerfully. Grant that the supposed knowledge disappears, its power of being made to engage the emotions will of course disappear along with it—but the emotions themselves, and their claim to be engaged and satisfied, will remain. Now if we find by experience that humane letters have an undeniable power of engaging the emotions, the importance of humane letters in a man's training becomes not less, but greater, in proportion to the success of modern science in extirpating what it calls "mediaeval thinking."

24 Have humane letters, then, have poetry and eloquence, the power here attributed to them of engaging the emotions, and do they exercise it? And if they have it and exercise it, *how* do they exercise it, so as to exert an influence upon man's sense for conduct, his sense for beauty? Finally, even if they both can and do exert an influence upon the senses in question, how are they to relate to them the results—the modern results—of natural science? All these questions may be asked. First, have poetry and eloquence the power of calling out the emotions? The appeal is to experience. Experience shows that for the vast majority of men, for mankind in general, they have the power. Next, do they exercise it? They do. But then, *how* do they exercise it so as to affect man's sense for conduct, his sense for beauty? And this is perhaps a case for applying the Preacher's words: "Though a man labour to seek it out, yet he shall not find it; yea, farther, though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it." Why should it be one thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say, "Patience is a virtue," and quite another thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say with Homer, *ιλητόν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν*—"for an enduring heart have the destinies appointed to the children of men"? Why should it be one thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say with the philosopher Spinoza, *Felicitas in ea consistit quod homo suum esse conservare potest*—"Man's happiness consists in his being able to preserve his own essence," and quite another thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say with the Gospel, "What is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself, forfeit himself?" How does this difference of effect arise? I cannot tell, and I am not much concerned to know; the important thing is that it does arise and that we can profit by it. But how, finally, are poetry and eloquence to exercise the power of relating the modern results of natural science to man's instinct for conduct, his instinct for beauty? And here again I answer that I do not know *how* they will exercise it, but that they can and will exercise it I am sure. But I do not mean that modern philosophical poets and modern philosophical moralists are to come and relate for us, in express terms, the results of modern scientific research to our instinct for conduct, our instinct for beauty. But I mean that we shall find, as a matter of experience, if we know the best that has been thought and uttered in the world—we shall find that the art and poetry and

eloquence of men who lived, perhaps long ago, who had the most limited natural knowledge, who had the most erroneous conceptions about many important matters—we shall find that this art, and poetry, and eloquence, have in fact not only the power of refreshing and delighting us; they have also the power—such is the strength and worth, in essentials, of their authors' criticism of life—they have a fortifying, and elevating, and quickening, and suggestive power, capable of wonderfully helping us to relate the results of modern science to our need for conduct, our need for beauty. Homer's conceptions of the physical universe were, I imagine, grotesque; but really, under the shock of hearing from modern science that "the world is not subordinated to man's use and that man is not the cynosure of things terrestrial," I could, for my own part, desire no better comfort than Homer's line which I quoted just now, *τιλὴτὸν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν*—"for an enduring heart have the destinies appointed to the children of men"!

25 And the more that men's minds are cleared, the more that the results of science are frankly accepted, the more that poetry and eloquence come to be received and studied as what in truth they really are—the criticism of life by gifted men, alive and active with extraordinary power at an unusual number of points—so much the more will the value of humane letters, and of art also, which is an utterance having a like kind of power with theirs, be felt and acknowledged, and their place in education be secured.

26 Let us, therefore, all of us, avoid indeed as much as possible any invidious comparison between the merits of humane letters, as means of education, and the merits of the natural sciences. But when some President of a Section for Mechanical Science insists on making the comparison and tells us that "he who in his training has substituted literature and history for natural science has chosen the less useful alternative," let us make answer to him that the student of humane letters only, will, at least, know also the great conceptions brought in by modern physical science, for science, as Professor Huxley says, forces them upon us all. But the student of the natural sciences only, will, by our very hypothesis, know nothing of humane letters; not to mention that in setting himself to be perpetually accumulating natural knowledge, he sets himself to do what only specialists have in general the gift for doing genially. And so he will probably be unsatisfied, or at any rate incomplete, and even more incomplete than the student of humane letters only.

27 I once mentioned in a school-report how a young man in one of our English training colleges having to paraphrase the passage in *Macbeth* beginning,

Can'st thou not minister to a mind diseased?

turned this line into, "Can you not wait upon the lunatic?" And I remarked what a curious state of things it would be if every pupil of our national

schools knew, let us say, that the moon is two thousand one hundred and sixty miles in diameter, and thought at the same time that a good paraphrase for

Can'st thou not minister to a mind diseased?

was, "Can you not wait upon the lunatic?" If one is driven to choose, I think I would rather have a young person ignorant about the moon's diameter, but aware that "Can you not wait upon the lunatic?" is bad, than a young person whose education had been such as to manage things the other way.

28 Or to go higher than the pupils of our national schools. I have in my mind's eye a member of our British Parliament who comes to travel here in America, who afterwards relates his travels and who shows a really masterly knowledge of the geology of this great country and of its mining capabilities, but who ends by gravely suggesting that the United States should borrow a prince from our Royal Family, and should make him their king, and should create a House of Lords of great landed proprietors after the pattern of ours; and then America, he thinks, would have her future happily and perfectly secured. Surely, in this case, the President of the Section for Mechanical Science would himself hardly say that our member of Parliament, by concentrating himself upon geology and mineralogy and so on, and not attending to literature and history, had "chosen the more useful alternative."

29 If then there is to be separation and option between humane letters on the one hand and the natural sciences on the other, the great majority of mankind, all who have not exceptional over-powering aptitudes for the study of nature, would do well, I cannot but think, to choose to be educated in humane letters rather than in the natural sciences. Letters will call out their being at more points, will make them live more.

J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER: ON SCIENCE AND CULTURE

1 We live in an unusual world, marked by very great and irreversible changes that occur within the span of a man's life. We live in a time where our knowledge and understanding of the world of nature grows wider and deeper at an unparalleled rate; and where the problems of applying this knowledge to man's needs and hopes are new, and only a little illuminated by our past history.

2 Indeed it has always, in traditional societies, been the great function of culture to keep things rather stable, quiet, and unchanging. It has been the function of tradition to assimilate one epoch to another, one episode to an-

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other, even one year to another. It has been the function of culture to bring out meaning, by pointing to the constant or recurrent traits of human life, which in easier days one talked about as the eternal verities.

3 In the most primitive societies, if one believes the anthropologists, the principal function of ritual, religion, of culture is, in fact, almost to stop change. It is to provide for the social organism what life provides in such a magic way for living organisms, a kind of homeostasis, an ability to remain intact, to respond only very little to the obvious convulsions and alterations in the world around.

4 Today, culture and tradition have assumed a very different intellectual and social purpose. The principal function of the most vital and living traditions today is precisely to provide the instruments of rapid change. There are many things which go together to bring about this alteration in man's life; but probably the decisive one is science itself. I will use that word as broadly as I know, meaning the natural sciences, meaning the historical sciences, meaning all those matters on which men can converse objectively with each other. I shall not continually repeat the distinction between science as an effort to find out about the world and understand it, on the one hand, and science, in its applications in technology, as an effort to do something useful with the knowledge so acquired. But certain care is called for, because, if we call this the scientific age, we make more than one kind of oversimplification. When we talk about science today, we are likely to think of the biologist with his microscope or the physicist with his cyclotron; but almost certainly a great deal that is not now the subject of successful study will later come to be. I think we probably today have under cultivation only a small part of the terrain which will be natural for the sciences a century from now. I think of the enormously rapid growth in many parts of biology, and of the fact, ominous but not without hope, that man is a part of nature and very open to study.

5 The reason for this great change from a slowly moving, almost static world, to the world we live in, is the cumulative character, the firmness, the givenness of what has been learned about nature. It is true that it is transcended when one goes into other parts of experience. What is true on the scale of the inch and the centimeter may not be true on the scale of a billion light-years; it may not be true either on the scale of a one hundred billionth of a centimeter; but it stays true where it was proven. It is fixed. Thus everything that is found out is added to what was known before, enriches it, and does not have to be done over again. This essentially cumulative irreversible character of learning things is the hallmark of science.

6 This means that in man's history the sciences make changes which cannot be wished away and cannot be undone. Let me give two quite different

examples. There is much talk about getting rid of atomic bombs. I like that talk; but we must not fool ourselves. The world will not be the same, no matter what we do with atomic bombs, because the knowledge of how to make them cannot be exorcised. It is there; and all our arrangements for living in a new age must reflect its omnipresent virtual presence, and the fact that one cannot change that. A different example: we can never have again the delusions about the centrality and importance of our physical habitat, now that we know something of where the earth is in the solar system, and know that there are hundreds of billions of suns in our galaxy, and hundreds of billions of galaxies within reach of the great telescopes of the world. We can never again base the dignity of man's life on the special character in space and time of the place where he happens to live.

7 These are irreversible changes; so it is that the cumulative character gives a paradigm of something which is, in other respects, very much more subject to question: the idea of human progress. One cannot doubt that in the sciences the direction of growth is progress. This is true both of the knowledge of fact, the understanding of nature, and the knowledge of skill, of technology, of learning how to do things. When one applies this to the human situation, and complains that we make great progress in automation and computing and space research but no comparable moral progress, this involves a total misunderstanding of the difference between the two kinds of progress. I do not mean that moral progress is impossible; but it is not, in any sense, automatic. Moral regress, as we have seen in our day, is just as possible. Scientific regress is not compatible with the continued practice of science.

8 It is, of course, true, and we pride ourselves on it that it is true, that science is quite international, and is the same (with minor differences of emphasis) in France, Russia, the United States, Japan; but culture is not international; indeed I am one of those who hope that, in a certain sense, it never quite will be, that the influence of our past, of our history, which is for different reasons and different peoples quite different, will make itself felt and not be lost in total homogeneity.

9 I cannot subscribe to the view that science and culture are coextensive, that they are the same thing with different names; and I cannot subscribe to the view that science is something useful, but essentially unrelated to culture. I think that we live in a time which has few historical parallels, that there are practical problems of human institutions, their obsolescence and their inadequacy, problems of the mind and spirit which, if not more difficult than ever before, are different, and difficult. I shall be dealing with some traits of the sciences which contribute to the difficulty, and may here give a synopsis of what they are. They have to do with the question of why the scientific revolution happened when it did; with the characteristic growth of the sci-

ences; with their characteristic internal structure; with the relation of discovery in the sciences to the general ideas of man in matters which are not precisely related to the sciences; with freedom and necessity in the sciences, and the question of the creative and the open character of science, its infinity; and with what direction we might try to follow in bringing coherence and order to our cultural life, in doing what is proper for a group of intellectuals, of artists, of philosophers, teachers, scientists, statesmen to do to help refashion the sensibility and the institutions of this world, which need refashioning if we are at all to survive.

10 It is not a simple question to answer why the scientific revolution occurred when it did. It started, as all serious historians would agree, in the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance, and was very slow at first. No great culture has been free of curiosity and reflection, of contemplation and thought. "To know the cause of things" is something that serious men have always wanted, a quest that serious societies have sustained. No great culture has been free of inventive genius. If we think of the culture of Greece, and the following Hellenistic and Roman period, it is particularly puzzling that the scientific revolution did not occur then. The Greeks discovered something without which our contemporary world would not be what it is: standards of rigor, the idea of proof, the idea of logical necessity, the idea that one thing implies another. Without that, science is very nearly impossible, for unless there is a quasi-rigid structure of implication and necessity, then if something turns out not to be what one expected, one will have no way of finding out where the wrong point is; one has no way of correcting himself, of finding the error. But this is something that the Greeks had very early in their history. They were curious and inventive; they did not experiment in the scale of modern days, but they did many experiments; they had as we have only recently learned to appreciate a very high degree of technical and technological sophistication. They could make very subtle and complicated instruments; and they did, though they did not write much about it. Possibly the Greeks did not make the scientific revolution because of some flaw in communication, but by what we know of it, it was very good. They were a small society; they talked freely with each other, and the record of these talks is even today an inspiring thing to read. It may be that there were not quite enough people involved.

11 I believe that none of these may be the right answer. Indeed in a matter of history, we cannot assign a unique cause, precisely because the event itself is unique; you cannot test, to see if you have it right. I think that the best guess is that it took something that was not present in Chinese civilization, that was wholly absent in Indian civilization, and absent also from Greco-

Roman civilization. It needed an idea of progress, not limited to better understanding, for this idea the Greeks had. It took an idea of progress which has more to do with the human condition, which is well expressed by the second half of the famous Christian dichotomy—faith and works; the notion that the betterment of man's condition, his civility, had meaning; that we all had a responsibility to it, a duty to it, and to man. I think that it was when this basic idea of man's condition, which supplements the other worldly aspects of religion, when this was fortified and fructified between the Thirteenth and the Fifteenth Centuries by the rediscovery of the ancient world, of the Greek scientists, philosophers, and mathematicians, that there was the beginning of the scientific age. It was very slow at first and marked by individual giants, by Kepler, by Newton. By the Seventeenth Century there were enough men involved in improving human knowledge, or useful knowledge—phrases varied—so that new societies were formed, the Royal Society, the Academy, where people could talk to each other and bring to the prosecution of science that indispensable element of working together, of communication, of correcting the other fellow's errors and admiring the other fellow's skills, thus creating the first truly scientific communities.

12 Just before Newton, Hobbes wrote:

The Sciences are small power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man, nor one at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in good measure have attained it.

Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory, are Power.

13 It was the next century that put science in a context of fraternity, even of universal brotherhood. It encouraged a political view which was egalitarian, permissive, pluralistic, liberal—everything for which the word *democratic* is today justly and rightly used. The result is that the scientific world of today is also a very large one: an open world in which, of course, not everybody does everything, in which not everybody is a scientist or a prime minister, but in which we fight very hard against arbitrary exclusion of people from any works, any deliberation, any discourse, any responsibility for which their talents and their interests suit them. The result is that we face our new problems, created by the practical consequences of technology, and the great intellectual consequences of science itself, in the context of a world of two or three billion people, an enormous society for which human institutions were not really ever designed. We are facing a world in which growth is characteristic, not just of the sciences themselves, but of the economy, of

technology, of all human institutions; no one can open a daily paper without seeing the consequences.

14 One can measure scientific growth in a number of ways, but it is important not to mistake things. The excellence of the individual scientist does not change much with time. His knowledge and his power does, but not the high quality that makes him great. We do not look to anyone to be better than Kepler or Newton, any more than we look to anyone to be better than Sophocles, or to any doctrine to be better than the gospel according to St. Matthew or the Bhagavad-Gita. Yet one can measure things, and it has been done. One can measure how many people work on scientific questions: one can count them. One can notice how much is published.

15 These two criteria show a doubling of scientific knowledge in every ten years. Casimir calculated that if the *Physical Review* continued to grow as rapidly as it has between 1945 and 1960, it would weigh more than the earth during the next century. In fifteen years, the volume of chemical abstracts has quadrupled; in biology the changes are faster still. Today, if you talk about scientists and mean by that people who have devoted their lives to the acquisition and application of new knowledge, then 93 per cent of us are still alive. This enormously rapid growth, sustained over two centuries, means, of course, that no man learned as a boy more than a small fraction in his own field of what he ought to know as a grown man.

16 There are several points to keep in mind. One would naturally think that if we are publishing so much, it must be trivial. I think that this is not true: any scientific community with sane people would protect itself against that, because we have to read what is published. The argument not to permit the accumulation of trivial, unimportant things which are not really new, which do not add to what was known before, is overwhelming.

17 The second point is that one may say that every new thing renders what was known before uninteresting, that one can forget as rapidly as one learns. That is in part true: whenever there is a great new understanding, a great new element of order, a new theory, or a new law of nature, then much that before had to be remembered in isolation becomes connected and becomes, to some extent, implied and simplified. Yet one cannot forget what went before, because usually the meaning of what is discovered in 1963 is to be found in terms of things that were discovered in 1955 or 1950 or earlier. These are the things in terms of which the new discoveries are made, the origins of the instruments that give us the new discoveries, the origins of the concepts in terms of which they are discovered, the origins of the language and the tradition.

18 A third point: if one looks to the future of something that doubles every ten years, there must come a time when it stops, just as *The Physical Review*

cannot weigh more than the earth. We know that this will saturate, and probably at a level very much higher than today; there will come a time when the rate of growth of science is not such that in every ten years the amount that is known is doubled; but the amount that is added to knowledge then will be far greater than it is today. For this rate of growth suggests that, just as the professional must, if he is to remain professional, live a life of continuous study, so we may find a clue here also to the more general behavior of the intellectual with regard to his own affairs, and those of his colleagues in somewhat different fields. In the most practical way a man will have some choice: he may choose to continue to learn about his own field in an intimate, detailed, knowledgeable way, so that he knows what there is to know about it; but then the field will not be very wide. His knowledge will be highly partial of science as a whole, but very intimate and very complete of his own field. He may, on the other hand, choose to know generally, superficially a good deal about what goes on in science, but without competence, without mastery, without intimacy, without depth. The reason for emphasizing this is that the cultural values of the life of science almost all lie in the intimate view: here are the new techniques, the hard lessons, the real choices, the great disappointments, the great discoveries.

19 All sciences grow out of common sense, out of curiosity, observation, reflection. One starts by refining one's observation and one's words, and by exploring and pushing things a little further than they occur in ordinary life. In this novelty there are surprises; one revises the way one thinks about things to accommodate the surprises; then the old way of thinking gets to be so cumbersome and inappropriate that one realizes that there is a big change called for, and one recreates one's way of thinking about this part of nature.

20 Through all this one learns to say what one has done, what one has found, and to be patient and wait for others to see if they find the same things, and to reduce, to the point where it really makes no further difference, the normally overpoweringly vital element of ambiguity in human speech. We live by being ambiguous, by not settling things because they do not have to be settled, by suggesting more than one thing because their copresence in the mind may be a source of beauty. But in talking about science one may be as ambiguous as ever until we come to the heart of it. Then we tell a fellow just what we did in terms that are intelligible to him, because he has been schooled to understand them, and we tell him just what we found and just how we did it. If he does not understand us, we go to visit him and help him; and if he still does not understand us, we go back home and do it over again. This is the way in which the firmness and solidity of science is established.

21 How then does it go? In studying the different parts of nature, one explores with different instruments, explores different objects, and one gets a branching of what at one time had been common talk, common sense. Each branch develops new instruments, ideas, words suitable for describing that part of the world of nature. This tree-like structure, all growing from the common trunk of man's common primordial experience, has branches no longer associated with the same question, nor the same words and techniques. The unity of science, apart from the fact that it all has a common origin in man's ordinary life, is not a unity of deriving one part from another, nor of finding an identity between one part and another, between let us say, genetics and topology, to take two impossible examples, where there is indeed some connection.

22 The unity consists of two things: first and ever more strikingly, an absence of inconsistency. Thus we may talk of life in terms of purpose and adaptation and function, but we have found in living things no tricks played upon the laws of physics and chemistry. We have found and I expect will find a total consistency, and between the different subjects, even as remote as genetics and topology, an occasional sharp mutual relevance. They throw light on each other; they have something to do with each other; often the greatest things in the sciences occur when two different discoveries made in different worlds turn out to have so much in common that they are examples of a still greater discovery.

23 The image is not that of an ordered array of facts in which every one follows somehow from a more fundamental one. It is rather that of a living thing: a tree doing something that trees do not normally do, occasionally having the branches grow together and part again in a great network.

24 The knowledge that is being increased in this extraordinary way is inherently and inevitably very specialized. It is different for the physicist, the astronomer, the microbiologist, the mathematician. There are connections: there is often important mutual relevance. Even in physics, where we fight very hard to keep the different parts of our subject from flying apart (so that one fellow will know one thing and another fellow will know another, and they do not talk to each other), we do not entirely succeed, in spite of a passion for unity which is very strong. The traditions of science are specialized traditions; this is their strength. Their strength is that they use the words, the machinery, the concepts, the theories, that fit their subjects; they are not encumbered by having to try to fit other sorts of things. It is the specialized traditions which give the enormous thrust and power to the scientific experience. This also makes for the problem of teaching and explaining the sciences. When we get to some very powerful general result which illuminates a large part of the world of nature, it is by virtue of its being general in the logical sense, of encompassing an enormous amount of

experience in its concepts and in its terminology, it is most highly specialized, almost unintelligible except to the men who have worked in the field. The great laws of physics today, which do not describe everything (or we would be out of business) but which underlie almost everything that is ever noticed in ordinary human experience about the physical world, cannot be formulated in terms that can reasonably be defined without a long period of careful schooling. This is comparably true in other subjects.

25 One has then in these specializations the professional communities in the various sciences. They are very intimate, work closely together, know each other throughout the world. They are always excited, sometimes jealous but usually pleased, when one member of the community makes a discovery. I think, for instance, that what we now call psychology will one day perhaps be many sciences, that there will be many different specialized communities practising them, who will talk with one another, each in its own profession and in its own way.

26 These specialized communities, or guilds, are a very moving experience for those who participate. There have been many temptations to see analogues in them for other human activities. One that we hear much discussed is this: "If physicists can work together in countries with different cultures, in countries with different politics, in countries of different religions, even in countries which are politically obviously hostile, is not this a way to bring the world together?" It is certainly one of the few things we know how to do; we certainly should do it; we do. Yet it is, of course, a very fragile and limited way to bring the world together. I shall turn shortly to a generalization of this that is called for by our times.

27 The specializing habits of the sciences have, to some extent, because of the tricks of universities, been carried over to other work, to philosophy and to the arts. There is technical philosophy, which is philosophy as a craft, philosophy for other philosophers, and there is art for the artists and the critics. To my mind, whatever virtues the works have for sharpening professional tools, they are profound misreadings, even profound subversions of the true functions of philosophy and art, which are to address themselves to the general common human problem, not to everybody, but to anybody, not to specialists.

28 As a final word on this account for structure and growth, it is clear that one is faced here with formidable problems of communication, of telling people about things, and of teaching. There is no escaping this. There is an immense job, never done, never ending, of teaching on all levels in every sense of the word.

29 It has often been held that the great discoveries in science, coming into the lives of men, affect their attitudes toward their place in life, their views,

their philosophy. There is surely some truth in this. Examples that are usually given include Newton and Darwin. Newton is not a very good example, for when we look at it closely we are struck by the fact that in the sense of the Enlightenment, the sense of a coupling of faith in scientific progress and man's reason with a belief in political progress and the secularization of human life, Newton himself was in no way a Newtonian. His successors were.

30 If discoveries in science are to have an honest effect on human thought and on culture, they have to be understandable. That is likely to be true only in the early period of a science, when it is talking about things which are not too remote from ordinary experience. Some of the great discoveries of this century go under the name of *relativity* and *uncertainty*, and when we hear these words we may think, "This is the way I felt this morning: I was relatively confused and quite uncertain": this is not at all a notion of what technical points are involved in these great discoveries, or what lessons.

31 I think that the reason why Darwin's hypothesis had such an impact was, in part, because it was a very simple thing in terms of ordinary life. We cannot talk about the contemporary discoveries in biology in such language, or by referring only to things that we have all experienced.

32 Thus I think that the great effects of the sciences in stimulating and in enriching philosophical life and cultural interests have been necessarily confined to the rather early times in the development of a science. There is another requirement. Discoveries will really only resonate and change the thinking of men when they feed some hope, some need that pre-exists in the society. I think that the real sources of the Enlightenment, fed a little by the scientific events of the time, came in the re-discovery of the classics, of classic political theory, perhaps most of all the Stoics. The hunger of the Eighteenth Century to believe in the power of reason, to wish to throw off authority, to wish to secularize, to take an optimistic view of man's condition, seized on Newton and his discoveries as an illustration of something which was already deeply believed in quite apart from the law of gravity and the laws of motion. The hunger with which the Nineteenth Century seized on Darwin had very much to do with the increasing awareness of history and change, with the great desire to naturalize man, to put him into the world of nature, which pre-existed long before Darwin and which made him welcome. I have seen an example in this century where the great Danish physicist Niels Bohr found in the quantum theory when it was developed thirty years ago this remarkable trait: it is consistent with describing an atomic system, only much less completely than we can describe large-scale objects. We have a certain choice as to which traits of the atomic system we wish to study and measure and which to let go; but we have not the

option of doing them all. This situation, which we all recognize, sustained in Bohr his long-held view of the human condition: that there are mutually exclusive ways of using our words, our minds, our souls, any one of which is open to us, but which cannot be combined; ways as different, for instance, as preparing to act and entering into an introspective search for the reasons for action. This discovery has not, I think, penetrated into general cultural life. I wish it had; it is a good example of something that would be relevant, if only it could be understood.

33 Einstein once said that a physical theory was not determined by the facts of nature, but was a free invention of the human mind. This raises the question of how necessary is the content of science, how much is it something that we are free not to find, how much is it something that could be otherwise? This is, of course, relevant to the question of how we may use the words *objectivity* and *truth*. Do we, when we find something, *invent* it or *discover* it?

34 The fact is, of course, just what one would guess. We are, of course, free in our tradition and in our practice, and to a much more limited extent individually to decide where to look at nature, and how to look at nature, what questions to put, with what instruments and with what purpose. But we are not the least bit free to settle what we find. Man must certainly be free to invent the idea of mass, as Newton did and as it has been refined and redefined; but having done so, we have not been free to find that the mass of the light quantum or the neutrino is anything but zero. We are free in the start of things. We are free as to how to go about it; but then the rock of what the world is, shapes this freedom with a necessary answer. That is why ontological interpretations of the word *objective* have seemed useless, and why we use the word to describe the clarity, the lack of ambiguity, the effectiveness of the way we can tell each other about what we have found or not found.

35 Thus in the sciences, total statements like those that involve the word *all*, with no qualifications, are hardly ever likely to occur. In every investigation or extension of knowledge we are involved in an action; in every action we are involved in a choice; and in every choice we are involved in a loss, the loss of that we did not do. We find this in the simplest situations. We find this in perception, where the possibility of perceiving is co-extensive with our ignoring many things that are going on. We find it in speech where the possibility of understandable speech lies in paying no attention to a great deal that is in the air, among the sound waves, in the general scene. Meaning is always attained at the cost of leaving things out. We find it in the idea of complementarity here in a sharp form as a recognition that the

attempt to make one sort of observation on an atomic system forecloses others. We have freedom of choice, but we have no escape from the fact that doing some things must leave out others.

36 In practical terms, this means, of course, that our knowledge is finite and never all-encompassing. There is always much that we miss, much that we cannot be aware of because the very act of learning, of ordering, of finding unity and meaning, the very power to talk about things means that we leave out a great deal.

37 Ask the question: "Would another civilization based on life on another planet very similar to ours in its ability to sustain life have the same physics?" One has no idea whether they would have the same physics or not. We might be talking about quite different questions. This makes ours an open world without end. I had a Sanskritist friend in California who used to say that, if science were any good, it should be much easier to be an educated man now than it was a generation ago. That is because he thought the world was closed.

38 The things that make us choose one set of questions, one branch of enquiry rather than another, are embodied in scientific traditions. In developed sciences each man has only a limited sense of freedom to shape or alter them; but they are not themselves wholly determined by the findings of science. They are largely of an aesthetic character. The words that we use, simplicity, elegance, beauty, indicate that what we grope for is not only more knowledge, but knowledge that has order and harmony in it, and continuity with the past. Like all poor fellows, we want to find something new, but not something too new. It is when we fail in that, that the great discoveries follow. I should as a warning repeat that the fact that something is simple, elegant, and beautiful does not mean that it is true. That is another matter.

39 All these themes—the origin of science, its pattern of growth, its branching reticular structure, its increasing alienation from the common understanding of man, its freedom, the character of its objectivity and its openness—are relevant to the relations of science and culture. I believe that they can be and should be far more robust, intimate, and fruitful than they are today.

40 I am not here thinking of the popular subject of mass culture. In touching on that, it seems to me one must be critical but one must, above all, be human; one must not be a snob; one must be rather tolerant and almost loving. It is a new problem; one must not expect it to be solved with the methods of Periclean Athens. In the problems of mass culture and, above all, of the mass media, it is not primarily a question of the absence of excellence. The modest worker, in the industrial world, has within reach probably better

music and more good music, more good art, more good writing than his predecessors have ever had. It seems rather that the good things are lost in such a stream of poor things, that the noise level is so high, that some of the conditions for appreciating excellence are not present. One does not eat well unless one is hungry; there is a certain frugality to the best cooking; and something of this sort is wrong with the mass media. But that is not now my problem.

41 Rather, I think loosely of what we may call the intellectual community: artists, philosophers, statesmen, teachers, men of most professions, prophets, scientists. This is an open group, with no sharp lines separating those that think themselves of it. It is a growing faction of all people. In it is vested the great duty for enlarging, preserving, and transmitting our knowledge and skills, and indeed our understanding of the interrelations, priorities, commitments, injunctions, that help men deal with their joys, temptations and sorrows, their finiteness, their beauty. Some of this has to do, as the sciences so largely do, with propositional truth, with propositions which say "If you do thus and so you will see this and that"; these are objective and can be checked and cross-checked until, though it is always wise from time to time to doubt, there are ways to put an end to the doubt. This is how it is with the sciences.

42 In this community there are other statements which emphasize a theme rather than state a fact. They may be statements of connectedness or relatedness or importance, or they may be in one way or another statements of commitment. For them the word *certitude*, which is a natural norm to apply in the sciences, is not very sensible; depth, firmness, universality, perhaps more; but certitude, which applies really to verification, is not the great criterion in most of the work of a philosopher, a painter, a poet, or a playwright. For these are not, in the sense I have outlined, objective. Yet for any true community, for any society worthy of the name, they must have an element of community, of being common, of being public, of being relevant and meaningful to man, not necessarily to everybody, but surely not just to specialists.

43 I have been much concerned that, in this world of change and scientific growth, we have so largely lost the ability to talk with one another, to increase and enrich our common culture and understanding. And so it is that the public sector of our lives, what we hold and have in common, has suffered, as have the illumination of the arts, the deepening of justice and virtue, and the ennobling power of our common discourse. We are less men for this. Never in man's history have the specialized traditions more flourished than today. We have our private beauties. But in those high undertakings where man derives strength and insight from public excellence, we have

been impoverished. We hunger for nobility, the rare words and acts that harmonize simplicity with truth. In this default I see some connection with the great unresolved public problems—survival, liberty, fraternity.

44 In this default I see the responsibility that the intellectual community has to history and to our fellows: a responsibility which is a necessary condition for remaking human institutions as they need to be remade today that there may be peace, that they may embody more fully those ethical commitments without which we cannot properly live as men.

45 This may mean for the intellectual community a very much greater effort than in the past. The community will grow; but I think that also the quality and the excellence of what we do must grow. I think, in fact, that with the growing wealth of the world, and the possibility that it will not all be used to make new committees, there may indeed be true leisure, and that a high commitment on this leisure is that we reknit the discourse and the understanding between the members of the intellectual community.

46 In this I think we have, all of us, to preserve our competence in our own professions, to preserve what we know intimately, to preserve our mastery. This is, in fact, our only anchor in honesty. We need also to be open to other and complementary lives, not intimidated by them and not contemptuous of them, as so many are today of the natural and mathematical sciences. As a start, we must learn again, without contempt and with great patience, to talk to one another; and we must hear.

III / ARRANGEMENT OF MATERIAL

Once the student has discovered, through the process of invention, or discovery of material, something to say on a given subject, he is faced with the problem of selecting and marshalling the available material in order to effect his purpose. Since usually he cannot, and should not, use all the material available to him, he has to select what is most pertinent and cogent. This selected material must then be put in some order, for without order the force of even the best material, though chosen with the keenest of discretion, will be weakened. The classical rhetoricians dealt with the problems of selection and arrangement under that part of rhetoric that the Greeks called *taxis* and the Latins called *dispositio*; we will use the term *arrangement*.

If we are to profit from the classical precepts about *dispositio*, we must come to a clear understanding of what *dispositio* meant for the ancients. For many people, disposition means simply the study of the several parts of a discourse: (1) the *exordium* or introduction; (2) the *narratio* or statement of facts or circumstances that need to be known about the subject of our discourse; (3) the *confirmatio* or proof of our case; (4) the *refutatio* or discrediting of the opposing views; (5) the *peroratio* or conclusion. Classical rhetoric did deal with those parts and in that sequence; but it was concerned with something more. It was concerned also with the strategic planning of the whole composition.

Quintilian hints at the more important concern of disposition when he says that it is to oratory what generalship is to war. It would be folly to hold a general to a fixed, predetermined disposition of his forces. He must be left free to distribute his troops in the order and proportion best suited

to cope with the situation in which he may find himself at any particular moment. So he will mass some of his troops at one point on the battle line, thin them out at other points, keep other troops in reserve, and perhaps concentrate his crack troops at the most crucial area. Guided by judgment and imagination, the general stands ready to make whatever adjustments in strategy eventualities may dictate.

Cicero made explicit the twofold aspect of disposition when he said that the orator "ought first to find out what he should say; next to dispose and arrange his matter, not only in a certain order, but according to the weight of the matter and the judgment of the speaker" (*De Oratore*, I, 31). The person bent on persuasion will be guided in his decisions about the appropriate disposition of his resources by a number of considerations:

1. The kind of discourse in which he is engaged—whether deliberative, judicial, or ceremonial.
2. The nature of his subject—a consideration which in turn will determine the quantity and quality of the matter available to him.
3. His own *ēthos*—his personality, his moral and philosophical bias, his limitations and capabilities.
4. The nature of his audience—their age, their social, political, economic, and educational level, their mood at the moment.

What all of this suggests is that disposition is what Aristotle meant by *technē*: an art by which one adapts means to an end.

What the classical rhetoricians seemed to be striving for under *dispositio* was that "subsuming form" which Ronald S. Crane spoke of when he described his own experience in composing an essay. The passage deserves to be quoted in full:

The process of literary composition has often been rather crudely divided, especially by authors of textbooks on English writing, into two stages: a stage of preparatory reading, thinking, planning, incubation, and a stage of putting the materials thus assembled into words; and what happens in the second stage has usually been represented as a direct transference to paper of the ideas or imaginations which the writer has come into possession of in the first stage—as a simple matter, that is, of giving to an acquired content an appropriate verbal form. I have myself taught this easy doctrine to students; but never, I believe, since I began to meditate on the disturbing fact that all too frequently, when I have attempted to write an essay after a long and interested concentration on the subject, and the noting of many exciting ideas and patterns of key terms, and the construction of what looked like a perfect outline, I have found myself unable to compose the first sentence, or even to know what

it ought to be about, or, having forced myself to go on, to bring the thing to a satisfying conclusion, whereas, on other occasions, with no more complete preparation, no greater desire to write, and no better state of nerves, I have discovered, to my delight, that nearly everything fell speedily into place, the right words came (or at any rate words which I couldn't change later on), and the sentences and paragraphs followed one another with scarcely a hitch and in an order that still seemed to me the inevitable one when I came to reread the essay in cold blood.

I have had so many more experiences of the first sort than of the second that I have tried to isolate the reason for the difference. And the best way I can explain it is to say that what I failed to attain in the former cases and did somehow, at one moment or another of the total process, in the latter was a kind of intuitive glimpse of a possible subsuming form for the materials, or at least those I attached most importance to, which I had assembled in my mind and notes—a form sufficiently coherent and intelligible, as a form in my mind, so that I could know at once what I must or could do, and what I need not or ought not to do, in what order and with what emphasis in the various parts, in developing my arguments and putting them into words. I have never been able to write anything which seemed to me, in retrospect, to possess any quality of organic wholeness, however uninteresting or thin, except in response to such a synthesizing idea. It is more than a general intention, more than a “theme,” and more than an outline in the usual sense of that word; it is, as I have said, a shaping or directing cause, involving at the same time, and in some sort of correlation, the particular conceptual form my subject is to take in my essay, the particular mode of argument or of rhetoric I am to use in discussing it, and the particular end my discussion is to serve: I must know, in some fashion, at least these three things before I can proceed with any ease or success.

From Ronald S. Crane, *The Language of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry*, The Alexander Lectures, 1951-52. Reprinted by permission of the University of Toronto Press.

If Professor Crane's analysis of the writing process is accurate, composition would seem to exact from the writer a number of preliminary, as well as current, judgments and decisions. In Book VII, Chapter X of his *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian pointed out that disposition was concerned with judgments and decisions about questions like these:

1. When is an introduction necessary and when can it be omitted or abbreviated?
2. When should we make our statement of facts continuous and when should we break it up and insert it *passim*?
3. Under what circumstances can we omit the statement of facts altogether?

4. When should we begin by dealing with the arguments advanced by our opponents and when should we begin by proposing our own arguments?
5. When is it advisable to present our strongest arguments first and when is it best to begin with our weakest arguments and work up to our strongest?
6. Which of our arguments will our audience readily accept and which of them must they be induced to accept?
7. Should we attempt to refute our opponents' arguments as a whole or deal with them in detail?
8. How much ethical appeal must we exert in order to conciliate the audience?
9. Should we reserve our emotional appeals for the conclusion or distribute them throughout the discourse?
10. What evidence or documents should we make use of and where in the discourse will this kind of argument be most effective?

These and many other questions will confront the student when he sits down to plan his composition and will call forth all his powers of discretion to decide. The student's native good sense and intuition will be indispensable when he has to make crucial decisions about appropriate strategies, but rhetoric can lay down certain general principles to guide him at this stage. It remains for the student, however, to discern where and how these principles are applicable to a particular situation.

It must be emphasized at this point that the disposition of one's material is not an indifferent matter. The importance of proper arrangement is pointed up by the incident in which the two great Athenian orators, Aeschines and Demosthenes, were engaged in an oratorical contest concerning Ctesiphon's proposal that Demosthenes be rewarded for his services with a golden crown. On that occasion, Aeschines proposed to the judges that Demosthenes be constrained to observe the same order of argument as he had followed in presenting his. But Demosthenes was quick to see that Aeschines' order would be disadvantageous to his own presentation. Accordingly, he pleaded with the judges to allow him to follow whatever order he saw fit. Demosthenes perceived that the arrangement of his arguments could be the decisive factor in the contest. The best of arguments could be weakened or nullified if inserted in the wrong place or if presented with inappropriate emphasis or proportion.

The Parts of a Discourse

Most rhetoricians recognized five parts for the usual argumentative discourse: *exordium*, *narratio*, *confirmatio* or *probatio*, *refutatio*, and *peroratio*. These terms were explained briefly in the introductory chapter of this book. In this text we will deal with four parts, using these labels: introduction, statement of fact, confirmation, and conclusion. This kind of partitioning of the discourse differs from the outlining system that the student may have learned. The outline is usually organized topically; this system of partitioning is determined by the *functions* of the various parts of a discourse.

We will use these four parts as the organizing principle of this chapter, but in accordance with the classical view of *dispositio*, we will be constantly pointing out the adjustments that one may have to make in sequence, proportion, emphasis, and coloring to fit a particular subject, occasion, purpose, or audience.

Introduction

Etymologically, *introduction* means "a leading into." The Greek and Latin rhetorical terms for this part carried the same suggestion. The Greek term *proemium* meant "before the song"; the Latin term *exordium* meant "beginning a web"—by mounting a woof or laying a warp. The basic function then of the introduction is to lead the audience into the discourse. Instinctively we feel that an abrupt, immediate entry into the body of our discourse would unsettle and confuse the audience. We sense that in most instances an audience must, as it were, be "eased into" the subject of the discourse.

Generally this preparation of the audience has a twofold aspect: (1) it informs the audience of the end or object of our discourse, and (2) it disposes the audience to be receptive to what we say. Conceivably, an audience could be well enough informed about a subject and sufficiently predisposed in our favor that the introduction could be made very brief or might be dispensed with entirely. Even under those conditions, however, most of us would feel that some kind of prelude was necessary—if nothing else a joke, an apt quotation, an entertaining anecdote, an ingratiating gesture toward the audience. Aristotle remarked that the introduction to some speeches was comparable to the preliminary flourishes that flute players made before their performance—an overture in which the musicians merely displayed what they could play best in order to gain the favor and attention of the audience for

the main performance. Without this kind of "ornamental" introduction, the discourse would have an abrupt, negligent, unfinished air about it. So it is a rare discourse that plunges immediately into "the heart of the matter."

INFORMING THE AUDIENCE

Granting then that most compositions require some kind of prelude, let us consider the first of the two main functions of the introduction—informing the audience of the end or subject of our discourse. In doing this, we are seeking to orient the audience, but, even more importantly, we are seeking to convince the audience that the subject of our discourse is worthy of their attention. We can render our subject attractive to the audience by showing that it is important, or momentous, or relevant to the interests of the audience, or startling, or pleasant. The nature of the subject that we have to deal with will determine, of course, which of these topics we will exploit. A subject that is trifling cannot, by any exercise of ingenuity, be made to appear important or momentous. But a trifling subject could be made to appear agreeable or exotic enough to warrant our attention.

Richard Whately in his *Elements of Rhetoric* invented a number of terms to designate the various kinds of introduction designed to arouse interest in our subject:

1. *Introduction Inquisitive*—to show that our subject is important, curious, or interesting.

In this example of the "introduction inquisitive," Arnold J. Toynbee asks a provocative question and then seeks to sustain the interest of the reader by suggesting the importance to the modern world of the answer to that question:

Does history repeat itself? In our Western world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this question used to be debated as an academic exercise. The spell of well-being which our civilization was enjoying at the time had dazzled our grandfathers into the quaint pharisaical notion that they were "not as other men are"; they had come to believe that our Western society was exempt from the possibility of falling into those mistakes and mishaps that have been the ruin of certain other civilizations whose history, from beginning to end, is an open book. To us, in our generation, the old question has rather suddenly taken on a new and very practical significance. We have awakened to the truth (how, one wonders, could we ever have been blind to it?) that Western man and his works are no more invulnerable than the now extinct civilizations of the Aztecs and the Incas, the Sumerians and the Hittites. So to-day, with some anxiety, we are searching the scriptures of the past to find out whether they contain a lesson that we can decipher. Does history give us

any information about our own prospects? And, if it does, what is the burden of it? Does it spell out for us an inexorable doom, which we can merely await with folded hands—resigning ourselves, as best we may, to a fate that we cannot avert or even modify by our own efforts? Or does it inform us, not of certainties, but of probabilities, or bare possibilities, in our own future? The practical difference is vast, for, on this second alternative, so far from being stunned into passivity, we should be roused to action. On this second alternative, the lesson of history would not be like an astrologer's horoscope; it would be like a navigator's chart, which affords the seafarer who has the intelligence to use it a much greater hope of avoiding shipwreck than when he was sailing blind, because it gives him the means, if he has the skill and courage to use them, of steering a course between charted rocks and reefs.

From *Civilization on Trial*, 1948. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.

2. *Introduction Paradoxical*—to show that although the points we are trying to establish seem improbable, they must after all be admitted.

Here, from the pen of the British drama critic Kenneth Tynan, is an example of the "introduction paradoxical":

The most characteristic English play on the subject of physical love is Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*. It is characteristic because it has no love scenes. The English, as their drama represents them, are a nation endlessly communicative about love without ever enjoying it. Full-blooded physical relationships engaged in with mutual delight are theatrically tabu. Thwarted love is preferred, the kind Mr. Coward wrote about in *Brief Encounter*, where two married people (married, of course, to two other people) form a sad and meagre attachment without being able to follow it through. At the end of a play on some quite different subject—religion, perhaps, or politics—it is customary for the hero to say, as he does in *Robert's Wife*: "I was deeply in love with a fine woman," and for the wife to reply: "My dear, dear husband"; but there should be no hint elsewhere in the text that they have as much as brushed lips.

From *Curtains*. Copyright © 1961 by Kenneth Tynan. Reprinted by permission of Atheneum Publishers and Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd.

3. *Introduction Corrective*—to show that our subject has been neglected, misunderstood, or misrepresented.

In the first paragraph of the following "introduction corrective," George Orwell states that there is general agreement about the problem but that

there is widespread misunderstanding about the cause and the significance of the problem; then in the second paragraph Orwell suggests the "corrective" line that his essay will take:

Most people who bother with the matter at all would admit that the English language is in a bad way, but it is generally assumed that we cannot by conscious action do anything about it. Our civilization is decadent and our language—so the argument runs—must inevitably share in the general collapse. It follows that any struggle against the abuse of language is a sentimental archaism, like preferring candles to electric light or hansom cabs to aeroplanes. Underneath this lies the half-conscious belief that language is a natural growth and not an instrument which we shape for our own purposes.

Now, it is clear that the decline of a language must ultimately have political and economic causes: it is not due simply to the bad influence of this or that individual writer. But an effect can become a cause, reinforcing the original cause and producing the same effect in an intensified form, and so on indefinitely. A man may take to drink because he feels himself to be a failure, and then fail all the more completely because he drinks. It is rather the same thing that is happening to the English language. It becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts. The point is that the process is reversible. Modern English, especially written English, is full of bad habits which spread by imitation and which can be avoided if one is willing to take the necessary trouble. If one gets rid of these habits one can think more clearly, and to think clearly is a necessary first step toward political regeneration: so that the fight against bad English is not frivolous and is not the exclusive concern of professional writers. I will come back to this presently, and I hope that by that time the meaning of what I have said here will have become clearer. Meanwhile, here are five specimens of the English language as it is now habitually written.

From "Politics and the English Language," *Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays*, 1950. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. and Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd.

4. *Introduction Preparatory*—to explain an unusual mode of developing our subject; or to forestall some misconception of our purpose; or to apologize for some deficiencies.

Here, in the first paragraph of Rachel Carson's *The Sea Around Us*, is an example of the "introduction preparatory," an introduction in which Miss Carson explains how she will proceed, lacking eye-witness accounts of the event, in tracing the history of the beginning of the ocean:

Beginnings are apt to be shadowy, and so it is with the beginnings of that great mother of life, the sea. Many people have debated how and when the earth got its ocean, and it is not surprising that their explanations do not always agree. For the plain and inescapable truth is that no one was there to see, and in the absence of eye-witness accounts there is bound to be a certain amount of disagreement. So if I tell here the story of how the young planet Earth acquired an ocean, it must be a story pieced together from many sources and containing many whole chapters the details of which we can only imagine. The story is founded on the testimony of the earth's most ancient rocks, which were young when the earth was young; on other evidence written on the face of the earth's satellite, the moon; and on hints contained in the history of the sun and the whole universe of star-filled space. For although no man was there to witness this cosmic birth, the stars and the moon and the rocks were there, and, indeed, had much to do with the fact that there is an ocean.

From *The Sea Around Us*, 1951. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.

5. *Introduction Narrative*—to rouse interest in our subject by adopting the anecdotal lead-in.

The anecdotal opening is one of the oldest and most effective gambits for seizing the attention of the reader. Here, from an article in *The Nation* about the mysterious murder of eight-year-old Melvin Dean Nimer's mother and father, is an example of the "introduction narrative":

A light flashed on the central switchboard of the New York Telephone Company office in Forest Avenue, West Brighton, S. I., at precisely 2:04 A.M., September 2, 1958. Mrs. Catherine B. Thompson, one of the operators on duty, plugged in on the line. She heard the sound of heavy breathing. "Hello," she said, "hello." There was no answer, just that heavy, breathing sound. Mrs. Thompson turned to another operator, Mrs. Florence Parkin, and asked her to trace the call. Mrs. Parkin quickly found that it was coming from a house at 242 Vanderbilt Avenue. Then she cut in on the line, holding it open, while Mrs. Thompson notified police that something appeared to be wrong.

Even as Mrs. Thompson was speaking to the desk sergeant at the St. George police station, Mrs. Parkin heard the labored breathing on the line turn into a voice. A woman gasped: "I've been stabbed."

The operator immediately cut the police in on the conversation, and both she and the desk officer heard the woman repeat: "I've been stabbed. I've been attacked with a knife." A second later, the voice added: "My husband has been stabbed, too."

Then there was silence. It lasted only a second. Then a new voice, a little boy's voice, came on the wire.

"My mother is bleeding," the voice said.

Mrs. Thompson told the boy police already were on the way.

"I'll wait for the police outside," he said.

"No," she told him, "you better stay with your mother."

Such was the beginning of a drama that was to shock the nation.

From Fred J. Cook and Gene Gleason, "He Never Had a Chance," *A View of The Nation: An Anthology, 1955-1959*, ed. H. M. Christman, pp. 152-3. Reprinted by permission of THE NATION, 333 Sixth Avenue, New York.

These are the common ways in which authors rouse interest in their subject at the same time that they are informing their readers of the object of their discourse. Obviously, there will be times when we do not have to rouse interest in the subject. The subject may be sufficiently interesting in itself (did Dr. Kinsey have to generate interest in his report about the sexual behavior of men and women?). Or the particular circumstances may make the subject interesting (did Winston Churchill have to fan interest in his subject when he got up in the House of Commons to deliver his "Blood, Toil, Tears, and Sweat" speech?). Or a subject will have its own interest for a particular kind of audience (did the speaker at a convention of geneticists have to whip up an interest in his report on DNA, the element that may hold the key to the creation of human life in a test tube?). Considerations of this sort will determine whether the speaker or writer will have to spend any time in his introduction rousing interest in his subject.

INGRATIATING ONESELF WITH THE AUDIENCE

Even when we do not have to rouse interest in our subject, we may have to spend some time in the introduction establishing our credit with the audience. This function of the introduction, which the Latin rhetoricians called *insinuatō*, is closely tied up with the *ethical appeal* that a discourse must exert. Sometimes an author has to convince an audience that he is qualified to speak on some subject. At other times, he must counteract prejudices or misconceptions either about himself or about the subject of his discourse. Or he must rouse hostility toward those whose point of view he is going to oppose in his discourse.

As the term *insinuation* suggests, the author must, in establishing his authority or counteracting prejudices, proceed with the utmost subtlety. To blatantly lay out his intellectual and moral qualifications—"to flaunt his clippings," as it were—could impress his audience as mere boasting and thereby nullify the intended effect of his recital. Good sense and good taste

must guide the writer in presenting his credentials. An audience will usually accept a man's display of his qualifying credentials if he recites the facts with due restraint and a becoming humility. The man who says, "I have spent fifteen years studying the problems of juvenile delinquency in such cities as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles," will do more to establish his qualifications than the man who says, "My thoroughgoing studies of the problems of juvenile delinquency in many parts of the country have completely discredited the half-baked notions of those who have investigated the problems with more zeal than wisdom." The man who jingles his Phi Beta Kappa key usually stirs up more resentment than confidence.

In the following example, we observe C. P. Snow modestly presenting his qualifications to write about "the two cultures," the sciences and the humanities.

It is about three years since I made a sketch in print of a problem which had been on my mind for some time. It was a problem I could not avoid just because of the circumstances of my life. The only credentials I had to ruminate on the subject at all came through those circumstances, through nothing more than a set of chances. Anyone with similar experience would have seen much the same things and I think made very much the same comments about them. It just happened to be an unusual experience. By training I was a scientist; by vocation I was a writer. That was all. It was a piece of luck, if you like, that arose through coming from a poor home.

But my personal history isn't the point now. All that I need say is that I came to Cambridge and did a bit of research here at a time of major scientific activity. I was privileged to have a ringside view of one of the most wonderful creative periods in all physics. And it happened through the flukes of war—including meeting W. L. Bragg in the buffet on Kettering station on a very cold morning in 1939, which had a determining influence on my practical life—that I was able, and indeed morally forced, to keep that ringside view ever since. So for thirty years I have had to be in touch with scientists not only out of curiosity, but as a part of a working existence. During the same thirty years I was trying to shape the books I wanted to write, which in due course took me among writers.

From *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, 1959. Reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press.

The man who has to minimize prejudices against him must be equally discreet, but he can usually be more open-handed than the man who has to establish his qualifications. No one resents the man who openly strives to clear himself of charges and misconceptions. An audience's natural sense of fair play stands ready to hear "the other side of the story."

In seeking to remove prejudices, the speaker or writer has a number of courses open to him. He can

1. deny the charges that have created the prejudices against him.
2. admit the charges but deny their alleged magnitude.
3. cite a compensating virtue or action.
4. attribute the discrediting action to an honest mistake on his part or to an accident or to an inescapable compulsion.
5. cite others who were guilty of the same thing but were not so charged.
6. substitute a different motive or cause for the one alleged.
7. inveigh against calumny and malicious insinuation in general.
8. cite the testimony of those who take a different view of the matter.

Here is a short example of a man seeking to remove a prejudice against him. Because of his sympathetic writings about the American colonists, Edmund Burke, the great British Parliamentarian, was suspected of pro-American tendencies and of grounding his sympathies not so much on abstract principles as on considerations of expediency. Note how he meets these charges:

I am charged with being an American. If warm affection towards those over whom I claim any share of authority be a crime, I am guilty of this charge. But I do assure you (and they who know me publicly and privately will bear witness to me) that if ever one man lived more zealous than another for the supremacy of Parliament and the rights of this imperial crown, it was myself. Many others indeed might be more knowing in the extent or the foundation of these rights. I do not pretend to be an antiquary, a lawyer, or qualified for the chair of professor in metaphysics. I never ventured to put your solid interests upon speculative grounds. My having constantly declined to do so has been attributed to my incapacity for such disquisitions; and I am inclined to believe it is partly the cause. I never shall be ashamed to confess that where I am ignorant I am diffident. I am indeed not very solicitous to clear myself of this imputed incapacity, because men even less conversant than I am in this kind of subtleties and placed in stations to which I ought not to aspire, have, by the mere force of civil discretion, often conducted the affairs of great nations with distinguished felicity and glory.

From A Letter to John Farr and John Harris, Esqurs., Sheriffs of the City of Bristol, on the Affairs of America, 1777.

Arousing hostility against one's opponent is usually more effective in the conclusion than in the introduction, for it is easier to discredit a man's *ethos* after one has demolished his arguments. But sometimes it is more expedient

to stir up animosity in the introduction. If circumstances make it difficult or impossible to clear oneself of prejudices or suspicion, one might be able to gain a hearing by showing that one's opponent is a fool or a knave. And this is best done in the introduction. We saw how Socrates early in the *Apology* sought to raise suspicions about Meletus's integrity. Socrates thereby "softened up" the audience for his subsequent refutation of Meletus's charges.

In these opening paragraphs of *The Rights of Man* (1791-92), Thomas Paine is seeking to prejudice the audience against Edmund Burke, the man whose political and social views Paine is going to attack in the main body of his book:

Among the incivilities by which nations or individuals provoke and irritate each other, Mr. Burke's pamphlet on the French Revolution [Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790)] is an extraordinary instance. Neither the people of France nor the National Assembly were troubling themselves about the affairs of England or the English Parliament; and that Mr. Burke should commence an unprovoked attack upon them, both in Parliament and in public, is a conduct that cannot be pardoned on the score of manners, nor justified on that of policy.

There is scarcely an epithet of abuse to be found in the English language with which Mr. Burke has not loaded the French nation and the National Assembly. Everything which rancor, prejudice, ignorance, or knowledge could suggest is poured forth in the copious fury of near four hundred pages. In the strain and on the plan Mr. Burke was writing, he might have written on to as many thousands. When the tongue or the pen is let loose in a frenzy of passion, it is the man, and not the subject, that becomes exhausted.

Hitherto Mr. Burke has been mistaken and disappointed in the opinions he had formed of the affairs of France, but such is the ingenuity of his hope, or the malignancy of his despair, that it furnishes him with new pretenses to go on. There was a time when it was impossible to make Mr. Burke believe there would be any revolution in France. His opinion then was that the French had neither spirit to undertake it nor fortitude to support it; and now that there is one, he seeks an escape by condemning it.

What we have been saying about the content and strategy of the introduction adds up to this: the introduction seeks to render the audience *attentive, benevolent*—that is, well-disposed toward the writer and his cause, and *docile*—that is, ready to be instructed or persuaded. In order to determine what must be done in the introduction to effect these ends, we must consider (1) what we have to say, (2) before whom, (3) under what circumstances, (4) what the prepossessions of the audience are likely to be, (5) how much time or space has been allotted to us. An honest confrontation of those considerations will tell us, not only what we must do in the introduction

but how long it has to be. If we see that there is no need to render our audience attentive, benevolent, and docile, our introduction can be very brief—a few ingratiating flourishes and a brief statement of the thesis. But if the occasion demands that the audience be “conditioned,” then our introduction may have to be more elaborate.

One caution needs to be stressed here: introductions tend to be disproportionately long. At some time or other, the student has probably heard the classic advice, “Throw away the first page of your rough draft and begin your final draft at the top of page two.” Obviously we cannot follow this advice in any mechanical fashion, but the principle here is fundamentally sound. Our first draft is often encumbered with excess fat. One of the reasons why a long “warming up” is so common is that there is a natural inertia to be overcome before we can get under way. Often it is the student with little to say on an assigned topic who produces the top-heavy introduction. He has 800 words to write. If he can spend 400 of these words on preliminaries, he can put off that formidable moment when he has to get down to the subject...and then there are only 400 words to go! If the discipline of the topics can fill up the “dry wells,” perhaps we can prevent this tendency to pad the introduction.

Allotted wordage is becoming more and more a major consideration in the determination of the length of introductions. Since space is at such a premium in modern newspapers and magazines, editors are insisting on strict observance of specified word limits. It may be that the nature of our subject or of our audience calls for a fairly elaborate introduction, but we have been asked to develop our thesis in 1200 words. So we shall have to ignore the exigency and get into the body of our discourse as soon as possible. One's writing can profit from the discipline of observing word-limits: nothing serves better to trim the fat from one's prose. Anyone who has been required to write book reviews in 300 to 350 words soon learns many salutary lessons about economy of means.

No mention has been made so far of the kind of opening that immediately captures the reader's interest. In books on the technique of fiction or the feature story, this kind of opening is often called “the hook.” A provocative question, a startling hyperbole, an intriguing paradox—these are some of the devices we are advised to use in order to buttonhole our reader. Norman Cousins uses the provocative question effectively in the opening paragraphs of his article “Don't Resign from the Human Race”:

Have you ever wondered what you would say if you were suddenly called upon to defend the human race?

Suppose you were invited to participate in a great debate or, better still, a mock court trial called for the purpose of deciding whether the human species had justified its right to survive—whether, on the basis

of its virtues and weaknesses, it was actually entitled to the gift of life. Suppose your job was that of attorney for the defense. How would you go about collecting your evidence? What witnesses would you call? What arguments would you use?

From *Saturday Review*, August 7, 1948. Reprinted by permission of the SATURDAY REVIEW, 25 West 45th Street, New York.

There are a number of reasons why such an opening is an attention-getter. First, although the initial question is a *rhetorical question*—a type that does not require a direct and immediate answer from the audience or reader—it does challenge the audience, make them more alert. Another reason for the effectiveness of this particular question is that it is both an unusual question—imagine suggesting that the human race has to justify its right to existence!—and an important one—it may concern our very existence. So the elements of surprise and importance are contributing to the effectiveness of the gambit. The second paragraph further challenges us by posing a hypothetical situation: suppose you were called upon to be the defense attorney for the human race. The final three questions suggest some of the problems that would face us in that capacity. So these opening paragraphs both alert us and disconcert us. Challenged by the importance of the question asked and perhaps somewhat chagrined that we do not have a ready answer for this important question, we are now “set up” to listen to this man’s answer.

The student must exercise good taste and judgment when he searches for the opening calculated to arrest attention. The overtly and excessively clever opening can repel readers rather than engage them. (The *New Yorker*, in one of its regular filler features, has a label for such brashly clever openings—Letters We Never Finished Reading.) As usual, the most reliable guide in regard to attractive openings is the nature and temper of the audience.

The closing lines of the introduction should be so managed that they lead easily and naturally into the next division of the discourse. The problem of transition is basically one of coherence. We want the parts of our discourse to “hang together,” and while we would like the sutures to be as unobtrusive as possible, we nevertheless want our readers to be aware that they are passing over into another division of the discourse. Aristotle himself, that great master of exposition, is not at all hesitant about marking his transitions explicitly. For instance, at the end of Chapter 1 in Book I of the *Rhetoric* he says, “Let us now try to give some account of the systematic principles of rhetoric itself—of the right method and means of succeeding in the object set before us. We must make as it were a fresh start, and before going further define what rhetoric is.” Throughout the *Rhetoric*—in fact, throughout most of his treatises—Aristotle carefully plants these transitional markers—often at the end of a chapter, sometimes at the beginning of a new

chapter, occasionally at divisions of an especially long and involved exposition. Sometimes, just the logical development of our thought allows us to glide into the next division without our having to use “pointers.” No rule-of-thumb can be laid down to tell us when it is best to mark our transitions explicitly and when we can rely on the logic of our thought development to carry the reader over into the next division. In this respect—as we have seen so often in the discussion of rhetorical strategies—the particular situation will dictate its own exigencies.

One final point about introductions. The things we strive to do in the introduction—to render the audience attentive, benevolent, and docile—have sometimes to be done at various points in the discourse, especially in long discourses. As some of the rhetoricians observed, it is sometimes more necessary to make a play for the attention of the audience at a later stage in the discourse than it is in the introduction. In fact, we can usually rely on a certain natural attentiveness in our audience at the beginning of our discourse, which may flag as we continue. In that case, we may have to pull our audience up again. Likewise, when we are about to launch forth into a particularly delicate argument, we may have to make another play for the good will of our audience.

Statement of Fact

We have used the term *statement of fact* to designate the second division of a discourse for want of a better term to translate the Latin *narratio*. *Narration* has taken on meanings for us that it did not have for the Romans. *Statement of fact* has its own ambiguities for us, but the term suggests more accurately than does *narration* what it is that we do in this part of expository and argumentative prose.

Statement of fact figured principally in forensic oratory. In this division of a forensic speech, the advocate set forth the essential facts of the case under consideration. “On the night of March 15,” we can imagine him saying, “Gaius Maximus was murdered in a back alley off the Forum. It has been alleged that my client, who was seen in the Forum that evening and who was known to be a political enemy of the deceased, was the murderer. Suspicion about my client has not been dispelled by the revelation that at the time of the murder my client was seen. . . .” If the prosecuting lawyer had previously set forth these facts, the defending lawyer might use this part in his speech to add pertinent facts or to correct details in the prosecution’s statement. In a court trial, what often initiates this part of the trial is the reading of the formal indictment against the defendant—in other words, the defining

of the issue in the case. For example, here was the indictment read by Attorney General A. T. Stewart on the second day of the "Monkey Trial" in July 1925—a trial that became a *cause célèbre* partly because of the conflict that developed in the courtroom between William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow:

That John Thomas Scopes, heretofore on the 24th of April, 1925, in the county aforesaid, then and there, unlawfully did wilfully teach in the public schools of Rhea County, Tennessee, which said public schools are supported in part and in whole by the public school fund of the state, a certain theory and theories that deny the story of the divine creation of man as taught in the Bible, and did teach instead thereof that man has descended from a lower order of animals, he, the said John Thomas Scopes, being at the time, and prior thereto, a teacher in the public schools of Rhea County, Tennessee, aforesaid, against the peace and dignity of the State.

From the official transcript of the trial *State of Tennessee vs. John Thomas Scopes*, Nos. 5231 and 5232, in the Circuit Court of Rhea County, Tennessee, p. 123.

Anyone familiar with the trial or with *Inherit the Wind*, the play based on the trial, knows that the argument frequently drifted far from the charge specified in that indictment. But despite all the pyrotechnic oratory about the larger issues involved in this case, the jury did eventually return a verdict of "guilty as charged."

Since the province of forensic discourse is the past, there is usually a set of facts or details to be recited for the benefit of the judge and jury. Ordinarily these "facts" have to be stated before they can be proved or refuted, and so *narratio* became a regular part of the oratory of the courtroom. Deliberative oratory, on the other hand, deals with the future, and consequently there are, strictly speaking, no "facts" to be recited. Because deliberative oratory argues about things that must be done, rather than things that have been done, *narratio* was regarded as an unnecessary, certainly as a dispensable, part of this kind of speech.

But the deliberative orator—and the ceremonial orator too—often felt the need to recite past events as a basis for his recommendations about the future. As a result, *narratio* began to figure in deliberative and ceremonial oratory as well as in forensic. Whether or not statement of fact is a necessary part of deliberative or ceremonial discourse is debatable; but the fact of the matter is that most discourses, of whatever kind, *do* devote a section—the one immediately following the introduction—to a statement of fact. Recognizing that a *statement of fact* can often be dispensed with, let us go on to consider what is done and in what manner in this part of a discourse.

The statement of fact is fundamentally *expository*. In this section we are informing our readers of the circumstances that need to be known about our subject. If the readers are sufficiently informed about the subject under consideration, we can dispense with this part altogether. But most of the time, even well-informed readers will appreciate, even if they do not require, some recital of the circumstances, the details, the state of the question.

It is customary for authors of scholarly articles to summarize briefly the history of the idea they are going to discuss in their article. Here is an example of that kind of statement of fact from an article entitled "Charles Lamb's Contribution to the Theory of Dramatic Illusion." The final sentence of the author's introduction provides a transition to the statement of fact: "Before discussing Lamb's view, which was the product of numerous visits to the playhouse, it would be well to keep in mind the broad outlines of the main theories advanced before the Romantic period." The article continues:

Neo-classical theory was committed, or thought it was committed, to advocating the dramatic unities of time, place, and action because it insisted upon the necessity of literal delusion. As might be expected, the late seventeenth century emphasized the rational aspect of the unities: it is unreasonable, the argument ran, to think that a spectator is able to pretend that the events of two days can be crowded into a few hours, or to demand that the audience, having transported itself to Asia, should be required to leap to Africa a few moments later. To make such demands is unfair, and to think that an audience can comply with them is, this view maintains, unreasonable. But in the eighteenth century a reply was evolved which gained increasing acceptance with audiences and with literary critics. Reasonable or not, this counterargument said, the mind can transport itself as easily to Africa from Asia as it can journey to Asia in the first place. The problem is not one of "reason" or "reasonableness," but of what, in fact (not in theory), the imagination is capable of doing. Dr. Johnson is somewhat in this second tradition, but he goes further than merely saying that the mind can hop about from place to place and condense time and space at its will. He insists that the playwright should not encumber himself with the unities (which at best might prevent a man from being a bad playwright, but could never make him a good one), but he denied that the spectator is literally deluded (by imagination or by reason) into believing he is watching a reality and not a play. Such is Johnson's broad theoretical generalization. We should perhaps keep in mind his practice—his reluctance, for example, to read *King Lear*, because Cordelia's death caused him such pain.

From Sylvan Barnet, "Charles Lamb's Contribution to the Theory of Dramatic Illusion," *PMLA*, LXIX (Dec. 1954), 1150-59. Reprinted by permission of the Modern Language Association of America.

Because of the audience for which this article was written—mainly teachers of English on the university level—this summary of previous doctrines can be more abbreviated than it could be if the article were directed to a lay audience. This summary does not so much *inform* the audience as *remind* it.

As in this example from a scholarly article, we often will have occasion to present a summary of what others have thought or said on the theme we are going to develop in our composition. Closely allied to this kind of summary of relevant views advanced by others is the summary of views that we are going to support or refute in our essay. In the following example, Norman Podhoretz summarizes the main theses from Hannah Arendt's book *Eichmann in Jerusalem* that he is going to take issue with in his article. The final sentence of Mr. Podhoretz's introduction, which provides a transition to this statement of fact, read, "The point to begin with, then, is Miss Arendt's thesis, and the problem to settle is whether it justifies the distortions of perspective it creates and the cavalier treatment of evidence it impels." Then—

According to Miss Arendt, the Nazis, in order to carry out their genocidal plan against the Jews, needed Jewish cooperation and in fact received it "to a truly extraordinary degree." This cooperation took the form of "administrative and police work," and it was extended by "the highly assimilated Jewish communities of Central and Western Europe" no less abundantly than by "the Yiddish-speaking masses of the East." In Amsterdam as in Warsaw, in Berlin as in Budapest, Miss Arendt writes,

Jewish officials could be trusted to compile the lists of persons and of their property, to secure money from the deportees to defray the expenses of their deportation and extermination, to keep track of vacated apartments, to supply police forces to help seize Jews and get them on trains, until, as a last gesture, they handed over the assets of the Jewish community in good order for final confiscation.

All this has long been known. What is new is Miss Arendt's assertion that if the Jews (or rather, their leaders) had not cooperated in this fashion, "there would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of victims would hardly have been between four and a half to six million people."

So much for the Jews. As for the Nazis, carrying out the policy of genocide required neither that they be monsters nor pathological Jew-haters. On the contrary: since the murder of Jews was dictated by the law of the state, and since selfless loyalty to the law was regarded by the Germans under Hitler as the highest of virtues, it even called for a certain idealism to do what Eichmann and his cohorts did. Miss Arendt in this connection quotes the famous remark attributed to Himmler: "To have stuck it out and, apart from exceptions caused by human weakness, to have remained decent, that is what has made us hard." Eichmann,

then, was telling the truth when he denied having been an anti-Semite: he did his duty to the best of his ability, and he would have performed with equal zeal even if he had loved the Jews. Thus, also, the Israeli prosecutor Gideon Hausner was absurdly off the point in portraying Eichmann as a brute and a sadist and a fiend: Eichmann was in actual fact a banal personality, a nonentity whose evil deeds flowed not from anything in his own character, but rather from his position in the Nazi system.

This system is, of course, known as totalitarianism, and it is totalitarianism that brings the two halves of Miss Arendt's thesis together. Long ago, David Rousset, Bruno Bettelheim, and Miss Arendt herself taught us that securing the complicity of the victim is one of the distinguishing ambitions of totalitarian states, and her tale of Jewish complicity here is offered (at least on the surface) as yet another illustration of this point. Long ago, too, she and her colleagues taught us that totalitarian states aim at the destruction of common-sense reality and the creation of a new reality moulded to the lineaments of the official ideology, and her conception of Eichmann as an ordinary man whose conscience was made to function "the other way around" is similarly set forth in illustration of the more general point. Obviously, though, this ordinary man could not have been turned into so great and devoted a perpetrator of evil if the system had not been so tightly closed—if, that is to say, there had been voices to protest or gestures of resistance. Such voices as existed, however, were in Miss Arendt's judgment pathetically small and thin, and such gestures of resistance as were displayed she finds relatively insignificant. Not only did "good society everywhere" accept the Final Solution with "zeal and eagerness," but the Jews themselves acquiesced and even cooperated—as we have seen—"to a truly extraordinary degree." Here, then, is the finishing touch to Miss Arendt's reading of the Final Solution, and the explanation she gives for dwelling on Jewish complicity: this chapter of the story, she says, "offers the most striking insight into the totality of the moral collapse the Nazis caused in respectable European society—not only in Germany but in almost all countries, not only among the persecutors but also among the victims."

From Norman Podhoretz, "Hannah Arendt on Eichmann: A Study in the Perversity of Brilliance," *Commentary*, XXXVI (Sept. 1963), 201-8. Copyright 1963 by the American Jewish Committee and reprinted by their permission.

The passage just quoted may strike the student as being an inordinately long statement of fact. But it is not really long when viewed in relation to the entire article, which covers eight double-column pages in the magazine. We quoted a fairly long passage to show what proportion a statement of fact might take in an extended discourse. In a shorter article, of course, the statement of fact, if one was needed, would have to be considerably condensed. As always, the importance and complexity of the subject matter and the depth

of treatment we choose to give it will also dictate the proper length of the statement of fact. If Mr. Podhoretz had been writing a mere review of Miss Arendt's book he could not have given as much space as he does here to the *narratio*.

Quintilian advises that the instruction of the audience in the statement of fact be *lucid*, *brief*, and *plausible*. These three qualities are, of course, relative to the speech situation. An exposition that is lucid and plausible for one audience might not be either for another. Therefore, as in our discussion of the strategies of the introduction, we can lay down no hard-and-fast rules about the management of the statement of fact. We must adapt our means to the *ad hoc* situation. All we can do here is point to some of the ways that might be used to achieve the qualities that Quintilian mentions, and trust to the student to choose those ways which will best fit the situation in which he finds himself.

Lucidity is largely a matter of style, a matter of so selecting and arranging words that we easily communicate our meaning to our audience. We will delay our discussion of this means of securing lucidity until the next chapter, on style. Lucidity, of course, should characterize all parts of the discourse. Here we will mention only those means of securing lucidity peculiar to the statement of fact. We will be clear if, first of all, we develop our exposition sufficiently to set forth all the facts that need to be known. A severe abridgement of the exposition could result in obscurity. On the other hand, an excessive elaboration could so clutter up the exposition that the main points are obscured. An *orderly* presentation of the facts will also aid lucidity. Sometimes *chronological order* will be the organizing principle of our exposition—first this happened, then this, then this, etc. At other times we will employ an order that moves *from the general to the particular* or *from the more familiar to the less familiar*.

Another aid to lucidity is the device that the Greeks called *enargeia* and that we may translate as *palpability* or *vividness*. *Enargeia* will be especially useful when our statement of fact lends itself more to a narrative treatment than to an expository treatment—as, for instance, in a recital of past events. Here if we can paint a word-picture of the scene instead of merely telling what happened we can produce that vividness—not to mention the emotional impact—which will etch the “facts” in the imaginations of our readers. One can imagine a prosecuting lawyer describing Raskolnikov's crime in words like these:

He pulled the axe quite out, swung it with both arms, scarcely conscious of himself, and almost without effort, almost mechanically, brought the blunt side down on her head. . . . The old woman was as always bare-headed. Her thin, light hair, streaked with grey, thickly smeared with grease, was plaited in a rat's tail and fastened by a broken horn comb

which stood out on the nape of her neck. As she was so short, the blow fell on the very top of her skull. She cried out, but very faintly, and suddenly sank all of a heap on the floor, raising her hands to her head.

From Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, Part I, Chapter 7, translated by Constance Garnett.

In Dostoyevsky's novel, this vivid narrative is not part of a prosecuting lawyer's representation in a courtroom, but such a description could be, and often has been, the manner in which a lawyer manages the statement of fact in a case. There is no doubt about the clarity and effectiveness of such a presentation. And while *enargeia* can be employed in other parts of a discourse, it most often finds its opportunity in the statement of fact.

Before we leave the subject of lucidity, we should make the point that clarity of statement does not always serve our purpose. There may be occasions when it is expedient for us deliberately to obfuscate the exposition. If the facts tell against us, it might be best at this point to omit the statement of fact altogether or to render our exposition ambiguous. It might be that a frank, lucid recital of the facts would so alienate our audience that they would become indisposed to listen to our proofs later on. The particular situation will dictate when it is prudent to adopt the strategy of omission or obfuscation.

Brevity of statement, as we remarked in our comments on the passage quoted from Norman Podhoretz's article, will also be determined by the particular situation. Aristotle scoffed at the prescription that the statement of fact be brief. He asked why the statement of fact had to be short or long. Why couldn't it be just right? In this characteristic insistence on the *via media*, Aristotle is calling for the length that is appropriate to the needs of the moment. The principle of "just enough" is the only general prescript that has validity here. We will achieve this due brevity if (1) we start our recital at a point where it begins to concern our readers (comparable to Horace's precept that we begin a story *in medias res* instead of *ab ovo*); (2) we exclude all irrelevancies; (3) we excise anything, however relevant, which contributes little or nothing to our readers' understanding of our case or to their friendly disposition toward our cause.

The plausibility of the statement of fact will result partly from the ethical tone of the discourse itself or from the ethical image of the writer. Readers will believe that the situation is as it has been described if they trust the authority or the character of the writer. The ethical appeal, of course, is important in all parts of the discourse, but we must not minimize its importance in this part of the discourse, which is concerned with a bare recital of the facts.

We can further enhance the credibility of our statement of fact by being careful not to say anything contrary to nature or to historical fact, by assigning believable causes or reasons for events, by trusting more to understatement than to hyperbole. An audience is amazingly quick to detect that a writer “doth protest too much.” If we alienate the credence of our readers at this state of the discourse, we jeopardize our chances of holding them when we come to the all-important stage of proof.

Confirmation

The use of the term *confirmation* to label this part may suggest that this division figures only in persuasive discourse. But if we regard *confirmation* or *proof* as the designation of that part where we get down to the main business of our discourse, this term can be extended to cover expository as well as argumentative prose. The previously discussed parts, the introduction and the statement of fact, certainly figure in both expository and argumentative discourse. If these two parts are regarded as the preliminaries, confirmation then may be regarded as the core, the central part, the main body, of our discourse—the part in which we do what we set out to do, whether that be to explain or to persuade. A good deal of what we say about confirmation is, of course, applicable only to argumentative discourse, but many of the precepts concerning this part of the discourse are equally applicable to expository prose. When we are talking about confirmation in the narrow sense of demonstrating or refuting an argument, this will be readily apparent to the student.

Because of the difficulty of illustrating the disposition of arguments by quoting short passages, such as we used in illustrating the previous two parts, we shall postpone exemplifying the points made until we come to consider whole essays in the readings at the end of this chapter.

It is in this part of the discourse principally that we use the material we have gathered in the process of invention. We must select and dispose this material for maximum effectiveness. The processes of invention and disposition are not really as independent of one another as we may have suggested by giving them separate treatments. In reading, the activity of evaluation can take place almost simultaneously with the activity of comprehension. Likewise, in composing, we are often engaged with the problems of selecting and arranging our material even while we are engaged in discovering our material. We have discussed invention and disposition separately partly because there is a sense in which we must *discover* before we can *arrange*

and partly because there is a pedagogical convenience to a separate discussion of these two processes.

One of the main problems we face in this part of the discourse is the problem of sequence. What point do we take up first? Once we have dealt with that point, then what point do we take up? In expository discourse, we can sometimes organize our material according to a chronological scheme—as, for instance, in an explanation of a relatively simple process, like changing a tire. In the exposition of a more complicated subject, we may have to move from the general to the particular or from the familiar to the unknown. Usually the nature of the thing to be explained will suggest the appropriate procedure.

In argumentative discourse, however, these organizing principles cannot always be relied on, for we are faced with questions like these: should I begin with my weakest arguments and build up to my strongest arguments? should I refute the opposing arguments first and then present my arguments, or should I establish my case first and then refute the opposition? As usual, the particular situation will dictate the appropriate strategy, and perhaps all that can be done here is to lay down some guidelines for the student.

As a general rule, in presenting our own arguments we should not descend from our strongest arguments to our weakest. More often than not, such an anticlimactic order will considerably weaken the effectiveness of our suasive efforts. We want to leave our strongest argument ringing in the memory of our audience; hence we usually place it in the emphatic final position. If we present our strongest arguments first and then add a series of weaker arguments, we will diminish the effectiveness of the strong ones. The audience may get the impression that our case, solid at first sight, is beginning to unravel. The weaker arguments will strike the audience as being so many “after-thoughts.” This suggests that the writer does not really have confidence in the cogency of his strong arguments, that he feels the need for adding some props. If he thus betrays a lack of confidence, he will dispel the confidence of his readers.

If we have available a number of arguments of co-ordinate value, we can arrange these arguments in almost any order. But even here we might be guided by certain principles. Where our arguments are of relatively equal strength, it might be best to present first those arguments that are likely to have suggested themselves to our readers. If we gain concurrence for the familiar arguments, we condition our readers to receive the unfamiliar. We have confirmed what they suspected and then have added what they did not know before.

If we have available to us a number of relatively strong and weak arguments, we might find it best to start out with a strong argument, then slip

in some of the weaker arguments, and then end up with the strongest argument. The initial strong argument conditions the audience to receive the weaker arguments; but then, just when the weaker arguments threaten to diminish the effectiveness of our opening argument, we come in with our strongest argument. The surprise that attends the introduction of a strong argument just when it seemed that we had "shot our bolt" will enhance the cogency of the final argument.

Refutation

So far we have been dealing only with the strategic sequence of arguments when we have merely to confirm our own case. Some additional problems present themselves when we have also to refute opposing views. In a public debate, involving an alternation of speakers, opposing views are actually voiced, and we have to decide which of the opposing arguments must be dealt with and whether we should refute the arguments first and then present our own arguments or present our own first and then refute the opposition. When we sit down to write an argumentative piece, there is no opponent whom we must confront and answer. Nevertheless, there usually is implicit in the issue we are discussing an opposing view that we must meet and dispose of. In such cases, it is not enough to establish our own case. However cogent our arguments may be, doubts will remain in the minds of our readers if we do not anticipate the objections to our thesis and answer those objections.

If the opposing views have been well received by the audience, it is usually advisable that we refute those views before we attempt to present our own arguments. People who are favorably disposed to the opposite point of view will not readily open their minds to our arguments, however valid and cogent they may be. The ground must be cleared, as it were, before we can parade our support.

It can never be an inflexible rule, however, that we must first refute the opposing arguments before we present our own. Where the opposing arguments are relatively weak, we can afford to delay answering them until after we have established our own case. In such instances, the cogency of our arguments will further dispose the audience to recognize the weakness of the opposing arguments. And even when the opposing arguments are strong and are favorably received by the audience, it will sometimes be expedient to delay refuting them. When an audience, for instance, is inordinately hostile to our view, the wisest strategy may be to keep the opposing arguments out of sight as long as possible. By reminding a hostile audience of opposing arguments

at the outset, we could so confirm the audience in their prejudices that they would not lend an ear to our refutation of those arguments. Under those circumstances, presenting our own arguments first might dispose an audience at least to listen to our refutation.

As has been constantly emphasized so far in this chapter, no inflexible rules can be laid down dictating what must be done and in what sequence. The writer must be prepared to adapt his means to his end and to adjust his strategies to fit the particular situation. He must "feel" his way through any given situation. Because some writers have a natural sense, or develop a sense, for what are the "right" means in any given situation, they often succeed where others fail. Unfortunately, rhetoric cannot give rules-of-thumb that will cover every situation, but we can briefly review some of the available means of refuting opposing views.

REFUTATION BY APPEAL TO REASON

There are two general ways in which we can refute a proposition: we can prove the contradictory of that proposition; we can demolish the arguments by which the proposition is supported. As we saw in the previous chapter, if we prove that one of a pair of contradictory propositions is true, we automatically prove that the other proposition is false. Proving a contradictory proposition can be the most compelling kind of refutation, since all men, because of their rational nature, readily recognize the principle that a thing cannot at the same time *be* and *not be*.

We are not always presented, however, with the convenience of contradictorily opposed arguments. More often we are faced with the challenge of refuting *contrary* propositions. One side maintains that a certain course of action is wise, and the other side maintains that it is foolish. In that case, we must knock out the props supporting the contrary assertion. We can do this (1) by denying the truth of one of the premises on which the argument rests and proving, perhaps through evidence or testimony, that the premise is false, or (2) by objecting to the inferences drawn from the premises. In rejecting the inferences, we say such things as, "I admit the principle, but I deny that it leads to such a consequence" or "I admit the principle but I deny that it applies in this case" or "Your assertion is true, but it has no force as an argument to support your conclusion."

These are ways of refuting arguments logically, but sometimes we have to deal with probabilities, which cannot be demolished by means of strict logic. In that case, we must draw on those enthymemes and examples which, if they do not refute the opposition conclusively, do have persuasive value. The emotional and ethical appeals, which we discussed in the previous chapter, will play their part in refutation too.

REFUTATION BY EMOTIONAL APPEALS

Knowledge of one's audience is perhaps nowhere more important than when one is using emotional appeals. A miscalculation about the temper of one's audience could destroy or reverse the intended effect. The wrong emotional appeal or an emotional appeal applied at an inappropriate place in the discourse or a disproportionate emotional appeal could not only render our refutation ineffectual but also diminish confidence in our previously established proof.

It should be obvious that emotional appeals will succeed better with some audiences than with others. One's problems with emotional appeals will increase in proportion to the heterogeneity of the audience. One can appreciate Senator Richard Nixon's dilemma in 1952 when he had to make decisions about the kind and degree of emotional appeal to employ in his address to a nationwide television audience in defense of his handling of campaign funds. Judging from the response to his speech, one would have to conclude that Mr. Nixon calculated wisely. His references to "the cloth coat" and to the "little dog Checkers" totally alienated one segment of the television audience. But for the majority of the audience, those references were the emotional touches which capped his apology.

It would seem that when addressing a large, heterogeneous audience, one must estimate which emotional appeals are likely to succeed with the major portion of the audience. In other words, we may have to sacrifice the concurrence of one part of our audience in order to gain the assent of the major portion. The author who writes a piece for the *New Republic* or *Commonweal* or *The National Review* has, in many ways, an easier task than the author who writes an argumentative piece for *Life* or the *Saturday Evening Post*, because the writer for magazines of limited circulation can presume more political, philosophical, or religious homogeneity in his audience than can the writer for the mass-circulation magazines.

REFUTATION BY ETHICAL APPEAL

The ethical appeal must pervade all parts of the discourse, but it is nowhere more important than in this part where we are seeking to prove our case or refute the opposition. So important is the ethical appeal in effecting persuasion that Aristotle said "it is more fitting for a good man to display himself as an honest fellow than as a subtle reasoner" (*Rhetoric*, III, 17). Sometimes when our case is weak, the ethical appeal, exerted either by the image of the writer or by the tone of the discourse, will carry the day. The effectiveness of the ethical appeal where one's case is weak was particularly evident in the

speech that General Douglas MacArthur delivered before Congress in 1951 when he returned to this country after being relieved of his command in Korea. Old soldiers *do* die, but they sometimes achieve a kind of immortality in the minds of the people they have served.

REFUTATION BY WIT

The Earl of Shaftesbury once claimed that "ridicule is the test of truth." Shaftesbury was suggesting that if what was alleged to be the truth could survive the onslaught of ridicule it must really be the truth. If Shaftesbury's claim can be accepted at all it must be accepted with reservations. A genuine truth might very well be reduced to absurdity by a witty rhetorician, but it would remain the truth despite its having been discredited in the minds of the audience.

Jests, sarcasm, and irony can be effective tools for refutation, but they must be used with the utmost discretion. The Greek rhetorician Gorgias advised that we should "kill our opponent's seriousness with our ridicule and his ridicule with our seriousness." Gorgias was shrewd enough to see that many times we cannot counteract the opposition by employing similar tactics. And since it is often difficult to "top" a display of wit, we might do well to avoid matching humorous sallies with our opponent and to adopt a becoming seriousness. On the other hand, we can sometimes destroy the effectiveness of a soberly presented argument by wittily reducing the argument to absurdity. The student must be cautioned however; he risks the dissipation of his ethical appeal if his wit is merely a cloak for weak or specious arguments. Witty but empty retorts can fool some of the people some of the time, but the man who is scrupulous about his tactics will not sacrifice integrity for success. The student should pay particular attention to the use that Donald L. Lloyd and Jacques Barzun make of wit against each other in the readings at the end of this chapter.

A joke can be used simply to disarm an audience or to dispose an audience favorably. When a joke is employed for these purposes, it is most often found in the introduction, the most obvious place for those devices which are calculated to ingratiate the speaker or writer with his audience. But the disarming kind of joke can sometimes be used in the confirmation also—as, for instance, when we are about to launch into an argument that we suspect will not readily gain acceptance.

But the joke can also be used for purposes of refutation if it provides some kind of analogy to the point we are seeking to discredit. The analogous joke can induce an audience to take an objective view of the point being discussed. If we can get an audience laughing at a situation somewhat removed from

the point being attacked, we will find it easier to make the audience perceive the absurdity when we make an application of the analogy.

With certain audiences, the more sophisticated varieties of humor will succeed best. One of the most effective kinds of sophisticated humor, especially for the purpose of disarming an audience, is the good-humored bantering in which the speaker or writer makes depreciatory remarks about himself. Almost everyone responds favorably to the man who takes himself down a peg or two, mainly because everyone likes to feel that a man, however exalted, is human after all and that he does not exaggerate his own importance or achievements. Although depreciation of others may sometimes backfire on us, belittling of ourselves will never arouse anyone's resentment and rarely undercut anyone's confidence in us.

The light touch resulting from an urbane finesse with words is another brand of humor that wears well with certain audiences, especially with the educated. As will be seen in the next chapter on style, many of the figures of speech can be used for this kind of beguiling verbal humor. Puns, for instance, have come to be regarded as a low form of humor, but most of the great writers, from Shakespeare to James Thurber, indulged in plays on words (the rhetoricians called it *paronomasia*) and felt no need to apologize for their verbal acrobatics. Irony is a subtle form of verbal ingenuity, and while irony comes naturally to most people ("My dear, it's a *beautiful* hat!"), we must exercise great care in using this trope. Because of its subtlety, irony can easily be misunderstood. There are college students even today who misread Swift's ironical *Modest Proposal*.

Sarcasm is another mode of humor that requires a master hand, for it can easily go wrong. Sarcasm seems to succeed best when it is directed at an individual; it is risky when it is directed at nationalities, classes, ranks, or vocations. That this should be so is rather curious, for of all modes of satirical wit, sarcasm is the one that most closely borders on uncharitableness. One might think that since the caustic gibe at an individual comes closer to violating the virtue of charity than the gibe at a group of people, personal sarcasm would be most likely to elicit unfavorable reactions in the audience. But human nature is so constituted that it will tolerate, even enjoy, the vituperation of an individual. The same London society that chuckled over Alexander Pope's vitriolic portrait of Lord John Hervey under the guise of "Sporus" would have been angered if his portrait had been directed at the class of aristocratic courtiers that Lord Hervey represented. The psychology behind this perverse pleasure is pointed up by La Rochefoucauld's famous maxim, "In the misfortune of our best friends, we often find something that pleases us."

The rhetoricians are unanimous in their condemnation of ribald jests in

formal discourse. The "dirty story" may provoke laughter when told in small, intimate groups, but in a public discourse, it almost invariably offends and alienates a larger audience. Likewise, we usually react unfavorably to a ribald joke when we see it in print. It is difficult to imagine any situation when a ribald jest will serve our purpose. For rhetorical reasons, then, as well as for moral reasons, we should avoid the use of obscenity and a *double-entendre* in our discourses.

The type of literature that makes most use, for rhetorical purposes, of the varieties of humor that we have discussed—and of some that we have not discussed, like parody and burlesque—is satire. And it is notable that some of the greatest English satirists, like Ben Jonson, John Dryden, Alexander Pope, and Jonathan Swift, were thoroughly schooled in classical rhetoric. The student will learn his best lessons about the skillful uses of humor for rhetorical purposes from reading the great satirists. And the student will acquire another method of reading and analyzing satiric literature if he will approach such literature as a manifestation of the kind of rhetoric we have been studying in this book.

Quintilian once said (*Instit. Orat.*, VI, iii, 26) that "there are no jests so insipid as those which parade the fact that they are intended to be witty." We might very well take these words as a general caution about the use of humor for rhetorical purposes. Humor that merely calls attention to our desire to be "funny" or to be "one of the boys" will alienate more people than it will win. Humor is an extremely difficult art, and if the student does not have a natural gift or an acquired skill for humor, he would do best to avoid the use of this available means of persuasion. And he must also remember that there are many occasions when humor of any kind is wholly inappropriate. We round back finally to that cardinal principle of rhetoric: the subject, the occasion, the audience, and the personality of the speaker or writer will dictate the means we should employ to effect our purpose.

Conclusion

A look at the terms that the classical rhetoricians used to designate the conclusion will give us a hint of what the rhetoricians conceived the function of this part of a discourse to be. The most common Greek term was *epilogos*, from the verb *epilegein*, meaning "to say in addition." An even more instructive Greek term for this part was *anakephalaiōsis*, which is the equivalent of the Latin *recapitulatio*, from which we have the English "recapitulation." The common Latin term for this part was *peroratio*, a word which in the prefix *per-* suggested "a finishing off" of one's plea. What the Latins meant

by "finishing off" is suggested by the two heads under which Quintilian treated of the peroration—*enumeratio* (an enumeration or summing-up) and *affectus* (producing the appropriate emotion in the audience).

While it is obvious that some discourses, because of the nature of the subject or situation or because of the limitations of time or allotted wordage, can dispense with an elaborate conclusion, the natural tendency for us, when we speak or write formally, is to "round off" what we have been molding in the earlier parts of the discourse. Without a conclusion, the discourse strikes us as merely *stopping* rather than *ending*. We are conscious too that because the conclusion stands in the final position in the discourse it is the part that is "left with" the audience, the part that lingers longest in the memory. Accordingly, this is the part where we feel the urge to pull out all the stops, where we tend to display the most conspicuous stylistic eloquence and emotional intensity. Because of this natural urge to sound the full diapason of our stylistic and emotional resources, we sometimes overdo these effects and thereby detract from the solid achievements of the earlier parts of the discourse. Discretion must be as alive here as it was in the earlier parts.

Aristotle taught that generally we strive to do four things in the conclusion:

1. to inspire the audience with a favorable opinion of ourselves and an unfavorable opinion of our opponents;
2. to amplify the force of the points we have made in the previous section and to extenuate the force of the points made by the opposition;
3. to rouse the appropriate emotions in the audience;
4. to restate in a summary way our facts and arguments.

Aristotle is suggesting that these are the things that we *may* do in the conclusion, not that we *must* do all of them in every discourse. Limitations of space may prevent our spinning out an elaborate conclusion. The nature of our subject or of our audience may make it inadvisable to attempt any kind of emotional appeal. When our arguments have been direct and uncomplicated, there may be no necessity to recapitulate or amplify them. The student will note, for instance, how short the conclusion is to Macaulay's speech reproduced among the readings at the end of this chapter. The advice here, as in other parts of the discourse, is that we should do what needs to be done, not what convention says must be done.

Of the four things that Aristotle designates, *recapitulation* is the one that will most often figure in the conclusion. Normally when we come to the end of a discourse, we all feel the need to restate in general terms the points we have set forth in detail in the body of the discourse. This inclination is prompted perhaps by our feeling that we must refresh the memory of our audience. Then too there is the awareness that facts and arguments the force

of which was blunted by details will gain in effect when set forth in capsule form at the end of the discourse.

Sometimes an author will explicitly signal that he is about to recapitulate the points he has made in the body of the essay. Here is an example of a formally announced recapitulation, together with the author's declaration of his reasons for the recapitulation, from the concluding paragraphs of an article, the thesis of which was set forth in the first sentence of the article: "I maintain that democratic manners—typified by the practice of calling the boss by his first name—have reached the point in our country where they conduce not to the preservation of personal dignity but to the abject submission of one man to another."

I have nearly finished. But I know that some fool—most likely, one with a Ph.D.—will read this article and forever after assert as a well-known fact that I yearn for a restoration of Tsardom, for a reinvigoration of the Hindu caste system and for a truly Chinese subjugation of women and children. So let me recapitulate, in the course of which I shall add one or two points that I forgot to mention earlier.

A sensible system of manners, sensibly formal, performs various services. Besides acting as a constant reminder of some important facts of life, it affords human beings the distinctly human satisfaction of symbolic expression. Besides making collective living possible, it provides a person, thanks to its formalities, with protective armor against collective pressures. For these formalities allow the individual to acquiesce in the social order while reserving his final judgment of it. They enable him to pledge his loyalty to men in authority without making those fine adjustments whose long-term results are the same as those of brainwashing.

Democratic manners in America are eating the heart out of American democracy. With no impressive way of saluting the system, and the position which a given official occupies in it, one must prostrate himself before the man. There is a country where such prostration is even more prostrate than in America. There the humblest citizen calls his mighty ruler *comrade*.

I suggest a prudent reform in American manners, not a revolution. If the only alternative to egalitarian manners is a nerveless society exhausted by protocol and ceremony, then this discussion is futile. But that is not the only alternative, except in the minds of latter-day Jacobins for whom the stratifications of the *ancien régime* are more real than the proletarianizations of their own time. There are in-between solutions, attuned to reality, however they resist simple and consistent formulation, as the English know, and as America, in her own fashion, can discover. Pedantic democrats presume to speak for wisdom, creative ability and service, as against mere money in the bank. But without a rectification of manners most men would rather achieve a Cadillac than such virtues, for these

virtues, unacknowledged in any regular way, do not show on a man, at least not conspicuously, whereas a Cadillac shows on anyone, conspicuously.

From Morton J. Cronin, "The Tyranny of Democratic Manners," *The New Republic*, January 20, 1958. Reprinted by permission of the author and The New Republic, 1244 Nineteenth St., Washington, D.C.

To realize the value of such a recapitulation, the student would have to study this passage in conjunction with the body of the article, where the author developed his points at some length. And whereas the author here explicitly informs his readers that he is going to recapitulate the points he has made in the article and tells them why he feels the need to do so, most of the time, writers slip into recapitulation without explicitly alerting the reader. Most of the time it is fairly obvious that the author is summarizing his points.

How important recapitulation can be is nowhere more dramatically demonstrated than in a court trial. The jury has spent days, sometimes weeks, listening to highly detailed testimony and cross-examination. Surely at the end of this period, the jury has all the material it needs to render a verdict. But, as anyone knows who has witnessed a real or a fictional trial, both the prosecuting and defending attorneys present a summary of their cases before the jury is sent out to deliberate its verdict. The prosecutor and defender spend most of their time in this summary reminding the jury of the main points established during the course of the trial. Not only are the issues and arguments sharpened by these summaries, but coming one upon the other in rapid succession, they gain a cumulative force.

Let us view a fictional example of such a summary. Because this summary is tightly controlled by the novelist, it is probably less rambling than the summaries lawyers present in actual trials. In this scene from the novel *To Kill a Mockingbird*, Atticus, the lawyer defending a Negro falsely accused of raping a white girl, is making his final plea to the jury:

"Gentlemen," he was saying, "I shall be brief, but I would like to use my remaining time with you to remind you that this case is not a difficult one, it requires no minute sifting of complicated facts, but it does require you to be sure beyond all reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. To begin with, this case should never have come to trial. This case is as simple as black and white.

"The state has not produced one iota of medical evidence to the effect that the crime Tom Robinson is charged with ever took place. It has relied instead upon the testimony of two witnesses whose evidence has not only been called into serious question on cross-examination, but has been flatly contradicted by the defendant. The defendant is not guilty, but somebody in this courtroom is.

"I have nothing but pity in my heart for the chief witness for the state, but my pity does not extend so far as to her putting a man's life at stake, which she has done in an effort to get rid of her own guilt.

"I say guilt, gentlemen, because it was guilt that motivated her. She has committed no crime, she has merely broken a rigid and time-honored code of our society, a code so severe that whoever breaks it is hounded from our midst as unfit to live with. She is the victim of cruel poverty and ignorance, but I cannot pity her: she is white. She knew full well the enormity of her offense, but because her desires were stronger than the code she was breaking, she persisted in breaking it. She persisted, and her subsequent reaction is something that all of us have known at one time or another. She did something every child has done—she tried to put the evidence of her offense away from her. But in this case she was no child hiding stolen contraband: she struck out at her victim—of necessity she must put him away from her—he must be removed from her presence, from this world. She must destroy the evidence of her offense.

"What was the evidence of her offense? Tom Robinson, a human being. She must put Tom Robinson away from her. Tom Robinson was her daily reminder of what she did. What did she do? She tempted a Negro.

"She was white, and she tempted a Negro. She did something that in our society is unspeakable: she kissed a black man. Not an old Uncle, but a strong young Negro man. No code mattered to her before she broke it, but it came crashing down on her afterwards.

"Her father saw it, and the defendant has testified as to his remarks. What did her father do? We don't know, but there is circumstantial evidence to indicate that Mayella Ewell was beaten savagely by someone who led almost exclusively with his left. We do know in part what Mr. Ewell did: he did what any God-fearing, persevering, respectable white man would do under the circumstances—he swore out a warrant, no doubt signing it with his left hand, and Tom Robinson now sits before you, having taken the oath with the only good hand he possesses—his right hand.

"And so a quiet, respectable, humble Negro who had the unmitigated temerity to 'feel sorry' for a white woman has had to put his word against two white people's. I need not remind you of their appearance and conduct on the stand—you saw them for yourselves. The witnesses for the state, with the exception of the sheriff of Maycomb County, have presented themselves to you gentlemen, to this court, in the cynical confidence that their testimony would not be doubted, confident that you gentlemen would go along with them on the assumption—the evil assumption—that *all* Negroes lie, that *all* Negroes are basically immoral beings, that *all* Negro men are not to be trusted around our women, an assumption one associates with minds of their caliber.

"Which, gentlemen, we know is in itself a lie as black as Tom Robinson's skin, a lie I do not have to point out to you. You know the truth,

and the truth is this: some Negroes lie, some Negroes are immoral, some Negro men are not to be trusted around women—black or white. But this is a truth that applies to the human race and to no particular race of men. There is not a person in this courtroom who has never told a lie, who has never done an immoral thing, and there is no man living who has never looked upon a woman without desire.”

From Harper Lee, *To Kill a Mockingbird*, Chapter 20. Copyright © 1960 by Harper Lee. Reprinted by permission of J. B. Lippincott Co. and William Heinemann Ltd.

Atticus goes on for three more paragraphs, appealing to the theme of equal justice for all in the courts. Anyone who has read *To Kill a Mockingbird* or has seen the movie based on the novel remembers how skillfully Atticus Finch had argued the points he is summarizing here and how necessary it was for him, considering the kind of jurymen he had to deal with, to remind the jury of the arguments in the case and to put the trial in its proper perspective. A summation like this does more, however, than merely remind the audience of the salient points; it continues and reinforces the persuasion which is the main object of the speech. So while Atticus's recapitulation is largely expository, it is argumentative, right down to the final period.

Closely allied to the kind of conclusion that recapitulates or summarizes, is the one that *generalizes*. This is the kind of conclusion that broadens and extends the view of the problem or issue that we have been considering in the body of the discourse, that considers the ultimate consequences of the views we have been arguing or refuting, that recommends an attitude to adopt or a course of action to follow. To put it another way, this is the kind of conclusion that presents the general conclusions we have arrived at as a result of considering our subject.

At the 1959 convention of the National Council of Teachers of English, Professor Warner G. Rice argued for the abolition of the Freshman English course in college. In rebuttal, Professor Albert R. Kitzhaber argued for a revision of the present English course. Here, in the concluding paragraph of his speech, Professor Kitzhaber generalizes on the points he had argued in the body of his speech:

I can sum up very briefly my position with regard to the question we are discussing. I am dissatisfied with the present Freshman English course in its typical form; but I am convinced that any radical amelioration must wait on, not precede, changes in the English curriculum in high school. Attempted coercion of high school English teachers would get us nowhere. They would like to do a better job of teaching writing quite as much as we would like to have them do it; but we must help them, working with them as equals on a problem neither they nor we have so far been able to solve properly. If our combined efforts lead to

the results we want, the need for this present Freshman course would disappear—but not the need for a new Freshman course that would take advantage of and build upon the revised high school courses. I would argue that such a course ought to be of at least as much value to the freshman as any other course he might take in that year—valuable because it would concentrate on trying to raise the level of his writing skill from competence to distinction, and valuable also because it would contribute significantly to his liberal education through the continued study of literature and language. Both of these are rightful concerns of an English department.

Indeed, I think they are obligations.

From "Death—or Transfiguration?" *College English*, XXI (April, 1960), 367-73. Reprinted by permission of the author and the National Council of Teachers of English.

It is in the summarizing kind of conclusion that we have the best opportunity to engage in what the rhetoricians called *amplification* and *extenuation*. Amplification is the process by which we highlight, by which we make as "big as possible," the points we have made; amplification is a way of reminding audiences of the importance or cogency or superiority of our points. Extenuation does just the opposite: it insists that the points made by the opposition are insignificant, weak, or inferior. The common topics that we most resort to when we are seeking to amplify our own points or to minimize our opponent's points are the topic of size and the topic of degree. In other words, we try to emphasize or de-emphasize either the absolute or the relative magnitude of the points we have made. Of course we try to do this when we are presenting our arguments, but it can be helpful to our cause to engage in some amplifying and extenuating in a summary way in the conclusion.

One final caution about the recapitulation; let it be as brief as possible. Otherwise the conclusion will take on the proportions of a second discourse, and it will serve only to weary and alienate the audience. Nothing so exasperates an audience as the speaker or writer who goes "on and on" after he has announced that he is about to conclude. A disproportionate conclusion is usually more damaging to the effect of an essay than a disproportionate introduction. A fresh audience may be disposed to forgive a treadmill introduction, but a weary audience will invariably resent the interminable conclusion.

Emotional appeals, as we have seen, are appropriate in any part of the discourse. Traditionally, however, the conclusion has been the part in which emotional appeals have figured most prominently. Present-day students have not been exposed very much to the Chautauqua style of oratory that was very popular in the early years of this century, but a look at the speeches of

a flamboyant orator like William Jennings Bryan would show them how speakers once indulged the natural urge to pull out all the emotional stops in the peroration. Probably more familiar to modern students, Sir Winston Churchill was an orator in the grand old tradition. An example of the rousing kind of emotional appeal is found in the peroration of Sir Winston Churchill's famous speech to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940:

I say to the House as I said to Ministers who have joined this government, I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat. We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have before us many, many months of struggle and suffering.

You ask, what is our policy? I say it is to wage war by land, sea, and air. War with all our might and with all the strength God has given us, and to wage war against a monstrous tyranny never surpassed in the dark and lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our policy.

You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word. It is victory. Victory at all costs—victory in spite of all terrors—victory, however long and hard the road may be, for without victory there is no survival.

Let that be realized. No survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for, no survival for the urge, the impulse of the ages, that mankind shall move forward toward his goal.

I take up my task in buoyancy and hope. I feel sure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among men.

I feel entitled at this juncture, at this time, to claim the aid of all and to say, "Come then, let us go forward together with our united strength."

Even today most of us have a nostalgic fondness for this kind of oratory, and occasionally, such as at a nominating convention, we are treated to a display of this rousing brand of oratory. Generally, however, we profess to be suspicious of grandiloquent exploitations of our emotions. And while we have probably misjudged our susceptibility to emotional appeals, it is true that bombastic displays of emotion have largely passed out of fashion.

Today we are more likely to regard as fitting the temperate kind of emotional appeal that Abraham Lincoln exerted in his "Second Inaugural Address." In this example, a good deal of the emotional appeal is produced by the choice of diction and by the rhythm and structure of the sentences:

The Almighty has His own purposes. "Woe unto the world because of offenses! for it must needs be that offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh." If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers

in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bond-man's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with a sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."

With malice towards none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in—to bind up the nation's wounds—to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.

To note the passing of the bombastic style is not to admit that we have ceased to be responsive to emotional appeals or that we have ceased to employ emotional appeals. What has happened is that emotional appeals, especially as they appear in conclusions, tend to be more subtle and more restrained than they were in this country even fifty years ago. We seem to be relying less on direct emotional appeals and more on such indirect means as the graces of style. The rhythms of our sentences, for instance, exert an influence on the emotions that is no less real for being all but unnoticeable. We shall consider these emotional effects at greater length in the chapter on style.

Whether we need to resort to emotional appeals in the conclusion and how hard we should come down on the emotional appeals will depend largely on the nature of our audience. It is extremely important that the speaker or writer gauge, as accurately as possible, the temper of the known or probable audience for his discourse. Some audiences will be less susceptible to emotional appeals than others. A professional group, for instance, inclined by temperament or training to accept or reject a proposal on its proven merits, may be impervious, even hostile, to any appeal to their emotions on matters of professional interest. An audience's susceptibility to emotional appeals could vary, of course, with the subject being discussed. A group of doctors, for instance, could be offended by any emotional appeal when they were being urged to adopt some new drug or technique; but on a subject like government sponsorship of medical insurance, this same group could be wide open to emotional appeals. Then too when the available means of logical persuasion on a given subject are weak—or at least weaker than those of the opposition—we may find it expedient to resort to emotional persuasion. Quintilian saw the effectiveness of emotional appeal in such a situation: "Proofs, it is true, may induce the judges to regard our case as superior to that of our opponent, but the appeal to the emotions will do more, for it will

make them wish our case to be better. And what they wish, they will also believe.”—*Instit. Orat.* VI, ii, 5. Quintilian went so far as to claim that “it is in its power over the emotions that the life and soul of oratory is to be found” (VI, ii, 7). The great Latin rhetorician may seem to be encouraging the use of any kind of unethical means to accomplish our purpose. But anyone who recalls Quintilian’s view that the ideal orator is “the good man speaking” must reject this imputation. Quintilian is merely giving frank recognition to the fact that, men being what they are, emotional appeal will in some circumstances be the most effective of the available means of persuasion. This recognition is not the same as sanctioning any and all exploitations of emotion, for the classical rhetoricians did not regard emotional appeals as illegitimate *per se*. Men sometimes abused this means of persuasion, but the fact that some men abused this power did not invalidate all uses of this resource.

The fourth thing we may do, and sometimes feel compelled to do, in the conclusion is to dispose the audience favorably toward ourselves. If we have not exerted an *ethical appeal* in the earlier parts of our discourse, it is probably too late to try to exert it in the conclusion. We have seen that as early as the introduction, we may have to ingratiate ourselves with a hostile audience or post our credentials with a skeptical audience, and in later parts of the discourse, we may frequently have to bolster the credit we have established with our audience. To delay establishing a favorable image of ourselves until the conclusion would usually jeopardize our chances of persuading an audience. So when we make an effort in the conclusion to dispose an audience favorably toward ourselves, we should be merely renewing and reinforcing the ethical appeal that has been working in earlier parts of the discourse.

The kinds of ethical appeal that seem to be most appropriate in the conclusion are the frank confession of our shortcomings, honest acknowledgment of the strength of the opposing case, and magnanimous gestures toward vindictive opponents. It is well to leave our audience with the impression that we have no illusions about ourselves or our position, that we have a respect for truth wherever we find it, and that we are capable of returning charity for malice. The audience gets the impression that the man capable of making frank confessions and generous concessions is not only a good man but a man so confident of the strength of his position that he can afford to concede points to the opposition.

We observed in the section on the introduction that if we feel it necessary to arouse hostility against our opponent, it is usually better to do this in the conclusion rather than in the introduction. It is easier, for one thing, to arouse hostility against an opponent *after* we have demolished his arguments. Circumstances, however, might dictate that it would be better to arouse this

hostility early in the discourse. In the reading from the *Apology* in the previous chapter, we saw that Socrates deemed it necessary to stir up animosity against Meletus quite early in his speech of defense.

Concluding Remarks on Arrangement

In this chapter, we have been reviewing the usual parts of an extensive discourse, noting what is normally done in each of these parts and remarking the adjustments that frequently have to be made to fit the particular situation. Almost no rule about arrangement is inflexible. Anything “bends” to the exigencies of the moment—to the demands, in other words, of the subject, or the kind of discourse, or the personality or ability of the writer, or the temper of the audience. Where so many adjustments may have to be made to the *ad hoc* situation, very few hard-and-fast precepts can be laid down. Some students succeed better than others in making these strategic adjustments because they have been endowed with sound instincts for what is effective in any given situation. But other students, not so gifted, can through experience and practice and guidance acquire a measure of this skill. Experience and practice the student must gain on his own; this text attempts to supply the general guidance that a student may need.

All that rhetoric can do is point out that given this subject or this purpose or this audience, this is what the student may have to do in some part of the discourse, and this is how he might do what he has to do. Disposition then becomes something more than the conventional system for organizing a discourse, something more than just a system of outlining the composition; it becomes a discipline that trains the student in the judicious selection and use of available means to the desired end.

Since so many decisions about arrangement depend upon the given situation, it would be well for the student now to study some readings in order to see how some authors have managed arrangement in their given situation.

Readings

THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY: EDUCATION

The advantage in starting our study of arrangement with a fairly long piece of connected discourse, is that the long piece has more parts, and it is easier to discern how important it is to arrange these many parts in such a way as to achieve maximum unity, coherence, and effectiveness. For our first ex-

ample, then, we have chosen Thomas Babington Macaulay's speech on the advantages of a state-supported educational system, delivered in the House of Commons on April 19, 1847.

A bill was up before the House of Commons in the spring of 1847, asking for an appropriation of one hundred thousand pounds to help finance a school system for those people who could not afford to send their children to private schools. When Lord John Russell moved that the bill be put to a vote of the House, Thomas Duncombe, the Member for Finsbury, proposed the following amendment:

That previous to any grant of public money being assented to by this House for the purpose of carrying out the scheme of national education, as developed in the Minutes of the Committee of Council on Education in August and December last, which minutes have been presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, a select Committee be appointed to inquire into the justice and expediency of such a scheme and its probable annual cost; also to inquire whether the regulations attached thereto do not unduly increase the influence of the crown, invade the constitutional functions of Parliament, and interfere with the religious convictions and civil rights of Her Majesty's subjects.

As a result of Macaulay's speech in opposition to that proposed amendment and of the subsequent debate in the House, the amendment was soundly defeated. Somewhat ironically, however, Macaulay was defeated the following July when he stood for re-election for Edinburgh.

Americans, with their flourishing network of public schools, may find it difficult to sympathize with the opposition offered by the Member for Finsbury to a system of subsidized schools, but there are a number of issues raised in Macaulay's speech which are still being vigorously debated in America today—principally the issue of federal vs. state support and control.

1 You will not wonder, Sir, that I am desirous to catch your eye this evening. The first duty which I performed, as a Member of the Committee of Council which is charged with the superintendence of public instruction, was to give my hearty assent to the plan which the honourable Member for Finsbury calls on the House to condemn. I am one of those who have been accused in every part of the kingdom, and who are now accused in Parliament, of aiming, under specious pretences, a blow at the civil and religious liberties of the people. It is natural therefore that I should seize the earliest opportunity of vindicating myself from so grave a charge.

2 The honourable Member for Finsbury must excuse me if, in the remarks which I have to offer to the House, I should not follow very closely the order of his speech. The truth is that a mere answer to his speech would be no

defence of myself or of my colleagues. I am surprised, I own, that a man of his acuteness and ability should, on such an occasion, have made such a speech. The country is excited from one end to the other by a great question of principle. On that question the Government has taken one side. The honourable Member stands forth as the chosen and trusted champion of a great party which takes the other side. We expected to hear from him a full exposition of the views of those in whose name he speaks. But, to our astonishment, he has scarcely even alluded to the controversy which has divided the whole nation. He has entertained us with sarcasms and personal anecdotes: he has talked much about matters of mere detail: but I must say that, after listening with close attention to all that he has said, I am quite unable to discover whether, on the only important point which is in issue, he agrees with us or with that large and active body of Nonconformists which is diametrically opposed to us. He has sat down without dropping one word from which it is possible to discover whether he thinks that education is or that it is not a matter with which the State ought to interfere. Yet that is the question about which the whole nation has, during several weeks, been writing, reading, speaking, hearing, thinking, petitioning, and on which it is now the duty of Parliament to pronounce a decision. That question once settled, there will be, I believe, very little room for dispute. If it be not competent to the State to interfere with the education of the people, the mode of interference recommended by the Committee of Council must of course be condemned. If it be the right and the duty of the State to make provision for the education of the people, the objections made to our plan will, in a very few words, be shown to be frivolous.

3 I shall take a course very different from that which has been taken by the honourable gentleman. I shall in the clearest manner profess my opinion on that great question of principle which he has studiously evaded; and for my opinion I shall give what seem to me to be unanswerable reasons.

4 I believe, Sir, that it is the right and the duty of the State to provide means of education for the common people. This proposition seems to me to be implied in every definition that has ever yet been given of the functions of a government. About the extent of those functions there has been much difference of opinion among ingenious men. There are some who hold that it is the business of a government to meddle with every part of the system of human life, to regulate trade by bounties and prohibitions, to regulate expenditure by sumptuary laws, to regulate literature by a censorship, to regulate religion by an inquisition. Others go to the opposite extreme, and assign to Government a very narrow sphere of action. But the very narrowest sphere that ever was assigned to governments by any school of political philosophy is quite wide enough for my purpose. On one point all the disputants are agreed. They unanimously acknowledge that it is the duty of

every government to take order for giving security to the persons and property of the members of the community.

5 This being admitted, can it be denied that the education of the common people is a most effectual means of securing our persons and our property? Let Adam Smith answer that question for me. His authority, always high, is, on this subject, entitled to peculiar respect, because he extremely disliked busy, prying, interfering governments. He was for leaving literature, arts, sciences, to take care of themselves. He was of opinion that the State ought not to meddle with the education of the rich. But he has expressly told us that a distinction is to be made, particularly in a commercial and highly civilised society, between the education of the rich and the education of the poor. The education of the poor, he says, is a matter which deeply concerns the commonwealth. Just as the magistrate ought to interfere for the purpose of preventing the leprosy from spreading among the people, he ought to interfere for the purpose of stopping the progress of the moral distempers which are inseparable from ignorance. Nor can this duty be neglected without danger to the public peace. If you leave the multitude uninstructed, there is serious risk that religious animosities may produce the most dreadful disorders. The most dreadful disorders! Those are Adam Smith's own words; and prophetic words they were. Scarcely had he given this warning to our rulers when his prediction was fulfilled in a manner never to be forgotten. I speak of the No Popery riots of 1780. I do not know that I could find in all history a stronger proof of the proposition that the ignorance of the common people makes the property, the limbs, the lives of all classes insecure. Without the shadow of a grievance, at the summons of a madman, a hundred thousand people rise in insurrection. During a whole week, there is anarchy in the greatest and wealthiest of European cities. The parliament is besieged. Your predecessor sits trembling in his chair and expects every moment to see the door beaten in by the ruffians whose roar he hears all round the house. The peers are pulled out of their coaches. The bishops in their lawn are forced to fly over the tiles. The chapels of foreign ambassadors, buildings made sacred by the law of nations, are destroyed. The house of the Chief Justice is demolished. The little children of the Prime Minister are taken out of their beds and laid in their night clothes on the table of the Horse Guards, the only safe asylum from the fury of the rabble. The prisons are opened. Highwaymen, housebreakers, murderers, come forth to swell the mob by which they have been set free. Thirty-six fires are blazing at once in London. Then comes the retribution. Count up all the wretches who were shot, who were hanged, who were crushed, who drank themselves to death at the rivers of gin which ran down Holborn Hill; and you will find that battles have been lost and won with a smaller sacrifice of life. And what was the cause of this calamity, a calamity which, in the history of London ranks

with the great plague and the great fire? The cause was the ignorance of a population which had been suffered, in the neighbourhood of palaces, theatres, temples, to grow up as rude and stupid as any tribe of tattooed cannibals in New Zealand, I might say as any drove of beasts in Smithfield Market.

6 The instance is striking; but it is not solitary. To the same cause are to be ascribed the riots of Nottingham, the sack of Bristol, all the outrages of Ludd, and Swing, and Rebecca, beautiful and costly machinery broken to pieces in Yorkshire, barns and haystacks blazing in Kent, fences and buildings pulled down in Wales. Could such things have been done in a country in which the mind of the labourer had been opened by education, in which he had been taught to find pleasure in the exercise of his intellect, taught to revere his Maker, taught to respect legitimate authority, and taught at the same time to seek the redress of real wrongs by peaceful and constitutional means?

7 This then is my argument. It is the duty of Government to protect our persons and property from danger. The gross ignorance of the common people is a principal cause of danger to our persons and property. Therefore, it is the duty of the Government to take care that the common people shall not be grossly ignorant.

8 And what is the alternative? It is universally allowed that, by some means, Government must protect our persons and property. If you take away education, what means do you leave? You leave means such as only necessity can justify, means which inflict a fearful amount of pain, not only on the guilty, but on the innocent who are connected with the guilty. You leave guns and bayonets, stocks and whipping-posts, treadmills, solitary cells, penal colonies, gibbets. See then how the case stands. Here is an end which, as we all agree, governments are bound to attain. There are only two ways of attaining it. One of those ways is by making men better, and wiser, and happier. The other way is by making them infamous and miserable. Can it be doubted which way we ought to prefer? Is it not strange, is it not almost incredible, that pious and benevolent men should gravely propound the doctrine that the magistrate is bound to punish and at the same time bound not to teach? To me it seems quite clear that whoever has a right to hang has a right to educate. Can we think without shame and remorse that more than half of those wretches who have been tied up at Newgate in our time might have been living happily, that more than half of those who are now in our gaols might have been enjoying liberty and using that liberty well, that such a hell on earth as Norfolk Island need never have existed, if we had expended in training honest men but a small part of what we have expended in hunting and torturing rogues.

9 I would earnestly entreat every gentleman to look at a report which is contained in the Appendix to the First Volume of the Minutes of the Com

mittee of Council. I speak of the report made by Mr. Seymour Tremenheare on the state of that part of Monmouthshire which is inhabited by a population chiefly employed in mining. He found that, in this district, towards the close of 1839, out of eleven thousand children who were of an age to attend school, eight thousand never went to any school at all, and that most of the remaining three thousand might almost as well have gone to no school as to the squalid hovels in which men who ought themselves to have been learners pretended to teach. In general these men had only one qualification for their employment; and that was their utter unfitness for every other employment. They were disabled miners or broken hucksters. In their schools all was stench and noise and confusion. Now and then the clamour of the boys was silenced for two minutes by the furious menaces of the master; but it soon broke out again. The instruction given was of the lowest kind. Not one school in ten was provided with a single map. This is the way in which you suffered the minds of a great population to be formed. And now for the effects of your negligence. The barbarian inhabitants of this region rise in an insane rebellion against the Government. They come pouring down their valleys to Newport. They fire on the Queen's troops. They wound a magistrate. The soldiers fire in return; and too many of these wretched men pay with their lives the penalty of their crime. But is the crime theirs alone? Is it strange that they should listen to the only teaching that they had? How can you, who took no pains to instruct them, blame them for giving ear to the demagogue who took pains to delude them? We put them down, of course. We punished them. We had no choice. Order must be maintained; property must be protected; and, since we had omitted to take the best way of keeping these people quiet, we were under the necessity of keeping them quiet by the dread of the sword and the halter. But could any necessity be more cruel? And which of us would run the risk of being placed under such necessity a second time?

10 I say, therefore, that the education of the people is not only a means, but the best means, of attaining that which all allow to be a chief end of government; and, if this be so, it passes my faculties to understand how any man can gravely contend that Government has nothing to do with the education of the people.

11 My confidence in my opinion is strengthened when I recollect that I hold that opinion in common with all the greatest lawgivers, statesmen, and political philosophers of all nations and ages, with all the most illustrious champions of civil and spiritual freedom, and especially with those men whose names were once held in the highest veneration by the Protestant Dissenters of England. I might cite many of the most venerable names of the old world; but I would rather cite the example of that country which the supporters of the Voluntary system here are always recommending to

us as a pattern. Go back to the days when the little society which has expanded into the opulent and enlightened commonwealth of Massachusetts began to exist. Our modern Dissenters will scarcely, I think, venture to speak contumeliously of those Puritans whose spirit Laud and his High Commission Court could not subdue, of those Puritans who were willing to leave home and kindred, and all the comforts and refinements of civilised life, to cross the ocean, to fix their abode in forests among wild beasts and wild men, rather than commit the sin of performing, in the House of God, one gesture which they believed to be displeasing to Him. Did those brave exiles think it inconsistent with civil or religious freedom that the State should take charge of the education of the people? No, sir; one of the earliest laws enacted by the Puritan colonists was that every township, as soon as the Lord had increased it to the number of fifty houses, should appoint one to teach all children to write and read, and that every township of a hundred houses should set up a grammar school. Nor have the descendants of those who made this law ever ceased to hold that the public authorities were bound to provide the means of public instruction. Nor is this doctrine confined to New England. "Educate the people" was the first admonition addressed by Penn to the colony which he founded. "Educate the people" was the legacy of Washington to the nation which he had saved. "Educate the people" was the unceasing exhortation of Jefferson; and I quote Jefferson with peculiar pleasure, because, of all the eminent men that have ever lived, Adam Smith himself not excepted, Jefferson was the one who most abhorred everything like meddling on the part of governments. Yet the chief business of his later years was to establish a good system of State education in Virginia.

12 And, against such authority as this, what have you who take the other side to show? Can you mention a single great philosopher, a single man distinguished by his zeal for liberty, humanity, and truth, who, from the beginning of the world down to the time of this present Parliament, ever held your doctrines? You can oppose to the unanimous voice of all the wise and good, of all ages, and of both hemispheres, nothing but a clamour which was first heard a few months ago, a clamour in which you cannot join without condemning, not only all whose memory you profess to hold in reverence, but even your former selves.

13 This new theory of politics has at least the merit of originality. It may be fairly stated thus. All men have hitherto been utterly in the wrong as to the nature and objects of civil government. The great truth, hidden from every preceding generation, and at length revealed, in the year 1846, to some highly respectable ministers and elders of dissenting congregations, is this. Government is simply a great hangman. Government ought to do nothing, except by harsh and degrading means. The one business of Government is to handcuff, and lock up, and scourge, and shoot, and stab, and strangle. It

is odious tyranny in a government to attempt to prevent crime by informing the understanding and elevating the moral feeling of a people. A statesman may see hamlets turned, in the course of one generation, into great seaport towns and manufacturing towns. He may know that on the character of the vast population which is collected in those wonderful towns depends the prosperity, the peace, the very existence of society. But he must not think of forming that character. He is an enemy of public liberty if he attempts to prevent those hundreds of thousands of his countrymen from becoming mere Yahoos. He may, indeed, build barrack after barrack to overawe them. If they break out into insurrection, he may send cavalry to sabre them; he may mow them down with grape shot; he may hang them, draw them, quarter them, anything but teach them. He may see, and may shudder as he sees, throughout large rural districts, millions of infants growing up from infancy to manhood as ignorant, as mere slaves of sensual appetite, as the beasts that perish. No matter. He is a traitor to the cause of civil and religious freedom if he does not look on with folded arms, while absurd hopes and evil passions ripen in that rank soil. He must wait for the day of his harvest. He must wait till the Jaquerie comes, till farm houses are burning, till threshing machines are broken in pieces; and then begins his business, which is simply to send one poor ignorant savage to the county gaol, and another to the antipodes, and a third to the gallows.

14 Such, Sir, is the new theory of government which was first propounded in the year 1846, by some men of high note among the Nonconformists of England. It is difficult to understand how men of excellent abilities and excellent intentions—and there are, I readily admit, such men among those who hold this theory—can have fallen into so absurd and pernicious an error. One explanation only occurs to me. This is, I am inclined to believe, an instance of the operation of the great law of reaction. We have just come victorious out of a long and fierce contest for the liberty of trade. While that contest was undecided, much was said and written about the advantages of free competition and about the danger of suffering the State to regulate matters which should be left to individuals. There has consequently arisen in the minds of persons who are led by words and who are little in the habit of making distinctions a disposition to apply to political questions and moral questions principles which are sound only when applied to commercial questions. These people, not content with having forced the Government to surrender a province wrongfully usurped, now wish to wrest from the Government a domain held by a right which was never before questioned and which cannot be questioned with the smallest show of reason. "If," they say, "free competition is a good thing in trade, it must surely be a good thing in education. The supply of other commodities, of sugar, for example, is left to adjust itself to the demand; and the consequence is that we are

better supplied with sugar than if the Government undertook to supply us. Why then should we doubt that the supply of instruction will, without the intervention of the Government, be found equal to the demand?"

15 Never was there a more false analogy. Whether a man is well supplied with sugar is a matter which concerns himself alone. But whether he is well supplied with instruction is a matter which concerns his neighbours and the State. If he cannot afford to pay for sugar, he must go without sugar. But it is by no means fit that, because he cannot afford to pay for education, he should go without education. Between the rich and their instructors there may, as Adam Smith says, be free trade. The supply of music masters and Italian masters may be left to adjust itself to the demand. But what is to become of the millions who are too poor to procure without assistance the services of a decent schoolmaster? We have indeed heard it said that even these millions will be supplied with teachers by the free competition of benevolent individuals who will vie with each other in rendering this service to mankind. No doubt there are many benevolent individuals who spend their time and money most laudably in setting up and supporting schools; and you may say, if you please, that there is, among these respectable persons, a competition to do good. But do not be imposed upon by words. Do not believe that this competition resembles the competition which is produced by the desire of wealth and by the fear of ruin. There is a great difference, be assured, between the rivalry of philanthropists and the rivalry of grocers. The grocer knows that if his wares are worse than those of other grocers, he shall soon go before the Bankrupt Court, and his wife and children will have no refuge but the workhouse; he knows that if his shop obtains an honourable celebrity, he shall be able to set up a carriage and buy a villa; and this knowledge impels him to exertions compared with which the exertions of even very charitable people to serve the poor are but languid. It would be strange infatuation indeed to legislate on the supposition that a man cares for his fellow creatures as much as he cares for himself.

16 Unless, Sir, I greatly deceive myself, those arguments, which show that the Government ought not to leave to private people the task of providing for the national defence, will equally show that the Government ought not to leave to private people the task of providing for national education. On this subject, Mr. Hume has laid down the general law with admirable good sense and perspicuity. I mean David Hume, not the Member for Montrose, though that honourable gentleman will, I am confident, assent to the doctrine propounded by his illustrious namesake. David Hume, Sir, justly says that most of the arts and trades which exist in the world produce so much advantage and pleasure to individuals that the magistrate may safely leave it to individuals to encourage those arts and trades. But he adds that there are callings which, though they are highly useful, nay, absolutely necessary

to society, yet do not administer to the peculiar pleasure or profit of any individual. The military calling is an instance. Here, says Hume, the government must interfere. It must take on itself to regulate these callings and to stimulate the industry of the persons who follow these callings by pecuniary and honorary rewards.

17 Now, Sir, it seems to me that, on the same principle on which Government ought to superintend and to reward the soldier, Government ought to superintend and to reward the schoolmaster. I mean, of course, the schoolmaster of the common people. That his calling is useful, that his calling is necessary, will hardly be denied. Yet it is clear that his services will not be adequately remunerated if he is left to be remunerated by those whom he teaches or by the voluntary contributions of the charitable. Is this disputed? Look at the facts. You tell us that schools will multiply and flourish exceedingly, if the Government will only abstain from interfering with them. Has not the Government long abstained from interfering with them? Has not everything been left, through many years, to individual exertion? If it were true that education, like trade, thrives most where the magistrate meddles least, the common people of England would now be the best educated in the world. Our schools would be model schools. Everyone would have a well chosen little library, excellent maps, a small but neat apparatus for experiments in natural philosophy. A grown person unable to read and write would be pointed at like Giant O'Brien or the Polish Count. Our schoolmasters would be as eminently expert in all that relates to teaching as our cutlers, our cottonspinners, our engineers are allowed to be in their respective callings. They would, as a class, be held in high consideration; and their gains would be such that it would be easy to find men of respectable character and attainments to fill up vacancies.

18 Now, is this the case? Look at the charges of the judges, at the resolutions of the grand juries, at the reports of public officers, at the reports of voluntary associations. All tell the same sad and ignominious story. Take the reports of the Inspectors of Prisons. In the House of Correction at Hertford, of seven hundred prisoners one half could not read at all; only eight could read and write well. Of eight thousand prisoners who had passed through Maidstone Prison, the proportion that could read and write well seems to have been still smaller. Turn from the registers of prisoners to the registers of marriages. You will find that about a hundred and thirty thousand couples were married in the year 1844. More than forty thousand of the bridegrooms and more than sixty thousand of the brides did not sign their names, but made their marks. Nearly one third of the men and nearly one half of the women, who are in the prime of life, who are to be the parents of the Englishmen of the next generation, who are to bear a chief part in forming the minds of the Englishmen of the next generation, cannot write

their own names. Remember, too, that though people who cannot write their own names must be grossly ignorant, people may write their own names and yet have very little knowledge. Tens of thousands who were able to write their names had in all probability received only the wretched education of a common day school. We know what such a school too often is: a room crusted with filth, without light, without air, with a heap of fuel in one corner and a brood of chickens in another; the only machinery of instruction a dog-eared spelling-book and a broken slate; the masters the refuse of all other callings, discarded footmen, ruined pedlars, men who cannot work a sum in the rule of three, men who cannot write a common letter without blunders, men who do not know whether the earth is a sphere or a cube, men who do not know whether Jerusalem is in Asia or America. And to such men, men to whom none of us would entrust the key of his cellar, we have entrusted the mind of the rising generation, and, with the mind of the rising generation, the freedom, the happiness, the glory of our country.

19 Do you question the accuracy of this description? I will produce evidence to which I am sure that you will not venture to take an exception. Every gentleman here knows, I suppose, how important a place the Congregational Union holds among the Nonconformists and how prominent a part Mr. Edward Baines has taken in opposition to State education. A Committee of the Congregational Union drew up last year a report on the subject of education. That report was received by the Union; and the person who moved that it should be received was Mr. Edward Baines. That report contains the following passage:

If it were necessary to disclose facts to such an assembly as this, as to the ignorance and debasement of the neglected portions of our population in towns and rural districts, both adults and juvenile, it could easily be done. Private information communicated to the Board, personal observation and investigation of the various localities, with the published documents of the Registrar General, and the reports of the state of prisons in England and Wales, published by order of the House of Commons, would furnish enough to make us modest in speaking of what has been done for the humbler classes and make us ashamed that the sons of the soil of England should have been so long neglected and should present to the enlightened traveller from other shores such a sad spectacle of neglected cultivation, lost mental power, and spiritual degradation.

Nothing can be more just. All the information which I have been able to obtain bears out the statements of the Congregational Union. I do believe that the ignorance and degradation of a large part of the community to which we belong ought to make us ashamed of ourselves. I do believe that an enlightened traveller from New York, from Geneva, or from Berlin,

would be shocked to see so much barbarism in the close neighbourhood of so much wealth and civilisation. But is it not strange that the very gentlemen who tell us in such emphatic language that the people are shamefully ill-educated should yet persist in telling us that under a system of free competition the people are certain to be excellently educated? Only this morning the opponents of our plan circulated a paper in which they confidently predict that free competition will do all that is necessary, if we will only wait with patience. Wait with patience! Why, we have been waiting ever since the Heptarchy. How much longer are we to wait! Till the year 2847? Or till the year 3847? That the experiment has as yet failed you do not deny. And why should it have failed? Has it been tried in unfavourable circumstances? Not so; it has been tried in the richest, and in the freest, and in the most charitable country in all Europe. Has it been tried on too small a scale? Not so; millions have been subjected to it. Has it been tried during too short a time? Not so; it has been going on during ages. The cause of the failure then is plain. Our whole system has been unsound. We have applied the principle of free competition to a case to which that principle is not applicable.

20 But, Sir, if the state of the southern part of our island has furnished me with one strong argument, the state of the northern part furnishes me with another argument, which is, if possible, still more decisive. A hundred and fifty years ago England was one of the best governed and most prosperous countries in the world; Scotland was perhaps the rudest and poorest country that could lay any claim to civilisation. The name of Scotchman was then uttered in this part of the island with contempt. The ablest Scotch statesmen contemplated the degraded state of their poorer countrymen with a feeling approaching to despair. It is well known that Fletcher of Saltoun, a brave and accomplished man, a man who had drawn his sword for liberty, who had suffered proscription and exile for liberty, was so much disgusted and dismayed by the misery, the ignorance, the idleness, the lawlessness of the common people, that he proposed to make many thousands of them slaves. Nothing, he thought, but the discipline which kept order and enforced exertion among the negroes of a sugar colony, nothing but the lash and the stocks, could reclaim the vagabonds who infested every part of Scotland from their indolent and predatory habits, and compel them to support themselves by steady labour. He therefore, soon after the Revolution, published a pamphlet, in which he earnestly and, as I believe, from the mere impulse of humanity and patriotism, recommended to the Estates of the Realm this sharp remedy, which alone, as he conceived, could remove the evil. Within a few months after the publication of that pamphlet a very different remedy was applied. The Parliament which sat at Edinburgh passed an act for the establishment of parochial schools. What followed? An improvement such

as the world had never seen took place in the moral and intellectual character of the people. Soon, in spite of the rigour of the climate, in spite of the sterility of the earth, Scotland became a country which had no reason to envy the fairest portions of the globe. Wherever the Scotchman went—and there were few parts of the world to which he did not go—he carried his superiority with him. If he was admitted into a public office, he worked his way up to the highest post. If he got employment in a brewery or a factory, he was soon the foreman. If he took a shop, his trade was the best in the street. If he enlisted in the army, he became a colour-serjeant. If he went to a colony, he was the most thriving planter there. The Scotchman of the seventeenth century had been spoken of in London as we speak of the Esquimaux. The Scotchman of the eighteenth century was an object, not of scorn, but of envy. The cry was that, wherever he came, he got more than his share; that, mixed with Englishmen or mixed with Irishmen, he rose to the top as surely as oil rises to the top of water. And what had produced this great revolution? The Scotch air was still as cold, the Scotch rocks were still as bare as ever. All the natural qualities of the Scotchman were still what they had been when learned and benevolent men advised that he should be flogged, like a beast of burden, to his daily task. But the State had given him an education. That education was not, it is true, in all respects what it should have been. But, such as it was, it had done more for the bleak and dreary shores of the Forth and the Clyde than the richest of soils and the most genial of climates had done for Capua and Tarentum. Is there one member of this House, however strongly he may hold the doctrine that the Government ought not to interfere with the education of the people, who will stand up and say that, in his opinion, the Scotch would now have been a happier and a more enlightened people if they had been left, during the last five generations, to find instruction for themselves?

21 I say then, Sir, that if the science of Government be an experimental science this question is decided. We are in a condition to perform the inductive process according to the rules laid down in the *Novum Organum*. We have two nations closely connected, inhabiting the same island, sprung from the same blood, speaking the same language, governed by the same Sovereign and the same Legislature, holding essentially the same religious faith, having the same allies and the same enemies. Of these two nations one was, a hundred and fifty years ago, as respects opulence and civilisation, in the highest rank among European communities; the other in the lowest rank. The opulent and highly civilised nation leaves the education of the people to free competition. In the poor and half barbarous nation the education of the people is undertaken by the State. The result is that the first are last and the last first. The common people of Scotland—it is vain to disguise the truth—have passed the common people of England. Free com-

petition, tried with every advantage, has produced effects of which, as the Congregational Union tell us, we ought to be ashamed and which must lower us in the opinion of every intelligent foreigner. State education, tried under every disadvantage, has produced an improvement to which it would be difficult to find a parallel in any age or country. Such an experiment as this would be regarded as conclusive in surgery or chemistry, and ought, I think, to be regarded as equally conclusive in politics.

22 These, Sir, are the reasons which have satisfied me that it is the duty of the State to educate the people. Being firmly convinced of that truth, I shall not shrink from proclaiming it here and elsewhere, in defiance of the loudest clamour that agitators can raise. The remainder of my task is easy. For if the great principle for which I have been contending is admitted, the objections which have been made to the details of our plan will vanish fast. I will deal with those objections in the order in which they stand in the amendment moved by the honourable Member for Finsbury.

23 First among his objections he places the cost. Surely, Sir, no person who admits that it is our duty to train the minds of the rising generation can think a hundred thousand pounds too large a sum for that purpose. If we look at the matter in the lowest point of view, if we consider human beings merely as producers of wealth, the difference between an intelligent and a stupid population, estimated in pounds, shillings, and pence, exceeds a hundredfold the proposed outlay. Nor is this all. For every pound that you have saved in education, you will spend five in prosecution, in prisons, in penal settlements. I cannot believe that the House, having never grudged anything that was asked for the purpose of maintaining order and protecting property by means of pain and fear, will begin to be niggardly as soon as it is proposed to effect the same objects by making the people wiser and better.

24 The next objection made by the honourable Member to our plan is that it will increase the influence of the Crown. This sum of a hundred thousand pounds may, he apprehends, be employed in corruption and jobbing. Those schoolmasters who vote for ministerial candidates will obtain a share of the grant; those schoolmasters who vote for opponents of the ministry will apply for assistance in vain. Sir, the honourable Member never would have made this objection if he had taken the trouble to understand the minutes which he has condemned. We propose to place this part of the public expenditure under checks which must make such abuses as the honourable Member anticipates morally impossible. Not only will there be those ordinary checks which are thought sufficient to prevent the misapplication of the many millions annually granted for the army, the navy, the ordnance, the civil government; not only must the Ministers of the Crown come every year to this House for a vote and be prepared to render an account of the manner in which they have laid out what had been voted in

the preceding year; but when they have satisfied the House, when they have got their vote, they will still be unable to distribute the money at their discretion. Whatever they may do for any schoolmaster must be done in concert with those persons who, in the district where the schoolmaster lives, take an interest in education and contribute out of their private means to the expense of education. When the honourable gentleman is afraid that we shall corrupt the schoolmasters, he forgets, first, that we do not appoint the schoolmasters; secondly, that we cannot dismiss the schoolmasters; thirdly, that managers who are altogether independent of us can, without our consent, dismiss the schoolmasters; and fourthly, that without the recommendation of those managers we can give nothing to the schoolmasters. Observe, too, that such a recommendation will not be one of those recommendations which goodnatured easy people are too apt to give to everybody who asks; nor will it at all resemble those recommendations which the Secretary of the Treasury is in the habit of receiving. For every pound which we pay on the recommendation of the managers, the managers themselves must pay two pounds. They must also provide the schoolmaster with a house out of their own funds before they can obtain for him a grant from the public funds. What chance of jobbing is there here? It is common enough, no doubt, for a Member of Parliament who votes with Government to ask that one of those who zealously supported him at the last election may have a place in the Excise or the Customs. But such a member would soon cease to solicit if the answer were, "Your friend shall have a place of fifty pounds a year, if you will give him a house and settle on him an income of a hundred a year." What chance then, I again ask, is there of jobbing? What, say some of the dissenters of Leeds, is to prevent a Tory Government, a High Church Government, from using this parliamentary grant to corrupt the schoolmasters of our borough and to induce them to use all their influence in favour of a Tory and High Church candidate? Why, Sir, the dissenters of Leeds themselves have the power to prevent it. Let them subscribe to the schools; let them take a share in the management of the schools; let them refuse to recommend to the Committee of Council any schoolmaster whom they suspect of having voted at any election from corrupt motives; and the thing is done. Our plan, in truth, is made up of checks. My only doubt is whether the checks may not be found too numerous and too stringent. On our general conduct there is the ordinary check, the parliamentary check. And, as respects those minute details which it is impossible that this House can investigate, we shall be checked, in every town and in every rural district, by boards consisting of independent men zealous in the cause of education.

25 The truth is, Sir, that those who clamour most loudly against our plan have never thought of ascertaining what it is. I see that a gentleman, who

ought to have known better, has not been ashamed publicly to tell the world that our plan will cost the nation two millions a year and will paralyse all the exertions of individuals to educate the people. These two assertions are uttered in one breath. And yet, if he who made them had read our minutes before he railed at them, he would have seen that his predictions are contradictory; that they cannot both be fulfilled; that, if individuals do not exert themselves, the country will have to pay nothing; and that, if the country has to pay two millions, it will be because individuals have exerted themselves with such wonderful, such incredible, vigour as to raise four millions by voluntary contributions.

26 The next objection made by the honourable Member for Finsbury is that we have acted unconstitutionally and have encroached on the functions of Parliament. The Committee of Council he seems to consider as an unlawful assembly. He calls it sometimes a self-elected body and sometimes a self-appointed body. Sir, these are words without meaning. The Committee is no more a self-elected body than the Board of Trade. It is a body appointed by the Queen; and in appointing it, Her Majesty has exercised, under the advice of her responsible Ministers, a prerogative as old as the monarchy. But, says the honourable Member, the constitutional course would have been to apply for an Act of Parliament. On what ground? Nothing but an Act of Parliament can legalise that which is illegal. But whoever heard of an Act of Parliament to legalise what was already beyond all dispute legal? Of course, if we wished to send aliens out of the country or to detail disaffected persons in custody without bringing them to trial, we must obtain an Act of Parliament empowering us to do so. But why should we ask for an Act of Parliament to empower us to do what anybody may do, what the honourable Member for Finsbury may do? Is there any doubt that he or anybody else may subscribe to a school, give a stipend to a monitor, or settle a retiring pension on a preceptor who has done good service? What any of the Queen's subjects may do the Queen may do. Suppose that her privy purse were so large that she could afford to employ a hundred thousand pounds in this beneficent manner; would an Act of Parliament be necessary to enable her to do so? Every part of our plan may lawfully be carried into execution by any person, Sovereign or subject, who has the inclination and the money. We have not the money; and for the money we come, in a strictly constitutional manner, to the House of Commons. The course which we have taken is in conformity with all precedent, as well as with all principle. There are military schools. No Act of Parliament was necessary to authorise the establishing of such schools. All that was necessary was a grant of money to defray the charge. When I was Secretary at War it was my duty to bring under Her Majesty's notice the situation of the female children of her soldiers. Many such children accompanied every regiment, and their educa-

tion was grievously neglected. Her Majesty was graciously pleased to sign a warrant by which a girls' school was attached to each corps. No act of Parliament was necessary. For to set up a school where girls might be taught to read and write and sew and cook was perfectly legal already. I might have set it up myself, if I had been rich enough. All that I had to ask from Parliament was the money. But I ought to beg pardon for arguing a point so clear.

27 The next objection to our plans is that they interfere with the religious convictions of Her Majesty's subjects. It has been sometimes insinuated, but it has never been proved, that the Committee of Council has shown undue favour to the Established Church. Sir, I have carefully read and considered the minutes; and I wish that every man who has exerted his eloquence against them had done the same. I say that I have carefully read and considered them and that they seem to me to have been drawn up with exemplary impartiality. The benefits which we offer we offer to people of all religious persuasions alike. The dissenting managers of schools will have equal authority with the managers who belong to the Church. A boy who goes to meeting will be just as eligible to be a monitor and will receive just as large a stipend, as if he went to the cathedral. The schoolmaster who is a nonconformist and the schoolmaster who is a conformist will enjoy the same emoluments and will, after the same term of service, obtain, on the same conditions, the same retiring pension. I wish that some gentleman would, instead of using vague phrases about religious liberty and the rights of conscience, answer this plain question. Suppose that in one of our large towns there are four schools, a school connected with the Church, a school connected with the Independents, a Baptist school, and a Wesleyan school; what encouragement, pecuniary or honorary, will, by our plan, be given to the school connected with the Church, and withheld from any of the other three schools? Is it not indeed plain that, if by neglect or maladministration the Church school should get into a bad state, while the dissenting schools flourish, the dissenting schools will receive public money and the Church school will receive none?

28 It is true, I admit, that in rural districts which are too poor to support more than one school the religious community to which the majority belongs will have an advantage over other religious communities. But this is not our fault. If we are as impartial as it is possible to be, you surely do not expect more. If there should be a parish containing nine hundred churchmen and a hundred dissenters, if there should, in that parish, be a school connected with the Church, if the dissenters in that parish should be too poor to set up another school, undoubtedly the school connected with the Church will, in that parish, get all that we give; and the dissenters will get nothing. But observe that there is no partiality to the Church, as the Church, in this

arrangement. The churchmen get public money, not because they are churchmen, but because they are the majority. The dissenters get nothing, not because they are dissenters but because they are a small minority. There are districts where the case will be reversed, where there will be dissenting schools, and no Church schools. In such cases, the dissenters will get what we have to give, and the churchmen will get nothing.

29 But, Sir, I ought not to say that a churchman gets nothing by a system which gives a good education to dissenters, or that a dissenter gets nothing by a system which gives a good education to churchmen. We are not, I hope, so much conformists, or so much nonconformists, as to forget that we are Englishmen and Christians. We all, Churchmen, Presbyterians, Independents, Baptists, Methodists, have an interest in this, that the great body of the people should be rescued from ignorance and barbarism. I mentioned Lord George Gordon's mob. That mob began, it is true, with the Roman Catholics; but long before the tumults were over, there was not a respectable Protestant in London who was not in fear for his house, for his limbs, for his life, for the lives of those who were dearest to him. The honourable Member for Finsbury says that we call on men to pay for an education from which they derive no benefit. I deny that there is one honest and industrious man in the country who derives no benefit from living among honest and industrious neighbours rather than among rioters and vagabonds. This matter is as much a matter of common concern as the defence of our coast. Suppose that I were to say, "Why do you tax me to fortify Portsmouth? If the people of Portsmouth think that they cannot be safe without bastions and ravelins, let the people of Portsmouth pay the engineers and masons. Why am I to bear the charge of works from which I derive no advantage?" You would answer, and most justly, that there is no man in the island who does not derive advantage from these works, whether he resides within them or not. And, as every man, in whatever part of the island he may live, is bound to contribute to the support of those arsenals which are necessary for our common security, so is every man, to whatever sect he may belong, bound to contribute to the support of those schools on which, not less than on our arsenals, our common security depends.

30 I now come to the last words of the amendment. The honourable Member for Finsbury is apprehensive that our plan may interfere with the civil rights of Her Majesty's subjects. How a man's civil rights can be prejudiced by his learning to read and write, to multiply and divide, or even by his obtaining some knowledge of history and geography, I do not very well apprehend. One thing is clear, that persons sunk in that ignorance in which, as we are assured by the Congregational Union, great numbers of our countrymen are sunk, can be free only in name. It is hardly necessary for us to appoint a Select Committee for the purpose of inquiring whether knowl-

edge be the ally or the enemy of liberty. He is, I must say, but a shortsighted friend of the common people who is eager to bestow on them a franchise which would make them all-powerful, and yet would withhold from them that instruction without which their power must be a curse to themselves and to the State.

31 This, Sir, is my defence. From the clamour of our accusers I appeal with confidence to the country to which we must, in no long time, render an account of our stewardship. I appeal with still more confidence to future generations, which while enjoying all the blessings of an impartial and efficient system of public instruction, will find it difficult to believe that the authors of that system should have had to struggle with a vehement and pertinacious opposition, and still more difficult to believe that such an opposition was offered in the name of civil and religious freedom.

ANALYSIS OF MACAULAY'S SPEECH

WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON ITS ARRANGEMENT

Macaulay's speech is a fruitful document for the study of the topics of argument, and students might well spend time analyzing the operation of the topics in this piece of deliberative discourse. But although we will frequently refer to the arguments in the speech, the chief emphasis in this analysis will be upon the arrangement and function of the various parts.

Several contemporaries have testified that Macaulay's delivery was quite unprepossessing. He spoke rapidly, with very little modulation and inflection of the voice and with few gestures. But for all that, he was a remarkably effective parliamentary orator. His speeches on the First Reform Bill, on Copyright, and on the Ten Hours Bill are regarded as classics of English oratory. It was the substance and style of his speeches which proved so effective with his audiences. As Lord Lytton, one of his political opponents, said of him: "It was certainly, however, the brilliant art with which his speeches were composed upon oratorical principles, both as to arrangement of argument and liveliness of phraseology, that gave them that prodigious effect which they (at least the earlier ones) produced upon a mixed audience, and entitles this eminent personage to the fame of a very considerable orator." Let us analyze Macaulay's strategy in selecting and disposing his arguments in order to win over the opponents of the proposed bill.

Throughout this chapter on arrangement we have repeatedly observed that it is impossible, in the abstract, to lay down any hard and fast precepts about the proper disposition of the material one has gathered in the process of invention. Considerations of the occasion, the subject matter, the personality of the speaker or writer, the temper of the audience will dictate

what the speaker or writer will have to do. Now we have a specific instance, and we can at least speculate about the decisions this particular orator made on this particular occasion.

First of all, let us look at the over-all organization of the speech:

Introduction (paragraphs 1-3).

Proof (paragraphs 4-30)

A. Confirmation of his own views (paragraphs 4-22)

B. Refutation of objections (paragraphs 23-30)

Conclusion (paragraph 30)

A number of things are immediately apparent from this overview of the speech. First of all, it is notable how small a proportion of this long speech (about 9500 words) is devoted to the introduction and the conclusion. Secondly, one notes that there is no statement of fact. (We shall try to account for this proportion and this omission when we study the parts in detail.) Thirdly, one observes that Macaulay devotes the major portion of his speech (eighteen paragraphs) to the *positive* arguments in support of his stand.

Now let us study the strategy of the several parts. As we observed earlier in this chapter, the introduction does one or both of two things—it informs and/or disposes an audience. In the first paragraph of this introduction, Macaulay explains why he feels obliged to challenge the Member for Finsbury: he must vindicate himself from the implied charge that he has promoted this education bill out of base motives. He is hinting here that if he can prove his case, he will, indirectly, remove the taint on his *ethos*. This is primarily a deliberative discourse, but because of the subsidiary purpose—exonerating himself—it has overtones of judicial discourse. So the first paragraph was intended principally to dispose the audience favorably by exerting an ethical appeal.

In the second paragraph of the introduction, Macaulay is doing two things: he explains why he cannot follow the order of his opponent's speech, and he is prejudicing the audience against his opponent. It would be a strategic mistake, Macaulay explains, to follow the order of his opponent's speech, because his opponent has avoided any discussion of the central issue in this matter: whether the State has any right or duty to interfere in the education of its citizens. If he were to avoid discussing this issue he could not exonerate himself or help the cause of his colleagues. By pointing out his opponent's avoidance of this central issue, Macaulay raises grave doubts in the minds of his hearers about the good sense and good will of his opponent. How could a man, seriously bent on forestalling the passage of the bill now before the House, avoid discussing the principle that is at the heart of the matter?

The third paragraph of the introduction is a transitional paragraph in which Macaulay informs his audience of how he will proceed in the argumentative part of his discourse. He will set forth, unequivocally, how he himself stands on the basic issue and then give the reasons for the stand he takes. In other words, Macaulay has decided that the better strategy in this case is to present his case first and then proceed to refute the objections. As was observed earlier in this chapter, when one has confidence in the strength of one's case, it is usually better to present that case first. Once the audience has been exposed to the cogency of one's case, the audience will be inclined to recognize more readily the weakness of the opposing case when one proceeds to the refutation.

Paragraph 4 marks Macaulay's entry into the argumentative part of the discourse. As we observed, this speech lacks the statement of fact, because in this instance there is no need to rehearse the state of the case. The members of the House know the facts; they have been discussing the matter for several days already. Macaulay is not going to risk boring his audience by laboring the obvious. He realizes that he must spend most of his time on the podium trying to sway any doubtful colleagues to his point of view.

The first sentence of paragraph 4—"it is the right and the duty of the State to provide means of education for the common people"—is the conclusion that Macaulay hopes to establish in his speech. The major premise upon which this conclusion is based is stated at the end of this paragraph—"it is the duty of every government to take order for giving security to the persons and property of the members of the community." Since there is universal agreement about this function of government, Macaulay does not have to spend time proving the truth of this proposition. What he has to prove is the truth of his minor premise.

This minor premise is presented in the first sentence of the next paragraph—"the education of the common people is a most effectual means of securing our persons and our property." The rest of the *confirmation* portion of the speech is devoted to a series of arguments—arguments from example, from testimony, from analogy—to prove that educating the common people is the best means of "securing our persons and our property."

We see then what great care Macaulay has taken to orient his audience at the outset of his speech. He exposes his ground-plan and makes it very clear what he is seeking to do. The human mind naturally delights in the perception of order of any kind, and when it is alerted at the outset to a plan, it is prepared to follow the working out of that plan. There will be times—especially when our case is weak or when an audience is unusually hostile—when it is better to conceal our plan until we are well launched into our argument. But since Macaulay has confidence in the strength of his case and since he knows that most of the members of the House concur with him,

he decides to take advantage of what can be gained by “ordering” his discourse at the outset and thereby revealing his strategy.

The first argument that Macaulay presents in paragraph 5 is an argument from testimony. And it is notable that the *first* authority he cites in support of his minor premise is Adam Smith. Adam Smith was a judicious choice, because after the publication of his *Wealth of Nations* (1776) he was generally regarded as the foremost champion of the free-enterprise system in political economy. Macaulay realizes that the people he has to convince are those who are fearful of government interference in the political, economic, and social affairs of men. What an advantage it will be to him if he can enlist in support of his contention the man who represents, for the unconvinced, the chief spokesman of the laissez-faire philosophy. Fortunately for his cause, Macaulay finds Adam Smith to be “an available means of persuasion” in this case, for Adam Smith had once contended that the education of the poor *was* the proper business of the Commonwealth.

To demonstrate how wise Adam Smith’s contention was, Macaulay cites examples, in the rest of paragraph 5 and in paragraph 6, of what happens when the Commonwealth does not take care for the education of the poor. There were No Popery riots led by Lord George Gordon in 1780, four years after Adam Smith made his unheeded recommendation, and there were subsequent riots in the industrial counties of the North.

In paragraphs 4-7 Macaulay has set forth, briefly and cogently, his main argument, summarizing it in the form of a syllogism in paragraph 7. And as we have seen, it is strategically advisable to advance positive arguments and a strong argument first, *when our case is strong*. But if Macaulay now leaves unanswered the major objection to his main argument, there will linger in the minds of the opposing faction the suspicion that he has avoided the opposing argument because it is stronger than his own argument. So he must meet this opposing argument head on, and this he does in paragraphs 8-10.

“And what is the alternative?” Macaulay asks at the beginning of paragraph 8. In meeting the opposing argument, he sets up an either-or situation. A government, he says, can protect persons and property either by educating the people or by putting people in prison. We can ignore the question of whether these are the *only* alternatives. Macaulay is merely taking advantage of the fact that the opposition has proposed punitive measures as the alternative to educating the people. In other words, since the opposition has not suggested other ways in which the government can fulfill its acknowledged duty to protect the lives and property of its citizens, Macaulay can deal exclusively with the alternative that the opposition *has* proposed.

In paragraph 9, Macaulay cites the example of what happened in Monmouthshire to show that punitive measures are ineffectual in protecting the

lives and property of the people. In the short paragraph 10, Macaulay generalizes from this single example: education of the people is not only *a* means but the *best* means of attaining the chief end of a government.

In paragraph 11, Macaulay attempts to reinforce his generalization by presenting another example—the example of the Protestant Dissenters in Massachusetts. By citing this example, Macaulay again displays his great rhetorical skill. Most of the opposition to state-supported schools in England was coming from Dissenting groups—sects like the Puritans, Baptists, Independents, and Methodists. Macaulay realizes how impressive it will be if he cites the example of what the Puritans who emigrated to the New World did when they established their commonwealths. They immediately made provisions for the establishment of public schools in every township. Macaulay then cites the testimony of men like William Penn, George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson—men who were wary of government interference—in support of his contention that it is prudent to educate the common people.

In paragraphs 12-15, Macaulay returns to the opposing argument in a further attempt to refute it. His main efforts here are devoted to a highly emotional appeal, in paragraph 13, calculated to reduce to absurdity the view that “Government is simply a great hangman,” and to his refutation, in paragraphs 14 and 15, of the analogical argument that if free competition is a good thing in business affairs, it must be a good thing in education.

In paragraphs 16-19, Macaulay counters the argument he has just refuted, with an analogical argument of his own: just as government ought to provide for the national defense, so it ought to provide for the education of the people. He supports his own argument with an argument of David Hume—another Dissenter—who maintained that some vocations are necessary for the well-being of society but will not be undertaken unless there is adequate compensation offered. Since teaching is one of those vital vocations that private enterprise is not likely to compensate adequately, the government should assume the responsibility of rewarding the schoolmaster. Up to this point, however, the government has not supported public education, and the result has been mass illiteracy, a condition that is confirmed by statistics from various sources, which, Macaulay shrewdly reminds his audience, is the Congregational Union, a Nonconformist agency.

Macaulay saves his most impressive example until last—the example of what state-supported education has accomplished in Scotland (paragraphs 20-21). The reminder about the educational system in Scotland must have been particularly impressive to the Dissenters in Macaulay’s audience, because Scotland, with its national religion of Presbyterianism, was a stronghold of the Nonconformist spirit. The example of Scotland was impressive for another reason too. By showing how Scotland, with far fewer physical and economic advantages, had outstripped England in the matter of ele-

mentary education, Macaulay must have piqued the patriotic pride of Englishmen.

Paragraph 22 is a transitional paragraph, signaling the end of his argument for the principle enunciated at the beginning of paragraph 4 and preparing the audience for the next section of the speech—the refutation of the specific objections made by the Member for Finsbury. If there was any doubt about Macaulay’s choosing to delay answering the objections until this point in the speech, the doubt would be cleared up by Macaulay’s own statement in this paragraph. “For if the great principle for which I have been contending is admitted,” Macaulay says here, “the objections which have been made to the details of our plan will vanish fast.” Macaulay also reveals something about the arrangement of the following section: he will deal with the objections in the order in which they were proposed in the amendment of the Member for Finsbury. Also, the audience can more easily check that he has answered *all* of the objections. He might have adopted another order—for instance, dealing with the most serious objection first, then going on to the next most serious—but by choosing to follow his opponent’s order, he subtly discloses his confidence that he can easily demolish the objections—in whatever order they come.

In paragraphs 23-30, Macaulay states and refutes in turn each of the five objections leveled against the proposed bill:

1. Objection to the cost of the bill (paragraph 23)
2. Objection to the increased influence of the Crown (paragraphs 24-25)
3. Objection to the unconstitutionality of the proposed bill (paragraph 26)
4. Objection to the interference with the religious convictions of the people (paragraphs 27-29)
5. Objection to the interference with the civil rights of the people (paragraph 30)

By the time Macaulay comes to his conclusion in paragraph 30, he has been haranguing his colleagues for at least an hour. He could now launch into a peroration that would briefly recapitulate his arguments, reinforce his ethical appeal, and rouse his audience to the proper emotional pitch. Instead, he concludes his speech with three sentences (99 words) of successively greater length.

Macaulay must have sensed that nothing more was to be gained, *with this particular audience*, by prolonging his speech. By this time, the audience has been subjected to so much debate on this matter that they will be grateful to the orator who sits down when he has made his point. These members of the House of Commons, who are being asked to appropriate a large sum of money, are hardheaded, practical men answerable to their constituents. Under the circumstances, they are not likely to be susceptible to emotional

appeal. They are going to be impressed by arguments which prove, or at least persuade them, that this measure is worthy, advantageous, or feasible. So Macaulay contents himself in the conclusion with a brief appeal: a reminder that the members of the House are accountable (1) to all the citizens of the country, and (2) to future generations. That reminder will prompt his audience to weigh the moral importance of their forthcoming vote.

ROBERT M. HUTCHINS:

MORALS, RELIGION, AND HIGHER EDUCATION

This is an essay by a well-known educator and professional writer on another problem connected with education. Robert M. Hutchins, former Chancellor of the University of Chicago and now President of the Fund for the Republic (a Ford Foundation agency), originally delivered this discourse as the Bedell Lecture at Kenyon College in October 1948, but later adapted the speech for inclusion in a collection of his essays entitled Freedom, Education, and the Fund: Essays and Addresses, 1946-1956 (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 81-100. Reprinted by permission of the author.

1 This essay is an inquiry into problems that are among the hardest in education. I cannot pretend that I have solved any of them. The inquiry will take us through some of the solutions that have been offered. If in the process it appears that these solutions are inadequate, I beg the reader not to despair; for it may be possible to discover solutions that may be workable and sound. I believe that higher education can make a unique contribution to morals and religion. I do not believe that it can make some of the contributions expected of it, and I think that these expectations obscure the real purposes and achievements of higher education. The object of this essay must therefore be rather more to clear the ground than to erect a building. I can regard the building attempted here as at best a very modest structure, which will accomplish more than I am entitled to hope for it if it serves as temporary shelter to those who may design the ultimate edifice.

2 The essay uses the words "morals," "religion," and "higher education" in a definite sense. The sense may be wrong, but it is consistently employed. By morals I mean good habits. Good habits are those which are good for the organism in question. To know what is good for an organism, you have to know the nature of that organism. If man is an animal like any other, then there is no reason why we should expect him to have habits any different from the other animals. For by good habits we do not mean obedience to conventions. That lies in the sphere of etiquette, rather than morals, and we are concerned here with morals.

3 For example, the Kinsey Report has no moral significance. The Report

seems to proceed on the assumption that, since man is an animal like any other, and since morals are purely conventional, a moral revolution may be effected by showing that we do not live according to the conventions we profess. To show that men do not live according to the conventions they profess merely shows that they do not live according to the conventions they profess. It shows nothing at all about what is good for man or what is bad for him. The fact that a great many men may be doing what is bad for them is neither new nor relevant. A man may change a convention by getting the leaders of society to join him in breaking it. A man cannot change bad to good even if he gets all his fellow-men to conspire with him.

4 By religion I mean belief in and obedience to God. This may not require adherence to a church or creed; but it demands religious faith. Faith is not reason, but it is something more than a vague, sentimental desire to do good and be good. The problem of faith and reason has agitated mankind for centuries, and I could not deal with it here, even if I knew how. But the kind of religion I am talking about is one that is sustained by both reason and faith. We see in St. Augustine's *Confessions* the way in which a man may come to the sort of religious conviction that has meaning. St. Augustine's conversion followed after tremendous wrestling with the intellectual difficulties of Christianity and was prepared by the conquest of those difficulties.

5 By higher education I mean that education which takes place in institutions beyond the secondary level as secondary education is usually defined. I mean the education that is given by the colleges and universities of this country. I do not believe that these institutions are properly organized. The college should occupy the area now uneasily filled by the last two years of high school and the first two years of college, and the university should begin its work at the beginning of the conventional junior year in college. But for the purposes of this essay I am willing to regard all the colleges of the United States as offering higher education. I am willing to include all universities, too, even though I believe that a university is a place where all professors and all students are engaged in independent study, and in this view a true university has not yet arisen in our country.

6 We are concerned, then, with what goes on or with what should go on in certain institutions, in institutions of a certain kind. And it is important to notice that what goes on or should go on in these institutions is severely limited to what can go on in them. What can go on in them is in part determined by the age of the students with whom they have to deal and by the length of time that they spend in the institutions. At any university, if an alumnus "succeeds" in later life, it is customary for the university to take the credit for it; if he goes to the penitentiary, it is said that he was bad material and should never have been admitted. President Truman's Com-

mission on Higher Education sees the student going to college in the moral and intellectual state of the newborn babe and graduating four, or even two, years later as a mature and autonomous member of society. The Commission, like most people who know far less about education, places on the educational institution a responsibility for the total development of the individual by starting and ending with the wrong assumptions.

7 The assumption that a college freshman has no habits is in obvious contradiction to the facts of life. The assumption that if he has no habits, or, if his habits are all bad, he can acquire in four years a set of good habits that will last all his life is certainly naive. My guess is that eighteen is a greater age than we who are past it are willing to admit. It is flattering to us, and it makes our work easier, to feel that our students are children who can do nothing and learn little without our help and supervision; but to suppose that a boy or girl of eighteen has been unaffected by his home and by society is not merely factually inaccurate; it gives higher education a false conception of its task and its possibilities; and it must contribute to that prolongation of adolescence which is so distressing a feature of American life.

8. We are concerned here, then, with what certain institutions can do in a certain period of time with certain people of a certain age.¹ And in each institution there will be a certain number of these young people, and usually a number larger than one per instructor. Rousseau's *Émile* contains some interesting educational suggestions, but it can help us in the solution of few of the practical problems that affect an educational system: *Émile* had a tutor and never went to school.² We are discussing what can be done in scholastic institutions at a certain level.

9 John Stuart Mill faced this question in his inaugural address at St. Andrew's. He said: "No one can dispense with an education directed expressly to the moral as well as the intellectual part of his being. Such education, so far as it is direct, is either moral or religious; and these may either be treated as distinct or as different aspects of the same thing. The subject we are now considering is not education as a whole, but scholastic education, and we must keep in view the inevitable limitations of what schools and universities can do. It is beyond their power to educate morally or religiously. Moral and religious education consist in training the feelings and the daily habits; and these are, in the main, beyond the sphere and inaccessible to the

¹ "We must remember that the whole problem of intellectual education is controlled by lack of time. If Methuselah was not an educated man, it was his own fault or that of his teachers" (A. N. Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*, p. 96).

² Cf.: "All Souls College, Oxford, planned better than it knew when it limited the number of its undergraduates to four; four is exactly the right number for any college which is really intent on getting results" (Albert Jay Nock, *Memoirs of a Superfluous Man*, Vol. III, chap. 3).

control of public education. It is the home, the family, which gives us the moral or religious education we really receive; and this is completed, and modified, sometimes for the better, often for the worse, by society and the opinions and feelings with which we are there surrounded."

10 So Cardinal Newman insisted over and over again that the purpose of a university was intellectual and not moral. The utilitarian philosopher and the Catholic theologian came to the same conclusion, though perhaps for different reasons. To the role of the family Newman adds that of the church, which, characteristically, Mill does not mention in his discussion of moral and religious education. They both hold that it is beyond the power of higher education to educate morally and religiously. Both Newman and Mill view the world about them as containing various agencies and institutions, each with a purpose of its own. The sphere of the family or the church is not the sphere of educational institutions; the sphere of educational institutions is not that of the family or the church.

11 Mill and Newman were writing in the nineteenth century, when both church and family were more effective in their spheres than they are today. Would their conclusion be any different now, when, we are told, the family is disintegrating and the church is dying? I think not. Even if they assumed that the family was going to pieces and the church on the way to extinction, Newman and Mill would hardly suppose that the way to revive these institutions was to turn over their functions to another agency. This could only guarantee the destruction of the family and the church. And, if the attempt were made to turn their functions over to the educational system, it would guarantee the increasing confusion of that agency. If we can find out what the proper function of the education system is, we shall discover at the same time, I am sure, that the performance of that function will require all the attention and intelligence that the educational system can command.

12 Mill emphasizes another point: some phases of human development are determined by the impact of society in adult life. In our time the impact of society, particularly as it makes itself felt through what are called the media of mass communication, of which Mill and Newman were fortunately ignorant, is, I think, the most important factor in moral and cultural development. I do not see how any educational system can be expected to cope with the comic book, the radio, the motion picture, the slick-paper magazine, television, and the sensational press. The tremendous skill and the enormous resources available to these moral and cultural agencies make them more influential in molding the lives of our people than the whole educational system. And even if the educational system had more money and more skill, as it certainly should have, there appears to be a kind of Gresham's law of culture, under which bad stuff drives out good. Probably because of original sin, human beings seem to prefer demoralization to improvement.

13 The usual answer to this is that we shall educate human beings to be better and to prefer to be better than worse. This seems to me to overlook the limited time that the educational system has at its disposal and the limited influence that it can therefore have upon the lives of those who, even while they are temporarily committed to its care, are soaking up through every pore poisons transmitted by every device that the triumphs of science and technology now make it possible to subject them to.

14 An officer of the General Electric Company has lately commented on cultural benefits conferred upon us by television. He said that the principal market for television sets was saloons and that therefore the contribution of this triumph of science and technology to the advance of civilization was more booze, less fresh air, and the same old ball game.

15 In *A Study of History* Mr. Toynbee deals at length with the stumbling blocks that have prevented universal free education from ushering in a new era of happiness and well-being for Western society. The dangerous consequence of the introduction of universal free education in Great Britain in 1870, Toynbee argues, was the triumph of yellow journalism—and later the movies—which succeeded in creating an intellectual tyranny more deadening than the illiteracy from which free schooling had rescued the masses.³ The only remedy to this situation, Toynbee continues, is to raise the level of mass cultivation.⁴

16 We must heartily agree with Mr. Toynbee that it is desirable to raise the level of mass cultivation. From the point of view of Mr. Toynbee's aims, universal liberal education, rather than universal schooling, is indicated. But to hope that even the best training in criticism can cope with the constant storm of triviality and propaganda that now beats upon the citizen seems to me to expect too much of any educational system. Such training should certainly be given, and given to everybody. But an educational system cannot reform a society, and Mr. Toynbee is calling for nothing less.

17 I can pursue this subject no further, for that way madness lies. I can only assume that the educational system will continue to do its best in the hope that some day a sort of mass conversion will overtake our people, and they will want to be better. If they do not want to be better, the educational system cannot make them so. And the educational system cannot make them want to be so. All it can do is to offer an opportunity and, perhaps, an

³ (London, 1939), IV, 193-94; also *ibid.*, p. 196.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 196-7; cf. Aldous Huxley, *Science, Liberty, and Peace* (New York, 1946), p. 9: "But in actual historical fact the spread of free compulsory education, and, along with it, the cheapening and acceleration of the older methods of printing, have almost everywhere been followed by an increase in the power of ruling oligarchies at the expense of the masses."

example of which those who wish to swim against the tide can avail themselves. It is, of course, imperative that this opportunity and this example should constantly be held before our people.

18 Let us return to Newman and Mill. They do not say that moral and religious education is unimportant. On the contrary, they both feel that moral and religious education is more important than intellectual education. So do I. The question is not whether moral and religious education is important, but what colleges and universities can do about it. No one would favor a nation of highly intelligent and well-trained robbers, murderers, thieves, arsonists, and forgers. And no one would contend that knowledge of the arts and sciences automatically leads to the development of good moral habits.

19 Aristotle said that it is impossible to be wise without being good, and impossible to be good without being wise. But this cannot be taken to mean that it is impossible to be good without qualifying for the Ph.D. degree. We all know good scholars who are bad men; and I have known some illiterates who seemed good to me. Aristotle meant that it is impossible to be good without being prudent, or practically wise, because the imprudent man does not know how to adjust means to ends; and it is impossible to be prudent, or practically wise, without being good, because the bad man is seeking the wrong ends. Though prudence is a habit of the mind, it seems to me that habit of the mind which higher education is least qualified and least likely to teach. The development of prudence requires long experience and reflection. Aristotle said that young men should not listen to lectures on moral philosophy, because they have had no experience; they would have only the vaguest and most abstract notions of what was under discussion. As I indicated earlier, college and university students are likely to be more mature than we think they are. They are not blank tablets upon which the teacher can write anything he pleases. They have habits, and many, if not most, of them have learned something of religion. But by saying that they are more mature than we think they are I do not mean to say they are mature. They are not experienced adults. It is hard to disagree with Aristotle's principle that subjects that require experience do not convey their full meaning to the inexperienced.

20 For this reason we may lament the low estate of the education of adults in this country. Moral and political philosophy, history, and literature yield up their full lessons only to those who have had the experience to comprehend them. If they are taught to the inexperienced and never taught again, they are never comprehended. A boy will read a few plays of Shakespeare in high school and never look at them for the rest of his life. Shakespeare remains for him a quaint ancient writer who did not know how to spell very well, but who has managed to leave us a large number of quotations for funeral orations and Fourth of July addresses. This does not mean that

Shakespeare should not be taught in high school. It means that if he is read only in high school, we never get more than a fraction of what he has to give us. My favorite illustration is *Macbeth*. When I taught *Macbeth* to students in a preparatory school, it was a blood-and-thunder story. It was a good blood-and-thunder story, and one well worth teaching; but it was a blood-and-thunder story still. *Macbeth* can mean to us what it meant to Shakespeare only if we have had enough experience, vicarious or otherwise, of marriage and ambition to understand the issues and their implications.

21 These considerations suggest that the curriculum in our schools and colleges is upside down. It is assumed that children are primarily interested in the life about them and that subjects dealing with the life about them command their attention and enlist their understanding; hence the increasing prominence of the social studies in the schools. Nothing in my experience suggests that children are more interested in American history than in arithmetic and the stories of ancient Greece. Those subjects which are commonly supposed to be too abstract for the young, like mathematics, grammar, logic, astronomy, and music, are the best subjects for the young precisely because they are abstract. Their comprehension requires no experience or maturity. I see no escape from the proposition that subjects that require experience and maturity cannot be profitably taught to the inexperienced and immature.

22 At any rate it seems to me that higher education probably cannot teach prudence or practical wisdom, that habit of the mind by which we select the right means to the end. Nor can it, I believe, teach good habits of action. It cannot teach morals.

23 The moral virtues are habits, and habits are formed by acts. We can have no assurance that courses in elementary, intermediate, and advanced goodness will be followed by good acts. In fact, such courses seem likely to induce precisely the opposite behavior. The boarding school in the country, and to some extent the college in a small town, may be able to prevent its students from the habitual performance of acts so bad that they violate the law or outrage the conventions. But even this opportunity is denied the metropolitan university, half the students of which live at home, far from the benevolent influence of the dean of men and the dean of women. In any event this kind of control must be of the most superficial and negative order. It will not do to say that higher education should try to prevent crime. What we are seeking to discover is the means by which higher education can promote the formation of good habits; it can hardly hope to do so by courses in how to be good.

24 Nor can it hope to do so by means of extra-curricular activities, at least on that industrial or "big-time" scale with which we in America are familiar. Under this system a few highly trained but somewhat underpaid experts

go through the discipline and sometimes suffer the fate of the gladiators of old while the rest of the college observes their conduct on Saturday afternoons in the spirit of a Roman holiday. I confess I am unable to see what this has to do with morals, religion, or higher education, except as to the experts referred to. They indeed may develop some habits, and some of the habits may be good. The four cardinal virtues are traditionally supposed to be courage, temperance, justice, and prudence; and the athlete may be compelled, in so far as he is an athlete, to give some appearance of them all.

25 The courage that is required to meet the shock of a 225-pound steel-worker imported from Gary, and the temperance required at the training table, and the justice required to obey the rules, and the prudence required to select the right means to the end of victory doubtless bear some relation to the courage, temperance, justice, and prudence that moralists had in mind when they isolated and described the cardinal virtues. But the effect of the activities of the experts on the moral character of the rest of the college must be slight at best. My class never saw Yale win a big game, and it was said of the coach of that time that he had conferred one inestimable moral benefit upon the student body: he had taught them not to bet—or at least not to bet on Yale. I do not depreciate this contribution; for temperance and prudence would seem to forbid gambling. But this contribution, important as it is, seems to me negligible in contrast to the enormous expenditure of time, money, effort, and interest that went into the acquisition of it.

26 Even if extra-curricular activities had the decisively beneficial influence on character that their devotees claim for them, that would hardly help us to answer the question of the special role of higher education in the formation of character; for extra-curricular activities could be conducted more effectively if there were no curriculum at all. They could be and are conducted in YMCA's or Boy Scout encampments, at country clubs and among the Campfire Girls. Extra-curricular activities are not the peculiar property of educational institutions, nor do they serve to clarify the peculiar part that educational institutions can play in the formation of character.

27 Higher education cannot hope to make students good by compulsory religious exercises. If a college or university has decided to be secular, in the sense that it requires no religious tests of its students or faculty, if it wants to appeal to those of no faith, of little faith, and many faiths, it cannot compel worship. It may compel attendance; my classmates came to morning chapel with overcoats over their pajamas and coughed the speaker down.⁵

⁵ There is some reason to believe that this is the group Milton had in mind when he referred to

“...Eli's sons, who fill'd
With lust and violence the house of God.”

(*Paradise Lost*, Bk. I, line 495).

After five years of coughing, compulsory chapel was abolished. There was moaning among some of the trustees, alumni, and faculty; but a college cannot have it both ways. It cannot hold itself out as secular and then demand that its members go through religious ceremonies as a condition of being allowed to continue as members.

28 The great majority of the endowed colleges and universities of this country have long since passed from under the control of the religious groups that founded them; and public institutions seem required by the Constitution to be secular. Yet it must be admitted that religion is of the greatest moral importance. If the whole world practiced Aristotle's *Ethics*, the whole world would be much better off than it is today. But I doubt if any single man, to say nothing of the whole world, can practice Aristotle's *Ethics* without the support and inspiration of religious faith. This Aristotle himself seemed to recognize; for the ideal man whom he holds up to our admiration is one who is almost divine. The modern critic is inclined to scoff at the Aristotelian dictum that men are rational animals. It is no longer fashionable to refer to the rationality of man. But Aristotle was saying not merely that men are rational but also that they are animal.⁶ Because men are animal, because the flesh is weak and life is hard, the moral virtues cannot be consistently practiced without divine aid.

29 Metaphysics and what is called natural theology deal with the ultimate questions. But intellectual history reveals nothing so clearly as their inadequacy for the task. The existence and nature of God, the character and destiny of the human soul, and the salvation of man are problems that remain obscure in the light of natural reason. Or consider human life without religion and history without providence. A perfect theory of democracy can be made out of the metaphysical and ethical writings of Aristotle. But as he himself did not have the fortitude to follow his premises to their conclusions and admit all men to participation in their own government, so it is improbable that the practice of democracy now or in the future can be achieved merely by the demonstration of its reasonableness. Men, simply because they are men, are unlikely to find within themselves the power that can bring the good life and the good state to pass. As Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out in his Gifford lectures, all anthropocentric ethical doctrines fail at this point: they overlook the fallen nature of man and assume that without grace he can reach a terrestrial end to which, almost by definition, no being with such a nature can ever attain.

30 No one could have been more conscious of the dependence of morals upon religion than Cardinal Newman, and it was he who said that the pur-

⁶ "Of new biological standpoints which last century gave us one most fruitful has been that of man as one of the animals. The thought is after all merely a return to the common-sense of Aristotle" (Sherrington, *Man on His Nature*, New York, 1939).

pose of a university was intellectual, not moral. Our question is not whether the educational system can give us everything that is indispensable to the good life. If a college cannot make its students religious, it cannot, to that extent, make them good.

31 Why cannot higher education make its students religious? Why can it not exact a religious commitment from all entering students and apply religious tests determining or affecting their progress through, and graduation from, the institution? Why can it not insist that all members of the faculty shall be members in good standing of Christian churches and shall perform their religious duties with the same regularity and obligation as they now perform their teaching duties?

32 Perhaps a college could do these things, but it would be unfortunate if it did. Faith is one of the theological virtues; it may be deserved, but it is not earned. It is a gift of God. Those who have been denied this gift should not be denied educational opportunities.

33 As to the professors, let us imagine that the college or university has a choice between a man who is a third-rate historian or physicist but an ardent believer and one who is a first-rate historian or physicist and an atheist? Which should it choose? I approach this question with some diffidence, for I am not at all sure of the answer. John Stuart Mill had an answer. He said: "The moral or religious influence which an university can exercise consists less in any express teaching than in the pervading tone of the place. Whatever it teaches, it should teach as penetrated by a sense of duty; it should present all knowledge as chiefly a means to worthiness of life, given for the double purpose of making each of us practically useful to his fellow-creatures and of elevating the character of the species itself; exalting and dignifying our nature."

34 Mill says that the moral and religious influence of a university consists in its pervading tone. If the pervading tone is moral and religious, moral and religious influence will follow. But how is the pervading tone set? The pervading tone of higher education must be set by those who guide its destinies and teach its students. If they are moral and religious, the tone may be that which Mill would like to hear. If they are not, the tone may be something else altogether.

35 Since we are agreed that it is more important to be good than to be intellectual and that it is hard, if not impossible, to be good without being religious, and since we want higher education to exert a moral and religious influence through its pervading tone, it would seem to follow that men should not be appointed to the faculties of colleges and universities unless they are moral and religious men. Yet we know that every day men are appointed to faculties after a most painstaking investigation of their intellectual attainments but without any inquiry into their moral habits or their

religious beliefs. I do it every day myself. We do not ask whether the prospective appointee is afflicted with scientism, skepticism, or secularism. We do not request him to state whether he believes in God or whether or not he thinks morals are indistinguishable from the mores and are relative, like the mores, to time and place. We ask what his training has been, what his record was, what his publications are, and what are the prospects of his publishing any more. We ask, in short, whether he has discovered any truths in his specialty and whether he can be expected to seek for and, perhaps, discover additional truths. It would be regarded as an impertinence in a secular institution to ask a prospective faculty member about anything outside his specialty, unless, of course, rumors of flagrant immorality likely to embarrass the college had reached the president's ears. These would have to be inquired into and all fears on this score set at rest. But everybody would be shocked at the suggestion that it is proper to investigate a man's beliefs or to ask what, if anything, he stands for.

36 It is perfectly fair for higher education to say that its aim is the pursuit and transmission of truth. For this purpose the institution is divided into departments, sub-departments, and sub-sections of sub-departments. The assumption is that nobody can discover the whole truth but that by a collective effort on the part of specialists in many fields the institution as such may get closer to the whole truth than any single individual.

37 The reason it is perfectly fair for a college or university to say that its aim is the pursuit and transmission of truth is that in our society only these institutions have this aim. So Mill said of morals and religion: "What is special to an university on these subjects belongs chiefly, like the rest of its work, to the intellectual department. An university exists for the purpose of laying open to each succeeding generation, as far as the conditions of the case admit, the accumulated treasure of the thoughts of mankind."

38 In this view a college or university is a place where people think. And the test of all its work, the test of the work of professors and students, the test of every course and every research project is: how much thought does it require? But can this be all? Does this mean that as long as there is thought it makes no difference what is thought about, or are some things more important to think about than others?

39 The practices of higher education in America do not conform to the views of Mill, to say nothing of meeting the further question I have raised concerning the relative importance of things to be thought about. The three types of curriculum current in this country may be called the life-activities centered curriculum, the student-interest centered curriculum, and the professor-interest centered curriculum. The life-activities centered curriculum is exemplified by the course of study of a women's college, which is based on a job analysis of the diaries of several hundred mature women. The categories

of the activities of these women constitute the structure of the college curriculum, although women, perhaps, ought to do and may even be doing things that these mature women did not do. The student-interest centered curriculum, apparently on the theory that it is hopeless to try to understand education or to figure out what an education should be, simply takes the expression of interest on the part of the student as revealing what he should study, for who knows what he should study, anyway? The professor-interest centered curriculum is the more usual variety. Each professor and each department want the whole time of the student so that he can be thoroughly trained in the professor's or the department's specialty. Since it is obviously impossible for the student's whole time to be spent in this way, the curriculum is determined by a process of pulling, hauling, and log-rolling; and finally emerges as a sort of checkerboard across which the bewildered student moves, absorbing from each square, it is hoped, a little of something that each professor or each department has to offer him.

40 None of these courses of study has any necessary connection with thinking. The activities of mature women may have had little to do with thinking. Some students may not be interested in thought. And I have heard of professors and departments who believed that their function was to cram their students with information. It is hard to contemplate such courses of study without agreeing with Henry Adams, who said, "The chief wonder of education is that it does not ruin everybody concerned in it, teachers and taught."

41 If we insist that colleges and universities should be devoted to thinking and if we insist that they should, if possible, think about important things, we may perhaps find the way in which higher education may make its unique contribution to morals and religion. Most of our educational institutions are and will probably remain secular, in the sense that they are not controlled by any church and are open to everybody regardless of his religious faith or lack of it. But there is another kind of secularism that besets the higher learning in America, and that is secularism in the sense in which we say that religion is insignificant, it is outmoded, it is equivalent to superstition. This kind of secularism higher education can and should repel. If a college or university is going to think and to think about important things, then it must think about religion. It is perhaps not necessary that all the faculty should be religious; it would be desirable that most of them, at least, should take religion seriously.

42 The same is true of morals. If a college or university is to think and think about important things, then it must think about morals, for we have admitted throughout that morals are most important. It may not be necessary that all the faculty be good; it would be desirable that most of them, at least, take goodness seriously.

43 If we grant that the purpose of higher education is to think and to think about important things for the purpose of learning as much of the truth as possible about these things and transmitting it to each succeeding generation, we see immediately that certain moral and religious consequences follow. In the first place, higher education then supplies the intellectual foundations of morals and religion. This is a contribution of the first importance, and it is, I believe, a contribution to morals and religion that only higher education can make.

44 As to religion, I need only refer again to St. Augustine to make the point that the resolution of intellectual difficulties seems to me, if not necessary, at least highly desirable as a prelude to or concomitant of religious faith. As to morals, habits are so much a function of the circumstances under which they were formed that we can have little assurance of their continuance in other circumstances unless the person who has the habits knows why he should retain them. As habits are formed by acts, they are broken by the cessation of these acts or by the continued performance of conflicting acts. The child carefully nurtured in good habits that he practices without comprehending the reasons for doing so is likely to fall from grace when he casts off the parental apron strings. The serious consideration of the intellectual foundations of good habits should supply him with the conviction he needs in order to keep up in adult life the good work begun in childhood.

45 The curriculum, then, should include the knowledge and understanding of the principles of morality. It should include both natural and sacred theology; for how can a man call himself educated who does not grasp the leading ideas that since the dawn of history have animated mankind? The institution must be committed to taking morality and religion seriously. This commitment involves a third: if the object of higher education is the truth, then, in order to take morality and religion seriously, the institution must believe that there is some truth and some discoverable truth about morality and religion. According to the dogmas of scientism, skepticism, and secularism there is no such truth. If there is truth at all, it is truth discoverable in the laboratory, by what is called the scientific method. I recently heard a minister of a Protestant church state at a public meeting that no man could tell whether a given act was right or wrong. I replied that he was a moral relativist, thinking that he would be so stung by this reproach that he might reconsider his position. Instead he proudly answered, "Of course I am a moral relativist," as though to say that anybody who is not a moral relativist is an unenlightened, unscientific, medieval reactionary.

46 We should all admit, I suppose, that a moral act is one performed in the right way under the right circumstances; but the notion that under some circumstances it could be right, for example, for one man to kill another

with malice aforethought must mean that there is no difference between good and bad, between right and wrong, that there is no moral law and there are no moral principles that higher education can take seriously. It must mean that there are no morals; there are only the mores; and there is no religion; there is only superstition. If higher education is to take morality and religion seriously, it must repudiate these dogmas; for the truths of morality and religion never have been and never can be discovered by experiment or by any allegedly "scientific" means. Morality and religion cannot be taken seriously unless the possibility of attaining truth by philosophical inquiry and by revelation is admitted. It is necessary to believe that philosophy is something more than words and that it is possible to be rational and religious at the same time.⁷

47 By the commitments to which I have referred, higher education may directly contribute to the formation of character. The indirect contributions it may make are, perhaps, almost as important. These are the moral by-products of its intellectual work. The life of learning requires the support of the moral virtues; and an arduous academic career must tend to develop those virtues. Without courage or fortitude no one can long stick at the painful task of thinking and studying. Without temperance no one can resist the momentary pleasures and distractions that interfere with study. Without at least some rudimentary sort of prudence no one can allocate his time and plan his work so as to make the most of his academic opportunities. Without justice, which involves a right relation to one's teachers and fellow-students, no one can conduct himself in the academic community in a way that respects the rights of the mind. I might add that as the student owes a debt of justice to his teachers, so his teachers owe a debt of justice to him, which they do not discharge by regaling him with last year's lecture notes.

48 The first obligation of an intellectual institution is to set high intellectual standards and to insist on good intellectual work. There is something in Woodrow Wilson's remark that character is a by-product—a by-product of hard work well done.⁸ The indirect contribution of higher education to

⁷ Cf. the report of O. H. Malik, vice-chancellor of the University of the Punjab to the Preparatory Conference of University Representatives, published by UNESCO (Paris, 1948), pp. 132-3.

⁸ "I hear a great deal about character being the object of education. I take leave to believe that a man who cultivates his character consciously will cultivate nothing except what will make him intolerable to his fellow-men. . . . Character . . . is a by-product. It comes, whether you will or not, as a consequence of a life devoted to the nearest duty, and the place in which character would be cultivated, if it be a place of study, is a place where study is the object and character the result" (address before the Phi Beta Kappa Society, Yale University, 1908).

morals cannot be made if educational institutions confer academic recognition on those who have done little more for four years than sit out their time. Habits of industry, habits of initiative, habits of tolerance, and habits of independent judgment can all be promoted by the course of study itself and by the methods by which the educational process is carried on.

49 If the bulk of the instruction is given by lectures, if the duty of the student is to take notes on lectures and to read textbooks, memorizing material to be regurgitated on the examinations given by the teacher who has taught the course, he may develop the habit of memory and the habit of studying the prejudices or curves of those whose favor he hopes to win. The first of these is a good and important habit, though perhaps not the best or most important of the intellectual virtues. The second is a habit valuable to salesmen, advertising men, college presidents, and others who spend their lives trying to get something from other people. But it is a habit into which most Americans seem to fall naturally; they do not need to go to college to get it. The value of the discussion method of instruction, of demanding a great deal of independent work from the student, and of a system of external examinations that requires study of the subject rather than the teacher, is that the habits of action, as well as the habits of thought and knowledge, formed by these means are closely analogous to, if they are not identical with, the four cardinal virtues.

50 I should add that there is a certain moral failure on the part of an educational institution that does not try to make its work something other than the accumulation of miscellaneous credits; for it seems unjust to expect the student to work hard on trivial, irrelevant, incoherent, and meaningless material. The vice of the adding-machine method of education is that it has a way of making even important subject matter seem trivial, irrelevant, incoherent, and meaningless.

51 There is a certain moral failure, too, on the part of an educational institution that does not allow the student to make his own the treasure of the accumulated thoughts of the race. So the failure of the elective system was a moral failure. The official historian of Harvard said of President Eliot that he had defrauded the Harvard students of their cultural heritage. The failure of vocational education is of the same variety: in the name of a specious commercial or industrial dexterity it cheats the student out of his place in the stream of human history.

52 An educational institution should be a community. A community must have a common aim, and the common aim of the educational community is the truth. It is not necessary that the members of the educational community agree with one another. It is necessary that they communicate with one another, for the basis of community is communication. In order to com-

municate with one another, the members of the community must understand one another, and this means that they must have a common language and a common stock of ideas. Any system of education that is based on the training of individual differences is fraudulent in this sense. The primary object of education should be to bring out our common humanity. For though men are different, they are also the same, and their common humanity, rather than their individual differences, requires development today as at no earlier era in history.

53 How, then, can higher education escape dogmatism, narrowness, the invasion of academic freedom, and failure in its proper intellectual task and still do its duty by morals and religion? A possible answer lies in the Great Conversation. The Great Conversation began with the Greeks, the Hebrews, the Hindus, and the Chinese and has continued to the present day. It is a conversation that deals, perhaps more extensively than it deals with anything else, with morals and religion. The questions of the nature and existence of God, the nature and destiny of man, and the organization and purpose of human society are the recurring themes of the Great Conversation.

54 There may be many ways in which a college or university can continue the Great Conversation, but it would seem off-hand that one of the best ways is through the reading and discussion by all the students of the books in which the Great Conversation has been carried on by the greatest men who have taken part in it. I emphasize discussion because of the contributions that this method makes to the moral and intellectual habits we desire; and I emphasize reading and discussion by all the students and faculty because in this way the formation of a community can be advanced. To continue and enrich the Great Conversation is the object of higher education.

55 The Civilization of the Dialogue is the only civilization worth having and the only civilization in which the whole world can unite. It is, therefore, the only civilization we can hope for, because the world must unite or be blown to bits. The Civilization of the Dialogue requires communication. It requires a common language and a common stock of ideas. It assumes that every man has reason and that every man can use it. It preserves to every man his independent judgment and, since it does so, it deprives any man or any group of men of the privilege of forcing their judgment upon any other man or group of men. The Civilization of the Dialogue is the negation of force. We have reached the point, in any event, when force cannot unite the world; it can merely destroy it. Through continuing and enriching the Great Conversation higher education not only does its duty by morals and religion; it not only performs its proper intellectual task: it also supports and symbolizes the highest hopes and the highest aspirations of mankind.

ANALYSIS OF HUTCHINS'S ESSAY WITH EMPHASIS ON ITS ARRANGEMENT

Robert M. Hutchins's deliberative discourse runs to about the same length as Macaulay's deliberative speech on education. It should be instructive to compare the strategies of arrangement in these two discourses. What we soon discover when we look closely at the two discourses is that the differences in subject matter, purpose, and audience call for basically different strategies of organization. Both men are talking about problems of education; but Macaulay is concerned with the way to finance a system of universal education, while Hutchins is concerned with the content of the curriculum of the colleges. This difference of subject matter does not, of itself, call for a different arrangement of parts, but when this difference is combined with the difference in purpose and kind of audience, we begin to see why the two men developed their discourses in different ways. Macaulay's purpose is to persuade his audience of legislators to take some action—in this case, to vote in favor of a bill which will appropriate money. Hutchins's purpose is to persuade his audience, made up largely of people involved in, or at least interested in, higher education to adopt his point of view about the place of morals and religion in the university curriculum. Macaulay has to swing the votes of a hostile opposition; Hutchins has to influence the views of a generally sympathetic but largely uncommitted audience. Macaulay's audience, because of the lengthy debate that had already taken place in the House of Commons, was already well informed about the issues; Hutchins's audience is interested in the problems of education but has not as yet formed firm convictions about the particular problem being discussed in this discourse.

As we have seen, Macaulay decided that the best strategy in his situation was to argue his case first and then refute the opposing arguments. Hutchins adopts a different tactic. He refutes the opposing arguments first and then advances his own proposal and the arguments supporting that proposal. Macaulay had so much confidence in the strength of his arguments that he felt he could more easily demolish the opposition by presenting his case first. Hutchins, on the other hand, felt that he could best "sell" his view by first clearing away the erroneous notions about the role of morals and religion in the college curriculum.

By withholding his proposal until the end, Hutchins also adds suspense to his discourse. As he knocks down, one by one, the prevailing views about the place of morals and religion in the curriculum, the audience becomes increasingly curious about what *he* thinks the proper role of morals and religion is. And Hutchins has cleverly laid the groundwork for this suspense

by announcing in the very first paragraph that "higher education can make a unique contribution to morals and religion." One can almost feel the growing curiosity of the audience as Hutchins proceeds: if these are *not* the contributions that higher education can make, what *is* the "unique contribution" that it can make?

Because this is a fairly long essay, the student might appreciate at the outset an overview of the organization. The outline of the main divisions of the essay runs something like this:

Introduction (paragraphs 1-5)

I. Refutation of the prevailing views about the place of morals and religion in higher education (paragraphs 6-35)

II. Proposal and justification of his own view of the unique contribution that higher education can make to morals and religion (paragraphs 36-52)

Conclusion (paragraphs 53-5)

From this outline, one can see that Hutchins devotes thirty paragraphs to demolishing the commonly proposed "solutions," while devoting only seventeen paragraphs to justifying his own proposal. But this proportion is not as top-heavy as it may at first appear. We must remember that Hutchins has to refute *several* proposals; he has to justify only *one* proposal. And when we consider that he devoted about half as many paragraphs to the support of that one proposal, we are made aware that Hutchins had to do a considerable amount of "selling" of his proposal. He did not take it for granted that once he had refuted the other proposals his audience would immediately "buy" his proposal. Having cleared the ground, he still had to exert a great deal of rhetorical skill to get his audience to accept the "building" he wanted to erect on the cleared ground. As he said at the end of his first paragraph, "I can regard the building attempted here as at best a very modest structure, which will accomplish more than I am entitled to hope for it if it serves as temporary shelter to those who may design the ultimate edifice."

Let us take a closer look at the parts now to see what Hutchins is doing in each of them and to speculate about their functions.

We saw from the outline that the first five paragraphs of the essay constitute the introduction. What does Hutchins do in this introduction? In the first paragraph, he informs the audience, in a general way, of the theme of the essay:

I believe that higher education can make a unique contribution to morals and religion. I do not believe that it can make some of the contributions expected of it, and I think that these expectations obscure the real purpose and achievements of higher education.

Note that the theme is stated in general terms. Hutchins does not tell us here what the "unique contribution" is. We have already indicated why he does not tell his audience what this contribution is: he wants to arouse their curiosity.

Hutchins also exerts a subtle ethical appeal in this first paragraph. Note the modesty and diffidence of his claims in this first paragraph—"I cannot pretend that I have solved any of them"; "it may be possible"; "I believe"; "I do not believe"; "I think"; "at best a very modest structure"; "more than I am entitled to hope for it." Hutchins comes to his audience—the original audience for the speech when it was first delivered at Kenyon College and the later readers of the printed essay—with a certain antecedent reputation. He is a well-known and esteemed spokesman on education. Very soon after he had become Chancellor of the University of Chicago, he acquired the reputation of being "the gadfly of American education." But here we see this renowned educator announcing his subject and his purpose with an ingratiating modesty.

In the next four paragraphs of the introduction, Hutchins defines three of the key terms of the essay—"morals," "religion," and "higher education." Whenever we have any doubts that our audience will understand some of the important terms of our discourse, we do well to define those terms—and as early as possible in the discourse. Note that Hutchins does not claim that his definitions are the *only* definitions. He is merely telling his audience what *he* means by these terms. Logicians sometimes call such definitions "stipulative definitions." Whenever we cannot establish final, precise definitions of terms, we can, in the interests of getting on with a discussion, stipulate the meaning we attach to the terms. In some cases, of course, we could prejudice the discussion in our favor—we could "beg the question"—by the definitions we propose. But in this instance, Hutchins is not "stacking the cards" in his favor; he is merely preparing his audience to understand the subsequent discussion.

After this relatively short introduction of five paragraphs, Hutchins launches into his refutation of the claims commonly advanced about the contributions that higher education can make to morals and religion. The topic that serves as the organizing principle of most of his counterarguments is the topic of the possible: can this proposal do what its advocates say it can do for the development of moral and religious habits? In refuting the various claims, he relies a great deal on the testimony of prominent and respected men who have written on the problems of education (e.g. Mill, Newman, Aristotle, Toynbee); on definitions (e.g. the nature of man and his learning processes, the nature of education); on examples, from his own and others' experience; on analogies (e.g. how he taught *Macbeth* to inexperienced preparatory-school students).

Although there is a discernible order to the progress of Hutchins's refutation, one would have a difficult time demonstrating that at every step Hutchins has observed an *inevitable* order. For instance, is there any reason why Hutchins had to consider the contributions that athletics can make to the formation of good habits before he considered the contribution that compulsory religious exercises can make? If we thought enough about it, we might be able to propose *a* reason, but it probably would not be a compelling reason. To say that the order of the arguments at some point is a rather arbitrary one is not to say that the essay is disorderly. Hutchins does ramble at times; he could tighten up the essay at several points; he could help his readers if he used transitional devices and connecting links more often. But all in all, Hutchins is too much of a disciplined thinker to write a chaotic discourse. The fact that no mature reader would get "lost" in this long essay is evidence that there is order here—order that one does not have to search very hard to find. Throughout the essay, one part leads naturally, if not always inevitably, into the next part.

It would be tedious to trace out, step by step, the course of the argument through the forty-seven paragraphs of the body of the essay, but perhaps we can learn something about arrangement of parts by hitting just the high points. The main proposition that Hutchins is intent on refuting is this: higher education can make students moral and religious. His arguments attack this proposition from various angles. He starts out by questioning whether the moral and religious education of students falls within the province of the schools at all. To support his own views on this matter, he brings to bear the pronouncements of two noted nineteenth-century writers who, one might expect, would have contrary opinions about the place of morals and religion in higher education. John Stuart Mill is associated in the minds of educated people—and Hutchins's audience is made up largely of educated people—with the rationalism of the nineteenth century, and as a "liberal," he represented, at least for the members of the Oxford Movement, a threat to the religious spirit of the Victorian Age. Hutchins finds that Mill once made the same point that he himself is making—that scholastic education cannot make students moral or religious. Cardinal Newman is another famous spokesman on education, his *Idea of a University* being generally regarded as the classic statement about the function and end of a liberal education. Moreover, Newman is a Catholic and an opponent of the rationalist, utilitarian movement that Mill represented. But surprisingly—and conveniently for Hutchins's purpose—Newman holds the same view on this matter as Mill does. Neither Newman nor Mill denies that religious and moral training is important; as a matter of fact they agree that such training is pre-eminently important. What they are both saying is that the chief, if not the exclusive, function of a university is to train students intel-

lectually; it is the function of the church and the family to train young men and women morally and religiously.

Although Hutchins's first argument addresses itself to the question of whether a university should educate its students morally and religiously rather than to the question of whether it can so educate them, it was a good argument to start out with because it concerns itself with the principle involved here rather than with the more debatable practicality of the matter.

From this point on, however, Hutchins deals with what a university *can* do to educate its students morally and religiously. He presents and expatiates on a number of reasons why the university cannot contribute substantially to the moral and religious development of the students:

1. The student's extra-mural environment—the home, his companions, mass media—has more of an impact on his religious and moral habits than the school does.
2. The schools have only a limited time to exert an influence on the student.
3. Good habits (Hutchins's synonym for "morals") are formed by acts, and mere instruction in good habits does not necessarily lead to acts.
4. Nor can the schools form good habits by the extra-curricular activities they offer—sports, for instance, or compulsory religious activities.
5. Nor can the schools make students religious, for a religious disposition depends on faith, and faith, we are told, is a gift that God grants to some and denies to others. (Can we deny educational opportunities to those who have been denied the gift of faith?)
6. The solidest base for good moral habits is a strong religious faith, but since, as we have just said, the schools cannot give their students this religious faith, they cannot hope to make much of a contribution to the moral development of the students.

The last question in this sequence that Hutchins addresses himself to—the hiring of professors—seems to be rather gratuitously added to the discussion. At least it is not as germane to the main argument as the other points are. When he makes the point, for instance, that schools do not usually inquire into the religious and moral disposition of the teachers they hire, he is talking, not about what schools should do or can do but about what, in actual practice, they do do. Hutchins might have left out this last part without loss to his argument—especially since he confesses that he has not entirely made up his own mind about what policies schools should adopt in hiring teachers.

If the student inspects the six arguments outlined above, he will see, as we suggested earlier, that there is no *necessary* order to the arrangement. The arguments do not always grow one out of the other, nor do they build climactically. They are just six pertinent, cogent arguments set down one after the other. Of the five most common principles of organization—the logical, the chronological, the spatial, the climactic, the associative—we might say that the associative order prevails here: Hutchins is setting down his arguments in the order in which they occur to him. The students might consider whether some other order could have been more effective.

In paragraph 36, Hutchins makes the transition to the positive part of his discourse. Up to this point he has been refuting, rejecting. Now he must propose and justify the “unique contribution” that he claimed education could make to morals and religion. We have already commented on the suspense value of delaying his proposal until now. But he has gained something more than the interest that can be generated by suspense; he has conditioned his audience to be more receptive to his proposal. Once the counterproposals have been dealt with, his audience is less likely to be indifferent to his proposal than it would have been if he had made his proposal at the beginning. The mood of Hutchins’s audience at this point must be something like this: All right, you have rejected the claims that others have made. What is there left to say? Does the study of morals and religion deserve *any* place in the college curriculum? If so, show us.

Hutchins’s method of argument in this section is basically deductive. The main stages of his argument could be set forth in the form of a syllogism:

The proper function of a university is to lead its students to think about important matters.

The study of the intellectual foundations of morals and religion would lead students to think about important matters.

Therefore, the study of the intellectual foundations of morals and religion would be the proper function of a university.

This constitutes the skeleton of his argument. But he devotes seventeen paragraphs to putting some meat on these bare bones. What accounts for most of the expansion is that Hutchins has to set up his premises and convince his audience of the truth of the premises.

He establishes his first premise, for instance, mainly by definition. He asserts that the proper object of a university is the pursuit and transmission of truth. Among all the institutions in our society, only a university has this aim. And he quotes Mill again to corroborate his view. It is not quite clear, however, just how Hutchins gets from the proposition that the object of a university is to pursue and transmit truth to the proposition which serves

as the major premise of his syllogism. In the first sentence of paragraph 43 he *hints* at how he got from one proposition to the other—"If we grant that the purpose of higher education is to think and to think about important things *for the purpose of learning as much of the truth as possible* about these things and transmitting it to each succeeding generation, . . ." (italics added)—but he does not carry us, by a series of carefully reasoned steps, from one proposition to the other.

Hutchins takes most of paragraphs 36-52 to establish the truth of his minor premise—"The study of the intellectual foundations of morals and religion would lead students to think about important matters." In doing this, he brings most of his arguments to bear on two points: (1) the importance of morals and religion and (2) the intellectual and practical benefits to be realized from the study of morals and religion. Just as he used quotations from prominent spokesmen on education to refute arguments in the first part of his discourse, so he uses here the authority of noted spokesmen to support his contention—Henry Adams, Woodrow Wilson, St. Augustine. We must remember that Hutchins's choice of authorities throughout the discourse has been dictated by the nature of his audience. Several of these authorities might have been unimpressive—because unfamiliar—to another kind of audience.

Hutchins decided that there was no need to recapitulate and reinforce his arguments in the conclusion of his discourse (paragraphs 53-5). Instead, he chose to enlarge on the subject of the proper intellectual function of the university. This permits him to expatiate on one of his favorite topics—the Great Conversation. This plea for the Great Conversation may seem to be extraneous to the main subject of the discourse, but when one recalls that Hutchins began both the refutation and confirmation parts of his discourse with the claim that the cultivation of the intellect should be the primary concern of the university, the conclusion seems not as irrelevant as it first appeared. And in the last sentence of the essay, Hutchins unites and extends the themes of this long discourse: "Through continuing and enriching the Great Conversation higher education not only does its duty by morals and religion; it not only performs its proper intellectual task; it also supports and symbolizes the highest hopes and highest aspirations of mankind."

So we have seen how one man organized his arguments on the role of morals and religion in higher education. If we were writing an essay on the same subject, we might, without any great loss in effectiveness, have arranged some of the parts differently, but given the same body of arguments, the same general purpose, and the same audience, we would probably find ourselves adopting the same basic strategy of arrangement that Hutchins employed.

Further Readings for the Study of Arrangement

The authors of the two pairs of essays that follow are engaged in a debate with one another. In addition to studying the arrangement of the arguments in each essay as a separate entity, the student should observe what adjustments each author made in his arrangement to suit the strategy of his opponent's arguments. The authors in these two debates really have two audiences: each other and the readers who will read these essays in a magazine. It is interesting to see what demands this double audience makes on the authors.

DONALD J. LLOYD:

SNOBS, SLOBS, AND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

1 There is at large among us today an unholy number of people who make it their business to correct the speech and writing of others. When Winston Churchill says "It's me" in a radio address, their lips purse and murmur firmly, "It is I," and they sit down and write bitter letters to the *New York Times* about What is Happening to the English Language. Reading "I only had five dollars," they circle *only* and move it to the right of *had*, producing "I had only five dollars" with a sense of virtue that is beyond the measure of man. They are implacable enemies of "different than," of "loan" and "contact" used as verbs, and of dozens of other common expressions. They put triumphant exclamation marks in the margins of library books. They are ready to tangle the thread of any discussion by pouncing on a point of grammar.

2 If these people were all retired teachers of high-school English, their weight in the community would be negligible; but unfortunately they are not. They are authors, scholars, business men, librarians—indeed, they are to be found wherever educated people read and write English. And they are moved by a genuine concern for the language. They have brought us, it is true, to a state in which almost anybody, no matter what his education or the clarity of his expression, is likely to find himself attacked for some locution which he has used. Yet their intentions are of the best. It is only that their earnest minds are in the grip of two curious misconceptions. One is that there is a "correct" standard English which is uniform and definite and has been reduced to rule. The other is that this "correct" standard can

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only be maintained by the vigilant attention of everybody concerned with language—indeed, by the whole body of educated men and women.

3 The enemy these self-appointed linguistic sentries see lurking in every expression which stirs the corrector's instinct in them is something they call illiteracy—which is not a simple state of being unlettered, but something more. This illiteracy is a willful and obstinate disregard for the standards of civilized expression. It stirs anger in them when they think they see it, because it seems to them a voluntary ignorance, compounded out of carelessness and sloth. When they think they find it in men who hold responsible positions in the community, they feel it to be a summation of all the decline of the graces of culture, the last reaches of a great wave of vulgarity which is eroding the educated and literate classes. It seems to them to be a surge of crude populism; they hear in each solecism the faint, far-off cries of the rising mob. It is really a sort of ringing in their ears.

4 In view of the general agreement among the literate that a "correct" standard English exists, and in view of the vituperation directed at anyone suspected of corrupting it, one would expect some kind of agreement about what is correct. There is little to be found; the easy utterance of one educated man is the bane of another. "For all the fussiness about *which* and *that*," remarks Jacques Barzun in the *Nation*, "the combined editorial brass of the country have feebly allowed the word 'disinterested' to be absolutely lost in its original sense. One finds as careful a writer as Aldous Huxley using it to mean uninterested, so that by now a 'disinterested judge' is one that goes to sleep on the bench." And on the subject of what surely is a harmless word, *whom*, Kyle Crichton, associate editor of *Collier's*, is quoted in *Harper's*: "The most loathsome word (to me at least) in the English language is 'whom.' You can always tell a half-educated buffoon by the care he takes in working the word in. When he starts it I know I am faced with a pompous illiterate who is not going to have me long as company."

5 Probably only a cynic would conclude from the abundance of such comments that those who demand correct English do not know it when they meet it; but some students of language must have been led to wonder, for they have made up lists of disputed locutions and polled the literate on them. So far, the only agreement they have reached has to be expressed in statistical terms.

6 The latest of these surveys, a questionnaire containing nineteen disputed expressions, was reported by Norman Lewis in *Harper's Magazine* for March, 1949. Lewis sent his list to 750 members of certain groups chosen mainly for their professional interest in the English language: lexicographers, high school and college teachers of English, authors, editors, journalists, radio commentators, and "a random sampling of *Harper's* subscribers."

7 If we count out two groups on the basis of extremely special knowledge and interest—the college professors of English and the lexicographers—we find all the others accepting about half the expressions. The authors and editors (book and magazine) were highest with about 56 per cent, and the editors of women's magazines lowest with about 45. (The expression which was least favored was *less* in the sense of *fewer*—"I encountered *less* difficulties than I had expected"—but even that received an affirmative vote of 23 per cent.) The distinguished electors seem individually to have played hop, skip and jump down the column, each finding among the nineteen expressions about ten he could approve of. If any two fell on the same ten, it was merely a coincidence.

8 A person innocent in the ways of this controversy, but reasonably well-informed about the English language, noticing that the disputants ignore the massive conformity of most writers in most of their language practices, in order to quibble about fringe matters, might assume that they would welcome the cold light of linguistic science. This is a naïve assumption. In response to an attempt of mine to correct some of the misapprehensions I found in Mr. Barzun's article—among them his curious notion that "detached" and not "uninterested" was the original meaning of "disinterested"—he replied by letter that I represented a misplaced and breezy scientism, and that what I said struck him as "the raw material of 'populism' and willful resistance to Mind.... All dictionaries to the contrary notwithstanding, the word disinterested is now prevailingly used in the meaning I deprecated.... The fact that an illiterate mistake may become the correct form... is no reason for not combating it in its beginnings..." This rejection both of the professional student of language and of the dictionary, when they disagree with the opinions of the writer, has the effect of making each man his own uninhibited authority on language and usage—an effect which I do not believe was exactly what Mr. Barzun had in mind.

9 What he did have in mind he stated clearly in one distinguished paragraph:

A living culture in one nation (not to speak of one world) must insist on a standard of usage. And usage, as I need not tell you, has important social implications apart from elegance and expressiveness in literature. The work of communication in law, politics and diplomacy, technology, and moral speculation depends on the maintenance of a medium of exchange whose values must be kept fixed, as far as possible, like those of any other reliable currency. To prevent debasement and fraud requires vigilance, and it implies the right to blame. It is not snobbery that is involved but literacy on its highest plane, and that literacy has to be protected from ignorance and sloth.

10 It is a pity that these sentiments, so deserving of approval, should receive it from almost all educated people except those who really know something about how language works. One feels like an uncultivated slob when he dissents—one of the low, inelegant, illiterate, unthinking mob. Yet as a statement about the English language, or about standard English, it is not merely partly true and partly false, but by the consensus of most professional students of language, totally false. It is one of those monstrous errors which gain their original currency by being especially plausible at a suitable time, and maintain themselves long after the circumstances which give rise to them have vanished. Mr. Barzun's remarks are an echo from the eighteenth century; they reek with an odor mustier than the lavender of Grandmother's sachet. They have little relevance to the use of the English language in America in our day.

11 In actual fact, the standard English used by literate Americans is no pale flower being overgrown by the weeds of vulgar usage: it is a strong, flourishing growth. Nor is it a simple, easily describable entity. Indeed, it can scarcely be called an entity at all, except in the loose sense in which we call the whole vast sum of all the dialects of English spoken and written throughout the world a single language. In this sense, standard American English is the sum of the language habits of the millions of educated people in this country. It is rooted in the intellectual life of this great and varied people. Its forms express what its users wish to express; its words mean what its users think they mean; it is correctly written when it is written by those who write it, and correctly spoken by those who speak it. No prim and self-conscious hoarding of the dead fashions of a superior class gives it its power, but its negligent use by minds intent on stubborn and important problems. There is no point in a tiresome carping about usage; the best thing to do is relax and enjoy it.

12 There are five simple facts about language in general which we must grasp before we can understand a specific language or pass judgment on a particular usage. It is a pity that they are not more widely known in place of the nonsense which now circulates, for they would relieve the native-born speaker of English of his present uncertainty, and give him a proper authority and confidence in his spontaneous employment of his mother tongue. They arise from a common-sense analysis of the nature of language and the conditions of its use.

13 In the first place, language is basically speech. Speech comes first in the life of the individual and of the race. It begins in infancy and continues throughout our lives; we produce and attend to a spoken wordage much greater than the written. Even the mass of writing which floods in upon us today is only the froth on an ocean of speech. In history, also, speech comes first. English has been written for only about fifteen hundred years; before

this, it is of incalculable antiquity. In speech its grammar was developed; from changes in the sounds of speech, changes in its grammar come. The educated are inclined to feel that the most important aspect of language is the written form of it, and that the spoken language must and should take its standards from this. Actually, the great flow of influence is from speech to writing. Writing does influence speech somewhat, but its influence is like the interest a bank pays on the principal entrusted to it. No principal, no interest.

14 In the second place, language is personal. It is an experience and a pattern of habits of a very intimate kind. In the home, the family, the school and the neighborhood we learn the speechways of our community, learning to talk as those close to us talk in the give and take of daily life. We are at one with our nation in our easy command of the pitch, tune and phrase of our own home town. Language is personal, also, in that our grasp of it is no greater than our individual experience with it. The English we know is not that vast agglomeration of verbal signs which fills and yet escapes the largest lexicons and grammars, but what we have personally heard and spoken, read and written. The best-read man knows of his native language only a limited number of forms in a limited number of combinations. Outside of these, the wealth which a copious tongue has as its potential is out of his world, and out of everybody's, for no dictionary is so complete or grammar so compendious as to capture it.

15 The third fact about language is that it changes. It changes in its sounds, its meanings and its syntax. The transmission of sounds, words and meanings from generation to generation is always in some respects imprecise. Minute differences add up in time to perceptible changes, and changes to noticeable drifts. Difference in changes and in rates of change make local speech sounds, pitches, tones and vocabularies draw subtly and persistently away from one another. And all it takes to produce an identifiable dialect is sufficient segregation over a sufficient length of time.

16 The fourth great fact about language, then, is that its users are, in one way or another, isolated. Each has with only a few others the sort of familiar relationships which join them in one language community. Yet there are upward of two hundred million native speakers of English in the world. Obviously they cannot all be in close touch with one another. They congeal in nuclei—some stable, some transitory—which by a kind of double-action draw them together and enforce isolation of many more-or-less shifting kinds: the isolation of distance, of education, of economic levels, of occupation, age and sex, of hobbies and political boundaries. Any one of these will be reflected in language habits; any two or three will bring about, in one community, speech differences as great as those caused by oceans and mountain ranges.

17 The fifth great fact about language is that it is a historical growth of a specific kind. The nature of English is one of the absolutes of our world, like air, water and gravity. Its patterns are not subject to judgment; they simply are. Yet they have not always been what they are; like the physical world, they have changed with time, but always in terms of what they have been. *Boy loves girl* means something different from *girl loves boy*. It is futile for us to prefer another way of conveying these meanings: that is the English way, and we must live with it. Yet students of the language see in this simple pattern the result of a cataclysmic change, great and slow like the geologic upheavals that have brought old salt beds to the very tops of mountain ranges, and as simple. Each is what it is because of what it has been before.

18 Language as a social instrument reflects all the tides which sweep society, reacting in a local or surface way easily and quickly—as a beach changes its contours to suit the waves—but it offers everywhere a stubborn rock core that only time and massive pressures can move. The whim of a girl can change its vocabulary, but no will of man can touch its essential structure; this is work for the long attrition of generations of human use. Ever lagging a little behind human needs, it offers a multitude of terms for the things men no longer care about, but keeps them improvising to say what has not been said before.

19 Spoken English is, then, by its own nature and the nature of man, a welter of divergences. The divergences of class and place are sharpest in Britain, where the same dialects have been spoken in the same shires and villages for more than a thousand years. Although these can be heard in America by any traveler, no matter how dull his ear, they are relatively slight, for our language is essentially and repeatedly a colonial speech. Each of the American colonies drew settlers from various parts of Britain; each worked out a common speech based mainly on the dialect of its most influential group of immigrants (which differed from colony to colony); each remained in relative isolation from the others for about a hundred years. Then many colonists began to move to the interior: wave after wave of settlers traveled along rather distinct lines of advance until the continent was covered. Everywhere there was a mingling of dialects, with a composite speech arising, based mainly on the speech of the dominant local group. And so we have a Northern speech fanning out from the Northeastern states, and a Southern speech in the land of cotton-raisers, all crossing and merging as the pioneers moved west. Local differences are greatest along the Atlantic coast.

20 Wherever our people settled, they worked out local ways of talking about the things of common experience, and found their own verbal symbols of class distinctions. Here and there are areas where foreign-speaking groups

clung together and developed special exotically-flavored dialects, but otherwise most speech patterns in America can be traced back to the dialects of Britain. Everywhere there is a common speech used by the multitude which works with its hands, and a slightly different dialect spoken by the professional and leisure classes.

21 The standard English written by Americans is not, however, the written form of educated speech, which shows great local variation. Its spellings have only a rough equivalence to the sounds we make; its grammatical system, which has nationwide and even worldwide currency, had its origin in the educated speech of the Northeastern states, and before that in the dialect of London, England. The concentration of schools, colleges, publishing houses and print shops in early New England and New York had the same effect in this country as the concentration in England, for centuries, of political power, commercial activity and intellectual life in London: it established a written standard, native only to those who grew up near the Hudson River or east of it. Elsewhere in America this written standard has been a learned class dialect—learned in the schools as the property and distinguishing mark of an educated class. Like many of its spellings, it is itself a relic of the past, an heirloom handed down from the days when the whole nation looked to the schoolmasters of New England for its book-learning.

22 The present controversy about usage is simply a sign that times have changed. The several vast and populous regions of this country have grown self-sufficient and self-conscious, and have taken the education of their youth into their own hands. Where the young once had to travel to the East for a respectable education, they receive it now in local public systems of rapid growth and great size. From local schools they may go to local universities of fifteen to fifty thousand students, where they can proceed to the highest degrees. Yale University is overcrowded with some six thousand students; in the community colleges alone of California more than 150,000 are enrolled. Most of these young people take their diplomas and go to work among their own people. They form a literate class greater in numbers and in proportion to the total population than the world has ever seen before. Speaking the speech of their region, they mingle naturally and easily with its people. When they write, they write the language they know, and they print it, for the most part, in presses close at hand. Everywhere they speak a standard literate English—but with differences: a regional speech derived from the usages of the early settlers.

23 Standard written English is, after all, an abstraction—a group of forms rather arbitrarily selected from the multitude offered by the language as a whole—an abstraction which serves the peculiar needs of the intellect. It achieves its wide currency because the interests of its users are the common

interests of the educated, which transcend frontiers and negate distances—law, literature, science, industry and commerce. It is the tool of intelligence. Any thinking person must use it, because only this form of the language provides the instruments of delicate intellectual discrimination. And it is not static. As the needs of the intellect change, standard English changes. Change is its life, as anyone can see who picks up a book written only a little time ago, or examines almost any old newspaper.

24 The common speech of the uneducated, on the other hand, is comparatively static. Though it varies greatly from place to place, it is everywhere conservative; far from corrupting the standard language, it follows slowly after, preserving old forms long ago given up by literate speakers. "Them things" was once standard, and so were "he don't," "giv," and "clumb" and "riz." Its patterns are archaic, its forms homely and local. Only its vocabulary is rich and daring in metaphor (but the best of this is quickly swiped by writers of standard English). Seldom written because its speakers seldom write, it is yet capable of great literary beauties, uncomplicated force, compact suggestion, and moving sentiment. But it will not bear the burden of heavy thinking, and anyhow, heavy thinkers have a better tool to use. It is about as much danger to the standard language as an old house cat.

25 I have often wondered at the fear of common English and its speakers which the cultural aristocracy display, at their curious definition of illiteracy, and at the intemperance of their terms, which verges on the pathological. A Freudian should have a picnic with them. They use such epithets as *illiteracies*, *crudities*, *barbarisms*, *ignorance*, *carelessness* and *sloth*. But who is not negligent in language, as in the mechanics of driving a car? They mutter darkly about "inchoate mob feelings." They confess themselves snobs by denying that their attitudes are snobbish. The stridency of their self-assurance puzzles the mind.

26 We might better adjust our minds to the divergences of usage in standard written English, for time, space and the normal drift of culture have put them there. We need not raise our eyebrows at a different twist of phrase, but enjoy it as an echo of a way of life somewhat different from our own, but just as good. We could do more than enjoy these things; we could recognize that the fixed forms of the language which do not come to our attention were developed in the past. We have come too late for the show. It is the changing forms that evidence the life in our language and in our society; we could learn much about our people and their ways by simply and objectively observing them.

27 If there is one thing which is of the essence of language, it is its drive to adapt. In an expanding culture like ours, which is invading whole new realms of thought and experience, the inherited language is not wholly suited to what we have to say. We need more exact and expressive modes

of utterance than we have; we are working toward finer tolerances. The fabric of our language is flexible, and it can meet our needs. Indeed, we cannot stop it from doing so. Therefore it would be well and wholesome for us to see, in the locutions of the educated which bring us up sharply as we read, not evidences of a rising tide of illiteracy (which they are not), but marks of a grand shift in modes of expression, a self-reliant regionalism, and a persistent groping toward finer distinctions and a more precise utterance.

JACQUES BARZUN: THE RETORT CIRCUMSTANTIAL

1 Mr. Lloyd's article is the culmination of a lively correspondence between him and me, in the course of which I feel sure that I repeatedly cut the ground from under his feet. Since from the outset he hadn't a leg to stand on, my efforts were bound to be useless, but we were both having such a good time that neither of us noticed his plight. At my suggestion he has consented to display his miraculous position in public, and I must therefore return to the charge. The public will judge.

2 It seems clear in the first place that by preaching the attitude of the mere recorder, the *registrar* of linguistic fact, Mr. Lloyd disqualifies himself for remonstrating with me or anybody else. I, as a writer, am his source, his document, his *raison d'être*, and he can no more logically quarrel with me than he can with a piece of papyrus. Nevertheless, I am willing to concede his human (and very modern) right to inveigh against my moralism in the tones of an outraged moralist.

3 What then does his objection come to? That in seeking to criticize certain tendencies in current literary English, I am usurping an authority I do not possess, and interfering with the natural evolution of the language. This is the prime fallacy in his case, which rests on a chain of reasoning somewhat as follows: English has greatly changed through the ages; many of these changes were resisted by purists; but the evolution was irresistible, and the result is something we now consider correct and natural. Hence Mr. Barzun's attitude is *contra naturam*; he is an old fogey, a snob, and an ignoramus who thinks he can set his face against the future only because he is blind to the past.

4 The truth is, of course, that one does not obtain "nature" by merely removing opposition, wise or unwise. Nor can we know what is inevitable until we have tried good and hard to stop it. The whole analogy with nature is false because language is an artificial product of social life, all of whose manifestations, even when regular, bear only a remote likeness to the course of nature. Being a social product, language is everybody's football, and that

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is precisely what gives me, as well as Mr. Lloyd, the right to push it this way or that by argument.

5 And here it is important to remember that resistance to change is by no means futile. The history of the language is not what the gallant liberals make out—a struggle between the dauntless Genius of English and a few misguided conservatives. It is a free-for-all. At this point it is usual for the advocates of the “Hands Off” policy to trot out the word “mob,” which Swift attacked with several other curtailed forms, and pretend that it was ridiculous of the Dean to boggle at it, “in the light of what came after.”

Well, what came after is that we deodorized “mob,” and abandoned altogether the other vulgarities he was deprecating: we no longer use *rep*, *pozz*, *phiz*, *hipps*, or *plenipo*. The future, in short, belonged as much to Dean Swift as to his opponents—and rather more if we count the hits and misses.

6 So much for the pseudo-naturalism of the linguistic registrars. Their vow not to judge among words and usages is a fine thing as long as it expresses a becoming sense of incapacity, but it must not turn into a union rule enforceable on those who have taken precisely opposite vows—namely, to exploit, preserve, and possibly enrich the language. This is the duty of the writer, it calls for judgment, and it brings us to that blessed word “disinterested,” which seems to have acted on Mr. Lloyd like a whiff of mustard to the nose.

7 My simple and meritorious deed as regards “disinterested” was to draw attention to its widespread misuse as a duplicate of *uninterested*. Examples abound, and the fight against the plague may already be lost without the confusion being anything like over. Every piece of printed matter exhibits it, and nearly every conversation. Just the other day I heard this sentence, spoken to identify a stranger: “He is an impresario, but when it comes to art, he’s completely disinterested.” Did the speaker mean, X has no interest in art? Or: he is so much interested in it that money is no object? According to current usage this is impossible to determine without questioning the speaker. Not even his presumed degree of education will settle the matter, for the wrong use has affected all ranks.

8 At the phrase “wrong use,” Mr. Lloyd twitched his non-existent leg, and with his hands made the motions of a man taking to earth in a dictionary. A few American, and especially collegiate dictionaries do give the meaning “uninterested” as a second choice—which is a sufficient reason for me to view with a lackluster eye Mr. Lloyd’s naïve faith in lexicographers. The one work that seems relevant to the argument is the *O.E.D.*, which gives us the history of the word. It tells us that the meaning *uninterested* is obsolete and it lists five separate earlier forms, going back to the French of Montaigne, all connected with the idea of “removing the self interest of a person in a thing.” As an English adjective, examples are given from 1659 to Dr. Livingstone in 1865, with the meaning: “not influenced by interest, impartial, un-

biased, unprejudiced." My original remark was to the effect that nowadays the "disinterested judge" is probably taken to mean one who sleeps on the bench. My final remark is: As a writer concerned with the precision and flexibility of the language I use, I cannot regard the return to an obsolete and ambiguous form as useful or in any other way justified.

9 I now carry the war into the enemy's camp. If instead of complacently taking notes on the growing confusion, and protecting under pretext of "science" the vagaries of modern usage, Mr. Lloyd and his compeers would reflect upon their data, they might be able to safeguard the complex instrument of our speech by telling us when and why these deplorable losses occur, and how they might be repaired—loss of clarity and exactness at large, absolute loss of meaning in a word such as "disinterested" and in another such as "connive." Everyone has seen this last used as a synonym for "conspire" and "contrive"; I have heard it in the intransitive sense of "manage" about some trivial business. "How did you connive?" Hitherto, when you escaped from the concentration camp because the guard deliberately looked the other way, it was he who *connived* at your escape, no one else. Can it be that the action is obsolete and we no longer need the word?

10 These instances are not isolated, and I shall accept statistical refutation only from someone who can show that he reads each year more written matter than I, and hears a greater variety of local uses from a larger body of students.

11 Meantime, the generality which I hazarded, and which Mr. Lloyd assails as undemocratic and tainted with ethical feeling, is that with the rapid extension of educational opportunities, many persons of otherwise simple hearts are snatching at words half understood in order to bedeck their thoughts. Only the other day I read in a "literary" review about a distinguished American critic who was so full of insight that he could be called a *voyeur*. The writer meant *voyant*, if anything, but he could certainly be sued for slander before an educated court.

12 Foreign words are always treacherous, but what of the newspaper editorial which states that Mr. So-and-so's election is "highly fortuitous" (meaning "fortunate"), or the college dean who tells parents that his institution gives the students "a fulsome education"? Then there are those who believe that "to a degree" means "to a certain extent," instead of just the opposite. Have not the oil and drug companies been forced to change their labels to "flammable" because many users of their products took "*inflammable*" to mean non-combustible? At that stage, the issue ceases to be comic or inconsequential. With the tremendous output of verbiage by air and print to which we are all subjected, the corruption of meaning is rapid and extensive. We are at the mercy of anyone who thinks the sense of a word is discoverable by inspection, and whose misuse consequently liberates an echoing error in the minds of his peers.

13 To put it differently, the danger to English today is not from bad grammar, dialect, vulgar forms, or native crudity, but from misused ornaments three syllables long. The enemy is not illiteracy but incomplete literacy—and since this implies pretension it justifies reproof. There is no defense against the depredations of the brash except vigilance and no quarter given. I am certain that in this regard Mr. Lloyd, who writes with so much felicity and force, does exactly this in his capacity as a college teacher of English. Why then does he not square his precepts with his practice? I cannot answer for him, but to help his amputated philosophy to its feet, I want by way of conclusion to quote from a writer who, being anonymous and attached to both journalism and business, can hardly be suspected of flaunting pedantry and preciosity. The extract is from *Fortune* for November, 1950:

14 “Language is not something we can disembody; it is an ethical as well as a mechanical entity, inextricably bound up in ourselves, our positions, and our relations with those about us.”

JOHN FISCHER: THE HARM GOOD PEOPLE DO

1 A little band of Catholics is now conducting a shocking attack on the rights of their fellow citizens. They are engaged in an un-American activity which is as flagrant as anything the Communist party ever attempted—and which is, in fact, very similar to Communist tactics. They are harming their country, their Church, and the cause of freedom.

2 Their campaign is particularly dangerous because few people realize what they are up to. It can hurt you—indeed, it already has—without your knowing it. It is spreading rapidly but quietly; and so far no effective steps have been taken to halt it.

3 Even the members of this organization probably do not recognize the damage they are doing. They are well-meaning people, acting from deeply moral impulses. They are trying, in a misguided way, to cope with a real national problem, and presumably they think of themselves as patriots and servants of the Lord. Perhaps a majority of Americans, of all faiths, would sympathize with their motives—though not with their methods.

4 They do not, of course, speak for all Catholics. On the contrary, they are defying the warnings of some of their Church's most respected teachers and theologians. The Catholic Church as a whole certainly cannot be blamed for their actions, any more than it could be held responsible a generation ago for the political operations of Father Coughlin.

5 The group calls itself the National Organization for Decent Literature. Its headquarters are in Chicago; its director is the Very Reverend Monsignor

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Thomas Fitzgerald. Its main purpose is to make it impossible for anybody to buy books and other publications which it does not like. Among them are works of some of the most distinguished authors now alive—for example, winners of the Nobel Prize, the Pulitzer, and the National Book Award.

6 Its chief method is to put pressure on news dealers, drug stores, and book-sellers, to force them to remove from their stocks every item on the NODL blacklist. Included on this list are reprint editions of books by Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, John Dos Passos, George Orwell, John O'Hara, Paul Hyde Bonner, Emile Zola, Arthur Koestler, and Joyce Cary. In some places—notably Detroit, Peoria, and the suburbs of Boston—the organization has enlisted the local police to threaten booksellers who are slow to “co-operate.”

7 This campaign of intimidation has no legal basis. The books so listed have not been banned from the mails, and in the overwhelming majority of cases no legal charges have ever been brought against them. Indeed, it seems that the National Organization for Decent Literature deliberately prefers to ignore the established legal channels for proceedings against books which it thinks improper. Its chosen weapons are boycott and literary lynching.

8 For example, early last year committees of laymen from Catholic churches in the four northern counties of New Jersey—Union, Hudson, Essex, and Bergen—began to call on local merchants. These teams were armed with the NODL lists. They offered “certificates,” to be renewed each month, to those storekeepers who would agree to remove from sale all of the listed publications. To enforce their demands, they warned the merchants that their parishioners would be advised to patronize only those stores displaying a certificate.

9 *Contact*, a bulletin published by the Sacred Heart Parish Societies of Orange, New Jersey, listed fourteen merchants in its March 1955 issue. “The following stores,” it said, “have agreed to co-operate with the Parish Decency Committee in not displaying or selling literature disapproved by the National Organization for Decent Literature.... Please patronize these stores only. They may be identified by the certificate which is for one month only.”

10 Similar tactics have been followed in scores of other communities. Even in Nevada—a state not noted for Puritanical temper—the Council of Catholic Men has asked booksellers to purge from their shelves a list of books which included such widely read novels as *Mr. Roberts* and *From Here to Eternity*. When an Associated Press reporter pointed out that millions of people already were familiar with these works, in print and on film, the state chairman of the campaign, Paul Laxalt of Carson City, replied:

11 “We’ve got to stand by the list. If we make one exception the list would be chopped up.”

12 Such tactics are highly effective. Most news dealers, druggists, and similar merchants carry paper-bound books only as a minor side line. Moreover, they receive from the wholesalers more books than they have space for; if they remove one title from their racks, there are plenty of others to take its place. They don't want trouble. It is never good business to argue with a customer—so most of them readily comply with this form of private censorship. After all, their other customers, who might want to read a book by Faulkner or Hemingway or Zola, will never know that it has been suppressed, and when they don't find it on the shelves they probably will buy something else.

13 For these reasons it was possible for the Archdiocesan Council of Catholic Men in St. Louis to report recently that it had "obtained the consent of about one-third of the store owners approached in a campaign to ask merchants to submit to voluntary screening...."

14 Something—but not much—can be said in defense of the National Organization for Decent Literature and its local campaigners. A good many tawdry and disreputable magazines, paper-bound reprints, and comic books have been offered for sale on a lot of newsstands. A few publishers unquestionably have tried to base their sales appeal on sex and violence; the pictures and text on the covers of their publications often hint that the contents are far more salacious than they are in fact. (Such misrepresentation, however, is less common now than it was a few years ago, and both the contents and the covers of most pocket-size books seem to be growing less lurid.)

15 It can be argued, too, that law enforcement agencies in some cities have not been vigorous in enforcing the statutes against obscene publications. Finally, the "decent literature" campaigners apparently feel that their main mission is to protect young people, whose judgment is unformed and who might be attracted to sleazy reading matter by a provocative newsstand display; they seem to take far less interest in the hard-bound editions of the same books available in libraries or regular book stores. The Detroit NODL, for example, states that its list is "not intended as a restrictive list for adults"—though it does not explain how adults could purchase the books if merchants have been persuaded not to stock them.

16 But the motives of these zealous people are not the issue. The real issue is whether any private group—however well-meaning—has a right to dictate what other people may read.

17 Clearly any church, or any sub-group within a church, has a right to advise its own members about their reading matter.

18 Clearly, too, anybody has a right to try to *persuade* other people to read or refrain from reading anything he sees fit.

19 The National Organization for Decent Literature, however, goes much further. Its campaign is not aimed at Catholics alone, and it is not attempting

to *persuade* readers to follow its views. It is *compelling* readers, of all faiths, to bow to its dislikes, by denying them a free choice in what they buy.*

20 This principle is of course unacceptable to Catholics—as it is to all Americans—if they **take the trouble** to think about it for a moment. How would Catholics react if, say, a group of Jewish laymen were to threaten merchants with boycott unless they banned from their shops all publications which referred to the divinity of Christ? Some religious denominations believe that gambling is immoral; most Catholics do not, and many of their parishes raise considerable sums by means of bingo games and raffles. What if some Protestant sect were to try to clean out of the stores all publications which spoke tolerantly of gambling, and to boycott every merchant who bought a raffle ticket?

21 The principle at stake was set forth with admirable clarity by Father John Courtney Murray, S.J., professor of moral theology at Woodstock College, Maryland, in a recent address on “Literature and Censorship.” He listed four rules, which ought to command the enthusiastic support of all Americans regardless of religious belief:

(1) “Each minority group has the right to censor for its own members, if it so chooses, the contents of the various media of communication, and to protect them, by means of its own choosing, from materials considered harmful according to its standards.” (He also pointed out that in the United States “all religious groups . . . are minority groups.”)

(2) “No minority group has the right to demand that government should impose a general censorship” on material “judged to be harmful according to the special standards held within one group.”

(3) “Any minority group has the right to work toward the elevation of standards of public morality . . . through the use of methods of persuasion and pacific argument.”

(4) “No minority group has the right to impose its own religious or moral views on other groups, through the use of methods of force, coercion, or violence.”

* No doubt unconsciously, the Catholic War Veterans, Our Lady of Sorrows Post No. 1046, underlined the similarity between these tactics and those of the Communists. In a February 25, 1956, mailing to book dealers in Hartford, Connecticut, it enclosed the NODL list of “objectionable” publications—and it quoted the Chinese Communists who have been conducting a campaign of their own against “objectionable” literature:

“These books and pictures seriously harm those workers who by constantly looking at them can easily become degenerate in their thinking,” cautions the *Peking Worker's Daily* as quoted by *Newsweek* magazine, January 23, 1956. We have to hand it to the Communists . . . who have launched a nationwide campaign against pornographic trash. . . . Should not this example provoke a similar literary clean-up in our land where the morality of our actions is gauged by service to God and not to an atheistic state?”

22 And Father Murray went on to warn that methods of coercion are especially imprudent for Catholic associations.

23 "The chief danger," he said, "is lest the Church itself be identified in the public mind as a power-association. The identification is injurious; it turns into hatred of the faith. And it has the disastrous effect of obscuring from the public view the true visage of the Church as God's kingdom of truth and freedom, justice and love."

24 He quoted from Jacques Leclercq "of the Catholic University of Louvain, who is no slight authority" the dictum that "no government has ever succeeded in finding a balanced policy of combating unhealthy sexual propaganda without injuring legitimate freedom or provoking other equally grave or worse disorders."

25 Finally, Father Murray emphasized that "censorship in the civil order must be a judicial process," carried out under the statutes and according to the due processes of law.

26 The conclusions which flow from Father Murray's teachings seem plain enough:

For the National Organization for Decent Literature. It should stop immediately its campaign of threats, blacklisting, and boycott. It should then pursue its aims by the legitimate methods of persuasion, propaganda, and action through the courts. Most states have adequate laws against the publication and sale of indecent literature. In cases where the law seems inadequate, the legislature can be persuaded to amend it, by the normal means of lobbying and petition. In cases where the law is not enforced, public officials should certainly be reminded of their duty—and opposed at the polls, in the democratic way, if they fall down on their jobs.

27 Above all, the NODL ought to consider the possibility of guiding young readers by positive rather than negative techniques. Youngsters are not likely to read trash whenever they have good books readily available. If they are brought up in homes where good literature is a constant part of their environment—where parents read to them from infancy, and encourage them to build up their own libraries—then there is scant chance that they will be attracted by comics or two-bit horrors.

28 What has the NODL done to urge parents to give their children such basic moral training? Has it done all it can to foster topnotch libraries—public, school, church, and family? In how many communities has it sponsored campaigns to stimulate good reading?

29 *For news dealers, booksellers, and other merchants.* They should muster the courage to defy any group of private citizens which tries to impose its own brand of censorship on the publications they offer for sale. And, with equal courage, they should set their own houses in order; they should refuse

to sell any publication which—in their own untrammelled judgment—falls below their own standards as responsible business men.

30 *For the patriotic citizen.* He should protest against the lynching of books just as vigorously as against the lynching of people. He should go out of his way to support the merchants who resist such coercion. He should point out to the members of the National Organization for Decent Literature (and to any other self-appointed censors in his community) the immeasurable damage they are doing to the American way of life, to the very foundations of democratic government.

31 For the gravest harm done here is not to the Catholic Church—though as Father Murray noted, that is dangerous enough—or to the individual who is denied the right to choose his own books. The great peril is to the fabric of orderly government. It is always injured when any group takes the law into its own hands. And whenever such a brand of vigilantes succeeds in imposing its will by force, some other—and perhaps more sinister—group is encouraged to try the same thing.

32 Dean Joseph O'Meara of the Notre Dame Law School recently put it like this:

“Unfortunately many sincere people do not comprehend the genius of our democracy . . . such people would deny free speech to those with whom they are in fundamental disagreement. . . . They would establish a party line in America—their party line, of course. This is an alien concept, a totalitarian concept; it is not consonant with the American tradition; it is anti-democratic; it is, in short, subversive and it should be recognized for what it is.”

33 Still another eminent Catholic—Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts—summed up the case in even more prophetic terms:

“The lock on the door of the legislature, the parliament, or the assembly hall,” he said, “by order of the King, the Commissar, or the Führer—has historically been followed or preceded by a lock on the door of the printer’s, the publisher’s, or the bookseller’s.”

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY:

THE BAD ARGUMENTS INTELLIGENT MEN MAKE

1 From his “Editor’s Easy Chair” (*Harper’s*, October 1956) John Fischer looks out and sees “immeasurable damage” being done “to the American way of life and to the very foundations of democratic government.” This

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has become a familiar vision; many of us share it. But we frequently differ on the question, who or what is doing the damage?

2 In Mr. Fischer's view the damage is being done by "a little band of Catholics" who are "conducting a shocking attack on the rights of their fellow citizens" through the medium of an organization called the National Organization for Decent Literature, which undertakes to "censor" certain publications.

3 I take a rather broader view. I see a large band of people, of all faiths, who are conducting a shocking attack on the reason of their fellow citizens through the medium of passionately irrational argument about important public issues. I believe that nothing is more damaging to democracy than lack of rationality in public argument. The foundations of our society are indeed laid in an identifiable consensus. But they are more importantly laid in a reasonable disposition to argue our many disagreements in intelligent and temperate fashion, using restrained language, avoiding misstatements, overstatements or simplifications, and endeavoring to define issues with precision in the light of all the relevant principles and facts. I believe that whatever corrupts rational public argument corrupts democracy.

4 It has seemed to me that censorship is one of the public issues that are being deformed by bad argument, emanating from all sides. Hence on May 4, 1956, in a talk given before the Thomas More Association in Chicago and printed in the organ of the Thomas More Book Shop, *Books on Trial*, I made an attempt at a contribution to good public argument on this difficult subject. Part of my argument consisted in stating four practical rules that should govern the action of minority groups in a pluralist society, in their legitimate efforts to improve public morality. These rules were not original. I had seen them stated in substance in a news release of a paper given at Marquette University on March 23, 1956, by Prof. Vernon J. Bourke of St. Louis University.

5 Mr. Fischer quotes my statement of these four procedural rules in support of certain conclusions of his own with regard to the activities of the National Organization for Decent Literature. Perhaps Mr. Bourke will undertake to say whether, and how far, Mr. Fischer's conclusions follow from the four norms of action for whose formulation, in language somewhat different from my own, he should be given the credit. (At the time of my writing there was no printed source to which I could refer the reader for Mr. Bourke's excellent paper; it has since appeared in the volume *Problems of Communication in a Pluralistic Society*, Marquette University Press, 1956.) My own major concern is with a broader question—the quality of public argument. My question is whether Mr. Fischer has made a contribution to rational public argument on the issue of censorship. I am afraid my answer must be No.

6 Consider the preliminary question of language. In his opening paragraph Mr. Fischer asserts that a "little band of Catholics" is "engaged in an un-American activity which is as flagrant as anything the Communist party ever attempted—and which is in fact very similar to Communist tactics." Does one open a rational public argument by two such attacks on the reason of the reader? That tired old cuss-word, "un-American activity"—has it not gone the way of all cuss-words, into meaninglessness? And the tactic of slapping the label "Communist" on your adversary's position—have we not agreed that this is a tactic of unreason? As for the later argument by epithet (the NODL is "lynching" books), one hardly expects to find it in *Harper's*, however much it may be used on the hustings.

7 The more substantive question is this: has Mr. Fischer done justice to the NODL's own understanding of its purposes and methods, as these are stated in its explanatory literature?

8 The literature is easily obtainable from the central office (31 East Congress St., Chicago 5, Ill.). On reading it, one would come, I think, to the following conclusions. The NODL is simply a "service organization," not an "action group." Its major service consists in offering to "responsible individuals and organizations an evaluation of current comic books, magazines and pocket-size books." This is the famous "NODL list." The evaluation of these types of publications (only these) is done singly from the standpoint of what is objectionable as juvenile reading. The standards of evaluation are nine in number. All of them are common-sense norms; none of them are special tenets of any type of "group morality." Methods of review vary for each type of publication. Five reviewers vote on each item. The purpose is to "encourage the publishing and distribution of good literature," as well as to discover what is unfit for adolescents.

9 NODL also distributes information about ways of organizing decent-literature campaigns on the community or parish levels. It is clearly stated that the list is merely an expression of a publication's nonconformity with the NODL code and that "the list is not to be used for purposes of boycott or coercion." The recommended procedures seem to rest on the suppositions that the ordinary merchant is a responsible man; that he would welcome some assistance in ridding his shop of stuff that responsible parents fairly judge to be unfit for their children; that if he accepts the assistance, he is to be commended; that if he rejects it, he is to be left alone. (NODL says: "Instruct your committee workers to leave silently if the owner, manager or clerk refuses cooperation.")

10 The general conclusion, on the basis of its own statements about itself, would be that the NODL looks to voluntary reform, through cooperation between parent-citizens and merchants, in an area where a special problem of public morality exists. That problem arises out of the ready accessibility

to boys and girls of a rather immense amount of cheap literature that is objectionable on common-sense grounds of morality and taste.

11 Consider now Mr. Fischer's description of the NODL. "Its main purpose is to make it impossible for anybody to buy books and other publications which it does not like." "Its chief method is to put pressure on news-dealers, drug stores and booksellers to force them to remove from their stocks every item on the NODL blacklist." It "deliberately prefers to ignore the established legal channels for proceedings against books which it thinks improper. Its chosen weapons are boycott and literary lynching." It is embarked upon a "campaign of intimidation."

12 Something is wrong here. When Mr. Fischer describes the NODL he is obviously not describing the same thing that NODL describes when it describes itself. Thus you have reproduced the perfect pattern—the perfectly wretched pattern—of so much American public argument at the moment. There is really no argument at all—at least not yet. The two sides are not talking about the same thing. Hence the exchange proceeds to the customarily futile end. On the basis of his own description Mr. Fischer asserts that NODL "is *compelling* [emphasis his] readers, of all faiths, to bow to its dislikes, by denying them a free choice in what they buy." Hence he defines the issue thus: "The real issue is whether any private group—however well-meaning—has a right to dictate what other people may read."

13 To Mr. Fischer's charges the NODL would, I expect, reply to this effect: "But we are not compelling anybody to do or not do anything. We are not doing any such arbitrary thing as making our own 'dislikes' the coercive standard for the reading of the general public. We are not trying to do any 'dictating.' And as for denying readers of all faiths a free choice in what they buy—that is not the real issue at all."

14 Thus the argument fulfills the customary American pattern. The next step is for the contestants to retire from the field, either in sorrow or in anger or in both. Thereafter their partisans move in. Epithets are bandied; labels are exchanged; non-sequiturs proliferate. Until finally, both sides mutter disgustedly, "So's your old man." And there is, for a time, a sullen silence.

15 Maybe the argument could be rescued from this dismal end, to which most arguments in America seem to be condemned. Mr. Fischer could have rescued it, but he didn't. The NODL could have obviated the need for rescue, but it hasn't. The point where rescue begins is, of course, fact. Mr. Fischer notes the fact, but he abuses it to advance his own purposes. The NODL must surely recognize the fact, but it has not acted on the recognition, to the detriment of its own purposes. The fact is that in half-a-dozen or more cities and towns the police have made use of the NODL list in order to threaten, coerce or punish dealers in reading matter.

16 Unquestionably, officers of the law have full right to use the weapons of law, which are coercive. The point in question, however, is their use of the NODL list. This puts NODL in an ambiguous position. It cannot expect to have the thing both ways. It cannot, on the one hand, protest that "the list is not to be used for purposes of boycott or coercion," and, on the other hand, fail to protest against the use of the list by the police. It has to choose its cooperators—either the merchant or the police. It cannot choose both; for the choice is really between opposed methods of cooperation—the method of voluntary cooperation as between equal citizens, or the method of coercion as used by the police.

17 If NODL consents to the use of its list by the police, it creates an ambiguity that its critics may rightly seize upon, as Mr. Fischer did; what is worse, it obscures from public view its own "idea," the altogether valid idea of voluntary reform. On the other hand, if NODL does not consent to the use of its list by the police, it should say so—publicly, and on every necessary occasion. Surely part of its service must be the supervision, conducted on its own principles, of the uses to which its list is put.

18 There is another inappropriateness here. Officers of the law must operate under statutes which in this matter are, or ought to be, narrowly drawn. On the other hand, voluntary reform, precisely because it is voluntary, may be based on the somewhat broader categories of common-sense judgment. The latter are employed by the NODL, rightly enough. But for this very reason it is not right for the police to use NODL's judgments in enforcing the law. The law must have its own standards, minimal enough to sustain the challenge of due process.

19 In this connection another fact must be noted. The fact is that on NODL lists there appear some twenty-odd works that either have received literary honors or at least have been acclaimed by serious critics. Doubtless high-school teachers could not, without absurdity, make them required reading for their students. But the police cannot, without equal absurdity, make them prohibited reading. Such stultification of the law is itself immoral.

20 There is a third fact of some consequence. The history of censorship has been a history of excess. The NODL has the problem of the local zealot, operating far from the central office in Chicago, and way outside the four pages of sensible procedures sent out from it. He or she "has the zeal of God indeed, but not according to understanding" (Romans 10:2). Such zealots are righteous, usually indignant, people. They have a good cause. They want results. What they lack is St. Paul's "understanding," which bears, he said, on "the way of justification."

21 I shall not labor the analogy. The point of it, in our case, is that the zealot at times fails to see how his zeal for results may betray him into the use of methods that will in turn betray his cause. Mr. Fischer, for example,

in his zeal for his own cause, which is a good one, fell into a bad method of argument. Among other faults, he fails to distinguish between the "idea" of the NODL, which is the substantive issue, and the applications of the idea, which raise issues of procedure. In good "liberal" fashion he assigns the primacy to the procedural over the substantive. Contrariwise, in good "Catholic" fashion, the local zealot for the NODL cause assigns the primacy to the substantive over the procedural. He, or she, wants the newsstands "cleaned up"; and he, or she, in some instances doesn't greatly care how.

22 At that, Mr. Fischer is more nearly right. In this sensitive area the question of procedure is all-important. Part of the service of NODL to its own cause should be what I can only call a service of fraternal correction. It should somehow find a way of rebuking, or at least disavowing, the local zealot who violates, or goes beyond, the cooperative procedures, none of them coercive, which it officially stands for. (As for Mr. Fischer, maybe I have myself done him some service of intellectual charity?)

23 At this point, with all the ambiguities at least sorted out, if not cleared up, we could begin the rational public argument. The starting-point would be a fact—the existence of a "real national problem" (Mr. Fischer's words). Then the questions arise. For instance, does Mr. Fischer adequately measure the dimensions of the problem? He says:

A good many tawdry and disreputable magazines, paper-bound reprints and comic books have been offered for sale on a lot of newsstands. A few publishers unquestionably have tried to base their sales appeal on sex and violence; the pictures and text on the covers of their publications often hint that the contents are far more salacious than they are in fact.

He adds that "law-enforcement agencies in some cities have not been vigorous in enforcing the statutes against obscene publications." And that's it.

24 Or is it? Others would maintain that this is an astonishing understatement of the real national problem. They see the problem much more ominously large. A major issue in public morality has arisen; the morals of youth are particularly involved in it; the problem is growing. They further see a causal line between bad magazines, etc., and immorality. And they feel it imperative to "do something" about the bad literature.

25 When these last statements are made, they start up the current argument between sociology and common sense. The sociologist expresses professional doubt about the causal line between bad reading and immorality; he finds insufficient evidence for it. The common-sense view asserts that the causal line is sufficiently established by the nature, content, tendency, etc., of the literature itself. At least a strong presumption is thus created; and it furnishes reason for action, until—and maybe after—all the Ph.D. theses, pro and con, have been written.

26 The word "action" disturbs the jealous advocate of civil rights. He therefore comes up with his own causal line—between any attempt at suppressing any kind of literature and the subversion of the foundations of the Republic. The common-sense view expresses doubt about this causal line. There is, it says, insufficient evidence that any such alarming consequences will follow, if the action taken is rational and prudent.

27 Here the real issue begins to appear: what kinds of action, as taken by whom, are rational and prudent in the circumstances? And what promise of effectiveness do they offer?

28 Mr. Fischer has his own program of action, which deserves consideration. He recommends two positive courses. The first is self-regulation by newsdealers, booksellers and other merchants. They should, he says, "set their own house in order; they should refuse to sell any publication which—in their own untrammelled judgment—falls below their own standards as responsible businessmen."

29 A question of fact occurs here: how effective so far has the principle of self-regulation been in the solution of our real national problem? The evidence suggests a discouraging answer. Some efforts in this direction have been made, always under the pressure of public opinion; but their slim success bases little hope for the future. Second, the principle itself may be, and has been, called in question. For instance, in a report entitled *The Freedom to Read*, written for the National Book Committee, Richard McKeon, Walter Gellhorn and Robert K. Merton say this:

The dangers of police censorship are obvious; but we are convinced that the dangers of a code of self-censorship are even greater. It provides the means by which all kinds of restrictions can be put on freedom of expression, and it places the freedom to read in the hands of a group which does not even have the accountability to the public which a chief of police has (p. 70).

I don't necessarily endorse this judgment; but it may suggest that Mr. Fischer is on shaky ground.

30 There are other questions too. What, I might ask, is the right of a newsdealer to "untrammelled judgment"? Is his judgment, as a matter of fact, untrammelled? And whether it is or not, why should one trust it as a means of solution for our real national problem? Is he a better critic of literature, a better judge of morality, than the average parent? How is one even to know what his "standards as a responsible businessman" are? And if they could be known, is there to be no possibility of public judgment on them? On what title is this Olympian immunity claimed? One would like to know.

31 The second positive course is the action of law—legislative and court action. I am inclined to think that Mr. Fischer's confidence in the efficacy

of legal action as a corrective in this difficult field of printed media will be astonishing to students of the law. If I mistake not, it is pretty generally admitted that the present legal picture is a muddle. It is further admitted that the difficulties encountered in trying to straighten it out are immense. There are the two sacred legal doctrines that must be protected—prior restraint and due process. Furthermore, there are certain adverse high-court decisions that seem to have reduced the law to a state of practical impotence, not least in the two crucial areas of obscenity and violence.

32 What is even more decisive, even if the law could be lifted to the full height of its legitimate potency, it would still be largely impotent to cope with the new problem of mass media, whose crude subtleties seem to defeat the subtle crudities of the law. The grounds for accepting the relative ineffectiveness of law in this special field, where the moral issue is not justice, are both theoretical and practical—to be found both in the art of jurisprudence and in the lessons of history.

33 Mr. Fischer suggests two manners of action—one private, the other public—whose possibilities ought by all means to be explored and exploited. But in the course of rational public argument it would, I think, appear that his program of positive action is inadequate to the real national problem that confronts us. His negative demand is more acceptable. He wants organizations of private right to stop campaigns of coercion. So do I. Mr. Fischer's reasons are, I think, doctrinaire; further argument would have to illuminate the fact, if it is a fact. Whereas, I, as a Catholic, am not a doctrinaire.

34 In my Chicago lecture I said that

... it is not possible to prove the position, taken by some, that an action like the boycott of a moving picture is somehow "unrightful," or "undemocratic" or "unconstitutional." No one can show that such an action lies beyond the limits of a primeval American right to protest and object. The action may indeed be strenuous; but the American right to protest and object is permitted to run to some pretty strenuous extremes. This said against the doctrinaire, it remains true that methods of action which verge upon the coercive exhibit some incongruity when used by citizen-groups in the interests of morality in literature or on the screen. Even if they raise no issue of abstract right, they do raise the concrete issue of prudence, which, equally with justice, is one of the cardinal virtues.

I hold to this position now, against Mr. Fischer (I think), and also (I think) against the NODL in its present ambiguous situation—certainly in its representation by local zealots and by the secular arm of the police.

35 I further hold to my previous position that private agencies such as the NODL can perform an indispensable public function in the promotion of public morality—provided they understand what their function is. It is not

to supplant the coercive function of the agencies of public law. It is to represent, soberly and honestly, the principle of voluntary reform, to be accomplished on the basis of social cooperation—that sincere cooperation which in America is always ready to be stimulated but often needs stimulation.

36 This principle of reform is altogether valid in itself. Its applications call for prudence—concretely, as I have previously said, for “men and women of prudence, who understand the art of procedure, and understand too that we are morally bound, by the virtue of prudence, to a concrete rightness of method in the pursuit of moral aims.” For the rest, the rationality of this method of social reform will be understood, and its pitfalls will be avoided, if we can all somehow hold to high standards of public discussion. In this respect the editor of *Harper's* has failed. But his failure is less reprehensible than that of Catholics who miss their present opportunity—and duty—to perform the instant task, which is to inject the Catholic tradition of rationality into a mass democracy that is rapidly slipping its moorings in reason.

IV / STYLE

The third part of classical rhetoric was concerned with style. Once arguments had been discovered, selected, and arranged, they had to be put into words. Words—either the sound symbols or the graphic symbols—serve as the medium of communication between the speaker or writer and his audience. *Elocutio*, the Latin word for style, carried this notion of “speaking out.” *Lexis*, the usual Greek word for style, carried the triple notion of “thought” and “word” (both of these notions contained in the Greek word *logos*) and “speaking” (*legein*). The threefold implication of *lexis* indicates that the Greek rhetoricians conceived of style as that part of rhetoric in which we take the *thoughts* collected by invention and put them into *words* for the *speaking out* in delivery. Cardinal Newman’s definition of style carried much the same idea: “Style is a thinking out into language.”

It is this “thinking out into language” that presents the most formidable problem in composition for many students. The sight of a blank sheet of paper paralyzes them. It may be some comfort to such students to know that the transcription of words on a sheet of paper can be difficult even for professional writers. Writing never becomes easy; it just becomes easier. Alfred North Whitehead once said, “Style, in its finest sense, is the last acquirement of the educated mind; it is also the most useful.” The difficulty that everyone has, in varying degrees, in putting thoughts into language stems partly from the inertia that must be overcome at the beginning of any task, partly from the lack of something to say, partly from indecisiveness about what to say first, and partly from the variety of possible ways to say something.

Inertia is a problem that can be overcome only by will power. One must

simply sit down and resolve to write something on a piece of paper. Lack of things to say may be solved by the procedures discussed in the chapter on discovery of arguments. Indecisiveness about the order of the parts may be resolved by attention to the suggestions presented in the chapter on arrangement. The problems posed by the fact that thoughts and feelings can be worded in a variety of ways will be the principal concern of this chapter.

One notion about style that needs to be erased at the outset is that style is simply "the dress of thought." It is difficult to determine just which school of rhetoric gave currency to the notion that style was ornament or embellishment, like the tinsel draped over the bare branches of a Christmas tree, but it is certain that none of the prominent classical rhetoricians—Isocrates, Aristotle, Demetrius, Longinus, Cicero, Quintilian—ever preached such a doctrine. All of these taught that there is an integral and reciprocal relationship between matter and form. "Thought and speech are inseparable from each other"—those words of John Henry Newman express the view of style that all the best rhetoricians held. According to this view, matter must be fitted to the form, and form to the matter.

This notion of the integral relationship between matter and form is the basis for any true understanding of the rhetorical function of style. It precludes the view that style is merely the ornament of thought or that style is merely the vehicle for the expression of thought. Style does provide a vehicle for thought, and style can be ornamental; but style is something more than that. It is another of the "available means of persuasion," another of the means of arousing the appropriate emotional response in the audience, and another of the means of establishing the proper ethical image.

If the student adopts this functional notion of style, he will have gone part of the way toward solving some of his writing problems. He will begin to regard style in the way that Stendhal conceived of it: *Le style est ceci: Ajouter à une pensée donnée toutes les circonstances propres à produire tout l'effet que doit produire cette pensée* ("Style is this: to add to a given thought all the circumstances fitted to produce the whole effect which the thought is intended to produce"). The student will be guided in his choice of "the circumstances fitted to produce the whole effect" by a consideration of his subject matter, the occasion, his purpose, his own personality, and his audience. Jonathan Swift's definition of style as "proper words in proper places" is not much help to the student until he has some criteria for deciding what is proper. The determination of what is proper can be arrived at only in relation to the above-named considerations.

Since *proper* is a relative term, there cannot be such a thing as an absolute "best style." A writer must be in command of a variety of styles, in order to draw on that style which is most appropriate to the situation. This is not to say that his several styles will differ radically from one another. Just as

there is a common strain in the range of dialects that he commands in his speech, so in his writing there will be a certain tenor that persists as he ranges from the most formal prose to the most relaxed prose. Each man, in other words, has his idiom—an idiom that is recognizable in all his dialects and styles. His various styles will result from the variations that he works on this common tenor.

How does the student acquire the variety of styles needed for the variety of subject matter, occasion, and audience that he is bound to confront? The classical rhetoricians taught that a man acquired versatility of style in three ways: (1) through a study of precepts or principles (*ars*), (2) through practice in writing (*exercitatio*), (3) through imitation of the practice of others (*imitatio*). Rhetoric textbooks are concerned mainly with laying down the principles that will guide the student in acquiring effective styles. Practice and imitation are exercises that the student usually performs outside the classroom. For his homework, he is required to write themes; or he may be asked to read “good writers,” or to write a stylistic analysis of some writer, or to imitate passages of good writing.

Although this chapter will deal mainly with the precepts of effective writing, specimens of prose will be presented later for observation, analysis, and imitation. Practice in writing will have to come from the writing assignments set by the instructor, but at this point it is important to remind the student that practice in writing is the most beneficial of the three means. Precepts and imitation can *teach* the student how to write, but it is only by writing that the student will *learn* how to write. *One learns to write by writing*. Once is enough to enunciate that truism; but its truth cannot be recalled often enough.

With these few general remarks about style, we are ready to consider some of the precepts about style.

Grammatical Competence

In the study of style, we should be clear about the provinces of grammar and rhetoric. Just as the confusion between *grammar* and *usage* produced a great deal of needless controversy, so the confusion between *grammar* and *rhetoric* could hamper an intelligent discussion of the effective use of language. There are times, of course, when considerations of grammar will shade over into considerations of rhetoric. But while it is generally true that we must possess grammatical competence before we can develop an effective style, “good grammar” does not invariably produce “good rhetoric.” Nor does “bad grammar” invariably produce “bad rhetoric.” In April 1927,

while awaiting execution in prison, Bartolomeo Vanzetti made this statement to a reporter:

If it had not been for these thing, I might have live out my life, talking at street corners to scorning men. I might have die, unmarked, unknown, a failure. Now we are not a failure. This is our career and our triumph. Never in our full life can we hope to do such work for tolerance, for justice, for man's understanding of man, as now we do by an accident.

There are a number of errors in grammar and idiom in this utterance, but the passage has such a moving eloquence about it that it has become the most memorable statement to issue from the famous Sacco-Vanzetti case. Translated into flawless English, the utterance loses a great deal of its rhetorical effectiveness.

The smallest unit that falls within the province of rhetoric is the word. Unlike grammar, rhetoric is not concerned with *parts* of words, such as *morphemes* (the smallest segments that have meaning) and *phonemes* (those contrasting sound segments which enable a native speaker of the language to "hear" different words). It might be well at this point to set side by side the provinces of grammar and rhetoric:

GRAMMAR: phoneme—syllable—word—phrase—clause

RHETORIC: word—phrase—clause—paragraph—division—whole composition

It is clear from this schema that grammar and rhetoric overlap in the areas of the word, the phrase, and the clause. But although grammar and rhetoric deal with these common elements, their concern with these elements is not, strictly speaking, the same. Commonly we think of grammar as being concerned with "correctness" and of rhetoric as being concerned with "effectiveness." What we mean—or what we should mean—when we say that grammar is concerned with "correctness" is that grammar is preoccupied with how a particular language works—how words are formed and how words can be put together in phrases and clauses. What we mean when we say that rhetoric is concerned with "effectiveness" is that rhetoric deals with the choice of the "best" from a number of *possible* expressions in a language.

We can illustrate the difference by looking at an English sentence:

He already has forgive them for leaving, before the curtain fell, the theater.

What the grammarian would pounce on here would be the word *forgive*. He would point out that modern English forms the perfect tense of the third-person singular verb with the auxiliary verb *has* and the past participle of the main verb. Once the grammarian had changed the verb in this

sentence to *has forgiven*, he would have no more grammatical errors to correct in the sentence—that is, he would have to make no further changes in word order, inflections, or function words. But if the grammarian were to assume the additional role of the rhetorician, he would probably recommend further changes in the sentence. Although it is grammatically possible to place the word *already* and the clause *before the curtain fell* in the positions they now occupy in the sentence, it would be rhetorically advisable to alter the word order. The rhetorician would recommend that, in normal circumstances, the sentence read this way:

He has already forgiven them for leaving the theater before the curtain fell.

He would probably justify the changes in word order on the grounds that the sentence reads more naturally, more euphoniously, that way. There might be a rhetorical situation which would justify placing the adverb clause where it was in the original sentence, but it is difficult to imagine what that situation would be. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine a situation that would justify putting *already* at the head of the sentence. If, for instance, we wanted to emphasize the time element, we might say, “Already he has forgiven them . . .”

Grammar would be concerned with the disposition of a word or clause only if the placement were impossible in English or would change the intended meaning of the sentence. English grammar would not permit this arrangement of words, for instance: *He has forgiven already them*. And if we were to say, “He had forgiven them before the curtain fell for leaving,” the grammarian might ignore the awkward placement of the adverb clause, but he would have to point out that by such placement we have changed the meaning of the sentence: the adverb clause now modifies *had forgiven*; in the original sentence the adverb clause modified the gerund *leaving*.

Rhetoric and grammar are concerned, of course, with something more than just the placement of words, phrases, and clauses in a sentence, but this discussion of placement does illustrate the difference in the interest that grammar and rhetoric take in words.

Choice of Diction

AN ADEQUATE VOCABULARY

Classical rhetoricians commonly considered style under two main heads: choice of diction, and composition of words in sentences. We will consider first the choice of diction.

In order to develop a good style, the student must have, in addition to grammatical competence, an ample vocabulary. How does he acquire the rich vocabulary he needs to develop a good style? There is no magic formula, certainly; the best advice that one can give the student is to urge him to read at every opportunity. There is no doubt that persistent reading will add immeasurably to his vocabulary resources. Every English teacher is willing to testify that the best writing is usually done by those students who have been omnivorous readers. Not only do such students have more to say on any given subject, but they seem to have at their command the words they need to express what they have to say. We more easily remember the words that we encounter repeatedly in our reading. How we remember and recall words at the appropriate time is not known. But we do know that a man cannot give what he does not have. The man who reads a great deal is more likely to encounter new words than the man who merely keeps his ears open to the speech that is constantly swirling about him. The reason for this is that the vocabulary for impromptu talk and conversation is considerably more limited than the vocabulary for written prose.

The writer who has words ready when he needs them is in a happy condition indeed. When apt words come readily, he knows that he has gained command over words. He must feel something of the assurance displayed by the centurion in the New Testament: "I say to one, 'Go,' and he goes, and to another, 'Come,' and he comes." What is especially fortunate about such a verbal facility is that words which present themselves readily are likely to be the "proper words in proper places." When we have to strain for the *mot juste*, there is always the danger that the word finally chosen will be slightly awry.

So the student who wants to acquire an adequate vocabulary should heed the advice to read, read, read. But let him not trust solely to unconscious acquisition. Although he will absorb many new words merely by meeting them frequently, he will accelerate the assimilation of new words if he will take the trouble to look up the meaning of unfamiliar words as he meets them. As Henry James said, "Try to be one of the people on whom nothing is lost!" The student will be amazed at how quickly and solidly his vocabulary grows if he takes the trouble to consult his dictionary every time he meets a new word.

Consulting the meaning of new words as one meets them is the best of the *conscious* methods of increasing one's vocabulary. It is best because it is functional: the student is pursuing the meanings of words that he needs to know in order to understand what he reads.

There are other conscious ways to accelerate the acquisition of a rich vocabulary. One of these is to study lists of "new," "unusual," or "useful" words. We can add rapidly to our stock of words by such a systematic study

of word-lists, and the student who feels himself to be notably deficient in vocabulary can expedite the catching-up process by learning and constantly reviewing a recommended list of words. There are many vocabulary studies available, which the student who wants to add quickly to his knowledge of words would be well advised to consult.

The student should be warned, however, that this is the least satisfactory of the methods of vocabulary study. For one thing, he is studying words in isolation, not in a context. Studying words out of context can have a number of unfortunate consequences. First of all, knowledge of words tends to become an end in itself instead of a means. For another thing, the meanings of words studied out of context tend not to "stick" with the student as readily as they do when words are seen in the context of the reading that the student does. Any teacher who has subjected his students to the study of selected word-lists knows how often he has been disappointed by seeing few of these words appear in the writing his students submit to him. The third consequence of studying words out of context is that students often use these words ineptly or unidiomatically. The student who writes, "George ate his chicken with hedonistic gusto," reveals his awareness that *hedonistic* has some connection with sensuous pleasure, but he reveals also that he has not yet acquired the fine sense of knowing when words "fit." Nor does it help much to insist that the student should compose a sentence using the word he has just looked up, because if he has not seen or heard the word used aptly he has no guide to its use. The student should not be discouraged, of course, from investigating the meanings of words that he finds in some recommended list, because there is always some profit in such a pursuit, but the student should be aware of the limitations of such an approach to words.

If writers have any reference tools on their desks, they are most likely to have a dictionary and a thesaurus. Writers often resort to their dictionary for spelling, for syllabication of words, for meanings of words. They do not resort to a thesaurus as often as they do to a dictionary, but it is the rare writer who has not sometime felt the need to consult a thesaurus. A thesaurus is indeed a valuable vocabulary-aid when the exact word that we need does not come to us readily.

The most famous thesaurus—the one which has become as much associated with synonymy as Webster is with lexicography and Bulfinch with mythology—is *Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases*, compiled originally by an English physician, Peter Mark Roget, and first published in London in 1852. Roget arranged his "treasury of words" under topical headings. Subsequent editors have revised the original *Thesaurus*, adding new words and removing some that had become obsolete, and the most recent

editors have arranged the entries in alphabetical order to facilitate use. There are many inexpensive editions of *Roget's* available today, as well as other thesauruses prepared by modern editors. The student will find enough use for a thesaurus to warrant his buying a copy.

A thesaurus merely lists synonyms (and some antonyms) for the entry word, with cross-references to other entries. Since synonyms seldom if ever are identical in meaning, a student needs considerable knowledge of words and a fine discrimination to use a thesaurus intelligently. Suppose that the student is composing a paragraph describing the people who attended the opening of an opera season. In one of the sentences, he wants to convey the idea that the women who attended this event displayed a lack of taste and moderation in the way they dressed. He has written the sentence this way:

The ladies ostentatiously showed off their silks and satins and diamonds.

But he is not satisfied with the sentence. For one thing, he does not like the awkwardness of *showed off*. For another thing, he senses that there is something repetitious about *ostentatiously showed off* (doesn't *ostentation* mean "a show"?) Well, he will have to reword, perhaps recast, the sentence. If the new words or new phrases do not come to him immediately, he may find help in a thesaurus. But where does he start in the thesaurus?

Part of the difficulty in using a thesaurus is knowing just which entry one should consult. If one merely wants a substitute for a word, he has only to consult the entry for that word in the thesaurus. But sometimes one has an idea that he wants to convey, but no word for that idea suggests itself. In that case, one must conjure up some word or some concept (and it was here that *Roget's* original topical categories were helpful) that is close to the notion he wants to convey. Even a remote word will give him a starting point in the thesaurus. Synonyms for that word and cross-references to other words will move him closer to the exact word.

The student in our instance is not sure, however, whether he needs just a substitute word or whether he needs an entirely new way of phrasing what he means to say. But since "showing off" is the general idea that he wants to convey with this sentence, he decides to start by consulting the entry *ostentation*. In *Roget's* he finds, as he will in most thesauruses, that the synonyms are grouped under part-of-speech headings—noun, verb, adjective, adverb. Looking at the list of synonyms under each part-of-speech heading may suggest to the student how to reword or revise his unsatisfactory sentence. He would like to keep, if he can, the "silks and satins and diamonds" of his present sentence because these words are concrete and sensory. (Perhaps without knowing it, the student has produced the figure of synecdoche—the

material here standing for the thing made from it.) From the nouns listed under *ostentation*, he experiments with various combinations:

The ladies made a *display* (or *show*, *flourish*, *parade*) of their silks and satins and diamonds.

Perhaps adding the adjective *vulgar* (or *garish*, *gaudy*, *glittering*) would reveal his value judgment on the scene—would, in other words, reveal his attitude toward the scene:

The ladies made a vulgar display of their silks and satins and diamonds.

Then he experiments with some verb combinations suggested by the synonyms listed under *ostentation*: *to exhibit*, *to display*, *to parade*, *to flaunt*, *to prink*, *to primp*. He finally settles on the verb *flaunt*—

The ladies flaunted their silks and satins and diamonds.

—because *flaunt* combines all the notions and attitudes that he tried to convey in his original sentence; and *flaunt*, being concrete and picturesque, fits well with the figure of speech that follows it.

A thesaurus can be a valuable aid when “the proper word in the proper place” does not immediately present itself. But the student should be on his guard against the temptations offered by such a treasury. Those who have gone through a period of serious effort to improve their style may recall how difficult it was at times to resist the temptation to replace all the drab, ordinary words with some of the resplendent, polysyllabic words discovered in a thesaurus. A student, for instance, might compose a sentence like this:

After the fire had been put out, the police roped off the street and prevented all sightseers from strolling past the charred ruins.

But that is too lackluster, he tells himself. So mining his lexicographical lode for some sesquipedalian nuggets, he bedizens his humdrum sentence in this fashion:

After the conflagration had been extinguished, the police obstructed the thoroughfare and forefended all inquisitive spectators from perambulating before the incinerated residue of the pyrogenic catastrophe.

Fortunately, the student who persists in his efforts to improve his style eventually outgrows his penchant for such polysyllabic anfractuosités. Perhaps the price that one has to pay for an enriched vocabulary is a period of addiction to “big” words. The ordeal will inflict no permanent damage if the student can “kick the habit” in its early stages.

PURITY, PROPRIETY, AND PRECISION OF DICTION

So far in our discussion of diction we have touched on two qualifications that the student must have if he is to improve his style: he must know the grammar of his language, and he must have an adequate vocabulary. Our concern from this point on will be mainly with the *rhetorical* competence that a student must have in order to make wise choices among words. George Campbell pointed up the distinction between grammatical and rhetorical competence in this way: "the grammatical art bears much the same relation to the rhetorical which the art of the mason bears to that of the architect."

The prime quality of prose style is *clarity*—or, to use the sonorous Latinate term, *perspicuity*. Since the object of rhetorical prose is persuasion, it follows that such prose must communicate with those who are to be persuaded. And if rhetorical prose must communicate, it follows that it must, above all, be clear. As one might expect from the man who viewed rhetoric as an activity that always involved an audience, Aristotle held that "language which does not convey a clear meaning fails to perform the very function of language." Lord Macaulay, one of the masters of the limpid prose style, put it this way: "The first rule of all writing—that rule to which every other is subordinate—is that the words used by the writer shall be such as most fully and precisely convey his meaning to the great body of his readers."

Clarity comes from selecting words carefully and arranging them well. Leaving aside the problem of arrangement for now, how can a writer learn to select the proper words? He will be helped in making his selection by keeping three criteria in mind—purity, propriety, and precision. While some judgments about whether language is pure, appropriate, and precise can be made only when the writer sees words in a sentence and when he views them in relation to his subject, purpose, and audience, it is still possible to say something about the purity, propriety, and precision of isolated words.

The discussion of *purity of diction* involves us, willy-nilly, in a consideration of those much-maligned criteria that George Campbell set forth in the eighteenth century to determine "good usage." In order to merit the stamp of approval, words must be, according to Campbell, in *reputable* use, in *national* use, and in *present* use. Despite the relativity of these criteria, there would seem to be little practical difficulty in using at least two of the criteria—national use and present use—to help us determine whether our diction is "pure" and therefore clear. If we are to communicate with a contemporary audience, it stands to reason that we must use current words and idioms—that is, words and idioms, however "old" they may be, that are understood by people today. Likewise, we must use the words which have a national currency. This criterion demands that we avoid dialectical words, technical words, coinages, and foreign words. But this second criterion immediately

calls for some qualification. If we view words in relation to an audience, for instance, we see that there are some situations which call for localisms, technical jargon, neologisms, and even foreign words.

When we try the third criterion, reputable use, we run into more difficulty. Campbell proposed this standard for judging reputable locutions: "whatever modes of speech are authorized as good by the writings of a great number, if not the majority, of celebrated authors." But is it conceivable that in a modern pluralistic society we could ever arrive at any consensus about who our "celebrated authors" are? Moreover, if two "celebrated authors" are in conflict on a matter of usage, which author do we follow?—the one who is *more* celebrated? And is it possible for the ordinary educated person to determine in every case, or even in many cases, whether a certain locution is sanctioned by a "great number" or "the majority" of celebrated authors?

These practical difficulties lead many people to rely on some arbiter of usage. The best source of such guidance is a reference work that boldly claims to be an arbiter. Fortunately, there are a few esteemed dictionaries of usage available. These dictionaries offer reliable guidance because the men or women who prepared them had good taste in language to start with and refined their taste with a close study of actual usage.

The most famous of these reference words is H. W. Fowler's *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage*, first published in 1926 but many times reprinted. This book has become a bible of usage for many famous writers and editors. Fowler was himself a lexicographer, having compiled, with the help of his brother Francis George Fowler, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*. To his sound knowledge of the English language, Fowler added a discriminating taste, and he wrote with such grace and wit that he was himself an exemplar of the "good English" that he advocated. It was Fowler who assured us, once and for all, that it was permissible at times, even advisable, to split an infinitive or to end a sentence with a preposition. And he made household words of some of the headings in his alphabetically arranged dictionary—tags like Battered Ornaments, Cannibalism, Elegant Variation, Out of the Frying Pan, Sturdy Indefensibles.

The student will have to consult *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage* to discover for himself the value and flavor of this admirable reference work. But here is a taste of Fowler's wit and judgment, taken from his article on the subject we have just been discussing—purity of diction:

PURISM. Now & then a person may be heard to 'confess', in the pride that apes humility, to being 'a bit of a purist'; but *purist* & *purism* are for the most part missile words, which we all of us fling at anyone who insults us by finding not good enough for him some manner of speech that is good enough for us. It is in that disparaging sense that the words are used in this book; by *purism* is to be understood a needless & irritat-

ing insistence on purity or correctness of speech. Pure English, however, even apart from the great numbers of elements (vocabulary, grammar, idiom, pronunciation, & so forth) that go to make it up, is so relative a term that almost every man is potentially a purist & a sloven at once to persons looking at him from a lower & a higher position in the scale than his own. The words have therefore not been very freely used; that they should be renounced altogether would be too much to expect considering the subject of the book. But readers who find a usage stigmatized as purism have a right to know the stigmatizer's place in the purist scale, if his stigma is not to be valueless. Accordingly, under headings of various matters with which purism is concerned, a few articles are now mentioned illustrating the kind of view that may be expected in other articles of a similar nature: . . .

Dictionary of Modern English Usage, Oxford University Press, pp. 474-5.
Reprinted by permission of the Clarendon Press, Oxford.

With the passage of time, Fowler's dictionary was bound to become outdated—at least on some matters of usage. And as the gap between British English and American English widened, American writers began to see that Fowler was not relevant to some of the locutions that had developed in the United States.

In order to fill the need for an up-to-date dictionary of usage that would pay special attention to American English, the Oxford University Press in 1957 published Margaret Nicholson's *A Dictionary of American-English Usage*. In her Preface, Miss Nicholson announces that her book is an adaptation of, not a replacement for, Fowler's *MEU*. She has retained many of Fowler's long articles, has abridged others, and has added a number of her own entries on modern Americanisms.

In 1957 Bergen Evans and Cornelia Evans published a completely new dictionary of American usage, *A Dictionary of Contemporary American Usage* (Random House). Writers who are loyal to Fowler will continue to use *due to* only in adjectival structures (*His absence was due to sickness*, but not, *The government failed due to widespread discontent with its policies*). But those writers who have come to trust the painstaking study that the Evanses have made of actual usage will probably be guided by this statement about the present status of *due to*:

due to may be used to qualify a noun, as in *a mistake due to carelessness*. This use of *due to* was listed by Dr. Johnson as "proper, but not usual." Since then it has become a familiar form of speech and no one thinks of objecting to it. But the words are also used today to qualify a verb, as in *he failed, due to carelessness*. This construction is relatively new and is condemned by some grammarians.

In both cases the words *due to* are being used as *owing to* might be used. It is claimed that *due to* is acceptable in the first case but not in the

second, and that only the form *owing to* may be used with a verb. This distinction cannot be defended on theoretical grounds, since *due to* and *owing to* are grammatically alike. The critics usually content themselves with saying that "*due to* cannot be used to qualify a verb." But it is used to qualify a verb, millions of times every day. And it is used in this way in very respectable places. A tablet in front of the Old State House in Philadelphia reads: *Here the Continental Congress sat from the date it convened, May 10, 1775, until the close of the Revolution, except when, in 1776-77, it sat in Baltimore, and in 1777-78, in Lancaster and York, due to the temporary occupation of Philadelphia by the British army.* (See also *owe*.)

From *A Dictionary of Contemporary American Usage* by Bergen Evans and Cornelia Evans. Copyright © 1957 by Bergen Evans and Cornelia Evans. Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc.

Any of the three dictionaries of usage we have discussed would be a valuable addition to the student's library. If the student's dictionary does not settle his doubts about the "purity" of a certain expression, a dictionary of usage can be of real help to him. He should be cautioned, however, not to develop a neurotic concern about usage. If American schools had been as much concerned with grammar, logic, and rhetoric, as they have been with "good usage," the quality of student writing today might be better than it generally is.

The principal point to be emphasized about purity of diction is that one's language must be intelligible and acceptable to an audience. There will always be a certain level of diction below which a speaker or writer will never slip, however crude and unlettered his audience may be. There is a large stock of words, a reservoir of "basic English," that will always be intelligible and acceptable to any audience. Deviations from this basic stock of ordinary words will be governed mainly by the nature of the audience addressed.

Propriety or appropriateness is the quality of diction that can least be judged in isolation; it always implies a judgment made in relation to something else. Conceivably, we could look at isolated words and make some judgment about whether they were current or national or reputable, but it is impossible to judge the appropriateness of isolated words.

Diction is appropriate when it suits our subject matter, our purpose, the occasion, and the audience. Unfortunately, there are no handbooks that can help the student make judgments about the appropriateness of his diction. Everyone seems to be endowed with a certain minimal sense of appropriateness—a sense absorbed from the experience of living in a society. Instinctively, we "tone up" our everyday language when we shift from a situation in which we are addressing our peers and intimates to a situation in which

we are addressing, say, the dean of the college. We make similar adjustments in our diction as our subject matter, occasion, and purpose change.

The refinements of this minimal sense of appropriateness will come naturally, as our experience deepens and our education advances, and will develop in proportion to our native intelligence and our conscious efforts to improve this sense. Just as certain people seem to inherit and develop a superior ability to get along with their fellow men, so some of them develop a keener sense than others for the appropriateness of their language.

Involved in this matter of appropriateness are the connotations of words. When we are concerned with the purity or precision of diction, we are concerned mainly with the denotations of words—with the dictionary meanings of verbal symbols. But in our choice of appropriate diction we must also take into consideration the connotations of words—those emotional and tonal qualities that come to be associated with words. We cannot control the connotations that cluster around a word; we can only be aware of those connotations and take advantage of them. It makes a great difference whether we call a man a "politician" or a "statesman." Because of the connotations that attend these words, the first word will tend, with most audiences, to dishonor the man, while the second word will tend to honor him.

The connotations of words have great rhetorical value—for example, in promoting the emotional appeal of a discourse. Robert H. Thouless has ably demonstrated the emotional value of connotations in his analysis of the diction in two verses by John Keats:

In *The Eve of St. Agnes*, Keats has written:

Full on this casement shone the wintry moon,
And threw warm gules on Madeline's fair breast.

These are beautiful lines. Let us notice how much of their beauty follows from the proper choice of emotionally colored words and how completely it is lost if these words are replaced by neutral ones. The words with strikingly emotional meanings are *casement*, *gules*, *Madeline*, *fair*, and *breast*. *Casement* means simply a kind of window with emotional and romantic associations. *Gules* is the heraldic name for red, with the suggestion of romance which accompanies all heraldry. *Madeline* is simply a girl's name, but one calling out favorable emotions absent from a relatively plain and straightforward name. *Fair* simply means, in objective fact, that her skin was white or uncolored—a necessary condition for the colors of the window to show—but also fair implies warm emotional preference for an uncolored skin rather than one which is yellow, purple, black, or any of the other colors which skin might be. *Breast* has also similar emotional meanings, and the aim of scientific description might have been equally well attained if it had been replaced by such a neutral word as *chest*.

Let us now try the experiment of keeping these two lines in a metrical form, but replacing all the emotionally colored words by neutral ones, while making as few other changes as possible. We may write:

Full on this window shone the wintry moon
Making red marks on Jane's uncolored chest.

No one will doubt that all of its poetic value has been knocked out of the passage by these changes. Yet the lines still mean the same in external fact; they still have the same objective meaning. It is only the emotional meaning which has been destroyed.

From Robert H. Thouless, *How To Think Straight*. Copyright 1932 by Robert H. Thouless. Reprinted by permission of Simon and Schuster, New York.

The student is probably well aware by now that poets exploit the emotional values of words, but he is not always alert to the subtle emotional effects exerted by connotation in a prose text. Faced with the evidence of H. L. Mencken's scholarly three-volume study of American English, we have to concede that he had a profound knowledge of his native language, but perhaps we are not sufficiently aware of how he manipulated the connotations of words to effect his rhetorical purpose. Consider this example, in which Mencken is seeking to influence our attitude toward a certain kind of teacher:

Such idiots, despite the rise of "scientific" pedagogy, have not died out in the world. I believe that our schools are full of them, both in pantaloon and in skirts. There are fanatics who love and venerate spelling as a tom-cat loves and venerates catnip. There are grammatomaniacs; schoolmarms who would rather parse than eat; specialists in an objective case that doesn't exist in English; strange beings, otherwise sane and even intelligent and comely, who suffer under a split infinitive as you or I would suffer under gastro-enteritis. There are geography cranks, able to bound Mesopotamia and Baluchistan. There are zealots for long division, experts in the multiplication table, lunatic worshipers of the binomial theorem. But the system has them in its grip. It combats their natural enthusiasm diligently and mercilessly. It tries to convert them into mere technicians, clumsy machines.

From H. L. Mencken, "Pedagogy," *A Mencken Chrestomathy*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949, p. 305. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

We cannot examine all the techniques that Mencken uses in his satirical writings, but we can note here the subtle way in which he influences our reactions simply by his choice of words. A good deal of the effect of this passage is produced by Mencken's "name-calling." The "names" that Mencken used here are heavily freighted with emotional overtones—*idiots*, *fanatics*, *schoolmarms* (one of Mencken's favorite derogatory epithets), *cranks*, *zealots*, *lunatic worshipers*. All of these words carry the discrediting connotation of

extreme, irrational commitment to a cause—the taint of “enthusiasm” that many critics ascribed to the evangelical sects in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England. Where Mencken fails to find an emotional epithet to suit his purpose, he invents one—*grammatomaniacs*. Most readers do not know what *gastro-enteritis* means; but they do not have to know—the word just *sounds* awful. Notice how Mencken, in the second sentence of this passage, indicates that he is talking about both men and women teachers—“in pantaloons and in skirts.” *Pantaloons* was an especially clever choice. *Pants* would have been the word that most of us would have chosen as the counterpart of *skirts*. But Mencken detected the extra connotative value of the word *pantaloons*, suggesting to a modern audience something archaic, slightly feminine. Note too how Mencken uses a simile in the third sentence to depreciate the object of his satire, comparing devotees of correct spelling to the lowly, back-alley *tom-cat*. One of the deadliest words in the English language is the word *mere*. Mencken uses this word with devastating effectiveness at the end of this passage, where he begins to shift his ground of attack, warning us that these “enthusiastic” pedagogues are now in danger of being turned into dispassionate machines as a result of their exposure to “teachers’ college” bun-kum. What is more chilling than to be called a “mere technician”?

We see then that the connotations of words must be considered in any judgment about the appropriateness of diction. Sensitivity to the connotations of words cannot be taught; it must be learned. What is even harder for the student to acquire is a fine sense for knowing how far to go in exploiting the emotional force of connotations. Mencken perhaps goes too far in the passage we have just considered. In most of his satirical writings, he relied too heavily on the shock technique that derived from the use of hyperbolic, simplistic diction. Many people are alienated rather than persuaded by his intemperate language. A clever writer can sometimes be too clever for his own good. It does not take a sledge-hammer to drive a nail.

We turn now to the third quality, precision. The word *precision* has its roots in the Latin verb *praeccidere*, “to cut off.” A precise word is a word shorn of all superfluous and irrelevant notions, a word that signifies neither more nor less than we intend to say. Words may be dubbed “imprecise” (1) when they do not express exactly what we intended to say; (2) when they express the idea but not quite fully; (3) when they express the idea but with something more than we intended.

The student who writes, “I was pleased by his fulsome praise,” has not said what he intended to say. If he consults the dictionary meaning of *fulsome* (“disgusting or offensive, mainly because of its excessiveness or insincerity”), he will see how wide of the mark he has come. If he writes, “I thought it was a tremendous performance,” he conveys the general idea that

he approved of the performance, but he conveys no exact notion of the particular way in which this performance was "tremendous." When he writes, "As a result of examining the basic flaws in the situation, he came up with a radical solution to the problem," he chooses an apt word in *radical* (a solution that gets at the *root* of the problem), but unwittingly he suggests an additional meaning that he did not intend (a solution that is *wild* or *subversive*). A word then will be inexact if it expresses *too little* or *too much* or if it is *too general*.

It is perhaps better to discuss faulty idiom here than under the head of pure diction, because, like the diction cited in the previous paragraph, faulty idiom "misses the mark." The reason why lapses in idiom constitute one of the commonest faults in student writing is that idiom, like connotation, is one of the tricky aspects of language. Dictionaries and handbooks of usage will more often be helpful to the student in matters of idiom than in matters of connotation, but the most reliable guide to correct idiom is the student's own awareness of how his native language is spoken. The student who has not read very much or who has not kept his ears open to the turns of phrase is the one most likely to violate the idiom of the language.

The "turns of phrase" in the previous sentence suggests an important observation about idiom. No single word, considered in isolation, can be declared unidiomatic. If we say of a certain word, "Native speakers of the language do not use that word," we are saying simply that such a word does not exist in the English language. A word can be classified as unidiomatic only in relation to some other word or words. No one could say of the word *for* that it is unidiomatic; either it is an English word or it is not. *For* can become unidiomatic only when it is used in conjunction with another word, as with the word *unequal*, in the sentence, "The judge proved to be unequal *for* the task." Then we can point out that native speakers of the language do not use the preposition *for* with *unequal*; they say "unequal *to* the task."

What complicates the difficulty is that grammar is of no help to the student in deciding matters of idiom. There is nothing ungrammatical in the locution "unequal for the task." Idiom is a matter of usage rather than of grammar: native speakers just do not say "unequal *for*." Neither is logic of much help to the student in regard to idiom. When we say, for instance, "He *looked up* the word in the dictionary," we are, in a sense, violating logic, because when we consult a word in the dictionary, we are more likely to *look down* the page to find the word than to *look up* the page. But "look up a word" is the correct idiom simply because that is the way people say it.

Sometimes the prefixes of words will provide a clue to the idiomatic preposition that goes with those words. So we say, "he *departed from* the scene," "the crowd *emerged from* the stadium," "he *is adverse to* the proposal," "they *compared it with* the first version," "the station-wagon *collided with* the motorcycle," "he *abstained from* all alcoholic beverages." But the lexical

meaning of these Latin prefixes is not always a clue to the proper preposition, for we also say, "in *contrast to*" (as well as "in *contrast with*"), "he *departed for* the station," "she *compared him to* an overgrown bear."

Since neither grammar nor logic is a reliable guide to proper idiom, we must develop our own awareness of the peculiar way in which native speakers of the language say certain things. Perhaps the last proficiency we acquire in learning a foreign language is a sense for the idioms of the language. It is a commonplace that the best way to attune our ear to the idioms of a foreign language is to live for a time in a community where that language is spoken exclusively. So in learning the idioms of our own language, we must *listen* to the speech that is all about us, and we must carefully observe the turns of phrase in the contemporary prose we read. Teachers can point out lapses in idiom and can correct the idiom in the student's writing, but in the absence of any "rules" about idiom, the student must develop his own sense for the idiosyncrasies of expression. He must become aware not only of the proper idiom but of the subtle changes of meaning and tone affected by idiom. In an article on the idiomatic preposition, John Nist has illustrated some of the vagaries of idiom:

Doting grandparents may indulge in loving pride and make *over* a favorite one-toothed blue-eyed darling. But a pouting lover had better make *up with* his sweetheart first; his chances of making *out* are otherwise very slim. An imbibor can conceivably be sleeping *in* while sleeping *out* for the sole sake of sleeping it *off*. How many a long-suffering son-in-law has had a run *in* with her whose kiss is colder than a mackerel because he intended to *run out* on his wife by running *off with* the understanding secretary? One of the favorite maxims of chilly age for flaming youth goes like this: Be careful how you live it *up*; you may never live it *down*! A philosopher chews *upon* a difficult thought; an able prosecutor chews *up* the defense attorney's arguments; a catcher chews *over* the signals with his pitcher; a diner chews *around* the bone; and an angry man chews *out* his offensive neighbor. A cutup at the party may cut *out* from the stag line and cut *in* on the belle of the ball. And he who goes all *out* in tracking down the tricky idiomatic preposition will undoubtedly find himself all *in*.

From John Nist, "The Idiomatic Preposition," *Word Study*, XXXIX (Dec. 1963), 1-4. By permission of the author and publisher. From *Word Study*, copyright 1963 by G. & C. Merriam Co., Publishers of the Merriam-Webster Dictionaries.

Many other observations might be made about diction, such as that diction should be "natural," "vigorous," "concrete," "graceful," "harmonious," but these epithets merely represent alternate ways of saying that diction should be *pure*, *appropriate*, and *precise*. Besides, our judgments about the naturalness, vigor, concreteness, gracefulness, and harmony of diction—or, to use

our own terms, the purity, propriety, and precision of diction—can best be made when we view diction in the context of a sentence and in relation to our rhetorical purpose. There will be times, for instance, when it might suit our purpose to make our diction awkward or insipid or abstract or ugly or unmusical.

In summary: Since words are the building-blocks of our sentences, it is obvious that we must have an adequate supply of words to erect the kind of edifice we have planned. When our supply of words is low, we will have to make some effort to add to our stock. Our working vocabulary will naturally expand as our experience and education expand, but we can accelerate the expansion by reading a great deal and by consulting dictionaries and thesauruses. Since we seek to communicate with others, it stands to reason that our diction must first of all be intelligible—intelligible, that is, to a particular audience. It will be mainly the audience that will determine whether we can use learned words or technical terms or foreign words or slang. The audience, the subject matter, the occasion, and our purpose constitute the criteria for judging the appropriateness of our diction. In addition to choosing intelligible and appropriate diction, we must choose diction that is as precise as the situation permits and demands. Dictionaries and handbooks of usage will help solve some of the student's problems with usage, idiom, and connotation, but the student will have to depend mainly on the development of his own sensitivity to these aspects of language.

Composition of the Sentence

Words are symbols of ideas, but they do not begin to “say” anything until we put them together. Sentences, which are syntactical units composed of words, “say” something, partly because of the *lexical content* (the meaning) of the words and partly because of the *grammatical forms* that govern words put together in patterns. Up to this point, we have been speaking mainly about the lexical aspect of words. As we move now to a discussion of the composition of the sentence, we must begin to be concerned with syntax. Eventually, we will be led into a discussion of another aspect of language: how the *rhetorical forms* of sentences, the schemes, constitute a third carrier of meaning.

As we pointed out in the previous section on choice of diction, no one can begin to develop a style until he has a basic competence in the grammar of the language. We presume that the student has this basic competence and is thus ready to develop the rhetorical competence he needs in order to compose effective sentences.

Rhetorical competence plays its part in the writing process when there are choices to be made from among two or more grammatical possibilities. Stylistic variations in the syntax of the sentence cannot ignore the grammar of the language. Any changes we make for rhetorical effect must respect the grammatical possibilities of the language.

As a starting point for our discussion of the rhetoric of the sentence, let us take this minimal sentence:

The boy loves the girl.

Native speakers of the language recognize this as a pattern of words that make a statement. They know the meanings of the words, and they are familiar with the grammar of the sentence: the function word *the*, the inflectional concordance between the subject and predicate, and the word order. Anyone who wanted to make a statement, in the English language, about a young male of the human species having a certain emotional attitude toward a young female of the human species would be limited in the words he could choose to express this idea and even more severely limited in the way he could put these words together to say what he wanted to say. As far as *rhetoric* goes, there is very little he could do with this sentence. He might make some different choice of words—proper nouns to replace the *boy* and *girl* or a synonymous verb to replace *loves*—to make the sentence rhetorically more effective. But there is almost nothing he could do to alter the grammar of the sentence. He cannot say “Boy love girl” or “Loves the boy the girl.” No, he must dispose whatever words he chooses in the usual pattern for a statement—subject-verb-complement (S-V-C)—and use the proper inflectional forms.

It is when we begin to expand this minimal sentence pattern that rhetoric has a bearing. There are a number of ways in which we can expand this sentence, and within each of the various ways there are often alternatives. Once there are alternatives, there are choices to be made; and once choices are to be made, rhetoric comes into the picture.

One of the ways in which we can expand our minimal sentence is by adding single-word, phrasal, or clausal modifiers to the *head word* in the S or V or C. For instance:

The tall, handsome boy sincerely loves the short, homely girl.

Can we alter the order of any of these modifiers? Yes, we can make *some* changes—changes that are grammatically and idiomatically possible but not always stylistically advisable. For example, we could make these changes:

The boy, tall and handsome, loves sincerely the short, homely girl.

Rarely does one see adjectival single-word modifiers placed *after* the head word in the complement: . . . *sincerely loves the girl, short and homely*. The following order is also possible in English:

Tall and handsome, the boy loves the short, homely girl sincerely.

We might choose this order, for instance, if we wanted to emphasize the boy's tallness and handsomeness and the sincerity of his love for the girl.

Another way to expand the minimal sentence is to use prepositional phrases as modifiers of any one or all of the head words in the S-V-C pattern:

The boy from Montana loves, with uncommon fervor, the girl from Missouri.

Prepositional phrases used as adjectival modifiers are almost always placed *after* the noun or pronoun they modify. There are some instances, however, when the prepositional phrase used adjectivally will be placed *before* the noun that it modifies. For example,

About this development, he had been given no advance warning.

(Here the phrase *about this development* modifies *warning*.)

Prepositional phrases used adverbially have more freedom of movement than do prepositional phrases used adjectivally. There are three other places where the phrase *with uncommon fervor* could be placed in our sentence:

With uncommon fervor, the boy from Montana loves the girl from Missouri.

The boy from Montana loves the girl from Missouri with uncommon fervor.

The boy from Montana with uncommon fervor loves the girl from Missouri.

There are a number of other ways in which we could expand our minimal sentence:

1. compounding the head words in the S-V-C pattern;
2. juxtaposing appositives to the head words in the S-V-C pattern;
3. using verbals or verbal phrases (participles, gerunds, and infinitives) in the S-V-C pattern;
4. using noun clauses to serve as the S or the C in the S-V-C pattern;
5. using adjective clauses to modify the S or C head word in the S-V-C pattern;
6. using adverb clauses to modify the V in the S-V-C pattern.

We could go on to illustrate these methods of expanding the sentence and to investigate the alternatives (if any) in word order of each of these meth-

ods, but the student can pursue these matters in the structural and transformational grammars now available. This brief excursion into the syntax of the English sentence serves to give a general idea of what we mean by the rhetoric of the sentence.

When we are presented with a number of syntactical choices, all of them grammatically and idiomatically possible, we will elect the possibility that best serves our purpose at the moment. If, for instance, one of the possibilities allows us to put a word or phrase in an emphatic position and if emphasis of that word or phrase is what we want at that point, then we should take advantage of that possibility. There are times when we want to de-emphasize a word or phrase, and in that case we should elect that possibility which would bury the word or phrase somewhere in the interior of the sentence. We might elect another grammatical possibility on the grounds that this disposition of words improved the rhythm of the sentence. Sometimes we might reject a grammatical possibility because it lends itself to ambiguity. (Such a case would be the "squinting modifier" in the sentence "The bandmaster strutted along *gaily* twirling his baton.") And of course we sometimes elect a grammatical possibility for no other reason than that we want to avoid monotony of sentence structure.

There is another point to be made here about the rhetoric of the sentence. Style, like grammar, is part of the expressive system of a language. Just as grammatical devices, like word order and inflections, are carriers of meaning, so the forms of sentence—the *schemes*, as the Renaissance rhetoricians called them—are expressive of meaning too. For example, let us consider the rhetorical device of parallelism. When we have to express a series of similar or equivalent "meanings," we usually resort to the grammatical device of compounding, and we reinforce the co-ordinate value of the compounded elements with the rhetorical device of parallelism.

We can illustrate how parallelism can be expressive of meaning by looking at a sentence in which it is a pronounced feature:

He [the president of a large, complex university] is expected to be a friend of the students, a colleague of the faculty, a good fellow with the alumni, a sound administrator with the trustees, a good speaker with the public, an astute bargainer with the foundations and the federal agencies, a politician with the state legislatures, a friend of industry, labor, and agriculture, a persuasive diplomat with donors, a champion of education generally, a supporter of the professions (particularly law and medicine), a spokesman to the press, a scholar in his own right, a public servant at the state and national levels, a devotee of opera and football equally, a decent human being, a good husband and father, an active member of a church.

From Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University*, Harvard University Press, 1963.
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This is an unusually long sentence, but it is so well articulated that it conveys its meaning clearly. The expansion, all of which takes place in the complement part of the sentence, is managed with a series of parallel structures. The student could learn the whole art of parallelism from a close study of this remarkable sentence. An analysis of the sentence reveals several levels of parallelism and enough variation in the basic pattern to break an otherwise monotonous rhythm. The basic pattern is this:

<i>indefinite article</i>	<i>noun</i>	<i>prepositional phrase</i>
a	friend	of the students
a	colleague	of the faculty

Dr. Kerr varies the rhythm of this basic pattern in several ways: (1) by introducing an adjective before the noun ("a good fellow with the alumni"); (2) by throwing in an adverb ("a champion generally"); (3) by inserting a parenthesis ("particularly law and medicine"); (4) by compounding the objects of the preposition ("a friend of industry, labor, and agriculture") or by compounding the adjectives modifying the object of the preposition ("a public servant at the state and national levels").

The main point that we want to make about this sentence, however, is that the rhetorical form is one of the carriers of meaning. The theme of Dr. Kerr's essay is that the modern university has become so huge and complex that it can no longer be regarded as a *uni*-versity but must be regarded now as a *multi*-versity. The point he is making in the section of the essay from which the above sentence was taken is that the president of such a multiversity must wear many hats, must be many things to many people. In this sentence he is enumerating some of the capacities in which the president is expected to serve, using a series of phrases. This compounding (without conjunctions, for the most part) is one of the expressive devices for indicating the variety of roles the president must play. But because Dr. Kerr also wants to indicate that the president is expected to play each of these roles equally well he uses the device of parallelism, which serves to reinforce the co-ordinate value of these several capacities. Dr. Kerr does not expect his reader to remember all these roles; he wants only to convey the general impression of the heavy burden that the president carries. Incidentally, the *length* of the sentence has a rhetorical function too: the long cataloguing is weighty and exhausting to the reader, as the job is to the president.

In the next sentence but one, Dr. Kerr makes use of antithesis, another rhetorical device, to convey the notion of the contrary qualities that the president must combine in his personality. Here is that sentence of 114 words:

He should be firm, yet gentle; sensitive to others, insensitive to himself; look to the past and the future, yet be firmly planted in the present; both visionary and sound; affable, yet reflective; know the value of a

dollar and realize that ideas cannot be bought; inspiring in his visions yet cautious in what he does; a man of principle yet able to make a deal; a man with broad perspective who will follow the details conscientiously; a good American but ready to criticize the status quo fearlessly; a seeker of truth where the truth may not hurt too much; a source of public pronouncements when they do not reflect on his own institution.

From Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University*, Harvard University Press, 1963.
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The various levels of parallelism and antithesis in this sentence look like this when laid out schematically:

He	should be	firm	/	yet gentle
		sensitive	/	insensitive
		to others		to himself
look			/	yet be firmly planted
	to the past and the future			in the present
		both visionary	/	and sound
		affable	/	yet reflective
know the value of a dollar			/	and realize the ideas cannot be bought
		inspiring	/	yet cautious
		in his visions		in what he does
	a man		/	yet able
	of principle			to make a deal

(antithesis persists, but parallelism is violated: a noun, *man*, yoked with an adjective, *able*; *man* modified by prepositional phrase but *able* modified by infinitive phrase)

a man	
with broad perspective	
who will follow the details conscientiously	

(again the antithesis is in the words—*broad perspective* / *details*—rather than in the structure)

a good American	/	but ready
		to criticize the status quo fearlessly

(departure from parallelism again)

a seeker	
of truth	
where the truth may not hurt too much	

a source	
of public pronouncements	
when they do not reflect on his own institution	

As we shall make clear when we come to discuss the figures of speech, the rhetoricians commonly associated the various schemes and tropes with the topics of *logos*, *pathos*, and *ēthos*. Antithesis, for instance, was tied up with the topic of dissimilarity or with the topic of contraries. In the third book of his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle pointed out the value of antithesis in discourse: "Such a form of speech is satisfying, because of the significance of contrasted ideas is easily felt, especially when they are thus put side by side." Whether Dr. Kerr was aware of the theory of antithesis is immaterial. What is important is that by putting his "contrasted ideas" in juxtaposition, he has assisted the communication of his meaning.

Up to this point we have been concentrating on only a few stylistic features—word order, methods of expansion, parallelism, antithesis. It is time now to consider a broader range of stylistic features, not only so that we can get to know what these various features are and how they function but so that we can derive the maximum benefit from the exercises in imitation later on in the chapter and can incorporate some of these features into our own style.

Study of Style

Before the student can benefit from a close observation of stylistic features, he must have some technique for analyzing prose style. Because the modern student has spent so little time analyzing prose style, he may be ignorant of what to look for in sentences and paragraphs. He has undoubtedly been impressed by the style of certain prose writers, but he is almost tongue-tied when asked to point out what it is he particularly admires about their style. The best he can do is to characterize various styles with such general, subjective epithets as "clear," "crisp," "urbane," "orotund," "whimsical," "heavy," "flowing," "staccato." The New Criticism has given the student a technique and a terminology for analyzing poetry, but most students do not know where to begin if they are asked to analyze the style of a piece of prose.

First, let us set down, in outline form a list of features that one can look for when analyzing prose style.

A. Kind of diction

1. general or specific
2. abstract or concrete
3. formal or informal
4. Latinate (usually polysyllabic) or Anglo-Saxon (usually monosyllabic)
5. common words or jargon
6. referential (denotative) or emotive (connotative)

- B. Length of sentences (measured in number of words)
- C. Kinds of sentences
 - 1. grammatical: simple, compound, complex, compound-complex
 - 2. rhetorical: loose, periodic, balanced, antithetical
 - 3. functional: statement, question, command, exclamation
- D. Variety of sentence patterns
 - 1. inversions
 - 2. sentence openers
 - 3. method and location of expansion
- F. Means of articulating sentences (coherence devices)
- G. Use of figures of speech
- H. Paragraphing
 - 1. length (measured in number of words and number of sentences)
 - 2. kind of movement or development in paragraphs
 - 3. use of transitional devices

Most of the items in this outline represent features that lend themselves to objective study. Some of the either/or combinations under "Kind of diction" are relative, and opinions about them could vary. But most of the features lend themselves to objective study in the same way that grammatical features (word order, inflections, function words) do. There are a number of incalculable features of style about which we might never be able to secure general agreement, but if we are to develop any system for analyzing prose style we must start with those features that are objectively observable.

KIND OF DICTION

The kind of diction that a writer habitually uses can tell us a great deal about the quality of his mind and the quality of his style. We made the point earlier that a writer must be in command of several styles, so that he can accommodate his manner to various subject matters, occasions, purposes, and audiences. But even within this range of styles, there will be a certain persistent level of style associated with that author. Dr. Johnson and Oliver Goldsmith displayed their versatility by trying their hands at several literary genres, but whether they were writing poems or plays or novels or familiar essays or critical essays, they maintained a certain note that identified the style as their own and no one else's. That peculiar note was achieved partly by the kind of diction they used: Johnson's philosophical, polysyllabic, Latinate diction; Goldsmith's concrete, familiar, colloquial diction. The "weight" of a man's style can be measured partly by the syllabic composition of his

words. The "tone" of his style can be measured partly by the texture of his words—their phonic values, their relative abstractness or concreteness, their level of usage. Judgments about the formality or informality of a man's style are made largely on the basis of the level of diction used.

LENGTH OF SENTENCES

The average length of sentences also can lead to some valid generalizations about a man's style. Modern prose style is characterized by sentences which are generally shorter than those of earlier centuries. (The narrow columns into which journalistic prose is fitted undoubtedly had some influence on the shortening of the sentence.) But we still discover remarkable variations in sentence-length in modern writers. We can arrive at a tenable generalization about a writer's characteristic sentence-length by counting the words in, say, five hundred consecutive sentences and then dividing the total number of words by the number of sentences. Having determined this average sentence-length, we would have to pursue the more important consideration: what relation does this characteristic sentence-length have to the rhetorical situation?

KINDS OF SENTENCES

Some very interesting observations can be made about a man's style and his habits of thought by studying the kinds of sentences he used and the proportions in which he used the various kinds. W. K. Wimsatt, for instance, in his valuable study *The Prose Style of Samuel Johnson*, saw in Dr. Johnson's persistent use of parallel and antithetical clauses a reflection of the bent of his mind: "Johnson's prose style is a formal exaggeration—in places a caricature—of a certain pair of complementary drives, the drive to assimilate ideas, and the drive to distinguish them—to collect and to separate." And so Dr. Johnson disposed his collection of ideas in parallel structures; he reinforced the distinctions in ideas by juxtaposing them in antithetical structures.

The history of the prose style of most Western languages reveals a gradual evolution from a paratactic syntax—stringing together a series of co-ordinate structures without conjunctions—to the most sophisticated of sentence patterns, subordination. In Anglo-Saxon, for instance—the earliest extant record of the English language—we note the lack of the relative pronoun and the subordinating conjunction, two of the grammatical devices by which Modern English renders clauses dependent. When we catalogue the kinds of grammatical sentences found in modern professional prose, we find surprisingly few compound sentences. Modern writers expand their sentences more by subordination and apposition than by compounding. Observation of the

grammatical kinds of sentences can tell us a great deal about someone's prose style and can point up significant deficiencies in our own prose style.

VARIETY OF SENTENCE PATTERNS

A study of variety in sentence patterns also has some valuable lessons to teach us about style. For one thing, such a study can dispel many of the myths about prose style. It is true that professional writers command a greater variety of lexical and syntactical resources than unpracticed writers do, but they do not make a fetish of variety for its own sake. Professor Francis Christensen made a study, for instance, of sentence-openers in the first two hundred sentences of some narrative and expository works written by modern American writers. Here are the results of his findings in the expository pieces:

<i>Expository</i>	<i>Sentence Openers</i>	<i>Adverbial</i>	<i>Verbal</i>	<i>Inverted</i>	<i>Co-ord. Conj.</i>
Carson, <i>Sea Around Us</i>	79	74	4	1	29
M. Chute, <i>Shakespeare of London</i>	64	63	0	1	4
De Voto, <i>Easy Chair</i>	51	50	1	0	16
Edman, <i>Arts and the Man</i>	37	33	2	2	14
Hightet, <i>Art of Teaching</i>	47	45	2	0	22
Mencken, <i>Vintage Mencken</i>	72	67	5	0	9
Lloyd & Warfel, <i>American English</i>	77	72	4	1	4
Trilling, <i>Liberal Imagination</i> (pp. 216-34)	60	57	3	0	34
Van Doren, <i>Shakespeare: Four Tragedies</i>	32	32	0	0	29
Wilson, <i>Literary Chronicle: 1920-1950</i> (pp. 9-29, 422-27)	56	51	3	2	14
TOTAL	575	544	24	7	175
PERCENTAGE	28.75	27.20	1.15	0.40	8.75

From Francis Christensen, "Notes Toward a New Rhetoric: I. Sentence Openers," *College English*, XXV (October, 1963), 9. Reprinted by permission of the National Council of Teachers of English and Francis Christensen. Cf. William K. Riley, "Sentence Openers in Freshman Writing," *College English*, XXVI (December, 1964), 228-30.

The numbers in the first column indicate the number of sentences, among the two hundred studied in each piece, that had sentence openers (words, phrases, or clauses which are not part of the subject cluster); the numbers

under the next four columns mark the various kinds of sentence openers. Rachel Carson had the highest percentage of sentence openers (39.5 per cent); Mark Van Doren had the lowest percentage (16 per cent). But the combined percentages show that almost three-quarters of the sentences written by these authors started out with the subject cluster rather than the sentence openers and that almost 95 per cent of the 575 sentence openers were of the adverbial type.

These figures would seem to indicate that some of our esteemed modern writers do not, contrary to common opinion and to the advice given in some writing texts, strive for a notable variety in the ways they begin their sentences. And the figures also invalidate the prescription about not beginning a sentence with a co-ordinating conjunction. Descriptive studies of other aspects of prose as it is actually written would probably destroy some additional illusions about how professional writers create their effects.

SENTENCE EUPHONY

Prose rhythm is one of the most difficult aspects of style to analyze. Perhaps the closest thing we have to the elaborate prosody that the Greeks and Romans devised for their quantitative languages is the system for scanning the English sentence that George Saintsbury worked out in his *A History of English Prose Rhythm* (Edinburgh, 1912). The euphony and rhythm of sentences undoubtedly play a part in the communicative and persuasive process—especially in producing emotional effects—but students would be ill advised to spend a great deal of time learning a system for scanning prose sentences. Euphony and rhythm are largely a matter for the ear, and students would do just as well to read their prose aloud in order to catch awkward rhythms, clashing vowel and consonant combinations (as in this five-word phrase), and distracting jingles. If, for instance, the student who wrote the following sentence had read it aloud, he might have caught the distracting repetition of the *ect* sound: “I will show how the testimony affected some people indirectly connected with the selection of the jurors.” It is probably more important to apply this test when one is preparing a discourse for oral delivery, but most good writers apply this test also to prose that they know will be read silently. The sentence which is difficult to enunciate is often a grammatically or rhetorically defective sentence.

But if the student is not content with relying on his ear for testing the rhythm of his sentences, he can resort to the fairly simple method of marking the stresses in series of words. With a little more ingenuity, he might be able to group the stressed and unstressed syllables into feet. In scanning poetry, we can get by with knowing the five most common feet in classical prosody: iambic (◡ —), trochaic (— ◡), anapaestic (◡ ◡ —), dactylic

(— ◡ ◡), and spondee (— —). To scan prose, however, we need a great many more combinations. In her book, *The Anatomy of Prose*, Marjorie Boulton defines twenty-three different combinations, which constitute, she says, "all the possible feet used in English prose." (Students who want to pursue these technicalities can consult pp. 55-7 of her book.) To illustrate this system of scansion, here is the way that Miss Boulton scanned the first nine verses of Psalm 90 in the Authorized Version of the Bible:

Lord, thou/ has been/ our dwelling place/ in all generations./
 Before/ the mountains/ were brought forth,/ or ever/ thou hadst
 formed/ the earth/ and the world,/ even/ from everlasting/ to everlast-
 ing,/ thou art God./
 Thou turnest man/ to destruction;/ and sayest,/ Return,/ ye children/
 of men./
 For a thousand/ years in/ thy sight/ are but/ as yesterday/ when it is
 past,/ and as a watch/ in the night./
 Thou carriest/ them away/ as with a flood;/ they are as a sleep:/ in
 the morning/ they are like grass/ which groweth up./
 In the morning/ it flourisheth,/ and groweth up;/ in the evening/ it
 is cut down,/ and withereth./
 For we are consumed/ by thine anger,/ and by thy wrath/ are we
 troubled./
 Thou hast set/ our iniquities/ before thee,/ our secret sins/ in the
 light/ of thy countenance./
 For all/ our days/ are passed/ away/ in thy wrath;/ we spend/ our
 years/ as a tale/ that is told./

From Marjorie Boulton, *The Anatomy of Prose*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954, p. 58. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

Miss Boulton goes on to say about this passage: "My stresses will not, I think, be disputed much, though even on this point some ears might object; many readers will probably disagree with the division into feet at some point. However, we can now see the contrast of stressed, monosyllabic endings and lighter endings, with the finality of the stress at the end on a heavy mono-

syllable. We see how the important words are also placed where, with their own strong stresses, they are surrounded by weak stresses to make them stronger by contrast. We may also notice, if we are beginners, that the four-syllable and five-syllable feet are needed to describe prose accurately."

ARTICULATION OF SENTENCES

An investigation of the ways in which a writer articulates his sentences can be one of the most fruitful exercises for the student who wants to improve the quality of his own prose. Coherence is a troublesome problem for most students. They usually develop a sense for unity and emphasis long before they master coherence. Cultivating the habit of thinking in an orderly, logical fashion is the best way to insure that one will express his thoughts coherently. But practiced writers use a number of linguistic devices to assist the coherent display of their thoughts. Let us see how an accomplished writer like Matthew Arnold makes his prose "hang together." Some of the verbal devices he uses to promote coherence are italicized; others will be pointed out in the commentary afterward.

The critical power is of lower rank than the creative. *True*; but in assenting to *this proposition, one or two things* are to be kept in mind. It is undeniable that the exercise of a *creative* power, that a free *creative* activity, is the highest function of man; *it is so* by man's finding in it his true happiness. *But* it is undeniable, *also*, that men may have the sense of exercising *this free creative activity* in *other* ways than in producing great works of literature or art; if it were not *so*, all but a very few men would be shut out from the *true happiness* of all men. *They may have it* in well-doing, *they may have it* in learning, *they may have it* even in criticising. *This is one thing* to be kept in mind. *Another* is that the exercise of the *creative* power in the production of *great works of literature or art*, however high *this* exercise of *it* may rank, is not at all epochs and under all conditions possible; *and* that *therefore* labour may be vainly spent in attempting *it*, *which* might with more fruit be used in preparing for *it*, in rendering *it* possible. *This creative power* works with elements, with materials; what if *it* has not *those materials*, those *elements*, ready for *its* use? *In that case*, *it* must surely wait till *they* are ready.

From Matthew Arnold, "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time,"
Essays in Criticism, First Series, 1865.

Most coherence devices (pronouns, demonstrative adjectives, repeated words and phrases, and some of the conjunctions) point backwards to what has just been said, thus connecting what has been said with what is about to be said. One of the commonest devices in Matthew Arnold's prose—so

common, in fact, that it has become a distinctive mark of his style—is the frequent repetition of key words and phrases. Arnold was a great phrase-maker, and once he had coined a phrase that carried the theme of an essay, he repeated that phrase time and time again in the essay. So conspicuous was this mannerism in his prose that one is inclined to believe that the cardinal principle of his expository technique was the famous pedagogical maxim, “Repetition is the mother of studies.” The most obtrusive repetition in this selection is the word *creative*—the key word of this paragraph and one of the two key words in the entire essay. The repetition then of substantive words is one of the linguistic means of stitching our sentences together.

Arnold also frequently uses demonstrative pronouns and demonstrative adjectives (*this, that; these, those*) and personal pronouns. The original meaning of the word *demonstrate* is “to show, to point.” Demonstrative pronouns and adjectives usually point backwards, tying what follows to what has gone before. By their very nature, all pronouns (except indefinite pronouns, like *anyone* and *someone*) point to a referent. Because of the close relationship between the pronoun and its referent, it is extremely important to be sure the referent is clear. When it is vague or, worse yet, when the referent is not there at all, the coherence of our writing is bound to suffer.

Good writers also make liberal use of conjunctions and conjunctive adverbs for stitching sentences together. The chief grammatical function of co-ordinating conjunctions is to splice together words, phrases, and clauses. But when co-ordinating conjunctions are placed at the beginning of the sentence (and Professor Christensen’s chart reveals how often modern writers do this), these conjunctions assume the rhetorical function of providing a logical bridge between sentences. Conjunctive adverbs—words like *however, nevertheless, moreover, also, indeed, therefore*—are even more common devices for aiding coherence. One can point up the logical relationship between sentences simply by inserting the appropriate conjunctive word.

We will note only two additional devices that Arnold uses to connect his sentences. Fragmentary sentences can sometimes strengthen coherence. We have an instance of this in the second sentence of Arnold’s paragraph. The single word *True* constitutes an elliptical sentence. Filled out, the ellipsis would read something like this: “That proposition is true.” The single word here conveys a meaning only because of its juxtaposition to the previous sentence; since it has to look backward to the previous sentence in order to become meaningful, it is “tied” to that sentence. This same principle of “dependent meaning” prevails in conversation, where we often talk in fragmentary sentences (“Where are you going tonight?” “The movies.” “With whom?” “Charlotte.”).

Another device that Arnold uses in this paragraph is parallelism, which is reinforced by the figure of anaphora (repetition of identical words at the

beginning of successive phrases). Three independent clauses are set down, one after the other ("They may have it in well-doing, they may have it in learning, they may have it even in criticising"). Although there are no conjunctions (asyndeton) to tie the clauses together grammatically, the clauses are connected by parallel structure and identical words. In addition to the functions that we noted in the analysis of Clark Kerr's two sentences, parallelism can also be used for coherence.

The passage quoted from Matthew Arnold exemplifies most of the verbal devices that good writers use to articulate their sentences. Good writers use such devices so unobtrusively that the sutures hardly show. A study of how an author uses them will help to account for the clarity of one man's prose and the fuzziness of another's.

FIGURES OF SPEECH

Since we are going to devote a long section of this chapter to a discussion of figures of speech, this is not the place to discuss them in detail. Suffice it to say here that they constitute one of the most revealing features of a man's prose style. If they are apt and fresh, they can contribute greatly to the clarity, liveliness, and interest of a man's style. But they must not be cultivated for their own sake. The excessive, strained use of figures proved to be detrimental to the "gracefulness" for which the Euphuistic writers of the sixteenth century were striving in their prose. On the other hand, the absence or scarcity of figurative language can have a deadening effect on style. Although it is not true that Jonathan Swift excluded all figurative language from his prose, it is true that he used figurative language sparingly. That rarity of metaphorical language may have been what Dr. Johnson had in mind when he made his famous comment on Swift's style: "For purposes merely didactic, when something is to be told that was not known before, [his style] is in the highest degree proper, but against that inattention by which known truths are suffered to lie neglected, it makes no provision; it instructs, but does not persuade."

PARAGRAPHING

There is a style of paragraphing as well as a style of sentence structure. Paragraphing, like punctuation, is a feature only of the written language. As a matter of fact, we can regard paragraphing as a typographical device for punctuating units of thought larger than the thought conveyed by a single sentence. The student is so accustomed to seeing, in the print he reads, indentations of segments of thought that he comes to take paragraphing as much for granted as he does the left-to-right movement of printed words.

And because the indentations are always there on the printed page, the student does not realize how much the marking off of thought-units facilitates his reading. Perhaps the best way to show the student how typographical devices contribute to the readability of printed prose is to reproduce a passage of prose with no punctuation, capitalization, or paragraphing:

it seems to me that it was far from right for the professor of english in yale the professor of english literature in columbia and wilkie collins to deliver opinions on cooper's literature without having read some of it it would have been much more decorous to keep silent and let persons talk who have read cooper cooper's art has some defects in one place in deerslayer and in the restricted space of two thirds of a page cooper has scored 114 offenses against literary art out of a possible 115 it breaks the record there are nineteen rules governing literary art in the domain of romantic fiction some say twenty two in deerslayer cooper violated eighteen of them these eighteen require that a tale shall accomplish something and arrive somewhere but the deerslayer tale accomplishes nothing and arrives in the air they require that the episodes of a tale shall be necessary parts of the tale and shall help to develop it but as the deerslayer tale is not a tale and accomplishes nothing and arrives nowhere the episodes have no rightful place in the work since there was nothing for them to develop they require that the personages in a tale shall be alive except in the case of corpses and that always the reader shall be able to tell the corpses from the others but this detail has often been overlooked in the deerslayer tale

If the student has difficulty making sense out of this river of words, he should be grateful to those printers and grammarians who invented typographical devices to mark off meaningful segments of thought. After trying out various combinations, the student might eventually be able to make sense of this passage, especially in those sections where there are enough grammatical signals to tell him what words are related. He will probably make faster progress in deciphering the passage if he reads it aloud, because the voice will add another grammatical element, intonation, which is the vocal equivalent of the graphic marks of punctuation. But there will be spots in this passage which will remain ambiguous, because grammar will allow in those places two or more combinations of words, each of which would make sense.

Now let us reproduce the passage as Mark Twain wrote it, restoring his punctuation, capitalization, and paragraphing:

It seems to me that it was far from right for the Professor of English in Yale, the Professor of English Literature in Columbia, and Wilkie Collins to deliver opinions on Cooper's literature without having read

some of it. It would have been much more decorous to keep silent and let persons talk who have read Cooper.

Cooper's art has some defects. In one place in *Deerslayer*, and in the restricted space of two-thirds of a page, Cooper has scored 114 offenses against literary art out of a possible 115. It breaks the record.

There are nineteen rules governing literary art in the domain of romantic fiction—some say twenty-two. In *Deerslayer* Cooper violated eighteen of them. These eighteen require:

1. That a tale shall accomplish something and arrive somewhere. But the *Deerslayer* tale accomplishes nothing and arrives in the air.
2. They require that the episodes of a tale shall be necessary parts of the tale and shall help to develop it. But as the *Deerslayer* tale is not a tale, and accomplishes nothing and arrives nowhere, the episodes have no rightful place in the work, since there was nothing for them to develop.
3. They require that the personages in a tale shall be alive, except in the case of corpses, and that always the reader shall be able to tell the corpses from the others. But this detail has often been overlooked in the *Deerslayer* tale. . . . [Twain goes on to designate, in a series of short, numbered paragraphs, the remaining fifteen "rules."]

From Mark Twain, "Fenimore Cooper's Literary Offenses," 1895.

The typographical device which contributes most, of course, to clarifying the syntax of a succession of words is the device for marking off sentences—an initial capital letter and end-punctuation (period, question mark, exclamation point). We underestimate, perhaps, how much of a contribution to clarity is made by other typographical devices—such simple things as commas, capital letters, italics, hyphens, quotation marks. Nor should we overlook the contribution that indentation of paragraphs makes to ease of reading. The value of paragraphing is evident in the Mark Twain passage. Indentation marks the shifts in the development of thought and indicates the relationship of the parts. Simply by setting off the violated rules in separate paragraphs and further marking them with numbers, Mark Twain makes it clear that he is specifying a series of parts.

A study of the density of an author's paragraphs tells us a great deal about the "weight" of his style. Many considerations, of course, dictate whether paragraphs will be long or short—the subject matter, the occasion, the audience. Narrative, for instance, especially when it is dealing with rapid action, often moves along in a series of short paragraphs. In dialogue, too, each shift of speaker is indicated by a new paragraph. For purposes of transition or emphasis, an author will insert a one- or two-sentence paragraph. And when one is writing copy for the narrow columns of a newspaper, he will rather arbitrarily chop up his prose into very short paragraphs.

But when all allowances have been made for such conventions and for various rhetorical situations, it remains true that professional writers generally write longer paragraphs than unpracticed writers do. Many of the one- and two-sentence paragraphs that students write have no rhetorical justification whatever. Such short paragraphs simply reveal that the students have not developed their thoughts adequately. They have nothing more to say, or think they have nothing more to say, on the idea presented in that paragraph. Perhaps by resorting to the topics to find something to say, the student will be able to put some meat on the bare bones of his paragraph.

A Student Report on a Study of Style

We have devoted several pages to a discussion of the objectively observable features of style because it is by this kind of close analysis that one learns why the style of an author produces its effects and learns also how to go about improving his own style. To illustrate the profit to be derived from such a close study, we will present the results of a student project.*

Two sections of an Honors Freshman class were set the task of making a comparative analysis of the length of sentences and paragraphs in a specified number of paragraphs in F. L. Lucas's essay "What Is Style?" and in all the paragraphs of one of their expository themes. For the purposes of this study, a sentence was defined as "a group of words beginning with a capital letter and ending with some mark of end-punctuation." The students were told that in choosing eight paragraphs from the Lucas essay they should avoid short transitional paragraphs and any paragraphs containing two or more sentences of quoted material. The students were presented with a mimeographed sheet containing the following items to be filled in:

EVALUATION	PROFESSIONAL	STUDENT
A. Total number of words in the piece studied	_____	_____
B. Total number of sentences in the piece studied	_____	_____
C. Longest sentence (in no. of words)	_____	_____
D. Shortest sentence (in no. of words)	_____	_____
E. Average sentence (in no. of words)	_____	_____
F. Number of sentences that contain more than 10 words <i>over</i> the average sentence	_____	_____
G. Percentage of sentences that contain more than 10 words over the average	_____	_____

* For an account of similar projects devised for an Advanced Composition course at the University of Nebraska, see Margaret E. Ashida and Leslie T. Whipp, "A Slide-Rule Composition Course," *College English*, XXV (October, 1963), 18-22.

EVALUATION	PROFESSIONAL	STUDENT
H. Number of sentences that contain 5 words or more <i>below</i> the average	_____	_____
I. Percentage of sentences that contain 5 words or more below the average	_____	_____
J. Paragraph length		
longest paragraph (in no. of sentences)	_____	_____
shortest paragraph (in no. of sentences)	_____	_____
average paragraph (in no. of sentences)	_____	_____

The numbers that the students entered in the first column differed according to the paragraphs they chose to study, but we can give some mean figures for four of the items in the list:

1. The average length of Lucas's sentences was 20.8 words.
2. About 17 per cent of Lucas's sentences were ten words or more over the average.
3. About 40 per cent of Lucas's sentences were five words or more below the average.
4. Lucas averaged 7.6 sentences per paragraph—a fairly well-developed paragraph.

Most of the students found that their average sentence matched the length of Lucas's average sentence. Many of the students were surprised to learn, however, that they had a higher percentage of above-average sentences and a strikingly lower percentage of below-average sentences. Perhaps the most dramatic difference that the students noted was in paragraph development. At least half of the students found that they were averaging between three and four sentences in their paragraphs.

In addition to filling out the mimeographed sheet, the students submitted an essay in which they commented on what they had learned about style from this exercise. Excerpts from their essays are reproduced below.

First of all, here are some of the students' comments about sentence length and sentence variety:

I found that the percentage of sentences in Lucas's essay that contained more than ten words over the average sentence was 17%, while mine was a mere 3%. But the percentage of his sentences that contained five words or more below the average was 39% compared to my 16%. I see now that I must strive for greater variety of sentence structure and length in my themes in order for the pieces to be more effective.

My average sentence length is very close to that of Mr. Lucas. I think this is misleading, however, since in my high school newspaper work I acquired the habit of gathering more than one thought in a single sentence. My sentence length is good, but my sentence content could be improved. Another factor that was evident is that I tend to use fewer short sentences than professional writers do. I think I can explain this lack of short sentences by considering the subject matter of the themes I write. I have noticed that in the past I would use longer, more involved (and less clear) sentences to write about things I didn't feel completely at ease in writing about. I use short sentences to present ideas that are very lucid to me.

.

One thing I found is that good prose doesn't necessarily imply long, verbose sentences and polysyllabic words.

.

There is not quite enough variety in length or pattern in my sentences. Even my longer sentences tend to be of the compound variety rather than the complex or compound-complex type.

Now for some excerpts from students' comments on paragraphing:

This paragraph analysis revealed some drastic differences in style. My paragraphs, surprisingly, are considerably longer than Lucas's. The average number of sentences per paragraph in my work is twelve, whereas Mr. Lucas's average is about eight. My longest paragraph has sixteen sentences, twice the professional's average. This could indicate poor paragraph planning and division on my part. My extended paragraphs seem much like run-on sentences and probably have a tiring effect on my reader.

.

My longest paragraph is 17 sentences, almost 10 sentences over my average paragraph length; Lucas's longest paragraph has 10 sentences, less than 3 sentences over his average paragraph length. Also, in this long paragraph the average length of sentences is 14 words, which is 7 words per sentence below the average for the whole theme. And in this same paragraph of mine there are 12 out of the total 17 sentences which contain 5 words or more below the average sentence. The reason for this paragraph being strikingly different from my average paragraph is that I used a different style of writing in this paragraph. I tried to make an emotional appeal to back up my arguments, using short questions and terse statements. In trying to give the effect of an impassioned speech, I departed from my usual prose style; thus this paragraph is not representative of my usual style of paragraphing.

In Lucas's piece there is an average of 126 words per paragraph, while I have an average of only 70 words per paragraph. I probably should use more words to develop my ideas, not for the sake of wordiness but for the sake of being more fully understood. I leave out examples and explanations which may be vital to the clarity of the theme.

.

In the paragraphs I chose to study, Mr. Lucas used a total of fifty-six sentences. I used a total of fifty-four sentences in my theme. This averages to approximately seven sentences per paragraph in both essays. However, this similarity is slightly invalid. In choosing the Lucas paragraphs, I was careful to choose only those which were of an "average" length; I purposely skipped those paragraphs which seemed short. One of the paragraphs in my theme contained only three sentences, but I had to count it. This tended to lower my average number of sentences per paragraph, whereas Mr. Lucas's average was slightly inflated because only "average" paragraphs were studied.

.

Another thing that I realized when doing this stylistic study is that in the professional writers' work the paragraphs fit together like the pieces in a jigsaw puzzle. Each paragraph develops a separate thought but becomes an integral part of the whole. I have trouble tying my ideas together. Although all my ideas relate to the theme topic, often I find that they do not follow in a logical pattern.

In addition to commenting on sentences and paragraphs, several students commented on other features of style that they had noted in doing this study. Here are some excerpts from those comments:

I see now that enlarging my vocabulary is necessary to improve my style. I don't mean necessarily that I must start using bigger words; I mean rather that I must learn when certain words should be used. I must learn to use big words only when they fall naturally into place and when they can be fully understood by the intended audience. Professional writers do not always use big words, but their knowledge of words enables them to use the proper word at the proper time.

.

One characteristic of Lucas's style which I don't like and which I think I avoided in my writing is the excessive use of parentheses and dashes. I certainly feel that a parenthesis or a dash is appropriate at times, and, in fact, I used a dash four times in my writing. But I believe that Mr. Lucas overworked parentheses and dashes. I feel that the reader's train of thought is broken when the writing contains many dashes or parentheses.

Lucas brings his writing to life by the use of figures of speech. When he says, "Men are often taken, like rabbits, by the ears," his writing becomes vivid and distinctive. Another of Mr. Lucas's figures of speech, "There are blustering signatures that swish across the page like cornstalks bowed before a tempest," shows that he avoids the trite, overworked figures. He searches for new and fresh expressions. I noticed that in my piece of writing there wasn't a single simile, metaphor, or personification.

.

Although Lucas's longest sentence is twice as long as my longest sentence, my sentence is harder to follow. This difference in readability can be attributed partly to the number of syllables. Although syllable-count was not included on the study sheet, it has a great bearing on the clarity of one's prose. The majority of words in Lucas's sentences are monosyllabic. Because of the monosyllabic diction, the interest of the reader is not bogged down by heavy words.

.

This study also confirmed something I was already suspicious of—I don't write really long sentences. This, I believe, is due to the fact that I am afraid of the punctuation a long sentence may require. It is much simpler to write two short sentences correctly than to write one long sentence correctly. Since we were graded in high school more on correctness than on style, I formed the habit of writing two shorter sentences rather than one long one. I guess I'll have to start worrying about style as well as correctness if I want to become a good writer.

.

I noticed how well the parts of Mr. Lucas's essay were proportioned and how mine seemed rather top-heavy. A closer look showed me that I overdevelop the beginnings of my essays, often leaving the middle thinly developed.

.

I have noticed that sometimes my sentences sound artificial and stiff because I place adverb clauses and verbal phrases where they do not fit naturally. . . . Good professional writers have mastered the art of appropriateness. I have found that most professional writers' long sentences are surprisingly easy to follow, while my long sentences are frequently too involved to be understood.

Here are a few excerpts from the students' comments on the general value of a close study like this. What is particularly notable is that the students retained their sense of perspective. They saw no merit in cultivating any

feature of style for its own sake; a stylistic device became a virtue only when it contributed to the effectiveness of the passage in which it occurred:

I know that this study of sentence and paragraph length has been beneficial to me, but I would like to consider the choice and arrangement of words used by professional authors. I may be wrong, but to me an author's word choice and word arrangement is more important than the length of his sentences and paragraphs.

I believe, however, that this comparison between my prose and Lucas's reveals simply a difference in style and that no definite decisions can be made about what I should do with my prose style. In order to make such a decision, I would have to compare my vocabulary and sentence structure with Mr. Lucas's when both of us were writing on the same subject-matter.

In general, style depends on a person's individuality and his basic knowledge of English grammar. It doesn't depend on how long the sentences are or how short they are. Mr. Lucas has successfully combined English grammar with his own personal touch to produce a good piece of prose. My own style suffers from the fact that my knowledge of English grammar has not yet developed enough to aid my individuality of expression.

Although this study cannot definitely determine whether my style is good or bad (since there is no entirely good or bad style), it can show the major similarities and differences between my style and a typical modern style.

The style of a professional—in this case, F. L. Lucas—shouldn't be slavishly copied, for it is only by evolving his own style that a student gains enough command over the language to become an effective writer.

So much for this discussion of what to look for when one analyzes prose style. The student will be further aided in developing his own style and in developing a technique for analyzing style by practicing some of the imitation exercises recommended in a later section of this chapter. The student is also urged to read the stylistic analyses of Addison's *Spectator* essay and of President Kennedy's Inaugural Address at the end of this chapter.

Figures of Speech

We come now to a consideration of figures of speech. It is fair enough to regard figures of speech as the "graces of language," as the "dressing of thought," as "embellishments," for indeed they do "decorate" our prose and give it "style," in the couturier's sense. But it would be a mistake to regard embellishment as the chief or sole function of figures. The classical rhetoricians certainly did not look upon them as decorative devices primarily. Metaphor, according to Aristotle, did give "charm and distinction" to our expression; but even more than that, metaphor was another way to *give* "clearness" and "liveliness" to the expression of our thoughts. Figures, in his view, provided one of the best ways to strike that happy balance between "the obvious and the obscure," so that our audience could grasp our ideas promptly and thereby be disposed to accept our arguments.

"What, then, can oratorical imagery effect?" Longinus asked. He was even more explicit than Aristotle in pointing out the rhetorical function of figures: "Well, it is able in many ways to infuse vehemence and passion into spoken words, while more particularly when it is combined with the argumentative passages it not only persuades the hearer but actually makes him its slave." —*On the Sublime*, XV, 9.

It was Quintilian who most explicitly related the figures to the *logos*, *pathos*, and *ēthos* of argument. Quintilian looked upon the figures as another means of lending "credibility to our arguments," of "exciting the emotions," and of winning "approval for our characters as pleaders" (*Instit. Orat.*, IX, i). This view of the function of figures of speech is perhaps the most reliable attitude to adopt toward these devices of style. Because figures can render our thoughts vividly concrete, they help us to communicate with our audience clearly and effectively; because they stir emotional responses, they can carry truth, in Wordsworth's phrase, "alive into the heart by passion"; and because they elicit admiration for the eloquence of the speaker or writer, they can exert a powerful ethical appeal.

Sister Miriam Joseph in her book *Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language* reclassified the more than two hundred figures distinguished by the Tudor rhetoricians according to the four categories: grammar, *logos*, *pathos*, and *ethos*. In doing this, she was able to demonstrate, quite convincingly, that the three "schools" of rhetoric during the Renaissance (the Ramists, the traditionalists, and the figurists) saw the figures as being intimately connected with the topics of invention. Metaphor, for instance, involving comparison of like things, is tied up with the topic of similarity; antithesis,

involving the juxtaposition of opposites, is tied up with the topic of dissimilarity or of contraries. Then there were figures, like apostrophe, that were calculated to work directly on the emotions, and figures, like *comprobatio*, that were calculated to establish the ethical image of the speaker or writer. In our exposition we shall frequently point out the relationship of the figures either with grammar or with the three modes of persuasive appeal.

The mention of two hundred figures of speech in the previous paragraph may have appalled the student. If pressed, most students could name—even if they could not define or illustrate—a half dozen figures of speech. But where did those *other* figures come from? and what are they? In their passion for anatomizing and categorizing knowledge, the Humanists of the Renaissance delighted in classifying and sub-classifying the figures. Admittedly, they were being overly subtle in distinguishing such a multitude of figures. The most widely used classical handbook in the Renaissance schools, *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, required the students to learn only 65 figures. Susenbrotus, in his popular *Epitome troporum ac schematum* (1540), distinguished 132 figures. But Henry Peacham, in his 1577 edition of *The Garden of Eloquence*, pushed the number up to 184. Pity the poor Tudor school-boy who was expected to define and illustrate and to use in his own compositions a goodly number of these figures.

We are not going to plague the student with a long catalogue of figures, but we are going to introduce more figures than he has met with in his previous study of style. If nothing else, the student should become aware, through this exposure, that his language has more figurative resources than he was conscious of. And he may discover that he has been using many of the figures of speech all his life. For men did not begin to use figures of speech only after academicians had classified and defined them; rather, the figures were classified and defined after men had been using them for centuries. Like the principles of grammar, poetics, and rhetoric, the doctrine of the figures was arrived at inductively. Rhetoricians merely gave “names” to the verbal practices of their fellow men.

What do we mean by the term “figures of speech”? We mean the same thing that Quintilian meant when he used the term *figura*: “any deviation, either in thought or expression, from the ordinary and simple method of speaking, a change analogous to the different positions our bodies assume when we sit down, lie down, or look back. . . . Let the definition of a figure, therefore, be *a form of speech artfully varied from common usage* (Ergo figura sit arte aliqua novata forma dicendi)”—*Instit. Orat.*, IX, i, 11.

We will use “figures of speech” as the generic term for any artful deviations from the ordinary mode of speaking or writing. But we will divide the figures of speech into two main groups—the *schemes* and the *tropes*. A

scheme (Greek *schēma*, form, shape) involves a deviation from the ordinary pattern or arrangement of words. A trope (Greek *tropein*, to turn) involves a deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of a word.

Both types of figures involve a *transference* of some kind: a trope, a transference of meaning; a scheme, a transference of order. When Shakespeare's Mark Antony said, "Brutus is an honorable man," he was using the trope called irony, because he was "transferring" the ordinary meaning of the word *honorable* to convey a different meaning to his audience. If Mark Antony had said, "Honorable is the man who gives his life for his country," he would have been using a species of the scheme hyperbaton, because he would be "transferring" the usual order of words. In a sense, of course, both schemes and tropes involve a change of "meaning," since both result in effects that are different from the ordinary mode of expression. But for all practical purposes, our distinction is clear enough to enable the student to distinguish between a scheme and a trope.

The terms used to label the various figures appear formidable—strange, polysyllabic words, most of them merely transliterated from the Greek. But technical terms, in any discipline, are always difficult at first sight; they are difficult, however, mainly because they are unfamiliar. Whenever we study a new discipline we have to learn the "names" of things peculiar to that discipline. Inevitably these specialized terms will be puzzling, but they will remain puzzling only until we learn to connect the *sign* with the concept or thing for which it stands. The word *tree* is difficult for the child only until he learns to associate the sound or the graphic mark of this word with the thing that it designates. The term *prosopopeia* will frighten the student at first, but once he gets to the point where he can immediately associate the term with its significance, *prosopopeia* will be no more frightening to the student than the familiar terms *metaphor* and *simile*. We could, as the Renaissance rhetorician George Puttenham tried to do, invent English terms for the various figures, but since they would have to be coined terms, they would not necessarily be any easier to learn than the classical terms. However, wherever a familiar Anglicized term exists for a figure, we will use that term instead of the classical one.

In any case, we must not look upon terminology as an end in itself. Just as we can speak and write our native language without knowing the names of the parts of speech, so we can use and respond to figurative language without knowing the names of the figures. Nomenclature, in any study, is a convenience for purposes of classification and discussion. But an awareness of the various figures of speech can increase our verbal resources, and if we make a conscious effort to learn the figures of speech, it is likely that we will resort to them more often.

The Schemes

SCHEMES OF WORDS

We shall not dwell very long on schemes of words because while they occur frequently in poetry—especially in the poetry of earlier centuries—they rarely occur in prose. The schemes of words (sometimes called *orthographical schemes*, because they involve changes in the spelling or sound of words) are formed (1) by adding or subtracting a letter or a syllable at the beginning, middle, or end of a word, or (2) by exchanging sounds. Terms like the following are of more concern to the grammarian and the prosodist than to the rhetorician:

prosthesis—adding a syllable in front of word—e.g. *beloved* for *loved*

epenthesis—adding a syllable in the middle of word—e.g. *visitating* for *visiting*

proparalepsis—adding a syllable at the end of word—e.g. *climature* for *climate*

aphaeresis—subtracting a syllable from the beginning of word—e.g. *'neath* for *beneath*

syncope—subtracting a syllable from the middle of word—e.g. *pros-prou* for *prosperous*

apocope—subtracting a syllable from the end of word—e.g. *even* for *evening*

metathesis—transposition of letters in a word—e.g. *clapse* for *clasp*

antisthecon—change of sound—e.g. *wrang* for *wrong*

One can easily see that all of these involve a change in the shape or configuration of words. Poets used to employ such schemes to accommodate the rhyme or the rhythm of a line of verse. And because such changes are associated primarily with poetry, it is customary to regard such altered words as “poetic diction.” Perhaps the situation in modern prose where we are most likely to use schemes of words would be the dialogue in a story. If a character in a story habitually clipped syllables from his words or mispronounced certain words, we might try to indicate those speech habits with spelling changes. Readers of *Finnegan's Wake* could supply numerous examples of other uses that James Joyce made of orthographical schemes in his remarkably ingenious prose.

SCHEMES OF CONSTRUCTION

1. *Schemes of Balance*

PARALLELISM—similarity of structure in a pair or series of related words, phrases, or clauses.

Examples: He tried to make the law equitable, precise, and comprehensive.

To contain the enemy forces, to reinforce his own depleted resources, to inspirit the sagging morale of his troops, and to re-assess the general strategy of the campaign—these were his objectives when he took command.

It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from those honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.—Abraham Lincoln

Parallelism is one of the basic principles of grammar and rhetoric. The principle demands that equivalent things be set forth in co-ordinate grammatical structures. So nouns must be yoked with nouns, prepositional phrases with prepositional phrases, adverb clauses with adverb clauses. When this principle is ignored, not only is the grammar of co-ordination violated, but the rhetoric of coherence is wrenched. Students must be made to realize that violations of parallelism are serious, not only because they impair communication but because they reflect disorderly thinking. Whenever the student sees a co-ordinating conjunction in one of his sentences, he should check to make sure that the elements joined by the conjunction are of the same grammatical kind. Such a check would prevent him from writing sentences like this: "He was jolly, a good talker, and even better as a drinker."

When the parallel elements are similar not only in structure but in length (that is, the same number of words, even the same number of syllables), the scheme is called *isocolon*. For example: His purpose was *to impress the ignorant, to perplex the dubious, and to confound the scrupulous*. The addition of symmetry of length to similarity of structure contributes greatly to the rhythm of sentences. Obviously, the student should not strive for isocolon every time he produces parallel structure. Such regularity of rhythm would approach the recurrent beat of verse.

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Since parallelism is a device that we resort to when we are specifying or enumerating pairs or series of like things, it is easy to see the intimate relationship between this device of form and the topic of similarity. See the analysis of the rhetorical effect of parallelism in Clark Kerr's sentence in the previous section.

ANTITHESIS—the juxtaposition of contrasting ideas, often in parallel structure.

Examples: Contempt is the proper punishment of affectation, and detestation the just consequence of hypocrisy.

Many things difficult to design prove easy to perform.

If you are pleased with prognostics of good, you will be terrified likewise with tokens of evil.

If of Dryden's fire the blaze is brighter, of Pope's the heat is more regular and constant.

All of these examples are quoted from Dr. Johnson, in whose prose, antithesis is such a pronounced feature that we have come to associate this structural device with his name. But antithesis was a scheme greatly admired by all the rhetoricians.

It was the unknown author of *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* who most clearly pointed up the fact that the opposition in an antithesis can reside either in the words or in the ideas or in both:

An antithesis occurs when both the wording and the sense, or one or other of them, are opposed in a contrast. The following would be an antithesis both of wording and sense: "It is not fair that my opponent should become rich by possessing what belongs to me, while I sacrifice my property and become a mere beggar." In the following sentence we have a merely verbal antithesis: "Let the rich and prosperous give to the poor and needy"; and an antithesis of sense only in the following: "I tended him when he was sick, but he has been the cause of very great misfortune to me." Here there is no verbal antithesis, but the two actions are contrasted. The double antithesis (that is, both of sense and of wording) would be the best to use; but the other two kinds are also true antitheses. (From *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, Ch. 26, trans. E. S. Forster.)

Nicely managed, antithesis can produce the effect of aphoristic neatness and can win for the author a reputation for wit. Antithesis is obviously related to the topic of dissimilarity and the topic of contraries. (See the analysis of antithesis in Clark Kerr's sentence.)

2. *Schemes of unusual or inverted word order* (hyperbaton)

ANASTROPHE—inversion of the natural or usual word order.

Examples: Backward run the sentences, till reels the mind. (From a parody of the style of *Time Magazine*.)

With folly no man is willing to confess himself very intimately acquainted.—Dr. Johnson

People that he had known all his life he didn't really know.—student theme

Perfectly does anastrophe conform to our definition of a scheme as “an artful deviation from the ordinary pattern or arrangement of words.” Because such deviation surprises expectation, anastrophe can be an effective device for gaining attention. But its chief function is to secure emphasis. It is a commonplace that the beginning and end of a clause are the positions of greatest emphasis. Words placed in those positions draw special attention, and when those initial or terminal words are not normally found in those positions, they receive extraordinary emphasis.

PARENTHESIS—insertion of some verbal unit in a position that interrupts the normal syntactical flow of the sentence.

Examples: But wherein any man is bold—I am speaking foolishly—I also am bold. . . . Are they ministers of Christ? I—to speak as a fool—am more.—St. Paul, 2 Cor. 11, 21 and 23

He tried—who could do more?—to restrain the fury of the mob.

The extraordinary number of bills passed during that session (312 of them) did not speak well of the Congressmen's capacity for deliberation.

The distinguishing mark of parenthesis is that the interpolated member is “cut off” from the syntax of the rest of the sentence. A parenthesis abruptly—and usually briefly—sends the thought off on a tangent. Although the parenthetical matter is not necessary for the grammatical completeness of the sentence, it does have a pronounced rhetorical effect. For a brief moment, we hear the author's voice, commenting, editorializing, and, for that reason, the sentence gets an emotional charge that it would otherwise not have. Note, for instance, the difference in effect if the parenthetical element in St. Paul's first sentence is syntactically integrated with the rest of the sentence: “But I am speaking foolishly if I claim that wherein any man is bold, I also am bold.”

APPOSITION—placing side by side two co-ordinate elements, the second of which serves as an explanation or modification of the first.

Examples: John Morgan, the president of the Sons of the Republic, could not be reached by phone.

A great many second-rate poets, in fact, are second-rate just for this reason, that they have not the sensitiveness and consciousness to perceive that they feel differently from the preceding generation and therefore must use words differently.—T. S. Eliot

Men of this kind—soldiers of fortune, pool-hall habitués, gigolos, beachcombers—expend their talents on trivialities.

Apposition is such a common method of expansion in modern prose that it hardly seems to conform to our definition of a scheme as “an artful deviation from the ordinary patterns of speech.” But if one reflects upon his own experience, he will have to acknowledge that appositional structures seldom occur in impromptu speech. Apposition may not be the exclusive property of written prose, but it certainly occurs most frequently in written prose—in a situation, in other words, where we have time to make a conscious choice of our arrangement of words. So there is something *artful* about the use of the appositive. And there is something out-of-the-ordinary about the appositive, too. Although the appositive does not disturb the natural flow of the sentence as violently as parenthetical expressions do (mainly because the appositive is grammatically co-ordinate with the unit that it follows), it does interrupt the flow of the sentence, interrupts the flow to supply some gratuitous information or explanation.

3. *Schemes of Omission*

ELLIPSIS—deliberate omission of a word or of words which are readily implied by the context.

Examples: And he to England shall along with you.—*Hamlet*, III, iii, 4

As with religion, so with education. In colonial New England, education was broad-based, but nevertheless elitist; and in its basic assumptions, intellectualist.—David Marquand, *Encounter* (March 1964)

When in doubt, play trumps.

Ellipsis can be an artful and arresting means of securing economy of expression. We must see to it, however, that the understood words are gram

matically compatible. If we wrote, "The ringleader was hanged, and his accomplices imprisoned," we would be guilty of a solecism, because the understood *was* is not grammatically compatible with the plural subject (*accomplices*) of the second clause. And we produce a "howler" if we say, "While in the fourth grade, my father took me to the zoo."

ASYNDETON—deliberate omission of conjunctions between a series of related clauses.

Examples: I came, I saw, I conquered.

They may have it in well-doing, they may have it in learning, they may have it even in criticism.—Matthew Arnold

The infantry plodded forward, the tanks rattled into position, the big guns swung their snouts toward the rim of the hills, the planes raked the underbrush with gunfire.

The Tudor rhetoricians had a special name for the omission of conjunctions between single words or phrases. They would have labelled the following as instances of brachylogia:

...and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.—Abraham Lincoln

...that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.—John F. Kennedy

But there seems to be no good reason why we cannot use the single term *asyndeton* for all these instances of omission of conjunctions. The principal effect of asyndeton is to produce a hurried rhythm in the sentence. Aristotle observed that asyndeton was especially appropriate for the conclusion of a discourse, because there, perhaps more than in any other place in the discourse, we may want to produce the emotional reaction that can be stirred by, among other means, rhythm. And Aristotle concluded his *Rhetoric* with an instance of asyndeton that is noticeable even in translation: "I have done. You have heard me. The facts are before you. I ask for your judgment."

The opposite scheme is polysyndeton (deliberate use of many conjunctions). Note how the proliferation of conjunctions in the following quotation slows up the rhythm of the prose and produces an impressively solemn note:

And God said, "Let the earth bring forth living creatures according to their kinds: cattle and creeping things and beasts of the earth according to their kinds." And it was so. And God made the beasts of the earth according to their kinds and the cattle according to their kinds and

everything that creeps upon the ground according to its kind. And God saw that it was good.—Genesis, 1:24-25

Ernest Hemingway uses polysyndeton to create another effect. Note how the repeated *and*'s in the following passage suggest the flow and continuity of experience:

I said, "Who killed him?" and he said, "I don't know who killed him but he's dead all right," and it was dark and there was water standing in the street and no lights and windows broke and boats all up in the town and trees blown down and everything all blown and I got a skiff and went out and found my boat where I had her inside Mango Key and she was all right only she was full of water.—Hemingway, "After the Storm"

Polysyndeton can also be used to produce special emphasis. Note the difference in effect of these two sentences:

This semester I am taking English, history, biology, mathematics, sociology, and physical education.

This semester I am taking English and history and biology and mathematics and sociology and physical education.

4. *Schemes of Repetition*

ALLITERATION—repetition of initial or medial consonants in two or more adjacent words.

Examples: The moan of doves in immemorial elms

And murmuring of innumerable bees,—Tennyson, *The Princess*

After life's fitful fever he sleeps well.—*Macbeth*, III, ii, 22

It is lawful to picket premises for the purpose of peacefully persuading persons to refrain from trespassing.

In Anglo-Saxon poetry, *alliteration* rather than rhyme was the device to bind verses together. Because it contributes to the euphony of verse or prose, alliteration became a conspicuous feature of Euphistic prose and Romantic poetry. Because it is such an obvious mannerism, alliteration is rarely used in modern prose. It is sometimes used today, however, for special effects—as a mnemonic device for slogans (Better Business Builds Bigger Bankrolls) and advertising catch-lines (Sparkling . . . Flavorful . . . Miller High Life . . . The Champagne of Bottle Beer . . . Brewed only in Milwaukee. Sometimes alliteration is deliberately used for humorous effect: He was a preposterously pompous proponent of precious pedantry.

ASSONANCE—the repetition of similar vowel sounds, preceded and followed by different consonants, in the stressed syllables of adjacent words.

Example: An old, mad, blind, despised, and dying king—
Princes, the dregs of their dull race, who flow
Through public scorn—mud from a muddy spring—
—Shelley, "Sonnet: England in 1819"

Assonance, a device of sound, like alliteration, is used mainly in poetry. A prose writer might deliberately use assonance to produce certain onomatopoeic or humorous effects. The danger for the prose writer, however, lies in the careless repetition of similar vowel-sounds, producing awkward jingles like this: "He tries to revise the evidence supplied by his eyes."

ANAPHORA—repetition of the same word or group of words at the beginnings of successive clauses.

Examples: The Lord sitteth above the water floods. The Lord remaineth a King forever. The Lord shall give strength unto his people. The Lord shall give his people the blessing of peace.—Psalm 29

We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing-grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills.—Winston Churchill

This is the essence—this is the heart—this is the day-to-day stuff of our duty in this Assembly as we see it: to build mightier mansions, to keep strengthening the United Nations.—Adlai E. Stevenson

Whenever anaphora occurs, we can be sure that the author has used it deliberately. Since the repetition of the words helps to establish a marked rhythm in the sequence of clauses, this scheme is usually reserved for those passages where the author wants to produce a strong emotional effect. Note how Reinhold Niebuhr combines anaphora with plays on words to produce this neat aphorism: "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary."

EPISTROPHE—repetition of the same word or group of words at the ends of successive clauses.

Examples: Shylock: I'll have my bond! Speak not against my bond!
I have sworn an oath that I will have my bond!
—*Merchant of Venice*, III, iii, 3-4

When I was a child, I spoke like a child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child—St. Paul, 1 Cor. 13, 11

After a war that everyone was proud of, we concluded a peace that nobody was proud of.—Walter Bagehot

He's learning fast. Are you earning fast?—Advertisement for Aetna Life Insurance

Epistrophe not only sets up a pronounced rhythm but secures a special emphasis, both by repeating the word and by putting the word in the final position in the sentence.

EPANALEPSIS—repetition at the end of a clause of the word that occurred at the beginning of the clause.

Example: Blood hath bought blood, and blows have answer'd blows:

Strength match'd with strength, and power confronted power.

—Shakespeare, *King John*, II, i, 329-30

Epanalepsis is rare in prose, probably because when the emotional situation arises that can make such a scheme appropriate, poetry seems to be the only form that can adequately express the emotion. It would seem perfectly natural for a father to express his grief over the death of a beloved son in this fashion: "He was flesh of my flesh, bone of my bone, blood of my blood." But would the father be speaking prose or poetry? Perhaps the only answer we could give is that it is heightened language of some sort, the kind of language which, despite its appearance of contrivance, springs spontaneously from intense emotion. Repetition, we know, is one of the characteristics of highly emotional language. And in this instance what better way for the father to express the intimacy of the relationship with his son than by the repetition of words at the beginning and end of successive groups of words?

Perhaps the best general advice about the use of epanalepsis—in fact of all those schemes that are appropriate only to extraordinary circumstances—would be, "If you find yourself consciously deciding to use epanalepsis, don't use it." When the time is appropriate, the scheme will present itself unbidden.

ANADIPLOSIS—repetition of the last word of one clause at the beginning of the following clause.

Examples: Labor and care are rewarded with success, success produces confidence, confidence relaxes industry, and negligence ruins the reputation which diligence had raised.—Dr. Johnson, *Rambler* No. 21

They point out what is perfectly obvious, yet seldom realized: That if you have a lot of things you cannot move about a lot, that furni-

ture requires dusting, dusters require servants, servants require insurance stamps. . . . It [property] produces men of weight. Men of weight cannot, by definition, move like the lightning from the East unto the West.—E. M. Forster, "My Wood," *Abinger Harvest*

CLIMAX—arrangement of words, phrases, or clauses in an order of increasing importance.

Examples: More than that, we rejoice in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces endurance, endurance produces character, and character produces hope, and hope does not disappoint us, because God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us.—St. Paul, Romans, 5, 3-5

Let a man acknowledge obligations to his family, his country, and his God.

In our institutions of higher learning one finds with the passing years more and more departmentalized pedants hiding in the holes of research, seeking to run away from embarrassing questions, afraid of philosophy and scared to death of religion.—Bernard Iddings Bell, "Perennial Adolescence"

Climax can be considered a scheme of repetition only when, as in the first example quoted above, it is a continued anadiplosis involving three or more members. Otherwise, as in the second and third examples, it is simply a scheme which arranges a series in an order of gradually rising importance. This latter variety of climax can be looked upon as a scheme related to the topic of degree, and it is the kind of climax that the student will most often find in modern prose and that he will probably find occasion to use in his own prose.

ANTIMETABOLE—repetition of words, in successive clauses, in reverse grammatical order.

Examples: One should eat to live, not live to eat.—Molière, *L'Avare*

You like it, it likes you.—Advertising slogan for Seven-Up

Mankind must put an end to war—or war will put an end to mankind.—John F. Kennedy, United Nations Speech, 1961

Ask not what America can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.—John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address

All of these examples have the air of the "neatly turned phrase"—the kind of phrasing that figures in most memorable aphorisms. Would the sentence

from President Kennedy's Inaugural Address be so often quoted if it had read something like this: "Do not ask what America can do for you. You would do better to ask whether your country stands in need of *your* services"? The "magic" has now gone out of the appeal. It would be a profitable exercise for the student to take several of the schemes presented in this section and convert them into ordinary prose. Such an exercise would undoubtedly reveal what the schemes add to the expression of the thought.

Similar to antimetabole is the scheme called chiasmus ("the criss-cross"). Chiasmus reverses the grammatical structures in successive clauses, but unlike antimetabole, does not repeat the words. Example: "I am indisposed to work, but to beg I am ashamed." Both antimetabole and chiasmus can be used to reinforce antithesis.

POLYPTOTON—repetition of words derived from the same root.

Examples: The Greeks are *strong*, and *skilful* to their *strength*,
Fierce to their *skill*, and to their *fierceness* valiant;
 —Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, I, i, 7-8

No man is *just* who deals *unjustly* with another man.

He is a man to *know* because he's *known*.

In the midst of all this dark, this void, this emptiness, I, more *ghostly* than a *ghost*, cry, "Who? Who?" to no answer.—Loren Eiseley, "The Uncompleted Man," *Harper's* (March 1964)

Their *blood bleeds* the nation of its sanguine assurance.

Not as a call to *battle*, though *embattled* we are.—John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address

Polyptoton is very much akin to those plays on words that we will investigate in the next section on tropes.

The Tropes

METAPHOR AND SIMILE

METAPHOR—an implied comparison between two things of unlike nature that yet have something in common.

SIMILE—an explicit comparison between two things of unlike nature that yet have something in common.

Examples (all from student themes):

He had a posture like a question-mark. (simile)

On the final examination, several students went down in flames.
(metaphor)

Like an arrow, the prosecutor went directly to the point. (simile)

The question of federal aid to parochial schools is a bramble patch.
(metaphor)

Silence settled down over the audience like a block of granite.
(simile)

Birmingham lighted a runaway fuse, and as fast as the headlines could record them, demonstrations exploded all over the country.
(metaphor)

We shall treat of metaphor and simile together because they are so much alike. The difference between metaphor and simile lies mainly in the manner of expressing the comparison. Whereas metaphor says, "David was a lion in battle," simile says, "David was *like* a lion in battle." Both of these tropes are related to the topic of similarity, for although the comparison is made between two things of unlike nature (*David* and *lion*), there is some respect in which they are similar (e.g., they are courageous, or they fight ferociously, or they are unconquerable in a fight). The thing with which the first thing is compared is to be understood in some "transferred sense": *David* is not literally a *lion*, but he is a lion in some "other sense."

An extended or continued metaphor is known as an allegory. We see one of these sustained metaphors in *The Battle of the Books*, where Jonathan Swift compares the classical writers, not to the spider, which spins its web out of its own entrails, but to the far-ranging bee:

As for us the ancients, we are content with the bee to pretend to nothing of our own, beyond our wings and our voices, that is to say, our flights and our language. For the rest, whatever we have got has been by infinite labor and search, and ranging through every corner of nature; the difference is that instead of dirt and poison, we have chosen to fill our hives with honey and wax, thus furnishing mankind with the two noblest of things, which are sweetness and light.

Closely allied to this form of extended metaphor is parable, an anecdotal narrative designed to teach a moral lesson. The most famous examples of parable are those found in the New Testament. In the parable of the sower of seeds, for instance, our interest is not so much in the tale of a man who went out to sow some seeds as in what each detail of the anecdote "stands

for," in what the details "mean." Whenever the disciples were puzzled about what a particular parable meant, they asked Christ to interpret it for them.

And while we are talking about these analogical tropes, we should warn the student to be on his guard against the "mixed metaphor," which results when he loses sight of the terms of his comparison. When Joseph Addison said, "There is not a single view of human nature which is not sufficient to extinguish the seeds of pride," it is obvious that he is mixing two different metaphors. We could say "to extinguish the *flames* of pride" or "to *water* the seeds of pride," but we cannot mix the notion of extinguishing with that of seeds. The rhetoricians sometimes called such "wrenching of words" *catachresis*.

SYNECDOCHE—a figure of speech in which a part stands for the whole.

Examples:

genus substituted for the species:

vessel for *ship*, *weapon* for *sword*, *creature* for *man*, *arms* for *rifles*,
vehicle for *bicycle*

species substituted for the genus:

bread for *food*, *cutthroat* for *assassin*

part substituted for the whole:

sail for *ship*, *hands* for *helpers*, *roofs* for *houses*

matter for what is made from it:

silver for *money*, *canvas* for *sail*, *steel* for *sword*

In general, we have an instance of synecdoche when the part or genus or adjunct that is mentioned suggests something else. It is an *oblique* manner of speaking. All of the following illustrate this trope: "Give us this day our daily *bread*." "All *hands* were summoned to the quarter-deck." "Not *marble*, nor the gilded monuments of princes, shall outlive this powerful *rhyme*." "They braved the *waves* to protect their fatherland." "Brandish your *steel*, men." "Are there no *roofs* in this town that will harbor an honorable man?" "It is pleasing to contemplate a *manufacture* rising gradually from its first mean state by the successive *labors* of innumerable *minds*."—Johnson, *Rambler* No. 9. "The door closed upon the extempore surgeon and midwife, and *Roaring Camp* sat down outside, smoked its pipe, and awaited the issue."—Bret Harte, "The Luck of Roaring Camp."

METONYMY—substitution of some attributive or suggestive word for what is actually meant.

Examples: *crown* for *royalty*, *mitre* for *bishop*, *wealth* for *rich people*, *brass* for *military officers*, *bottle* for *wine*, *pen* for *writers*

Metonymy and synecdoche are so close to being the same trope that George Campbell, the eighteenth-century rhetorician, wondered whether we should make any great effort to distinguish them. Those rhetoricians who did make the effort to discriminate these tropes would label the following as examples of metonymy:

He slinks out of the way of the humblest *petticoat*.—G. B. Shaw

As if the *kitchen* and the *nursery* were less important than the *office* in the city.—G. B. Shaw

"Who is this Son of Man?" Jesus said to them, "The *light* is with you for a little longer. Walk while you have the *light* lest the *darkness* overtake you."—John 13, 34-5

He addressed his remarks to the *chair*.

He was addicted to the *bottle*.

Yesterday I sold a *Rembrandt*.

If the nearness of our last necessity brought a nearer conformity into it, there were happiness in *hoary hairs* and no calamity in *half senses*.—Sir Thomas Browne

In Europe, we gave the *cold shoulder* to De Gaulle, and now he gives the *warm hand* to Mao Tse-tung.—Richard Nixon

PUNS—generic name for those figures which make a play on words.

- (1) Antanaclasis—repetition of a word in two different senses.

Learn a *craft* so that when you grow older you will not have to earn your living by *craft*.

Never serve the coffee without the *cream*—Harvey's Bristol *Cream* (advertising slogan)

- (2) Paronomasia—use of words alike in sound but different in meaning.

It was a *foul* act to steal my *fowl*.

RCA—A *sound* tradition (advertisement for a stereo set).

- (3) Syllepsis—use of a word understood differently in relation to two or more other words, which it modifies or governs.

He *lost* his hat and his temper.

Here thou, great Anna! whom three realms obey
Dost sometimes counsel *take*—and sometimes tea.—Alexander Pope

The figure of zeugma is somewhat like syllepsis, but whereas in syllepsis the single word is grammatically and idiomatically compatible with both of the other words that it governs, in a zeugma the single word does not fit grammatically or idiomatically with one member of the pair. If we say, "Jane *has murdered* her father, and may you too" or "He maintained a *flourishing* business and racehorse," we would be producing an instance of zeugma, because in both sentences the underlined word is either grammatically or idiomatically incongruous with one member (in these examples, the second member) of the pair it governs. Those two lines from Pope's *Rape of the Lock* which are often classified as zeugma—"Or stain her honour, or her new brocade" and "Or lose her heart, or necklace, at a ball"—would, according to our definition, be examples of syllepsis. Syllepsis is the only one of these two figures which can be considered a form of pun. Zeugma, if skillfully managed, could be impressive as a display of wit, but often enough, zeugma is nothing more than a faulty use of the scheme of ellipsis.

ANTHIMERIA—the substitution of one part of speech for another.

Examples: I'll *unhair* thy head.—Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, II, v. 64

A mile before his tent fall down, and *knee*

The way into her mercy.—Shakespeare, *Coriolanus*, V, i, 5

The thunder would not *peace* at my bidding.—Shakespeare, *King Lear*, IV, vi, 103

Dozens of other examples of anthimeria could be quoted from Shakespeare's plays. If a word was not available for what he wanted to express, Shakespeare either coined a word or used an old word in a new way. Today's writer must use *anthimeria* seldom and with great discretion unless he is truly a master of the existing English language. On the other hand, an apt creation can be pungent, evocative, witty, or memorable. English today is a rich, flexible language, because words have been borrowed, changed, and created. Think of all the ways in which a word like *smoke* has been used since it first came into the language:

The smoke rose from the chimney.

The chimney smokes.

He smoked the ham.

He smokes.

He asked for a smoke.

He objected to the smoke nuisance.

He noticed the smoky atmosphere.

He tried smoking on the sly.
 He smoked out the thief.
 His dreams went up in smoke.
 The Ferrari smoked along the wet track.

Someday someone will say, if it hasn't been said already, "He looked at her smokily."

PERIPHRAISIS (antonomasia)—substitution of a descriptive word or phrase for a proper name or of a proper name for a quality associated with the name.

Examples: The *Splendid Splinter* hit two more *round-trippers* today.

The Negro does not escape *Jim Crow* when he moves into a higher-income bracket.

She may not have been a *Penelope*, but she was not as unfaithful as the gossips made her out to be.

When his swagger is exhausted, he drivels into erotic poetry or sentimental uxoriousness. And the *Tennysonian King Arthur* posing at *Guinevere* becomes *Don Quixote* grovelling before *Dulcinea*.—G. B. Shaw

The frequency with which we meet this trope, even in modern prose, is evidence of the urge in man to express familiar ideas in uncommon ways. Circumlocutions and tags can become tiresome clichés (as they often do on the sports page), but when they display a fresh, decorous inventiveness, they can add grace to our writing. It is the trite or overly ingenious oblique expression that wearies the reader.

PERSONIFICATION (prosopoeia)—investing abstractions or inanimate objects with human qualities or abilities.

Examples: The ground thirsts for rain.

The very stones cry out for revenge.

Can Honor's voice provoke the silent dust,
 Or Flatt'ry sooth the dull cold ear of Death?—Thomas Gray

Personification is such a familiar figure that there is no need to multiply examples of it. This is one of the figures that should be reserved for passages designed to stir the emotions. Another emotional figure, closely allied to personification, is apostrophe (addressing an absent person or a personified abstraction). Here is an example of apostrophe from Sir Walter Raleigh's *History of the World*:

O eloquent, just, and mighty Death! whom none could advise, thou hast persuaded; what none hath dared, thou hast done; and whom all the world has flattered, thou only hast cast out of the world and despised. Thou hast drawn together all the far-stretched greatness, all the pride, cruelty, and ambition of man, and covered it all with these two narrow words, *Hic jacet*.

HYPERBOLE—the use of exaggerated terms for the purpose of emphasis or heightened effect.

Examples: His eloquence would split rocks.

It's really ironical . . . I have gray hair. I really do. The one side of my head—the right side—is full of millions of gray hairs.—Holden Caulfield in *Catcher in the Rye*

My left leg weighs three tons. It is embalmed in spices like a mummy. I can't move. I haven't moved for five thousand years. I'm of the time of Pharaoh.—Thomas Bailey Aldrich, "Marjorie Daw"

Hyperbole is so steadily droned into our ears that most of us have ceased to think of it as a figure of speech. Advertisers and teenagers can hardly talk without using superlatives. Perhaps we would not be so much amused by the Oriental greeting, "We welcome you, most honorable sir, to our miserable abode," if we stopped to consider how exaggerated many of our forms of greeting, address, and compliment are.

Hyperbole can be a serviceable figure of speech if we learn to use it with restraint and for a calculated effect. Under the stress of emotion, it will slip out naturally and will then seem appropriate. If we can learn to invent fresh hyperboles, we will be able to produce the right note of emphasis (as in the first example above) or humor (as in the quotation from Aldrich).

Being related to the topic of degree, hyperbole is like the figure called *auxesis* (magnifying the importance or gravity of something by referring to it with a disproportionate name). So a lawyer will try to impress a jury by referring to a scratch on the arm as "a wound" or to pilfering from the petty-cash box as "embezzlement." We can accept Mark Antony's reference to the wound that Brutus inflicted on Caesar as "the most unkindest cut of all," but the occasion seemed not to warrant Senator Joseph McCarthy's classic remark, "That's the most unheard of thing I ever heard of."

LITOTES—deliberate use of understatement, not to deceive someone but to enhance the impressiveness of what we say.

Examples: It was a not unhappy crowd that greeted the team at the airport.

Scaliger's influence in France was not inconsiderable during the sixteenth century.—Joel E. Spingarn, *Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*

Last week I saw a woman flayed, and you will hardly believe how much it altered her appearance for the worse.—Jonathan Swift, *A Tale of a Tub*

I am a citizen of no mean city.—St. Paul

Litotes is a form of meiosis (a lessening). The same lawyer whom we saw in the previous section using auxesis might represent another of his clients by referring to a case of vandalism as “boyish highjinks.” A rose by any other name will smell as sweet, but a crime, if referred to by a name that is not too patently disproportionate, may lose some of its heinousness.

RHETORICAL QUESTION (erotema)—asking a question, not for the purpose of eliciting an answer but for the purpose of asserting or denying something obliquely.

Examples: What! Gentlemen, was I not to foresee, or foreseeing was I not to endeavor to save you from all these multiplied mischiefs and disgraces? . . . Was I an Irishman on that day that I boldly withstood our pride? or on the day that I hung down my head and wept in shame and silence over the humiliation of Great Britain? I became unpopular in England for the one, and in Ireland for the other. What then? What obligation lay on me to be popular?—Edmund Burke, *Speech in the Electors of Bristol*

Wasn't the cult of James a revealing symbol and symbol of an age and society which wanted to dwell like him in some false world of false art and false culture?—Maxwell Geismar, *Henry James and His Cult*

The rhetorical question is a common device in impassioned speeches, but it can be used too in written prose. It can be an effective persuasive device, subtly influencing the kind of response one wants to get from an audience. The manner in which the question is phrased can determine either a negative or an affirmative response. If we say, “Was this an act of heroism?” the audience will respond, in the proper context, with a negative answer. By inducing the audience to make the appropriate response, the rhetorical question can often be more effective as a persuasive device than a direct assertion would be.

IRONY—use of a word in such a way as to convey a meaning opposite to the literal meaning of the word.

Examples: For Brutus is an *honourable* man;
So are they all, all *honourable* men.—Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, III, ii, 88-9

It is again objected, as a very absurd, ridiculous custom that a set of men should be suffered, much less employed and hired, to bawl one day in seven against the *lawfulness* of those methods most in use toward the pursuit of greatness, riches, and pleasure, which are the constant practice of all men alive on the other six. But this objection is, I think, a little unworthy of *so refined* an age as ours.—Swift, *Argument Against the Abolishing of Christianity*

As a trope which quite definitely conveys a “transferred meaning,” irony is related to the topic of contraries or the topic of contradiction. A highly sophisticated device, irony must be used with great caution. If one misjudges the intelligence of his audience, he may find that his audience is taking his words in their ostensible sense rather than in the intended opposite sense.

The Tudor rhetoricians had a special name for the kind of irony in which one proposed to pass over some matter, yet managed subtly to reveal the matter anyway. They called this kind of irony *paralipsis*. A notable example of paralipsis is found in Mark Antony's famous "Friends, Romans, countrymen" speech in *Julius Caesar*:

Let but the commons hear this testament,
Which (pardon me) I do not mean to read,
And they would go and kiss dead Caesar's wounds . . .
Have patience, gentle friends; I must not read it.
It is not meet you know how Caesar lov'd you . . .
'Tis good you know not that you are his heirs.
(III, ii, 136-51)

A look at the entire speech will show how Antony, despite his disclaimers, managed to let the mob know what was in Caesar's last will.

ONOMATOPOEIA—use of words whose sound echoes the sense.

Examples: 'Tis not enough no harshness gives offense,
The sound must seem an echo to the sense:
Soft is the strain when Zephyr gently blows,
And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows;
But when loud surges lash the sounding shore,
The hoarse, rough verse should like the torrent roar:
When Ajax strives some rock's vast weight to throw,
The line too labors, and the words move slow;
Not so, when swift Camilla scours the plain,
Flies o'er the unbending corn, and skims along the main.

—Pope, *Essay on Criticism*, II, 364-73

Over the cobbles he clattered and clashed in the dark innyard.—
Alfred Noyes, "The Highwayman"

The spray was hissing hot, and a huge jet of water burst up from its midst.

In the passage quoted above from Pope, some of the onomatopoeic effects are produced by the rhythm of the lines as well as by the sounds of words. Since onomatopoeia seeks to match sound with sense, it is easy to see why this figure was commonly associated with the topic of similarity. Onomatopoeia will be used much less frequently in prose than in poetry, yet it still has its appropriate uses in prose. Wherever sound-effects can be used to set the emotional or ethical tone of a passage, onomatopoeia can make a contribution. In seeking to discredit a person or an act, we could reinforce the effect of pejorative diction with cacophony. In a phrase like "a dastardly episode," we reveal our attitude toward the event not only by the unpleasant connotations of the word *dastardly* but also by the harsh sound of the word.

OXYMORON—the yoking of two terms which are ordinarily contradictory.

Examples: expressions like *sweet pain*, *cheerful pessimist*, *conspicuous by his absence*, *cruel kindness*, *thunderous silence*, *luxurious poverty*, *abject arrogance*, *make haste slowly*.

By thus combining contradictories, the writer produces a startling effect, and he may, if his oxymorons are fresh and apt, win for himself a reputation for wit. There is displayed in this figure, as in most metaphorical language, what Aristotle considered a special mark of genius: the ability to see similarities. Here are some examples of oxymoron:

Thou, silent form, dost tease us out of thought
As doth eternity: Cold Pastoral!
Keats, "Ode on a Grecian Urn"

But that he may not be thought to conceive nothing but things inconceivable, he has at last thought on a way by which human sufferings may produce good effect.—Dr. Johnson, Review of a treatise by Soame Jenyns

Much as he had accomplished, she could not observe that his most splendid successes were almost invariably failures, if compared with the ideal at which he aimed.—Nathaniel Hawthorne, "The Birthmark"

As an evolutionist, I never cease to be astounded by the past.—
Loren Eiseley, "The Uncompleted Man," *Harper's* (March 1964)

Concluding Remarks on the Figures of Speech

A knowledge of the figures that have been presented in this chapter will not insure that the student will be able to invent his own figures or that when he uses figures he will use them aptly and efficaciously. The benefit from such an investigation is rather that having been made aware of the various schemes and tropes the student may make a conscious effort to use figures when he sees that they will suit his purpose. In acquiring any skill, we must at first do consciously what experts do automatically; or, as Dr. Johnson said, "What we hope ever to do with ease, we must learn first to do with diligence." And during this period of apprenticeship, we can expect to do awkwardly what experts do smoothly. With practice, however, we will arrive at that happy state of naturalness that Longinus spoke of in *On the Sublime*:

Wherefore a figure is at its best when the very fact that it is a figure escapes attention. . . . For art is perfect when it seems to be nature, and nature hits the mark when she contains art hidden within her.

Imitation

Up to this point we have been dealing with the precepts of style. Now we will move on to the second of the ways in which one learns to write or to improve his writing—imitation. Classical rhetoric books are filled with testimonies about the value of imitation for the refinement of the many skills involved in effective speaking or writing. Style is, after all, the most imitable of the skills that co-operate to produce effective discourse.

Rhetoricians recommended a variety of exercises to promote conscious imitation. Roman schoolboys, for example, were regularly set the task of translating Greek passages into Latin and vice versa. In some of the Renaissance schools in England, schoolboys worked back and forth between Greek and Latin and English. Schoolmasters—the better ones anyway—were aware that grammatical differences among these three languages necessitated certain stylistic adjustments in the translation from one language to another. Despite these differences, however, students did learn from this exercise many valuable lessons about sentence structure.

Another exercise imposed on schoolboys was the practice of paraphrasing poetry into prose. Here again many adjustments in style had to be made. Besides teaching students the salient differences between the poetic medium

and the prose medium, this exercise made students pay close attention to the potentialities of precise, concrete diction, of emphatic disposition of words, and of figures of speech. Even today there are those who maintain that the best way to improve one's prose style is to study or write poetry.

Another common practice was to set the students the task of saying something in a variety of ways. This process usually started out with a model sentence, which had to be converted into a variety of forms each retaining the basic thought of the original. Erasmus, for instance, in Chapter 33 of his widely-used little book, *De duplici copia verborum ac rerum*, showed the students 150 ways of phrasing the Latin sentence, *Tuae literae me magnopere delectarunt* (Your letter has delighted me very much). This variety was achieved partly by the choice of different words, partly by different collocations of words. Here is a sampling of Erasmus's reworkings:

Your epistle has cheered me greatly.

Your note has been the occasion of unusual pleasure for me.

When your letter came, I was seized with an extraordinary pleasure.

What you wrote to me was most delightful.

On reading your letter, I was filled with joy.

Your letter provided me with no little pleasure.

Obviously, not all of the 150 sentences were equally satisfactory or appropriate; in fact, some of them were monstrosities. But by artificially experimenting with various forms, the student becomes aware of the flexibility of the language in which he is working and learns to extend his own range. Ultimately he learns that although there is a variety of ways of saying something, there is a "best way" for his particular subject matter, occasion, or audience. What was "best" for one occasion or audience, he discovers, is not "best" for another occasion or audience.

This text will give the student the opportunity to practice two kinds of imitation—copying passages of prose and imitating various sentence patterns. But before we get into those exercises, we will present the testimony of some famous writers about how they learned to write. The student will see as he reads these testimonies how basic imitation is to the formation of style.

BEN JONSON

For a man to write well, there are required three necessities—to read the best authors, observe the best speakers, and much exercise of his own style. In style, to consider what ought to be written, and after what manner, he

From *Timber, or Discoveries*, 1640.

must first think and excogitate his matter, then choose his words, and examine the weight of either. Then take care, in placing and ranking both matter and words, that the composition be comely; and to do this with diligence and often. No matter how slow the style be at first, so it be laboured and accurate; seek the best, and be not glad of the forward conceits, or first words, that offer themselves to us; but judge of what we invent, and order what we approve. Repeat often what we have formerly written; which besides that it helps the consequence, and makes the juncture better, it quickens the heat of imagination, that often cools in the time of setting down, and gives it new strength, as if it grew lustier by the going back. As we see in the contention of leaping, they jump farthest that fetch their race longest; or, as in throwing a dart or javelin, we force back our arms to make our loose the stronger. Yet if we have a fair gale of wind, I forbid not the steering out of our sail, so the favour of the gale deceive us not. For all that we invent doth please us in the conception of birth, else we would never set it down. But the safest is to return to our judgment, and handle over again those things the easiness of which might make them justly suspected. So did the best writers in their beginnings; they imposed upon themselves care and industry; they did nothing rashly; they obtained first to write well, and then custom made it easy and a habit. By little and little their matter showed itself to them more plentifully; their words answered, their composition followed; and all, as in a well-ordered family, presented itself in the place. So that the sum of all is, ready writing makes not good writing, but good writing brings on ready writing.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

About this time I met with an odd volume of the *Spectator*. It was the third. I had never before seen any of them. I bought it, read it over and over, and was much delighted with it. I thought the writing excellent, and wished, if possible, to imitate it. With this view I took some of the papers, and, making short hints of the sentiment in each sentence, laid them by a few days, and then, without looking at the book, try'd to compleat the papers again, by expressing each hinted sentiment at length, and as fully as it had been expressed before, in any suitable words that should come to hand. Then I compared my *Spectator* with the original, discovered some of my faults, and corrected them. But I found I wanted a stock of words, or a readiness in recollecting and using them, which I thought I should have acquired before that time if I had gone on making verses; since the continual occasion for words of the same import, but of different length, to suit the measure, or

From *The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin*, 1771.

of different sound for the rhyme, would have laid me under a constant necessity of searching for variety, and also have tended to fix that variety in my mind, and make me master of it. Therefore I took some of the tales and turned them into verse; and, after a time, when I had pretty well forgotten the prose, turned them back again. I also sometimes jumbled my collections of hints into confusion, and after some weeks endeavored to reduce them into the best order, before I began to form the full sentences and compleat the paper. This was to teach me method in the arrangement of thoughts. By comparing my work afterwards with the original, I discovered many faults and amended them; but I sometimes had the pleasure of fancying that, in certain particulars of small import, I had been lucky enough to improve the method or the language, and this encouraged me to think I might possibly in time come to be a tolerable English writer, of which I was extremely ambitious.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

I continued in this unpretentious situation for nearly a year. However, by being so long in the lowest form [at Harrow] I gained an immense advantage over the cleverer boys. They all went on to learn Latin and Greek and splendid things like that. But I was taught English. We were considered such dunces that we could learn only English. Mr. Somervell—a most delightful man, to whom my debt is great—was charged with the duty of teaching the stupidest boys the most disregarded thing—namely, to write mere English. He knew how to do it. He taught it as no one else has ever taught it. Not only did we learn English parsing thoroughly, but we also practised continually English analysis. Mr. Somervell had a system of his own. He took a fairly long sentence and broke it up into its components by means of black, red, blue, and green inks. Subject, verb, object: Relative Clauses, Conditional Clauses, Conjunctive and Disjunctive Clauses! Each had its colour and its bracket. It was a kind of drill. We did it almost daily. As I remained in the Third Form (β) three times as long as anyone else, I had three times as much of it. I learned it thoroughly. Thus I got into my bones the essential structure of the ordinary British sentence—which is a noble thing. And when in after years my schoolfellows who had won prizes and distinction for writing such beautiful Latin poetry and pithy Greek epigrams had to come down again to common English, to earn their living or make their way, I did not feel myself at any disadvantage. Naturally I am biased in favour of boys learning English. I would make them all learn English: and then I

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would let the clever ones learn Latin as an honour, and Greek as a treat. But the only thing I would whip them for is not knowing English, I would whip them hard for that.

SOMERSET MAUGHAM

IX

As it is, I have had to teach myself. I have looked at the stories I wrote when I was very young in order to discover what natural aptitude I had, my original stock-in-trade, before I developed it by taking thought. The manner had a superciliousness that perhaps my years excused and an irascibility that was a defect of nature; but I am speaking now only of the way in which I expressed myself. It seems to me that I had a natural lucidity and a knack for writing easy dialogue.

When Henry Arthur Jones, then a well-known playwright, read my first novel, he told a friend that in due course I should be one of the most successful dramatists of the day. I suppose he saw in it directness and an effective way of presenting a scene that suggested a sense of the theatre. My language was commonplace, my vocabulary limited, my grammar shaky and my phrases hackneyed. But to write was an instinct that seemed as natural to me as to breathe, and I did not stop to consider if I wrote well or badly. It was not till some years later that it dawned upon me that it was a delicate art that must be painfully acquired. The discovery was forced upon me by the difficulty I found in getting my meaning down on paper. I wrote dialogue fluently, but when it came to a page of description I found myself entangled in all sorts of quandaries. I would struggle for a couple of hours over two or three sentences that I could in no way manage to straighten out. I made up my mind to teach myself how to write. Unfortunately I had no one to help me. I made many mistakes. If I had had someone to guide me like the charming don of whom I spoke just now I might have been saved much time. Such a one might have told me that such gifts as I had lay in one direction and that they must be cultivated in that direction; it was useless to try to do something for which I had no aptitude. But at that time a florid prose was admired. Richness of texture was sought by means of a jewelled phrase and sentences stiff with exotic epithets: the ideal was a brocade so heavy with gold that it stood up by itself. The intelligent young read Walter Pater with enthusiasm. My common sense suggested to me that it was anaemic stuff; behind those elaborate, gracious periods I was conscious of a

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tired, wan personality. I was young, lusty and energetic; I wanted fresh air, action, violence, and I found it hard to breathe that dead, heavily scented atmosphere and sit in those hushed rooms in which it was indecorous to speak above a whisper. But I would not listen to my common sense. I persuaded myself that this was the height of culture and turned a scornful shoulder on the outside world where men shouted and swore, played the fool, wenched and got drunk. I read *Intentions* and *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. I was intoxicated by the colour and rareness of the fantastic words that thickly stud the pages of *Salome*. Shocked by the poverty of my own vocabulary, I went to the British Museum with pencil and paper and noted down the names of curious jewels, the Byzantine hues of old enamels, the sensual feel of textiles, and made elaborate sentences to bring them in. Fortunately I could never find an opportunity to use them, and they lie there yet in an old notebook ready for anyone who has a mind to write nonsense. It was generally thought then that the Authorized Version of the Bible was the greatest piece of prose that the English language has produced. I read it diligently, especially the Song of Solomon, jotting down for future use turns of phrase that struck me and making lists of unusual or beautiful words. I studied Jeremy Taylor's *Holy Dying*. In order to assimilate his style I copied out passages and then tried to write them down from memory.

The first fruit of this labour was a little book about Andalusia called *The Land of the Blessed Virgin*. I had occasion to read parts of it the other day. I know Andalusia a great deal better now than I knew it then, and I have changed my mind about a good many things of which I wrote. Since it has continued in America to have a small sale it occurred to me that it might be worth while to revise it. I soon saw that this was impossible. The book was written by someone I have completely forgotten. It bored me to distraction. But what I am concerned with is the prose, for it was as an exercise in style that I wrote it. It is wistful, allusive and elaborate. It has neither ease nor spontaneity. It smells of hothouse plants and Sunday dinner like the air in the greenhouse that leads out of the dining-room of a big house in Bayswater. There are a great many melodious adjectives. The vocabulary is sentimental. It does not remind one of an Italian brocade, with its rich pattern of gold, but of a curtain material designed by Burne-Jones and reproduced by Morris.

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I do not know whether it was a subconscious feeling that this sort of writing was contrary to my bent or a naturally methodical cast of mind that led me then to turn my attention to the writers of the Augustan Period. The prose of Swift enchanted me. I made up my mind that this was a perfect way to write, and I started to work on him in the same way as I had done

with Jeremy Taylor. I chose *The Tale of a Tub*. It is said that when the Dean re-read it in his old age he cried: 'What genius I had then!' To my mind his genius was better shown in other works. It is a tiresome allegory, and the irony is facile. But the style is admirable. I cannot imagine that English can be better written. Here are no flowery periods, fantastic turns of phrase or high-flown images. It is a civilized prose, natural, discreet and pointed. There is no attempt to surprise by an extravagant vocabulary. It looks as though Swift made do with the first word that came to hand, but since he had an acute and logical brain it was always the right one, and he put it in the right place. The strength and balance of his sentences are due to an exquisite taste. As I had done before, I copied passages and then tried to write them out again from memory. I tried altering words or the order in which they were set. I found that the only possible words were those Swift had used and that the order in which he had placed them was the only possible order. It is an impeccable prose.

But perfection has one grave defect: it is apt to be dull. Swift's prose is like a French canal, bordered with poplars, that runs through a gracious and undulating country. Its tranquil charm fills you with satisfaction, but it neither excites the emotions nor stimulates the imagination. You go on and on and presently you are a trifle bored. So, much as you may admire Swift's wonderful lucidity, his terseness, his naturalness, his lack of affectation, you find your attention wandering after a while unless his matter peculiarly interests you. I think if I had my time over again I would give to the prose of Dryden the close study I gave to that of Swift. I did not come across it till I had lost the inclination to take so much pains. The prose of Dryden is delicious. It has not the perfection of Swift nor the easy elegance of Addison, but it has a springtime gaiety, a conversational ease, a blithe spontaneousness that are enchanting. Dryden was a very good poet, but it is not the general opinion that he had a lyrical quality; it is strange that it is just this that sings in his softly sparkling prose. Prose had never been written in England like that before; it has seldom been written like that since. Dryden flourished at a happy moment. He had in his bones the sonorous periods and the baroque massiveness of Jacobean language, and under the influence of the nimble and well-bred felicity that he learnt from the French he turned it into an instrument that was fit not only for solemn themes but also to express the light thought of the passing moment. He was the first of the rococo artists. If Swift reminds you of a French canal Dryden recalls an English river winding its cheerful way round hills, through quietly busy towns and by nestling villages, pausing now in a noble reach and then running powerfully through a woodland country. It is alive, varied, wind swept; and it has the pleasant open-air smell of England.

The work I did was certainly very good for me. I began to write better;

I did not write well. I wrote stiffly and self-consciously. I tried to get a pattern into my sentences, but did not see that the pattern was evident. I took care how I placed my words, but did not reflect that an order that was natural at the beginning of the eighteenth century was most unnatural at the beginning of ours. My attempt to write in the manner of Swift made it impossible for me to achieve the effect of inevitable rightness that was just what I so much admired in him. I then wrote a number of plays and ceased to occupy myself with anything but dialogue. It was not till five years had passed that I set out again to write a novel. By then I no longer had any ambition to be a stylist; I put aside all thought of fine writing. I wanted to write without any frills of language, in as bare and unaffected a manner as I could. I had so much to say that I could afford to waste no words. I wanted merely to set down the facts. I began with the impossible aim of using no adjectives at all. I thought that if you could find the exact term a qualifying epithet could be dispensed with. As I saw it in my mind's eye my book would have the appearance of an immensely long telegram in which for economy's sake you had left out every word that was not necessary to make the sense clear. I have not read it since I corrected the proofs and do not know how near I came to doing what I tried. My impression is that it is written at least more naturally than anything I had written before; but I am sure that it is often slipshod, and I daresay there are in it a good many mistakes in grammar.

Since then I have written many other books; and though ceasing my methodical study of the old masters (for though the spirit is willing, the flesh is weak), I have continued with increasing assiduity to try to write better. I discovered my limitations, and it seemed to me that the only sensible thing was to aim at what excellence I could within them. I knew that I had no lyrical quality. I had a small vocabulary, and no efforts that I could make to enlarge it much availed me. I had little gift of metaphor; the original and striking simile seldom occurred to me. Poetic flights and the great imaginative sweep were beyond my powers. I could admire them in others as I could admire their far-fetched tropes and the unusual but suggestive language in which they clothed their thoughts, but my own invention never presented me with such embellishments; and I was tired of trying to do what did not come easily to me. On the other hand, I had an acute power of observation, and it seemed to me that I could see a great many things that other people missed. I could put down in clear terms what I saw. I had a logical sense, and if not great feeling for the richness and strangeness of words, at all events a lively appreciation of their sound. I knew that I should never write as well as I could wish, but I thought with pains I could arrive at writing as well as my natural defects allowed. On taking thought it seemed to me that I must aim at lucidity, simplicity, and euphony. I have put these three qualities in the order of the importance I assigned to them.

ROLLO WALTER BROWN:

HOW THE FRENCH BOY LEARNS TO WRITE

As soon as an American teacher comes into direct contact with the French educational system, he marvels at the large place writing holds in the schools and their routine life. First, it matters not in what classroom a small boy may be seen, he is never without his general notebook, in which he records all assignments, all problems, all experiments, all quotations to be learned, all geographical and historical notes and maps, as well as many special exercises; and the language he employs in this work is carefully marked and graded by the teacher. In the second place, compositions are numerous. From the time the boy is regarded as mature enough to think consecutively, he prepares compositions at regular intervals. In some classes he writes two short exercises every three or five days. In the elementary primary schools, even up to the time the boy is thirteen or fourteen years old, the shorter themes once or twice a week seem to stand in great favor. These vary in length, usually, from a hundred and fifty to four hundred words—they are rather longer than the average American daily theme—and the less frequent, longer compositions range ordinarily from six hundred to fifteen hundred words. Then, in the upper grades, there are, in addition, many papers in history, civics, philosophy, and literature. So it may be seen that a boy is provided with much opportunity to write. It is, in fact, scarcely an exaggeration to say that he writes all the time. In any event, his practice is so continuous that he sooner or later comes to do the work in a perfectly normal frame of mind, just as he performs his other schoolday labors.

The volume of required writing, however, is regarded as less important than its quality. If a boy thinks and writes poorly, he is looked upon as an unfortunate who deserves either pity or contempt. If, on the other hand, he is able to think and write skillfully, he is held in great honor by his teachers and his classmates. And this interest in ability to write is evident outside the recitation-room. Authors of books and articles discuss the perils of the pure mother tongue as seriously as if they were dealing with a question of ethics or of grave national policy. Parents, I found when I was securing compositions for the purposes of this book, are usually desirous of preserving the written work of their children. Moreover, when pupils distinguish themselves in examinations—which in France are always largely a matter of composition—they receive prizes and public mention very much as if they were the winners of athletic trophies. Now I would not have anyone make the

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hasty inference that intellectual contests are substituted for athletics. The French boy loves the open just as much as the American boy does, and outdoor sports are steadily taking a larger place in school life. But the ideal of writing well has been held up before the schoolboy so long, and with such seriousness, that he attaches more importance to ability of this kind than the average American boy could at present be led to comprehend.

When so much importance is everywhere attached to ability to write, it is not surprising to find that in both the primary and secondary school systems the course in the mother tongue gives large place to systematic training in composition. It is the conviction of the great body of teachers, as well as the Ministry, that work in grammar, rhetoric, and literature is in most respects lost unless it contributes to the pupil's ability to give full, intelligent expression to his thought. Moreover, theories of teaching, and all the proposed changes in the course of study, seem to be considered first in respect to their influence on this ability of the pupil. Expression is not the sole end, but in all the lower schools it is the primary end. And, taking the other point of view, the chief responsibility for the pupil's manner of expression rests upon the teacher of the mother tongue. As we shall see later, the writing that the boy does in history, geometry, and his other subjects is made to contribute its full share to his skill; yet upon the teacher of the native language rests the largest responsibility and the greatest burden of labor. He accepts his task as difficult, very expensive in time and energy, but extremely important. Without going into any examination of exceptional aims or of intricate personal devices, let us see what he attempts to accomplish and how he pursues his way.

Two groups of exercises are everywhere regarded as essential preliminaries to work in original composition. Those in the first group are intended to enlarge and organize the pupil's vocabulary. Now, I am aware that when one stands apart and looks at exercises designed to improve the vocabulary, they are likely to appear very artificial and ineffective. And, in truth, they may be. In the hands of a poorly trained teacher, or one who lacks the all-important teaching instinct, it would be difficult to imagine an exercise that could be more dismally futile. But this possibility seems to be disregarded by French educators. They are ready to admit that the lessons may become valueless, or even harmful, when directed by a poor teacher—and what exercise may not?—but they do not spring to the conclusion that such lessons should for that reason be cast aside. They have taken the good teacher as the norm, and have given themselves earnestly to the task of obviating the dangers and developing the advantages of a kind of instruction which at its best appears to them to have unquestioned value.

The theory upon which this instruction is based is not the individual

opinion of the occasional teacher; it is accepted doctrine throughout the country. In the volume of *Instructions* issued by the Minister to teachers in the secondary school system, it is summarized as follows: "The preceding exercises [in grammar] help the pupil to understand his native language and to enrich his vocabulary; but for this latter purpose, one ought not to rely solely upon them or even upon conversation, dictations, reading, or the explication of texts. The pupil must learn words, though never apart from things; he must be able to seize their signification and the exact shade of their meaning; and he must become accustomed to finding the words quickly when he stands in need. Hence the value of exercises devoted especially to the study of the vocabulary."

The teaching of the vocabulary I found, then, falls readily into three parts: (1) enlarging; (2) sharpening; (3) quickening. To be sure, the instruction is not divided into three separate processes, but the teacher has a threefold aim that determines his method. One will not see every aspect of the method in one recitation or in several. Yet the principles emphasized in the *Instructions* to secondary teachers, in textbooks for primary schools, in classes in the mother tongue in both school systems, and even in many classes in English, serve to give outline to the varying details of the work.

In the exercise designed to enlarge the vocabulary, it is held to be absolutely essential that the pupil relate the word unmistakably to the object or idea which it represents. Although it is much more difficult to have a word in mind without relating it to some idea than we generally suppose, the French teacher seems to take no risk. He guides the pupil to feel the uselessness of words unless they are symbols of something physically or mentally real. Secondly, the pupil is required to relate a new word to other words already in his working vocabulary, so that it will remain firmly fixed in his mind. The new word may be linked to a synonym that is known to the pupil, it may be contrasted with words already known to him, or it simply may be linked to a group of ideas that by circumstances are brought to his mind frequently; but in some manner he is led to associate it with words which he knows well. Thirdly, the word is put into normal contexts—sometimes before its meanings are explained—so that the pupil may develop a feeling for its idiomatic use. And finally, in the definition or explanation that a word or a group of words may require, the beginning is specific rather than general, concrete rather than abstract. In theory at least, a teacher would establish the meaning of *sincere* in a boy's mind before he discussed the abstract quality, *sincerity*. He would show the boy that many things are *rich* before he explained *richness*; or *noble*, before he explained *nobility*. Moreover, if a word has many definitions, the simplest one, the one most easily understood, the one that would most readily associate itself with the boy's stock of concrete ideas and images is explained before those that are predominantly

abstract or figurative. It is taken for granted that if a word is to be of much value to a boy, it must represent an idea clearly established in his mind, and it must have its individual flavor.

In the exercises designed primarily to sharpen feeling for words, one is sure to be impressed with the many means by which a word is brought into the pupil's life. He defines it, he finds examples of its accepted uses, he learns its original significance—its literal meaning when the word is predominantly figurative—he compares it with other words of similar meaning, and above all, he contrasts it with words that are essentially its opposite. It is scarcely too much to say that the basis of all word-teaching is contrast rather than likeness. If a given word is used chiefly as a noun, the teacher does not let the pupil form the notion that synonymous adjectives may be attached to it indiscriminately, but helps him to learn what adjectives are or may be used appropriately with it. If the word is an adjective or verb, he shows how it normally takes certain adverbs, and how others, as soon as they are brought into close relation with it, seem awkward and unidiomatic. In a similar manner he guides the pupil to see the distinctions that usage has established between nouns which in general meaning are the same. To take a very simple example, if the word *stem* appeared in a lesson, he would be extremely careful to bring out the difference between *stem* and *stalk*, *stem* and *trunk*, and *stalk* and *trunk*, so that the pupil would never fall into the error of using them as if they were convertible terms. Through numerous exercises of this kind the pupil is made to see that words do not have the same value, and that the choosing of them is not merely a question of finding approved dictionary definitions when occasion arises, but of possessing a word sense.

Concerning the exercises in calling words to mind quickly, little need be said. Their character has already been suggested. They usually consist of rapid-fire questions about the word itself, its use, its likes and opposites, and of oral or written practice in composition on subjects likely to call words of a given class into use. I saw no turning of verse into prose, but I did see many exercises that required the pupils to turn one kind of prose into another. In most instances the teacher simply read a story or an essay to the class and then called upon pupils to repeat it in language of their own. After a little practice of this kind, a boy unconsciously adopts many words that he has well understood but has not made a part of his working vocabulary. He does not surrender his individuality, as he must do—momentarily, at least—in writing imitations, yet he is in a state of open-mindedness that encourages a definite impression of what he reads or hears read.

The scope of the lessons in vocabulary is wide. By the time a boy has

reached the age of twelve he not only has had practice in calling simple objects by their right names, but he has reached out into the world around him and made acquaintance with words belonging to a great variety of activities. He can speak intelligently about the professions, the occupations of workingmen, the farm, social life, political life; he can discuss the more familiar phenomena of the atmosphere, the physical qualities of his friends, their moral virtues and their moral faults; he can use accurately the words that spring from such relations as commerce, war, colonization, life in the city or the small village; and he can talk or write about such means of communication as railways, steamships, street-railways, and the telegraph and telephone. This ability he gains not by sporadic or blind plunging about, but by means of orderly, systematic study. The instruction is not overrigid or mechanical; one might visit classrooms for months without feeling that the instruction was organized in any large way. Yet it is the careful organization that makes the wide scope of the work possible. The simplicity is not that of isolated, individual effort, but of well-designed plan.

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The second of the preliminary exercises universally employed by the French teacher of the mother tongue is dictation. In America, dictation seems to have been put aside to make way for something new. French teachers, however, do not hesitate to use an old-fashioned method or device if they believe it is good. Instead, therefore, of dropping dictation from the programme of studies, they have emphasized it and developed it until it is now a very important and thoroughly established part of their educational procedure. It is based on the conviction that a child can acquire skill before he develops the power of profound or sustained thought. He has much practice, then, in writing the thoughts of others while he is yet too young to write his own. Teachers admit that dictation has its dangers, but since they regard these as incomparable to its possible value, they employ it, just as they employ exercises in vocabulary, with the confidence that though they are risking small dangers, they are following the direction of a larger common sense.

French teachers usually dwell upon four or five specific values of dictation. It gives the pupil much practice in the handling of the sentence; it directs his attention to grammatical constructions; it helps him to learn to spell, to punctuate, and to capitalize; it enlarges his vocabulary and gives him practice in the use of words already known to him; and it fills his mind with good standards of speech. To these should be added one value that the thoughtful teacher must regard as greatest of all; namely, that dictation prevents the pupil from separating spoken language and writing. One of the objections almost invariably made by the young pupil to practice in original composition is that writing seems an artificial process quite unlike anything

he has ever before attempted. In making this objection, he is, of course, merely giving expression to the fact that language is naturally a matter of speech rather than writing, and the additional fact that he has not felt a close relation between what he says by word of mouth and what he writes on paper. If then, before he begins composition, and later while he is practicing it in an elementary manner, he has drill in writing down what he hears, the relation between speech and writing is much less likely to be weakened. While he is listening carefully to his teacher's reading, catching the words in their natural thought groups, and putting them down one by one in his exercise-book, he is not only learning much about the mechanics of composition, but he is saving himself from the error of looking upon theme-writing as something far removed from normal existence.

In giving dictations, the teacher exercises great care. After the very earliest classes, where the work must of necessity be simple, he does not give isolated or detached sentences, but instead, a complete, interesting paragraph. Moreover, he always explains the paragraph fully before he asks the pupil to write it down. This precaution is regarded as so important that a teacher is prohibited from requiring a pupil to write down anything that is meaningless or vague. Again, he reads a paragraph that contains material suited to keep the pupil's attention. That is to say, the ideas and the words in which they are expressed must be just within the pupil's reach. And finally, the teacher guards against letting the exercise become monotonous. It is never long—usually it is a short, crisp paragraph—the corrections are made immediately while interest is warm, and the pupil is not asked to rewrite the dictation unless he has been exceedingly careless. The ten or fifteen minutes are so full of pleasant activity that the time passes quickly, and the boy seems never to dream that he is doing something that might, under a thoughtless teacher, become a dreary, useless punishment.

When we turn from the preliminary preparation for writing to the actual work of constructing original compositions, we find at the outset that the French teacher attaches unusual importance to the kind of material with which a pupil practices. It is possible to conceive of a time in the history of French education when the substance of a pupil's writing might have been sacrificed to the niceties of elegant expression; but certainly no such evil exists to-day. In truth, here in our own country, where we boast—sometimes to our misfortune—that "substance is the thing," we give much less attention to the finding and developing of theme material than does the average teacher in France. It is true that the French are not yet satisfied with what they have accomplished in giving material its deserved place in the teaching of composition. In spite of the progress they have made, they believe that

much yet remains to be done. But this very state of mind indicates how much importance is attached to subject matter.

Material receives much of the teacher's thought not only because in a given instance it has a large part in determining the boy's success in his writing, but also because the subject-matter about which a boy writes from month to month and from year to year may be made an extremely influential part of his education. Here again we may observe the results of the Frenchman's ability to see things in the large. Regardless of differences of opinion about questions of detail, teachers agree that theme material should have a threefold influence upon a pupil's life: it should cultivate (1) observation, (2) imagination, and (3) reflection or judgment.

In daily practice, the French watchword is sincerity. Teachers and heads of schools feel that in the older days when the Classical languages dominated completely the teaching of the mother tongue, much of the material assigned was to some extent beyond the pupil's mental reach. Consequently there is to-day a loud cry and a strict guarding against the encouragement of any sort of intellectual hypocrisy. One may yet meet occasionally with a teacher who clings to the older method of giving his boys culture or finish, but he is so much alone and so thoroughly on the defensive that he seems to belong to another educational age. The teacher that one meets every day believes in making theme material vital by relating it to the pupil's life. Neither in the grade of the material nor in the type within the grade does he permit unnecessary temptation to falsehood or affectation. Thus it comes about that the very young boy does not attempt to write organized compositions at all; that his first efforts in original work require only direct observation or the memory of observation previously made; that the next in order require observation and imagination; and that only as he approaches the end of his course—that is to say, when he would be a senior in an American high school or a freshman in college—is the material he must write upon designed chiefly to encourage analysis or reflection. Of course, these lines of demarcation are not rigidly drawn. The young pupil is asked to reflect, and the oldest pupil is asked to observe and imagine; but the emphasis is first upon observation, then upon imagination, and finally upon reflection.

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In helping pupils toward the actual process of writing down what they have to say, the French teachers so generally follow one practice that it must be regarded as an essential part of their method of instruction. This is the working over of material in the classroom. Teachers seem to feel that their first duty is to arouse the boy's interest in his subject and to put his mind in motion. He is made to feel at the outset that he must not attempt to organize his material—much less to write—until he knows what the material

really is. Hence much emphasis is placed upon what one teacher aptly called the imaginative part of composing. That is to say, the boy is encouraged to let his power of association run free for the purpose of collecting as many ideas or images as possible. His only aim is to reach the limits of his subject; nothing that promises to be of the least value is permitted to escape. After these miscellaneous ideas or images are jotted down or by some other means fixed in mind, the members of the class examine them more carefully. And here, it might be observed in passing, speech is brought into use as an aid to writing. The exercise does not partake in the least of the nature of a formal lesson in oral composition, but the members of the class must speak accurately and clearly. The teacher questions the pupils, the pupils question the teacher, and the pupils question one another. The purpose is not to provide the indolent with material that is ready to use, but to give everyone enough of a basis to enable him to do thinking of his own. In the lower grades, the exercise is frequently nothing more than questions and answers designed to reveal the accuracy with which observations have been made; but in the higher grades it assumes the character of an interesting round-table discussion.

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The usual method of criticising themes is significant in at least two respects. In the first place, the teacher makes a very large part of his criticism orally in the presence of the entire class. The written criticism is not slighted. But the vigorous classroom discussion is regarded as the chief means of helping pupils to do better work.

Ordinarily when the teacher begins this oral part of the criticism, he first satisfies himself that the pupils are wide awake and intent upon the matter in hand. Sometimes he accomplishes this end by asking rapid-fire questions about a number of different themes; sometimes he directs questions to three or four pupils about one theme; and sometimes he calls a pupil to the desk, asks him to stand so that his classmates may hear, and then plies him with questions solely about the theme he himself has submitted. In some such manner the teacher stimulates an intellectual activity that is a sure guarantee against lifelessness in the lesson proper. Once this is begun, the teacher usually gives all his attention to the discussion of a few typical weaknesses or typical evidences of strength. There is no over-magnifying of details—if the pupil has neglected them he is hastily ridiculed or completely ignored—and there is little turning aside to matters that are only incidental. Almost all effort is directed upon a few essential matters that are vital to a large per cent of the class.

The method of criticism is significant, secondly, because of its genuinely constructive nature. Teachers, as a rule, do not content themselves with show-

ing pupils how themes are faulty or weak or uninteresting, but point out clearly how they might be made better. Prevailing faults are dealt with, most certainly; but much more time is devoted to pointing out qualities that are good. Frequently, poor work is put alongside good work, so that the pupils may see more readily just how far the one is from the other. Sometimes the comparison is humiliating to one of the pupils, but the teacher seems to worry very little about that fact. He wants the comparison to have its full force. Neither does he group all the grades of the better pupils between 90 and 92 $\frac{7}{16}$. He does not deal harshly with the pupil who because of little ability cannot do well; but he does not try to conceal anyone's weakness. His purpose is to lead all the pupils of the class to do better the next time, and if one boy's fault will be of service to himself or his classmates in future work, the teacher's sensitiveness about "hurting some one's feelings" is not likely to stand in the way. He points out pitfalls, and he dwells upon the good qualities that individual themes possess. Then he is almost certain to follow a plan of rebuilding that is recommended in the *Instructions* for secondary teachers. In this he and the pupils bring together the good qualities of the themes that have been read, and the teacher's and the pupils' best notions of what a theme ought to be, and fuse them into a kind of ideal theme, so that every pupil may see how good the work would be if it were the result of the combined intelligence of the class. Thus no pupil is left with the crushing conviction that there is no direction in which he may improve himself.

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Summary

The attention, then, that the actual business of writing receives in the French schools is a matter not only of adequate instruction, but of full and definite practice under stimulating circumstances. Composition is held up as a very important part—in fact, the most important part—of the course in the mother tongue. Studies in vocabulary and practice in dictation are carried on constantly in the lower grades in order that the boy may express himself without hindrance when he is once old enough to have something of his own to say in organized compositions. The material assigned is regarded as a matter of great moment. It is intended to develop, in order, the powers of attention and observation, the imagination, and habits of reflection. This material, moreover, is almost invariably discussed in the classroom until the pupil is awakened and interested; and when he writes upon it, he must give the most thoughtful care to organization and general good form. In the criticism of themes, oral discussion holds a large place. Furthermore, the teacher makes his critical suggestions distinctly constructive; that is, he emphasizes the

difference between poor work and good, and he leads the pupils to reflect upon the possibilities that the subject-matter possesses, rather than upon the magnitude of their own shortcomings. And finally, the training that pupils receive in the study of the mother tongue is re-enforced to no small degree by the work in other subjects.

Exercises in Imitation

COPYING PASSAGES

The first exercise in imitation that we will recommend to the student consists of copying passages, word for word, from admired authors. This may strike the student as being a rather brainless exercise, but it can teach the student a great deal about the niceties of style. Earlier in this chapter, we pointed out a number of features one looks for when he makes a close study of style. These features will strike the student as he carefully transcribes the passage.

If the student is to derive any benefit from this exercise, he must observe a few simple rules:

1. He must not spend more than fifteen or twenty minutes copying at any one time. If he extends this exercise much beyond twenty minutes at any one sitting, his attention will begin to wander, and he will find himself merely copying words.

2. He must do this copying with a pencil or pen. Typing is so fast and so mechanical that the student can copy off whole passages without paying any attention to the features of an author's style. Copying by hand, he transcribes the passage at such a pace that he has time to observe the choice and disposition of words, the patterns of sentences, and the length and variety of sentences.

3. He must not spend too much time with any one author. If the student concentrates on a single author's style, he may find himself falling into that "servile imitation" that rhetoricians warned of. The aim of this exercise is not to acquire someone else's style but to lay the groundwork for developing one's own style by getting the "feel" of a variety of styles.

4. He must read the entire passage before starting to copy it so that he can capture the thought and the manner of the passage as a whole. When he is copying, it is advisable to read each sentence through before transcribing it. After the student has finished copying the passage, he should read his transcription so that he once again gets a sense of the passage as a whole.

5. He must copy the passage slowly and accurately. If he is going to dash through this exercise, he might as well not do it at all. A mechanical way

of insuring accuracy and the proper pace is to make his handwriting as legible as he can.

The student will derive the maximum benefit from this copying exercise if he will practice it over an extended period of time. Transcribing a single different passage every day for a month will prove more beneficial to the student than transcribing several different passages every day for a week. The student must have time to absorb what he has been observing in this exercise; and he will not have time to absorb the many lessons to be learned from this exercise if he crams it into a short period.

IMITATING SENTENCE PATTERNS

After the student has spent some time merely copying passages, he might attempt another kind of imitation. He can take individual sentences as patterns on which to devise sentences of his own. This is a more difficult exercise than the verbatim copying, but it pays high dividends to the student who uses it conscientiously.

How closely should the student follow the model? As closely as he cares to, is the most sensible answer. But he will find this exercise most fruitful if he will observe at least the same *kind*, *number*, and *order* of clauses and phrases. If the model sentence has an adverb clause, he should write an adverb clause. If the model sentence is introduced by a participial phrase, he should put a participial phrase in the lead-off position. If the model sentence has three noun clauses arranged in parallel structure, he should write a sentence containing three noun clauses in a similar structure.

The aim of this exercise is not to achieve a word-for-word correspondence with the model but rather to achieve an awareness of the variety of sentence structures of which the English language is capable. The reason why many students never venture outside their puerile, monotonous sentence structure is that they have never attempted sophisticated sentence patterns. Writing such patterns according to models will increase the student's syntactical resources. And with more resources at his command, he will acquire more confidence in his writing ability.

No one, of course, says to himself while he is writing, "I just wrote a compound sentence interspersed with gerund phrases. This time I think I'll begin my sentence with an adverb clause and use a series of noun clauses as the object of the main verb." Such a self-conscious approach to writing would undoubtedly result in some monstrous prose.

No, our prose must come as naturally as—to use Keats's words—"the leaves to the trees." The kind of prose we write cannot be arbitrary; it is governed by the subject matter, the occasion, the purpose, the audience, and the per-

sonality of the writer. If it is true that matter and form are intimately related, then there must be one best way in which to say a particular thing for a given audience and purpose. But as a practical matter, what we manage to achieve most of the time is one of a number of *better* ways to say something. Coleridge once said that the infallible test of a perfect style was "its *untranslatableness* in words of the same language without injury to the meaning." Only seldom, perhaps, do we achieve this kind of "inevitable prose." What we achieve most of the time is, at best, an adequate prose.

A great deal of the writing the student may be called upon to do in the future will be impromptu, spur-of-the-moment writing. While he is still in school, he will have to write essay-type examinations, where he has little time for reflection and almost no time for revision. In his job someday, he will have to dash off memos, directives, and letters. As a private citizen, he will have to scribble off notes to send to school with his children, pen a hurried letter to his parents, pound out a letter to the editor of the local newspaper. The more practice he has had in writing, the better will be this one-draft prose.

But he may also be called upon at times to do some writing that entails a great deal of reflection, research, organization, and revision. He may have to write a report to be read to the board of governors or prepare a speech to be delivered before the Chamber of Commerce. It is this kind of deliberate writing that will call upon all the inventive and stylistic resources at his command. This will necessarily be slow writing, but it does not have to be labored writing for being slow. Someone once said that "hard writing makes for easy reading." And Quintilian once said, "Write quickly and you will never write well; write well and you will soon write quickly."

So with these cautions and objectives in mind, let the student now try his hand at imitating the sentence patterns of practiced writers. The student may never in his life have occasion to write a sentence like some of those that he has mechanically imitated in this exercise, but he will be none the worse for having gone through the paces.

As examples of how to imitate sentence patterns, a few samples of the method are printed below. For models, the student can select sentences from his favorite authors, or he can use sentences from the specimen passages reproduced in this chapter.

SAMPLE IMITATIONS

MODEL SENTENCE: The gallows stood in a small yard, separate from the main grounds of the prison and overgrown with tall prickly weeds.—
George Orwell, *Burmese Days*

IMITATION: The dog shivered in the background, wet from nosing his way through the early-morning grasses and covered with damp cockle-spurs.

(Write a sentence according to the pattern of the model sentence.)

MODEL SENTENCE: He went through the narrow alley of Temple Bar quickly, muttering to himself that they could all go to hell because he was going to have a good night of it.—James Joyce, "Counterparts"

IMITATION: They stood outside on the wet pavement of the terrace, pretending that they had not heard us when we called to them from the library.

MODEL SENTENCE: To regain the stage in its own character, not as a mere emulation of prose, poetry must find its own poetic way to the mastery the stage demands—the mastery of action. Archibald MacLeish, "The Poet as Playwright"

IMITATION: To discover our own natures, not the personalities imposed on us by others, we must honestly assess the values we cherish—in short, our "philosophy of life."

MODEL SENTENCE: If one must worship a bully, it is better that he should be a policeman than a gangster.—George Orwell, "Raffles and Miss Blandish"

IMITATION: Since he continued to be belligerent, it was plain that cajoling would prove more effective than scolding.

MODEL SENTENCE: I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I had not lived.—Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*

IMITATION: I greeted him politely, although I planned to challenge him repeatedly, to assess his erudition, to test whether he could discriminate what was expedient in each situation, and, after I had probed him thoroughly, to announce that we had no place for him in our organization.

MODEL SENTENCE: To have even a portion of this illuminated reason and true philosophy is the highest state to which nature can aspire, in the way of intellect.—John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University*

IMITATION: To win a measure of his affection and esteem was the most difficult task that I had ever assigned myself.

MODEL SENTENCE: As most of these old Custom House officers had good traits and as my position in reference to them, being paternal and protective, was favorable to the growth of friendly sentiments, I soon grew to like them all.—Nathaniel Hawthorne, *Scarlet Letter*

IMITATION: When he offered me the gift and when his classmates, perceiving his embarrassment, discreetly withheld their applause, I gratefully accepted his gesture of friendship.

MODEL SENTENCE: The real art that dealt with life directly was that of the first men who told their stories round the savage camp-fire.—Robert Louis Stevenson, "A Humble Remonstrance"

IMITATION: The man who insists on perfection in others is the man who is most tolerant of imperfection in himself.

MODEL SENTENCE: The most important Indian grouping on the continent, north of Mexico, from the very beginning of European conquest on through and after the American Revolution was the Confederacy of the Iroquois.—John Collier, *Indians of the Americas*

IMITATION: The foremost alliance in Europe, amenable to expansion, during the eighteenth century and again after the collapse of the three-nation concordat, was the pact among the Big Four.

MODEL SENTENCE: This brings us to that growing army of "publicity men" and women who sometimes do not—but frequently do—give the best of their years and their vitality to pushing causes in which they have no faith and to becoming personalities whom privately they designate as stuffed shirts.—Stuart Chase, "The Luxury of Integrity"

IMITATION: He presented a startling conglomeration of statistics and testimonies that confirmed—or allegedly confirmed—the general's capacity for subverting causes of which he was suspicious and toward minimizing faults that he considered "politically innocent."

Specimen Passages for Imitation

THE BIBLE

I returned and saw under the sun that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all. For man also knoweth not his time: as the fishes that are taken in an evil net, and as the birds that are caught in the snare; so are the sons of men snared in an evil time, when it falleth suddenly upon them. This wisdom have I seen also under the sun, and it seemed great unto me. There was a little city, and few men within it; and there came a great king against it, and besieged it, and built great bulwarks against it. Now there was found in it a poor wise man, and he by his wisdom delivered the city; yet no man remembered that same poor man. Then said I, Wisdom is better than

strength: nevertheless the poor man's wisdom is despised, and his words are not heard. The words of wise men are heard in quiet more than the cry of him that ruleth among fools. Wisdom is better than weapons of war: but one sinner destroyeth much good.

(From Ecclesiastes, IX, 11-18, King James Version, 1611.)

And so it was, that, while they were there, the days were accomplished that she should be delivered. And she brought forth her firstborn son and wrapped him in swaddling clothes and laid him in a manger; because there was no room for them in the inn. And there were in the same country shepherds abiding in the field, keeping watch over their flock by night. And, lo, the angel of the Lord came upon them, and the glory of the Lord shone round about them: and they were sore afraid. And the angel said unto them, Fear not: for, behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people. For unto you is born this day in the city of David a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord. And this shall be a sign unto you; Ye shall find the babe wrapped in swaddling clothes, lying in a manger. And suddenly there was with the angel a multitude of the heavenly host praising God and saying, Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward men.

(From St. Luke, II, 6-14, King James Version, 1611.)

JEREMY TAYLOR

By the Cross of Christ stood the holy Virgin Mother, upon whom old Simeon's prophesy was now verified. For now she felt a sword passing through her very soul; she stood without clamour and womanish noises, and, silent, and with a modest grief, deep as the waters of the abyss, but smooth as the face of a pool, full of love and patience and sorrow and hope. Now she was put to it to make use of all those excellent discourses her holy Son had used to build up her spirit and fortify it against this day. Now she felt the blessings and strengths of Faith, and she passed from the griefs of the Passion to the expectation of the Resurrection, and she rested in this death as in a sad remedy; for she knew it reconciled God with all the World. But her hope drew a veil before her sorrow, and though her grief was great enough to swallow her up, yet her love was greater and did swallow up her grief. But the sun also had a veil upon his face and taught us to draw a curtain before the passion, which would be the most artificial expression of its greatness, whilst by silence and wonder we confess it great, beyond our expression, or which is all one, great as the burden and baseness of our sins; and with this veil drawn before the face of Jesus let us suppose him at the

gates of Paradise, calling with his last words in a loud voice to have them opened: *That the King of glory might come in.*

(From *The Great Exemplar . . . the History of the Life and Death of . . . Jesus Christ*, 1649.)

THOMAS HOBBS

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true Knowledge to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them himself. For the errors of Definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lies the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens that they which trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their books; as birds that entering by the chimney and finding themselves inclosed in a chamber flutter at the false light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right Definition of Names lies the first use of Speech; which is the acquisition of Science; and in the wrong, or no Definitions, lies the first abuse, from which proceed all false and senseless Tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err, and as men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise or more mad than ordinary.

(From *Leviathan*, Part I, Chapter 4, 1651.)

SIR THOMAS BROWNE

If the nearness of our last necessity brought a nearer conformity into it, there were a happiness in hoary hairs, and no calamity in half-senses. But the long habit of living indisposeth us for dying; when avarice makes us the sport of death, when even David grew politicly cruel, and Solomon could hardly be said to be the wisest of men. But many are too early old, and before the date of age. Adversity stretcheth our days, misery makes Alcmena's nights, and

time hath no wings unto it. But the most tedious being is that which can unwish itself, content to be nothing, or never to have been, which was beyond the malcontent of Job, who cursed not the day of his life, but his nativity; content to have so far been, as to have a title to future being, although he had lived here but in an hidden state of life, and as it were an abortion.

(From *Hydriotaphia, Urn-Burial*, 1658.)

JOHN BUNYAN

Now therefore I went on in sin with great greediness of mind, still grudging that I could not be so satisfied with it as I would. This did continue with me about a month or more; but one day, as I was standing at a neighbor's shop-window, and there cursing and swearing and playing the madman, after my wonted manner, there sat within the woman of the house, and heard me, who, though she was a very loose and ungodly wench, yet protested that I swore and cursed at that most fearful rate that she was made to tremble to hear me; and told me further that I was the ungodliest fellow for swearing that ever she heard in all her life; and that I, by thus doing, was able to spoil all the youth in the whole town, if they came but in my company.

At this reproof I was silenced and put to secret shame, and that too, as I thought, before the God of heaven; wherefore, while I stood there, and hanging down my head, I wished with all my heart that I might be a little child again, that my father might learn me to speak without this wicked way of swearing; for, thought I, I am so accustomed to it that it is in vain for me to think of a reformation, for I thought it could never be.

But how it came to pass, I know not; I did from this time forward so leave my swearing that it was a great wonder to myself to observe it; and whereas before, I knew not how to speak unless I put an oath before and another behind, to make my words have authority, now I could, without it, speak better, and with more pleasantness, than ever I could before. All this while I knew not Jesus Christ, neither did I leave my sports and play.

(From *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*, 1688.)

SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE

I know very well that many, who pretend to be wise by the forms of being grave, are apt to despise both poetry and music as toys and trifles too light for the use or entertainment of serious men. But whoever find themselves wholly insensible to these charms would, I think, do well to keep their own counsel, for fear of reproaching their own temper, and bringing the goodness of their natures, if not of their understandings, into question. It may be thought at least an ill sign, if not an ill constitution, since some of the

Fathers went so far as to esteem the love of music a sign of predestination, as a thing divine, and reserved for the felicities of Heaven itself. While this world lasts, I doubt not but the pleasure and request of these two entertainments will do so too; and happy those that content themselves with these or any other so easy and so innocent, and do not trouble the world or other men, because they cannot be quiet themselves, though nobody hurts them.

When all is done, human life is, at the greatest and the best, but like a froward child, that must be played with and humoured a little to keep it quiet till it falls asleep, and then the care is over.

(From "Of Poetry," 1690.)

JOHN DRYDEN

'Tis a vanity common to all writers, to overvalue their own productions; and 'tis better for me to own this failing in myself, than the world to do it for me. For what other reason have I spent my life in so unprofitable a study? why am I grown old in seeking so barren a reward as fame? The same parts and application which have made me a poet might have raised me to any honours of the gown, which are often given to men of as little learning and less honesty than myself. No Government has ever been, or ever can be, wherein time-servers and blockheads will not be uppermost. The persons are only changed, but the same jugglings in State, the same hypocrisy in religion, the same self-interest and mismanagement, will remain for ever. Blood and money will be lavished in all ages, only for the preferment of new faces, with old consciences. There is too often a jaundice in the eyes of great men; they see not those whom they raise in the same colours with other men. All whom they affect look golden to them, when the gilding is only in their own distempered sight. These considerations have given me a kind of contempt for those who have risen by unworthy ways. I am not ashamed to be little, when I see them so infamously great; neither do I know why the name of poet should be dishonourable to me, if I am truly one, as I hope I am; for I will never do anything that shall dishonour it.

(From the Dedication to *Examen Poeticum*, 1693.)

DANIEL DEFOE

I must confess myself to have been very much dejected just before this happened; for the prodigious number that were taken sick the week or two before, besides those that died, was such, and the lamentations were so great everywhere, that a man must have seemed to have acted even against his reason if he had so much as expected to escape; and as there was hardly a house but mine in all my neighbourhood but what was infected, so had it

gone on it would not have been long that there would have been any more neighbours to be infected. Indeed it is hardly credible what dreadful havoc the last three weeks had made, for if I might believe the person whose calculations I always found very well grounded, there were not less than 30,000 people dead and near 100,000 fallen sick in the three weeks I speak of; for the number that sickened was surprising; indeed it was astonishing, and those whose courage upheld them all the time before, sank under it now.

In the middle of their distress, when the condition of the City of London was so truly calamitous, just then it pleased God, as it were, by His immediate hand to disarm this enemy; the poison was taken out of the sting. It was wonderful; even the physicians themselves were surprised at it. Wherever they visited they found their patients better; either they had sweated kindly, or the tumors were broke, or the carbuncles went down, and the inflammations round them changed color, or the fever was gone, or the violent headache was assuaged, or some good symptom was in the case; so that in a few days everybody was recovering, whole families that were infected and down, that had ministers praying with them, and expected death every hour, were revived and healed, and none died at all out of them.

(From *A Journal of the Plague Year*, 1722.)

GILBERT WHITE

Though large herds of deer do much harm to the neighbourhood, yet the injury to the morals of the people is of more moment than the loss of their crops. The temptation is irresistible; for most men are sportsmen by constitution: and there is such an inherent spirit for hunting in human nature, as scarce any inhibitions can restrain. Hence, towards the beginning of this century all this country was wild about deer-stealing. Unless he was a *hunter*, as they affected to call themselves, no young person was allowed to be possessed of manhood or gallantry. The *Waltham blacks* at length committed such enormities that government was forced to interfere with that severe and sanguinary act called the *black act*, which now comprehends more felonies than any law that ever was framed before. And, therefore, a late bishop of Winchester, when urged to re-stock Walthamchase, refused, from a motive worthy of a prelate, replying that "it had done mischief enough already."

Our old race of deer-stealers are hardly extinct yet: it was but a little while ago that, over their ale, they used to recount the exploits of their youth; such as watching the pregnant hind to her lair and, when the calf was dropped, paring its feet with a penknife to the quick to prevent its escape, till it was large and fat enough to be killed; the shooting at one of their neighbours with a bullet in a turnip-field by moonshine, mistaking him for a deer; and the losing a dog in the following extraordinary manner:—Some fellows, sus-

pecting that a calf new-fallen was deposited in a certain spot of thick fern, went, with a lurcher, to surprise it; when the parent-hind rushed out of the brake and, taking a vast spring with all her feet close together, pitched upon the neck of the dog and broke it short in two.

(From *The Natural History of Selborne*, 1789.)

EDWARD GIBBON

The renewal, or perhaps the improvement, of my English life was embittered by the alteration of my own feelings. At the age of twenty-one I was, in my proper station of a youth, delivered from the yoke of education, and delighted with the comparative state of liberty and affluence. My filial obedience was natural and easy; and in the gay prospect of futurity, my ambition did not extend beyond the enjoyment of my books, my leisure, and my patrimonial estate, undisturbed by the cares of a family and the duties of a profession. But in the militia I was armed with power; in my travels, I was exempt from control; and as I approached, as I gradually passed, my thirtieth year, I began to feel the desire of being master in my own house. The most gentle authority will sometimes frown without reason, the most cheerful submission will sometimes murmur without cause; and such is the law of our imperfect nature that we must either command or obey; that our personal liberty is supported by the obsequiousness of our own dependents. While so many of my acquaintances were married or in parliament, or advancing with a rapid step in the various roads of honour and fortune, I stood alone, immovable and insignificant; for after the monthly meeting of 1770, I had even withdrawn myself from the militia, by the resignation of an empty and barren commission. My temper is not susceptible of envy, and the view of successful merit has always excited my warmest applause. The miseries of a vacant life were never known to a man whose hours were insufficient for the inexhaustible pleasures of study. But I lamented that at the proper age I had not embraced the lucrative pursuits of the law or of trade, the chances of civil office or India adventure, or even the fat slumbers of the church; and my repentance became more lively as the loss of time was more irretrievable.

(From *Memoirs of My Life and Writings*, 1796.)

FRANCIS JEFFREY

A man who has been for twenty years at work on such matter as is now before us and who comes complacently forward with a whole quarto of it, after all the admonitions he has received, cannot reasonably be expected to "change his hand or check his pride," upon the suggestion of far weightier

monitors than we can pretend to be. Inveterate habit must now have given a kind of sanctity to the errors of early taste; and the very powers of which we lament the perversion, have probably become incapable of any other application. The very quantity, too, that he has written, and is at this moment working up for publication upon the old pattern, makes it almost hopeless to look for any change of it. All this is so much capital already sunk in the concern, which must be sacrificed if that be abandoned; and no man likes to give up for lost the time and talent and labour which he has embodied in any permanent production. We were not previously aware of these obstacles to Mr. Wordsworth's conversion; and, considering the peculiarities of his former writings merely as the result of certain wanton and capricious experiments on public taste and indulgence, conceived it to be our duty to discourage their repetition by all the means in our power. We now see clearly, however, how the case stands; and, making up our minds, though with the most sincere pain and reluctance, to consider him as finally lost to the good cause of poetry, shall endeavour to be thankful for the occasional gleams of tenderness and beauty which the natural force of his imagination and affections must still shed over all his productions, and to which we shall ever turn with delight, in spite of the affectation and mysticism and prolixity, with which they are so abundantly contrasted.

(From a review, in the *Edinburgh Review*, of Wordsworth's *Excursion*, 1814.)

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE

To these defects which, as appears by the extracts, are only occasional, I may oppose, with far less fear of encountering the dissent of any candid and intelligent reader, the following (for the most part correspondent) excellences. First, an austere purity of language both grammatically and logically; in short a perfect appropriateness of the words to the meaning. Of how high value I deem this, and how particularly estimable I hold the example at the present day, has been already stated: and in part, too, the reasons on which I ground both the moral and intellectual importance of habituating ourselves to a strict accuracy of expression. It is noticeable how limited an acquaintance with the masterpieces of art will suffice to form a correct and even a sensitive taste, where none but masterpieces have been seen and admired: while, on the other hand, the most correct notions, and the widest acquaintance with the works of excellence of all ages and countries, will not perfectly secure us against the contagious familiarity with the far more numerous offspring of tastelessness or of a perverted taste. If this be the case, as it notoriously is, with the arts of music and painting, much more difficult will it be to avoid the infection of multiplied and daily examples in the practice

of an art which uses words, and words only, as its instruments. In poetry, in which every line, every phrase, may pass the ordeal of deliberation and deliberate choice, it is possible, and barely possible, to attain that ultimatum which I have ventured to propose as the infallible test of a blameless style—its *untranslatableness* in words of the same language without injury to the meaning. Be it observed, however, that I include in the *meaning* of a word not only its correspondent object but likewise all the associations which it recalls. For language is framed to convey not the object alone, but likewise the character, mood, and intentions of the person who is representing it.

(From *Biographia Literaria*, Ch. XXII, 1817.)

WASHINGTON IRVING

The dominant spirit, however, that haunts this enchanted region and seems to be commander-in-chief of all powers of the air, is the apparition of a figure on horseback without a head. It is said by some to be the ghost of a Hessian trooper, whose head had been carried away by a cannon-ball, in some nameless battle during the revolutionary war; and who is ever and anon seen by the country folk, hurrying along in the gloom of night, as if on the wings of the wind. His haunts are not confined to the valley, but extend at times to the adjacent roads, and especially to the vicinity of a church at no great distance. Indeed, certain of the most authentic historians of those parts, who have been careful in collecting and collating the floating facts concerning this spectre, allege that the body of the trooper having been buried in the churchyard, the ghost rides forth to the scene of battle in nightly quest of his head; and that the rushing speed with which he sometimes passes along the Hollow, like a midnight blast, is owing to his being belated and in a hurry to get back to the churchyard before daybreak.

(From "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow," *The Sketch-Book*, 1819-20.)

WILLIAM HAZLITT

Any one may mouth out a passage with a theatrical cadence, or get upon stilts to tell his thoughts; but to write or speak with propriety and simplicity is a more difficult task. Thus it is easy to affect a pompous style, to use a word twice as big as the thing you want to express: it is not so easy to pitch upon the very word that exactly fits it. Out of eight or ten words equally common, equally intelligible, with nearly equal pretensions, it is a matter of some nicety and discrimination to pick out the very one, the preferableness of which is scarcely perceptible, but decisive. The reason why I object to Dr. Johnson's style is that there is no discrimination, no selection, no variety in it. He uses none but "tall, opaque words," taken from the

"first row of the rubric"—words with the greatest number of syllables, or Latin phrases with merely English terminations. If a fine style depended on this sort of arbitrary pretension, it would be fair to judge of an author's elegance by the measurement of his words, and the substitution of foreign circumlocutions (with no precise associations) for the mother-tongue. How simple it is to be dignified without ease, to be pompous without meaning! Surely, it is but a mechanical rule for avoiding what is low to be always pedantic and affected. It is clear you cannot use a vulgar English word, if you never use a common English word at all. A fine tact is shewn in adhering to those which are perfectly common, and yet never falling into any expressions which are debased by disgusting circumstances, or which owe their significance and point to technical or professional allusions. A truly natural or familiar style can never be quaint or vulgar, for this reason, that it is of universal force and applicability, and that quaintness and vulgarity arise out of the immediate connection of certain words with coarse and disagreeable, or with confined, ideas.

(From "On Familiar Style," 1821.)

CHARLES LAMB

I am by nature extremely susceptible of street affronts; the jeers and taunts of the populace; the low-bred triumph they display over the casual trip, or splashed stocking, of a gentleman. Yet can I endure the jocularly of a young sweep with something more than forgiveness. In the last winter but one, pacing along Cheapside with my accustomed precipitation when I walk westward, a treacherous slide brought me upon my back in an instant. I scrambled up with pain and shame enough—yet outwardly trying to face it down, as if nothing had happened—when the roguish grin of one of these young wits encountered me. There he stood, pointing me out with his dusky finger to the mob, and to a poor woman (I suppose his mother) in particular, till the tears for the exquisiteness of the fun (so he thought it) worked themselves out at the corners of his poor red eyes, red from many a previous weeping, and soot-inflamed, yet twinkling through all with such a joy, snatched out of desolation that Hogarth—but Hogarth has got him already (how could he miss him?) in "The March to Finchley," grinning at the pie-man—there he stood, as he stands in the picture, irremovable, as if the jest was to last for ever—with such a maximum of glee, and minimum of mischief, in his mirth—for the grin of a genuine sweep hath absolutely no malice in it—that I could have been content, if the honour of a gentleman might endure it, to have remained his butt and his mockery till midnight.

(From "The Praise of Chimney-Sweepers," 1822.)

WALTER SAVAGE LANDOR

Let those who look upon style as unworthy of much attention ask themselves how many, in proportion to men of genius, have excelled in it. In all languages, ancient and modern, are there ten prose-writers at once harmonious, correct, and energetic? Harmony and correctness are not uncommon separately, and force is occasionally with each; but where, excepting in Milton, where, among all the moderns, is energy to be found always in the right place? Even Cicero is defective here, and sometimes in the most elaborate of his orations. In the time of Milton it was not customary for men of abilities to address to the people at large what might inflame their passions. The appeal was made to the serious, to the well-informed, to the learned, and was made in the language of their studies. The phraseology of our Bible, on which no subsequent age has improved, was thought to carry with it solemnity and authority; and even when popular feelings were to be aroused to popular interest, the language of the prophets was preferred to the language of the vulgar. Hence, amid the complicated antagonisms of war there was more austerity than ferocity. The gentlemen who attended the court avoided the speech as they avoided the manners of their adversaries. Waller, Cowley, and South were resolved to refine what was already pure gold, and inadvertently threw into the crucible many old family jewels deeply encased within it. Eliot, Pym, Selden, and Milton revered their father's house and retained its right language unmodified. Lord Brougham would make us believe that scarcely a sentence in Milton is easy, natural, and vernacular. Nevertheless, in all his dissertations, there are many which might appear to have been written in our days, if indeed any writer in our days were endowed with the same might and majesty.

(From *Imaginary Conversations*, 1829.)

THOMAS CARLYLE

Here, too, may we not pause for an instant and make a practical reflection? Considering the multitude of mortals that handle the Pen in these days, and can mostly spell, and write without glaring violations of grammar, the question naturally arises: How is it, that no Work proceeds from them, bearing any stamp of authenticity and permanence; of worth for more than one day? Shiploads of Fashionable Novels, Sentimental Rhymes, Tragedies, Farces, Diaries of Travel, Tales by flood and field, are swallowed monthly into the bottomless Pool: still does the Press toil; innumerable Paper-makers, Compositors, Printers' Devils, Book-binders, and Hawkers grown hoarse with loud proclaiming, rest not from their labour; and still, in torrents,

rushes on the great array of Publications, unpausing, to their final home; and still Oblivion, like the Grave, cries, Give! Give! How is it that of all these countless multitudes, no one can attain to the smallest mark of excellence, or produce aught that shall endure longer than "snowflake on the river," or the foam of penny-beer? We answer: Because they *are* foam; because there is no *Reality* in them. These Three Thousand men, women and children, that make up the army of British Authors, do not, if we will well consider it, *see* anything whatever; consequently *have* nothing that they can record and utter, only more or fewer things that they can plausibly pretend to record. The Universe, of Man and Nature, is still quite shut up from them; the "open secret" still utterly a secret; because no sympathy with Man or Nature, no love and free simplicity of heart has yet unfolded the same. Nothing but a pitiful Image of their own pitiful Self, with its vanities, and grudgings, and ravenous hunger of all kinds, hangs forever painted in the retina of these unfortunate persons; so that the starry ALL, with whatsoever it embraces, does but appear as some expanded magic-lantern shadow of that same Image—and naturally looks pitiful enough.

(From "Biography," *Fraser's Magazine*, April, 1832.)

RALPH WALDO EMERSON

There is a time in every man's education when he arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for better for worse as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given to him to till. That power which resides in him is new in nature, and none but he knows what that is which he can do, nor does he know until he has tried. Not for nothing one face, one character, one fact, makes much impression on him and another none. This sculpture in the memory is not without pre-established harmony. The eye was placed where one ray should fall, that it might testify of that particular ray. We but half express ourselves, and are ashamed of that divine idea which each of us represents. It may be safely trusted as proportionate and of good issues, so it be faithfully imparted, but God will not have his work made manifest by cowards. A man is relieved and gay when he has put his heart into his work and done his best; but what he has said or done otherwise shall give him no peace. It is a deliverance which does not deliver. In the attempt his genius deserts him; no muse befriends; no invention, no hope.

Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string. Accept the place the divine providence has found for you, the society of your contemporaries,

the connection of events. Great men have always done so, and confided themselves childlike to the genius of their age, betraying their perception that the absolutely trustworthy was seated at their heart, working through their hands, predominating in all their being. And we are now men, and must accept in the highest mind the same transcendent destiny; and not minors and invalids in a protected corner, not cowards fleeing before a revolution, but guides, redeemers, and benefactors, obeying the Almighty effort and advancing on Chaos and the Dark.

(From "Self-Reliance," 1841.)

HENRY DAVID THOREAU

I have paid no poll-tax for six years. I was put into a jail once on this account, for one night; and, as I stood considering the walls of solid stone, two or three feet thick, the door of wood and iron, a foot thick, and the iron grating which strained the light, I could not help being struck with the foolishness of that institution which treated me as if I were mere flesh and blood and bones, to be locked up. I wondered that it should have concluded at length that this was the best use it could put me to, and had never thought to avail itself of my services in some way. I saw that, if there was a wall of stone between me and my townsmen, there was a still more difficult one to climb or break through before they could get to be as free as I was. I did not for a moment feel confined, and the walls seemed a great waste of stone and mortar. I felt as if I alone of all my townsmen had paid my tax. They plainly did not know how to treat me, but behaved like persons who are underbred. In every threat and in every compliment there was a blunder; for they thought that my chief desire was to stand the other side of that stone wall. I could not but smile to see how industriously they locked the door on my meditations, which followed them out again without let or hindrance, and *they* were really all that was dangerous. As they could not reach me, they had resolved to punish my body; just as boys, if they cannot come at some person against whom they have a spite, will abuse his dog. I saw that the State was half-witted, that it was timid as a lone woman with her silver spoons, and that it did not know its friends from its foes, and I lost all my remaining respect for it, and pitied it.

(From *Civil Disobedience*, 1849.)

JOHN STUART MILL

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That prin-

ciple is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

(From *On Liberty*, 1859.)

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

(From *The Gettysburg Address*, 1863.)

JOHN RUSKIN

And therefore, first of all, I tell you earnestly and authoritatively (I *know* I am right in this), you must get into the habit of looking intensely at words and assuring yourself of their meaning, syllable by syllable—nay, letter by letter. For though it is only by reason of the opposition of letters in the function of signs, to sounds in the function of signs, that the study of books is called “literature,” and that a man versed in it is called, by the consent of nations, a man of letters instead of a man of books, or of words, you may yet connect with that accidental nomenclature this real fact: that you might read all the books in the British Museum (if you could live long enough) and remain an utterly “illiterate,” uneducated person; but that if you read ten pages of a good book, letter by letter—that is to say, with real accuracy—you are for evermore in some measure an educated person. The entire difference between education and non-education (as regards the merely intellectual part of it) consists in this accuracy. A well-educated gentleman may not know many languages—may not be able to speak any but his own—may have read very few books. But whatever language he knows, he knows precisely; whatever word he pronounces, he pronounces rightly; above all, he is learned in the *peerage* of words; knows the words of true descent and ancient blood, at a glance, from words of modern canaille; remembers all their ancestry, their intermarriages, distant relationships, and the extent to which they were admitted, and offices they held, among the national noblesse of words at any time and in any country. But an uneducated person may know, by memory, many languages, and talk them all, and yet truly know not a word of any—not a word even of his own.

(From “Of Kings’ Treasuries,” *Sesame and Lilies*, 1864.)

WALTER BAGEHOT

History, it is said, is of no use; at least a great critic, who is understood to have in the press a very elaborate work in that kind, not long since seemed to allege that writings of this sort did not establish a theory of the universe, and were therefore of no avail. But whatever may be the use of this sort of composition in itself and abstractedly, it is certainly of great use relatively and to literary men. Consider the position of a man of that species. He sits beside a library-fire, with nice white paper, a good pen, a capital style, every means of saying everything, but nothing to say; of course he is an able man; of course he has an active intellect, beside wonderful culture; but still one cannot always have original ideas. Every day cannot be an era; a train of new speculation very often will not be found; and how dull it is to make

it your business to write, to stay by yourself in a room to write, and then to have nothing to say! It is dreary work mending seven pens and waiting for a theory to "turn up." What a gain if something would happen! then one could describe it. Something has happened, and that something is history. On this account, since a sedate Greek discovered this plan for a grave immortality, a series of accomplished men have seldom been found wanting to derive a literary capital from their active and barbarous kindred. Perhaps when a Visigoth broke a head, he thought that that was all. Not so; he was making history; Gibbon has written it down.

(From "Edward Gibbon," *Literary Studies*, 1879.)

MARK TWAIN

Once a day a cheap, gaudy packet arrived upward from St. Louis, and another downward from Keokuk. Before these events, the day was glorious with expectancy; after them, the day was a dead and empty thing. Not only the boys, but the whole village, felt this. After all these years I can picture that old time to myself now, just as it was then: the white town drowsing in the sunshine of a summer's morning; the streets empty, or pretty nearly so; one or two clerks sitting in front of the Water Street stores, with their splint-bottomed chairs tilted back against the walls, chins on breasts, hats slouched over their faces, asleep—with shingle-shavings enough around to show what broke them down; a sow and a litter of pigs loafing along the sidewalk, doing a good business in watermelon rinds and seeds; two or three lonely little freight piles scattered about the "levee"; a pile of "skids" on the slope of the stone-paved wharf, and the fragrant town drunkard asleep in the shadow of them; two or three wood flats at the head of the wharf, but nobody to listen to the peaceful lapping of the wavelets against them; the great Mississippi, the majestic, the magnificent Mississippi, rolling its mile-wide tide along, shining in the sun; the dense forest away on the other side; the "point" above the town, and the "point" below, bounding the river-glimpse and turning it into a sort of sea, and withal a very still and brilliant and lonely one. Presently a film of dark smoke appears above one of those remote "points"; instantly a negro drayman, famous for his quick eye and prodigious voice, lifts up the cry, "S-t-e-a-m-boat a-comin'!" and the scene changes! The town drunkard stirs, the clerks wake up, a furious clatter of drays follows, every house and store pours out a human contribution, and all in a twinkling the dead town is alive and moving. Drays, carts, men, boys, all go hurrying from many quarters to a common center, the wharf. Assembled there, the people fasten their eyes upon the coming boat as upon a wonder they are seeing for the first time.

(From *Life on the Mississippi*, 1883.)

GEORGE BERNARD SHAW

Among the friends to whom I have read this play in manuscript are some of our own sex who are shocked at the "unscrupulousness," meaning the utter disregard of masculine fastidiousness, with which the woman pursues her purpose. It does not occur to them that if women were as fastidious as men, morally or physically, there would be an end of the race. Is there anything meaner than to throw necessary work upon other people and then disparage it as unworthy and indelicate. We laugh at the haughty American nation because it makes the negro clean its boots and then proves the moral and physical inferiority of the negro by the fact that he is a shoeblack; but we ourselves throw the whole drudgery of creation on one sex, and then imply that no female of any womanliness or delicacy would initiate any effort in that direction. There are no limits to male hypocrisy in this matter. No doubt there are moments when man's sexual immunities are made acutely humiliating to him. When the terrible moment of birth arrives, its supreme importance and its superhuman effort and peril, in which the father has no part, dwarf him into the meanest insignificance: he slinks out of the way of the humblest petticoat, happy if he be poor enough to be pushed out of the house to outface his ignominy by drunken rejoicings. But when the crisis is over he takes his revenge, swaggering as the breadwinner, and speaking of Woman's "sphere" with condescension, even with chivalry, as if the kitchen and the nursery were less important than the office in the city. When his swagger is exhausted he drivels into erotic poetry or sentimental uxoriousness; and the Tennysonian King Arthur posing at Guinevere becomes Don Quixote grovelling before Dulcinea.

(From the Preface to *Man and Superman*, 1903. Reprinted by permission of the Public Trustee and The Society of Authors, London.)

G. K. CHESTERTON

But as I sat scrawling these silly figures on the brown paper, it began to dawn on me, to my great disgust, that I had left one chalk, and that a most exquisite and essential chalk, behind. I searched all my pockets, but I could not find any white chalk. Now, those who are acquainted with all the philosophy (nay, religion) which is typified in the art of drawing on brown paper, know that white is positive and essential. I cannot avoid remarking here upon a moral significance. One of the wise and awful truths which this brown-paper art reveals is this, that white is a color. It is not a mere absence of color; it is a shining and affirmative thing, as fierce as red, as definite as black. When, so to speak, your pencil grows red-hot, it draws

roses; when it grows white-hot, it draws stars. And one of the two or three defiant verities of the best religious morality, of real Christianity, for example, is exactly this same thing; the chief assertion of religious morality is that white is a color. Virtue is not the absence of vices or the avoidance of moral dangers; virtue is a vivid and separate thing, like pain or a particular smell. Mercy does not mean not being cruel or sparing people revenge or punishment; it means a plain and positive thing like the sun, which one has either seen or not seen. Chastity does not mean abstention from sexual wrong; it means something flaming, like Joan of Arc. In a word, God paints in many colors; but He never paints so gorgeously, I had almost said so gaudily, as when He paints in white. In a sense our age has realized this fact, and expressed it in our sullen costume. For if it were really true that white was a blank and colorless thing, negative and noncommittal, then white would be used instead of black and gray for the funeral dress of this pessimistic period. We should see city gentlemen in frock coats of spotless silver linen, with top hats as white as wonderful arum lilies. Which is not the case.

(From "A Piece of Chalk," from *Tremendous Trifles* by G. K. Chesterton, copyright 1909. Published by Sheed & Ward, Inc., New York. Reprinted by permission of Miss Dorothy Collins, A. P. Watt & Son, London, and Sheed & Ward, Inc., New York.)

HENRY JAMES

The house of fiction has in short not one window, but a million—a number of possible windows not to be reckoned, rather; every one of which has been pierced, or is still pierceable, in its vast front, by the need of the individual vision and by the pressure of the individual will. These apertures, of dissimilar shape and size, hang so, all together, over the human scene that we might have expected of them a greater sameness of report than we find. They are but windows at the best, mere holes in a dead wall, disconnected, perched aloft; they are not hinged doors opening straight upon life. But they have this mark of their own that at each of them stands a figure with a pair of eyes, or at least with a field-glass, which forms, again and again, for observation, a unique instrument, insuring to the person making use of it an impression distinct from every other. He and his neighbours are watching the same show, but one seeing more where the other sees less, one seeing black where the other sees white, one seeing big where the other sees small, one seeing coarse where the other sees fine. And so on, and so on; there is fortunately no saying on what, for the particular pair of eyes, the window may *not* open; "fortunately" by reason, precisely, of this incalculability of range. The spreading field, the human scene, is the

"choice of subject"; the pierced aperture, either broad or balconied or slit-like and low-browed, is the "literary form"; but they are, singly or together, as nothing without the posted presence of the watcher—without, in other words, the consciousness of the artist. Tell me what the artist is, and I will tell you of what he has *been* conscious. Thereby I shall express to you at once his boundless freedom and his "moral" reference.

(From the Preface to *The Portrait of a Lady*, 1915.)

ERNEST HEMINGWAY

Sometimes in the dark we heard the troops marching under the window and the guns going past pulled by motor-tractors. There was much traffic at night and many mules on the roads with boxes of ammunition on each side of their packsaddles and gray motor-trucks that carried men, and other trucks with loads covered with canvas that moved slower in the traffic. There were big guns too that passed in the day drawn by tractors, the long barrels of the guns covered with green branches and green leafy branches and vines laid over the tractors. To the north we could look across a valley and see a forest of chestnut trees and behind it another mountain on this side of the river. There was fighting for that mountain too, but it was not successful, and in the fall when the rains came the leaves all fell from the chestnut trees and the branches were bare and the trunks black with rain. The vineyards were thin and bare-branched too and all the country wet and brown and dead with the autumn. There were mists over the river and clouds on the mountain and the trucks splashed mud on the road and the troops were muddy and wet in their capes; their rifles were wet and under their capes the two leather cartridge-boxes on the front of the belts, gray leather boxes heavy with the packs of clips of thin, long 6.5 mm. cartridges, bulged forward under the capes so that the men, passing on the road, marched as though they were six months gone with child.

(From *A Farewell to Arms*, 1929. Reprinted by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, Jonathan Cape, Ltd., London, and the Executors of the Ernest Hemingway Estate.)

E. M. FORSTER

In the first place, [my wood] makes me feel heavy. Property does have this effect. Property produces men of weight, and it was a man of weight who failed to get into the Kingdom of Heaven. He was not wicked, that unfortunate millionaire in the parable, he was only stout; he stuck out in front,

not to mention behind, and as he wedged himself this way and that in the crystalline entrance and bruised his well-fed flanks, he saw beneath him a comparatively slim camel passing through the eye of a needle and being woven into the robe of God. The Gospels all through couple stoutness and slowness. They point out what is perfectly obvious, yet seldom realized: that if you have a lot of things you cannot move about a lot, that furniture requires dusting, dusters require servants, servants require insurance stamps, and the whole tangle of them makes you think twice before you accept an invitation to dinner or go for a bathe in the Jordan. Sometimes the Gospels proceed further and say with Tolstoy that property is sinful; they approach the difficult ground of asceticism here, where I cannot follow them. But as to the immediate effects of property on people, they just show straight-forward logic. It produces men of weight. Men of weight cannot, by definition, move like the lightning from the East unto the West, and the ascent of a fourteen-stone bishop into a pulpit is thus the exact antithesis of the coming of the Son of Man. My wood makes me feel heavy.

(From "My Wood," *Abinger Harvest*, 1936. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York, and Edward Arnold Ltd., London.)

D. H. LAWRENCE

We have our very individuality in relationship. Let us swallow this important and prickly fact. Apart from our connections with other people, we are barely individuals, we amount, all of us, to next to nothing. It is in the living touch between us and other people, other lives, other phenomena that we move and have our being. Strip us of our human contacts and of our contact with the living earth and the sun, and we are almost bladders of emptiness. Our individuality means nothing. A skylark that was alone on an island would be songless and meaningless, his individuality gone, running about like a mouse in the grass. But if there were one female with him, it would lift him singing into the air, and restore him his real individuality.

And so with men and women. It is in relationship to one another that they have their true individuality and their distinct being: in contact, not out of contact. This is sex, if you like. But it is no more sex than sunshine on the grass is sex. It is a living contact, give and take: the great and subtle relationship of men and women, man and woman. In this and through this we become real individuals, without it, without the real contact, we remain more or less nonentities.

(From *Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers*, 1936. Reprinted by permission of The Viking Press, Inc., New York, and A. Watkins, Inc., New York.)

JAMES AGEE

I must excuse myself this apparent digression because you of whom I write are added to the meaning of this song, and its meaning to yours: for here, here, in this time; on this vast continental sorrowful clay it is I see you, encamped, imprisoned, each in your pitiously decorated little unowned ship of home, ten million, patient, ignorant, grievous, ruined, so inextricably trapped, captured, guarded; in the patience of your lives; and though you cannot know it you like these prisoners are constantly waiting; and though you cannot hear it yet like them you do hear; how on the stone of this planet there is a marching and resonance of rescuing feet which shall at length all dangers braved, all armies cut through, past, deliver you freedom, joy, health, knowledge like an enduring sunlight: and not to you alone, whose helpless hearts have been waiting and listening since the human world began, but to us all, those lovable and those hateful all alike. And whether this shall descend upon us over the steep north crown I shall not know, but doubt: and after how many false deliverances there can be no hopeful imagining: but that it shall come at length there can be no question: for this I know in my own soul through that regard of love we bear one another: for there it was proved me in the meeting of the extremes of the race.

(From *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men*, 1939. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.)

WILLIAM FAULKNER

This time the bear didn't strike him down. It caught the dog in both arms, almost loverlike, and they both went down. He was off the mule now. He drew back both hammers of the gun but he could see nothing but moiling spotted houndbodies until the bear surged up again. Boon was yelling something, he could not tell what; he could see Lion still clinging to the bear's throat and he saw the bear, half erect, strike one of the hounds with one paw and hurl it five or six feet and then, rising and rising as though it would never stop, stand erect again and begin to rake at Lion's belly with its forepaws. Then Boon was running. The boy saw the gleam of the blade in his hand and watched him leap among the hounds, hurdling them, kicking them aside as he ran, and fling himself astride the bear as he had hurled himself onto the mule, his legs locked around the bear's belly, his left arm under the bear's throat where Lion clung, and the glint of the knife as it rose and fell.

It fell just once. For an instant they almost resembled a piece of statuary: the clinging dog, the bear, the man astride its back, working and probing

the buried blade. Then they went down, pulled over backward by Boon's weight, Boon underneath. It was the bear's back which reappeared first but at once Boon was astride it again. He had never released the knife and again the boy saw the almost infinitesimal movement of his arm and shoulder as he probed and sought; then the bear surged erect, raising with it the man and the dog too, and turned and still carrying the man and the dog it took two or three steps toward the woods on its hind feet as a man would have walked and crashed down. It didn't collapse, crumple. It fell all of a piece, as a tree falls, so that all three of them, man dog and bear, seemed to bounce once.

(From "The Bear," by William Faulkner. Copyright 1942 by The Curtis Publishing Co. Copyright 1942 by William Faulkner. Reprinted from *Go Down, Moses and Other Stories*, by William Faulkner, by permission of Random House, Inc.)

JAMES BALDWIN

Negroes want to be treated like men: a perfectly straightforward statement, containing only seven words. People who have mastered Kant, Hegel, Shakespeare, Marx, Freud, and the Bible find this statement utterly impenetrable. The idea seems to threaten profound, barely conscious assumptions. A kind of panic paralyzes their features, as though they found themselves trapped on the edge of a steep place. I once tried to describe to a very well-known American intellectual the conditions among Negroes in the South. My recital disturbed him and made him indignant; and he asked me in perfect innocence, "Why don't all the Negroes in the South move North?" I tried to explain what *has* happened, unfailingly, whenever a significant body of Negroes move North. They do not escape Jim Crow: they merely encounter another, not-less-deadly variety. They do not move to Chicago, they move to the South Side; they do not move to New York, they move to Harlem. The pressure within the ghetto causes the ghetto walls to expand, and this expansion is always violent. White people hold the line as long as they can, and in as many ways as they can, from verbal intimidation to physical violence. But inevitably the border which has divided the ghetto from the rest of the world falls back bitterly before the black horde; the landlords make a tidy profit by raising the rent, chopping up the rooms, and all but dispensing with the upkeep; and what has once been a neighborhood turns into a "turf." This is precisely what happened when the Puerto Ricans arrived in their thousands—and the bitterness thus caused is, as I write, being fought out all up and down those streets.

(From "Fifth Avenue, Uptown: A Letter from Harlem," *Nobody Knows My Name*. Copyright © 1960, 1961 by James Baldwin. Reprinted by permission of The Dial Press, Inc. and Michael Joseph Ltd.)

EDMUND WILSON

But the experience of the war itself as well as the mechanical age—and, as Allan Nevins has shown, the conduct of the war gave great stimulus to an increase of Northern efficiency—had its influence on American style. Grant and Lincoln, in writing and speaking, were distinguished by similar qualities: lucidity, precision, terseness. What was it they had in common that gave them the same traits of style? Lincoln was not a West Pointer; he had not been affected by military discipline. Nor was it that both came from the West and had the habit of homely speech. The humor of the West was drawling: its drawl was exploited by Mark Twain in his readings and no doubt in the same way by Lincoln when he was telling his funny stories; and Western eloquence was slow and expansive. But Grant and Lincoln were both quick thinkers: no drawl is to be heard in their writings or in the framing of their reported opinions. Even when Lincoln is debating Douglas, there is nothing of the spellbinder about him. Though it would seem that he does attempt sometimes, as Douglas accused him of doing, to temper his sentiments to his audience—as he passes, in Illinois, from the North to the South—he avoids the demagogic tricks that make up so much of Douglas's armory; he aims to be direct and cogent, to try to hit the nails on the head. What was it, then, that led Grant and Lincoln to express themselves with equal concision? It was undoubtedly the decisiveness with which they had to speak. They had no time in which to waste words. To temporize or deceive was too dangerous. They are obliged to issue orders and to lay down lines of policy that will immediately be understood. Their role is to convince and direct. This is the language of responsibility, and its accent of decisiveness will be carried on by the younger men who have served in the war: by Ambrose Bierce in his stoical nightmare; by John De Forest in his Roman impassivity; by Justice Holmes in his judicial austerity. One finds this even in Cable when, emerging from the humid bayous and the rich dialects of Louisiana, he comes to present in unequivocal language his analysis of the problems of the South.

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Readings

HUGH BLAIR: CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE STYLE OF
MR. ADDISON IN NO. 411 OF "THE SPECTATOR"

In 1759, Dr. Hugh Blair began teaching rhetoric at the University of Edinburgh, and in 1762, he was appointed the first Regius Professor of Rhetoric

Lecture XX of Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, first published in 1783.

and *Belles Lettres* at Edinburgh. In 1783, upon his retirement from this post, Blair published the forty-seven lectures on rhetoric and literature that he had presented for twenty-four years to packed classrooms. This text *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* became a widely used book in the English and American schools in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

Midway in the course of lectures Blair presented detailed stylistic analyses of four of Addison's *Spectator* essays (Nos. 411-14) and an analysis of Jonathan Swift's "*A Proposal for Correcting, Improving, and Ascertaining the English Tongue*." These analyses represent one of the few instances in English of a stylistic analysis of an entire essay.

Blair comments on points of grammar, usage, and style in Addison's essays. From the reprinting of Blair's first analysis, the student will learn one technique of analyzing, pointedly and concretely, English prose sentences and may become more conscious of his own prose style. Some of Blair's strictures on Addison's style, such as his views on the relative pronouns which and that, are delivered from the standpoint of eighteenth-century usage. And while some of Blair's comments may strike a modern audience as being somewhat captious, most students will find Blair's criticism judicious. In almost every case where Blair has rewritten Addison's sentences, the student will remark an improvement in the neatness and clarity of the prose.

Occasionally, Blair's style of punctuation has been silently changed.

I have insisted fully on the subject of language and style, both because it is, in itself, of great importance and because it is more capable of being ascertained by precise rule, than several other parts of composition. A critical analysis of the style of some good author will tend further to illustrate the subject, as it will suggest observations which I have not had occasion to make and will show, in the most practical light, the use of those which I have made.

Mr. Addison is the author whom I have chosen for this purpose. *The Spectator*, of which his papers are the chief ornament, is a book which is in the hands of every one and which cannot be praised too highly. The good sense and good writing, the useful morality and the admirable vein of humour which abound in it, render it one of those standard books which have done the greatest honour to the English nation. I have formerly given the general character of Mr. Addison's style and manner as natural and unaffected, easy and polite, and full of those graces which a flowery imagination diffuses over writing. At the same time, though one of the most beautiful writers in the language, he is not the most correct; a circumstance which renders his composition the more proper to be the subject of our

present criticism. The free and flowing manner of this amiable writer sometimes led him into inaccuracies which the more studied circumspection and care of far inferior writers have taught them to avoid. Remarking his beauties, therefore, which I shall have frequent occasion to do, as I proceed, I must also point out his negligences and defects. Without a free, impartial discussion, of both the faults and beauties which occur in his composition, it is evident this piece of criticism would be of no service; and from the freedom which I use in criticising Mr. Addison's style, none can imagine that I mean to depreciate his writings, after having repeatedly declared the high opinion which I entertain of them. The beauties of this author are so many and the general character of his style is so elegant and estimable that the minute imperfections I shall have occasion to point out are but like those spots in the sun, which may be discovered by the assistance of art but which have no effect in obscuring its lustre. It is, indeed, my judgment that what Quintilian applies to Cicero, "*Ille se profecisse sciat, cui Cicero valde placebit,*" may, with justice, be applied to Mr. Addison: that to be highly pleased with his manner of writing is the criterion of one's having acquired a good taste in English style. The paper on which we are now to enter is No. 411, the first of his celebrated Essays on the Pleasures of the Imagination in the sixth volume of *The Spectator*. It begins thus:

(1) Our sight is the most perfect and most delightful of all our senses.

This is an excellent introductory sentence. It is clear, precise, and simple. The author lays down, in a few plain words, the proposition which he is going to illustrate throughout the rest of the paragraph. In this manner, we should always set out. A first sentence should seldom be a long, and never an intricate, one.

He might have said, "*Our sight is the most perfect and the most delightful.*" But he has judged better in omitting to repeat the article *the*. For the repetition of it is proper, chiefly when we intend to point out the objects of which we speak, as distinguished from, or contrasted with, each other; and when we want that the reader's attention should rest on that distinction. For instance, had Mr. Addison intended to say that our sight is at once the most *delightful* and the most *useful* of all our senses, the article might then have been repeated with propriety, as a clear and strong distinction would have been conveyed. But as between *perfect* and *delightful* there is less contrast, there was no occasion for such repetition. It would have had no other effect but to add a word unnecessarily to the sentence. He proceeds:

(2) It fills the mind with the largest variety of ideas, converses with its objects at the greatest distance, and continues the longest in action, without being tired or satiated with its proper enjoyments.

This sentence deserves attention, as remarkably harmonious and well constructed. It possesses, indeed, almost all the properties of a perfect sentence. It is entirely perspicuous. It is loaded with no superfluous or unnecessary words. For *tired or satiated* towards the end of the sentence are not used for synonymous terms. They convey distinct ideas and refer to different members of the period: that this sense *continues the longest in action without being tired*, that is, without being fatigued with its action; and also, without being *satiated with its proper enjoyments*. That quality of a good sentence which I termed its unity is here perfectly preserved. It is *our sight* of which he speaks. This is the object carried through the sentence and presented to us, in every member of it, by those verbs, *fills, converses, continues*, to each of which it is clearly the nominative. Those capital words are disposed of in the most proper places; and that uniformity is maintained in the construction of the sentence which suits the unity of the object.

Observe, too, the music of the period; consisting of three members, each of which, agreeable to a rule I formerly mentioned, grows and rises above the other in sound, till the sentence is conducted, at last, to one of the most melodious closes which our language admits—*without being tired or satiated with its proper enjoyments*. *Enjoyments* is a word of length and dignity, exceedingly proper for a close which is designed to be a musical one. The harmony is the more happy, as this disposition of the members of the period which suits the sound so well is no less just and proper with respect to the sense. It follows the order of nature. First, we have the variety of objects mentioned, which sight furnishes to the mind; next, we have the action of sight on those objects; and lastly, we have the time and continuance of its action. No order could be more natural and happy.

This sentence has still another beauty. It is figurative, without being too much so for the subject. A metaphor runs through it. The sense of sight is, in some degree, personified. We are told of its *conversing* with its objects; and of its not being *tired or satiated* with its *enjoyments*; all which expressions are plain allusions to the actions and feelings of men. This is that slight sort of personification which, without any appearance of boldness and without elevating the fancy much above its ordinary state, renders discourse picturesque and leads us to conceive the author's meaning more distinctly, by clothing abstract ideas, in some degree, with sensible colours. Mr. Addison abounds with this beauty of style beyond most authors; and the sentence which we have been considering is very expressive of his manner of writing. There is no blemish in it whatever, unless that a strict critic might perhaps object that the epithet *large*, which he applies to *variety—the largest variety of ideas*—is an epithet more commonly applied to extent than to number.

It is plain that he here employed it to avoid the repetition of the word *great*, which occurs immediately afterwards.

- (3) The sense of feeling can, indeed, give us a notion of extension, shape, and all other ideas that enter at the eye, except colours; but, at the same time, it is very much straitened and confined in its operations to the number, bulk, and distance of its particular objects.

This sentence is by no means so happy as the former. It is, indeed, neither clear nor elegant. *Extension* and *shape* can, with no propriety, be called *ideas*; they are properties of matter. Neither is it accurate, even according to Mr. Locke's philosophy (with which our author seems here to have puzzled himself), to speak of any sense *giving us a notion of ideas*; our senses give us the ideas themselves. The meaning would have been much more clear if the author had expressed himself thus: "The sense of feeling can, indeed, give us the idea of extension, figure, and all the other properties of matter which are perceived by the eye, except colours."

The latter part of the sentence is still more embarrassed. For what meaning can we make of the sense of feeling being *confined in its operation to the number, bulk, and distance, of its particular objects*? Surely, every sense is confined, as much as the sense of feeling, to the number, bulk, and distance of its own objects. Sight and feeling are, in this respect, perfectly on a level; neither of them can extend beyond its own objects. The turn of expression is so inaccurate here that one would be apt to suspect two words to have been omitted in the printing, which were originally in Mr. Addison's manuscript, because the insertion of them would render the sense much more intelligible and clear. These two words are *with regard—it is very much straitened and confined in its operations, with regard to the number, bulk, and distance of its particular objects*. The meaning then would be that feeling is more limited than sight *in this respect*—that it is confined to a narrower circle, to a smaller number of objects.

The epithet *particular*, applied to *objects*, in the conclusion of the sentence, is redundant and conveys no meaning whatever. Mr. Addison seems to have used it in place of *peculiar*, as indeed he does often in other passages of his writings. But *particular* and *peculiar*, though they are too often confounded, are words of different import from each other. *Particular* stands opposed to *general*; *peculiar* stands opposed to what is possessed in *common with others*. *Particular* expresses what, in the logical style, is called *species*; *peculiar*, what is called *differentia*. *Its peculiar objects* would have signified, in this place, the objects of the sense of feeling, as distinguished from the objects of any other sense and would have had more meaning than *its*

particular objects, though, in truth, neither the one nor the other epithet was requisite. It was sufficient to have said simply, *its objects*.

(4) Our sight seems designed to supply all these defects, and may be considered as a more delicate and diffusive kind of touch, that spreads itself over an infinite multitude of bodies, comprehends the largest figures, and brings into our reach some of the most remote parts of the universe.

Here again the author's style returns upon us in all its beauty. This is a sentence distinct, graceful, well arranged, and highly musical. In the latter part of it, it is constructed with three members, which are formed much in the same manner with those of the second sentence, on which I bestowed so much praise. The construction is so similar that if it had followed immediately after it, we should have been sensible of a faulty monotony. But the interposition of another sentence between them prevents this effect.

(5) It is this sense which furnishes the imagination with its ideas; so that by the pleasures of the imagination or fancy (which I shall use promiscuously) I here mean such as arise from visible objects, either when we have them actually in our view or when we call up their ideas into our minds by paintings, statues, descriptions, or any the like occasion.

In place of, *It is this sense which furnishes*, the author might have said more shortly, *This sense furnishes*. But the mode of expression which he has used is here more proper. This sort of full and ample assertion, *it is this which*, is fit to be used when a proposition of importance is laid down to which we seek to call the reader's attention. It is like pointing with the hand at the object of which we speak. The parenthesis in the middle of the sentence, *which I shall use promiscuously*, is not clear. He ought to have said, *terms which I shall use promiscuously*; as the verb *use* relates not to the pleasures of the imagination but to the terms of fancy and imagination, which he was to employ as synonymous. *Any the like occasion*. To call a painting or a statue *an occasion* is not a happy expression, nor is it very proper to speak of *calling up ideas by occasions*. The common phrase, *any such means*, would have been more natural.

(6) We cannot indeed have a single image in the fancy that did not make its first entrance through the sight; but we have the power of retaining, altering, and compounding those images which we have once received into all the varieties of picture and vision that are most agreeable to the imagination; for, by this faculty, a man in a dungeon is capable of entertaining himself with scenes and landscapes more beautiful than any that can be found in the whole compass of nature.

It may be of use to remark that in one member of this sentence, there is an inaccuracy in syntax. It is very proper to say, *altering and compounding those images which we have once received into all the varieties of picture and vision*. But we can with no propriety say, *retaining them into all the varieties*; and yet, according to the manner in which the words are ranged, this construction is unavoidable. For *retaining, altering, and compounding* are participles, each of which equally refers to, and governs, the subsequent noun, *those images*; and that noun again is necessarily connected with the following preposition, *into*. This instance shows the importance of carefully attending to the rules of grammar and syntax; when so pure a writer as Mr. Addison could, through inadvertence, be guilty of such an error. The construction might easily have been rectified by disjoining the participle *retaining* from the other two participles in this way: "We have the power of retaining, altering, and compounding those images which we have once received and of forming them into all the varieties of picture and vision." The latter part of the sentence is clear and elegant.

(7) There are few words in the English language which are employed in a more loose and uncircumscribed sense than those of the fancy and the imagination.

There are few words—which are employed. It had been better if our author here had said more simply, *few words in the English language are employed*. Mr. Addison, whose style is of the free and full, rather than the nervous, kind, deals, on all occasions, in this extended sort of phraseology. But it is proper only when some assertion of consequence is advanced, and which can bear an emphasis, such as that in the first sentence of the former paragraph. On other occasions, these little words, *it is*, and *there are*, ought to be avoided as redundant and enfeebling. *Those of the fancy and the imagination*. The article ought to have been omitted here. As he does not mean the powers of *the fancy and the imagination* but the words only, the article certainly had no proper place; neither, indeed, was there any occasion for the other two words, *those of*. Better if the sentence had run thus: "Few words in the English language are employed in a more loose and uncircumscribed sense than fancy and imagination."

(8) I therefore thought it necessary to fix and determine the notion of these two words, as I intend to make use of them in the thread of my following speculations, that the reader may conceive rightly what is the subject which I proceed upon.

Though *fix* and *determine* may appear synonymous words, yet a difference between them may be remarked, and they may be viewed, as applied here, with peculiar delicacy. The author had just said that the words of which

he is speaking were *loose* and *uncircumscribed*. *Fix* relates to the first of these, *determine* to the last. We *fix* what is *loose*; that is, we confine the word to its proper place that it may not fluctuate in our imagination and pass from one idea to another; and we *determine* what is *uncircumscribed*; that is, we ascertain its *termini* or limits, we draw the circle round it that we may see its boundaries. For we cannot conceive the meaning of a word, or indeed of any other thing, clearly, till we see its limits and know how far it extends. These two words, therefore, have grace and beauty as they are here applied, though a writer more frugal of words than Mr. Addison would have preferred the single word *ascertain*, which conveys, without any metaphor, the import of them both.

The *notion of these words* is somewhat of a harsh phrase, at least not so commonly used as the *meaning of these words*. *As I intend to make use of them in the thread of my speculations*. This is plainly faulty. A sort of metaphor is improperly mixed with words in the literal sense. He might very well have said, *as I intend to make use of them in my following speculations*. This was plain language; but if he chose to borrow an allusion from *thread*, that allusion ought to have been supported; for there is no consistency in *making use of them in the thread of speculations*; and indeed, in expressing anything so simple and familiar as this is, plain language is always to be preferred to metaphorical. *The subject which I proceed upon* is an ungraceful close of a sentence; better, *the subject upon which I proceed*.

- (9) I must therefore desire him to remember that, by the pleasures of the imagination, I mean only such pleasures as arise originally from sight, and that I divide these pleasures into two kinds.

As the last sentence began with, *I therefore thought it necessary to fix*, it is careless to begin this sentence in a manner so very similar, *I must therefore desire him to remember*—especially as the small variation of using, *on this account* or *for this reason*, in place of *therefore* would have amended the style. When he says, *I mean only such pleasures*, it may be remarked that the adverb *only* is not in its proper place. It is not intended here to qualify the word *mean* but *such pleasures*, and therefore should have been placed in as close a connexion as possible with the word which it limits or qualifies. The style becomes more clear and neat when the words are arranged thus: "By the pleasures of the imagination, I mean such pleasures only as arise from sight."

- (10) My design, being first of all to discourse of those primary pleasures of the imagination, which entirely proceed from such objects as are before our eyes; and, in the next place, to speak of those secondary pleasures of the imagination, which flow from the ideas of visible objects, when the objects are not actually before the eye but are called up into our memo-

ries or formed into agreeable visions of things that are either absent or fictitious.

It is a great rule in laying down the division of a subject to study neatness and brevity as much as possible. The divisions are then more distinctly apprehended and more easily remembered. This sentence is not perfectly happy in that respect. It is somewhat clogged by a tedious phraseology. *My design being first of all, to discourse—in the next place, to speak of—such objects as are before our eyes—things that are either absent or fictitious.* Several words might have been spared here; and the style made more neat and compact.

(11) The pleasures of the imagination, taken in their full extent, are not so gross as those of sense, nor so refined as those of the understanding.

This sentence is distinct and elegant.

(12) The last are indeed more preferable, because they are founded on some new knowledge or improvement in the mind of man; yet it must be confessed that those of the imagination are as great and as transporting as the other.

In the beginning of this sentence, the phrase *more preferable* is such a plain inaccuracy that one wonders how Mr. Addison should have fallen into it, seeing *preferable*, of itself, expresses the comparative degree and is the same with "more eligible" or "more excellent."

I must observe farther that the proposition contained in the last member of this sentence is neither clear nor neatly expressed—*it must be confessed that those of the imagination are as great and as transporting as the other.* In the former sentence, he had compared three things together—the pleasures of the imagination, those of sense, and those of the understanding. In the beginning of this sentence, he had called the pleasures of the understanding *the last*; and he ends the sentence with observing that those of the imagination are as great and transporting *as the other*. Now, besides that *the other* makes not a proper contrast with *the last*, he leaves it ambiguous whether, by *the other*, he meant the pleasures of the understanding or the pleasures of the sense; for it may refer to either, by the construction; though, undoubtedly, he intended that it should refer to the pleasures of the understanding only. The proposition reduced to perspicuous language runs thus: "Yet it must be confessed that the pleasures of the imagination, when compared with those of the understanding, are no less great and transporting."

(13) A beautiful prospect delights the soul as much as a demonstration; and a description in Homer has charmed more readers than a chapter in Aristotle.

This is a good illustration of what he had been asserting and is expressed with that happy and elegant turn, for which our author is very remarkable.

(14) Besides, the pleasures of the imagination have this advantage above those of the understanding, that they are more obvious and more easy to be acquired.

This is also an unexceptionable sentence.

(15) It is but opening the eye, and the scene enters.

This sentence is lively and picturesque. By the gayety and briskness which it gives the style, it shows the advantage of intermixing such a short sentence as this amidst a run of longer ones, which never fails to have a happy effect. I must remark, however, a small inaccuracy. A *scene* cannot be said to *enter*; an *actor* enters, but a scene *appears* or *presents itself*.

(16) The colours paint themselves on the fancy, with very little attention of thought or application of mind in the beholder.

This is still beautiful illustration, carried on with that agreeable floweriness of fancy and style which is so well suited to those pleasures of the imagination of which the author is treating.

(17) We are struck, we know not how, with the symmetry of anything we see, and immediately assent to the beauty of an object, without inquiring into the particular causes and occasions of it.

There is a falling off here from the elegance of the former sentences. *We assent* to the truth of a proposition but cannot so well be said *to assent to the beauty of an object*. *Acknowledge* would have expressed the sense with more propriety. The close of the sentence too is heavy and ungraceful—*the particular causes and occasions of it*; both *particular* and *occasions* are words quite superfluous; and the pronoun *it* is in some measure ambiguous, whether it refers to beauty or to object. It would have been some amendment to the style to have run thus: "We immediately acknowledge the beauty of an object, without inquiring into the cause of that beauty."

(18) A man of polite imagination is let into a great many pleasures that the vulgar are not capable of receiving.

Polite is a term more commonly applied to manners or behaviour than to the mind or imagination. There is nothing farther to be observed on this sentence, unless the use of *that* for a relative pronoun, instead of *which*—an usage which is too frequent with Mr. Addison. *Which* is a much more definitive word than *that*, being never employed in any other way than as a relative, whereas *that* is a word of many senses—sometimes a demonstra-

tive pronoun, often a conjunction. In some cases we are indeed obliged to use *that* for a relative, in order to avoid the ungraceful repetition of *which* in the same sentence. But when we are laid under no necessity of this kind, *which* is always the preferable word and certainly was so in this sentence. *Pleasures which the vulgar are not capable of receiving* is much better than *pleasures that the vulgar etc.*

(19) He can converse with a picture and find an agreeable companion in a statue. He meets with a secret refreshment in a description; and often feels a greater satisfaction in the prospect of fields and meadows than another does in the possession. It gives him, indeed, a kind of property in every thing he sees; and makes the most rude, uncultivated parts of nature administer to his pleasures: so that he looks upon the world, as it were, in another light and discovers in it a multitude of charms that conceal themselves from the generality of mankind.

All this is very beautiful. The illustration is happy and the style runs with the greatest ease and harmony. We see no labour, no stiffness or affectation; but an author writing from the native flow of a gay and pleasing imagination. This predominant character of Mr. Addison's manner, far more than compensates all those little negligences which we are now remarking. Two of these occur in this paragraph. The first, in the sentence which begins with *it gives him indeed a kind of property*. To this *it* there is no proper antecedent in the whole paragraph. In order to gather the meaning, we must look back as far as to the third sentence before, the first of the paragraph, which begins with *a man of a polite imagination*. This phrase, *polite* imagination, is the only antecedent to which this *it* can refer; and even that is an improper antecedent, as it stands in the genitive case, as the qualification only of *a man*.

The other instance of negligence is towards the end of the paragraph, *so that he looks upon the world, as it were in another light*. By *another* light, Mr. Addison means a light different from that in which other men view the world. But though this expression clearly conveyed this meaning to himself when writing, it conveys it very indistinctly to others and is an instance of that sort of inaccuracy, into which, in the warmth of composition, every writer of a lively imagination is apt to fall and which can only be remedied by a cool, subsequent review. *As it were* is upon most occasions no more than an ungraceful palliative; and here there was not the least occasion for it, as he was not about to say anything which required a softening of this kind. To say the truth, this last sentence, *so that he looks upon the world*, and what follows had better been wanting altogether. It is no more than an unnecessary recapitulation of what had gone before—a feeble adjection to the lively picture he had given of the pleasures of the imagi-

nation. The paragraph would have ended with more spirit as the words immediately preceding—*the uncultivated parts of nature administer to his pleasures*.

(20) There are, indeed, but very few who know how to be idle and innocent, or have a relish of any pleasures that are not criminal; every diversion they take is at the expense of some one virtue or another, and their very first step out of business is into vice or folly.

Nothing can be more elegant or more finely turned than this sentence. It is neat, clear, and musical. We could hardly alter one word or disarrange one member without spoiling it. Few sentences are to be found more finished or more happy.

(21) A man should endeavour, therefore, to make the sphere of his innocent pleasures as wide as possible that he may retire into them with safety and find in them such a satisfaction as a wise man would not blush to take.

This is also a good sentence and gives occasion to no material remark.

(22) Of this nature are those of the imagination, which do not require such a bent of thought as is necessary to our more serious employments, nor, at the same time, suffer the mind to sink into that indolence and remissness, which are apt to accompany our more sensual delights; but like a gentle exercise to the faculties awaken them from sloth and idleness, without putting them upon any labour or difficulty.

The beginning of this sentence is not correct and affords an instance of a period too loosely connected with the preceding one. *Of this nature*, says he, *are those of the imagination*. We might ask, of what nature? For it had not been the scope of the preceding sentence to describe the nature of any set of pleasures. He had said that it was every man's duty to make the sphere of his innocent pleasures as wide as possible, in order that, within that sphere, he might find a safe retreat and a laudable satisfaction. The transition is loosely made by beginning the next sentence with saying, *of this nature are those of the imagination*. It had been better if, keeping in view the governing object of the preceding sentence, he had said, "This advantage we gain" or "This satisfaction we enjoy by means of the pleasures of imagination." The rest of the sentence is abundantly correct.

(23) We might here add that the pleasures of the fancy are more conducive to health than those of the understanding, which are worked out by dint of thinking and attended with too violent a labour of the brain.

On this sentence, nothing occurs deserving of remark, except that *worked out by dint of thinking* is a phrase which borders too much on vulgar and

colloquial language to be proper for being employed in a polished composition.

(24) Delightful scenes, whether in nature, painting, or poetry, have a kindly influence on the body, as well as the mind, and not only serve to clear and brighten the imagination but are able to disperse grief and melancholy and to set the animal spirits in pleasing and agreeable motions. For this reason, Sir Francis Bacon, in his Essay upon Health, has not thought it improper to prescribe to his reader a poem or a prospect, where he particularly dissuades him from knotty and subtile disquisitions and advises him to pursue studies that fill the mind with splendid and illustrious objects, as histories, fables, and contemplations of nature.

In the latter of these two sentences, a member of the period is altogether out of its place—which gives the whole sentence a harsh and disjointed cast and serves to illustrate the rules I formerly gave concerning arrangement. The wrong-placed member which I point at is this: *where he particularly dissuades him from knotty and subtile disquisitions*; these words should undoubtedly have been placed not where they stand but thus: *Sir Francis Bacon, in his Essay upon Health, where he particularly dissuades the reader from knotty and subtile speculations, has not thought it improper to prescribe to him etc.* This arrangement reduces every thing into proper order.

(25) I have in this paper, by way of introduction, settled the motion of those pleasures of the imagination, which are the subject of my present undertaking, and endeavoured, by several considerations, to recommend to my readers the pursuit of those pleasures; I shall, in my next paper, examine the several sources from whence these pleasures are derived.

These two concluding sentences afford examples of the proper collocation of circumstances in a period. I formerly showed that it is often a matter of difficulty to dispose of them in such a manner as that they shall not embarrass the principal subject of the sentence. In the sentences before us, several of these incidental circumstances necessarily come in—*By way of introduction—by several considerations—in this paper—in the next paper.* All which are with great propriety managed by our author. It will be found, upon trial, that there were no other parts of the sentence, in which they could have been placed to equal advantage. Had he said, for instance, “I have settled the notion (rather, *the meaning*) of those pleasures of the imagination, which are the subject of my present undertaking, by way of introduction, in this paper, and endeavoured to recommend the pursuit of those pleasures to my readers, by several considerations,” we must be sensible that the sentence, thus clogged with circumstances in the wrong place, would neither have been so neat nor so clear, as it is by the present construction.

JOHN F. KENNEDY: INAUGURAL ADDRESS

(January 20, 1961)

1 We observe today not a victory of party but a celebration of freedom, symbolizing an end as well as a beginning, signifying renewal as well as change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three-quarters ago.

2 The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary belief for which our forebears fought is still at issue around the globe, the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God.

3 We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans, born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage, and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

4 Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

5 This much we pledge—and more.

6 To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of co-operative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do, for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.

7 To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom, and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside.

8 To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required, not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.

9 To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge: to convert our good words into good deeds, in a new alliance for progress, to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.

10 To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support: to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective, to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak, and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run.

11 Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction.

12 We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.

13 But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course—both sides over-burdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final war.

14 So let us begin anew, remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.

15 Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide us.

16 Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms, and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations.

17 Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths and encourage the arts and commerce.

18 Let both sides unite to heed in all corners of the earth the command of Isaiah to "undo the heavy burdens...[and] let the oppressed go free."

19 And if a beachhead of co-operation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in creating a new endeavor, not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.

20 All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days. Nor will it be finished in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of this Administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But let us begin.

21 In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course. Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.

22 Now the trumpet summons us again—not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need; not as a call to battle, though embattled we are; but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, “rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation,” a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.

23 Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?

24 In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility; I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it, and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.

25 And so, my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.

26 My fellow citizens of the world, ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.

27 Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you. With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God’s work must truly be our own.

THE EDITORS OF THE “NEW YORKER”:

JOHN F. KENNEDY’S INAUGURAL ADDRESS

As rhetoric has become an increasingly dispensable member of the liberal arts, people have abandoned the idea, held so firmly by the ancient Greeks and Romans, that eloquence is indispensable to politics. Perhaps President Kennedy’s achievements in both spheres will revive a taste for good oratory

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—a taste that has been alternately frustrated by inarticulateness and dulled by bombast. There have been a few notable orators in our day—most recently Adlai Stevenson—but they have been the exceptions, and it has taken Mr. Kennedy's success as a politician to suggest that the power to "enchant souls through words" (Socrates) may soon be at a premium once more. Whatever the impact of the Inaugural Address on contemporary New Frontiersmen, we find it hard to believe that an Athenian or Roman citizen could have listened to it unmoved, or that Cicero, however jealous of his own reputation, would have found reason to object to it.

We are all familiar by now with the generally high praise the President received for his first speech, but before the responsibility for a final judgment is yielded to Time it would be a shame not to seek the opinion of a couple of true professionals. Both Aristotle and Cicero, the one a theorist and the other a theorizing orator, believed that rhetoric could be an art to the extent that the orator was, first, a logician and, second, a psychologist with an appreciation and understanding of words. Cicero felt further, that the ideal orator was the thoroughly educated man. (He would be pleased by Mr. Kennedy's background, with its strong emphasis on affairs of state: the philosopher-orator-statesman.) Of the three types of oratory defined by the ancients—political, forensic, and display (in which audience participation was limited to a judgment of style)—the political was esteemed most highly, because it dealt with the loftiest of issues; namely, the fate of peoples, rather than of individuals. ("Now the trumpet summons us again . . . against the common enemies of man . . .") The ideal speech was thought to be one in which three kinds of persuasion were used by the speaker: logical, to present the facts of the case and construct an argument based on them; emotional, to reach the audience psychologically; and "ethical," to appeal to the audience by establishing one's own integrity and sincerity. The Inaugural Address, being a variation on the single theme of man's rights and obligations, is not primarily logical, although it contains no illogic; it is an appeal to men's souls rather than to their minds. During the Presidential campaign, Mr. Kennedy tested and patented an exercise in American psychology that proved to be all the emotional appeal he required for the inaugural speech: "And so, my fellow-Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." His ethical persuasion, or indication of his personal probity, consisted of an extension of that appeal: "...ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you."

Aristotle recognized only one (good) style, while Cicero thought that there were three styles—the plain, the middle, and the grand. To Aristotle, who considered it sufficient for a style to be clear and appropriate, avoiding undue elevation (whence bombast) and excessive lowliness, it would have seemed that Mr. Kennedy had achieved the Golden Mean. The formality

of the Inaugural Address ("To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations...") is appropriate to the subject; the language ("In your hands, my fellow-citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course") is clear and direct. Cicero's ideal orator was able to speak in all three styles, in accordance with the demands of his subject, and in that respect Mr. Kennedy filled the role by speaking plainly on the practical ("All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days"), by speaking formally but directly on the purpose of national defense ("For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed"), and by speaking grandly on the potential accomplishments of the movement toward the New Frontier ("The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it—and the glow from that fire can truly light the world").

The address, however, is largely in the grand style, which is characterized by Cicero as the ultimate source of emotional persuasion, through figures of speech and a certain degree of dignified periodic rhythm, not iambic ("The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty, and all forms of human life"). The oration is so rich in figures of speech—the many metaphors include a torch, a beachhead, jungles, a trumpet, a tiger—that we can imagine students of the future studying it for examples of antithesis ("If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich"), personification ("...the hand of mankind's final war"), and anaphora ("Not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need; not as a call to battle, though embattled we are..."). "Battle" and "embattled"—an excellent example of paronomasia.

And so we leave the speech to the students of rhetoric, having invoked for Mr. Kennedy the blessings of Aristotle and Cicero, and for ourself the hope that he has re-established the tradition of political eloquence.

ANALYSIS OF THE STYLE OF

JOHN F. KENNEDY'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS

"If, in the effective use of language, style is the man, style is the nation too; men, countries, and entire civilizations have been tested and judged by their literary tone."—John F. Kennedy

General Situation for the Speech

If we are to relate the style of the Inaugural Address to its content, we must take into account the subject matter, the occasion, the audience, and the ethos of the speaker. An inauguration is a solemn, ceremonial event, attended by

certain traditions and rituals. A speech delivered on such an occasion is usually of the ceremonial variety, although there may be deliberative elements in it. What the people have come to expect is not so much a speech that lays down a specific program as a speech that sets a mood. In striking the keynote of the coming administration, the speaker will try to heal the wounds that may have been inflicted during the campaign, to remind the audience of a common heritage and a common purpose, to set forth, in a general way, the policies and objectives of the new administration, and to reassure the international community of the continuity and determination of the nation.

Since a ceremonial speech like this deals in generalities rather than in particulars, it can very easily slip off into platitude and pious cant. In seeking to please everyone with a "safe" speech, the speaker runs the risk of pleasing no one. In striving for that happy mean between the general and the specific, between the trite and the bizarre, and between the offensive and the fulsome, the speaker will have to draw on all his ingenuity to come up with a content and a form that will impress his audience without boring them.

Having characterized the kind of speech that is usually delivered at an inauguration, we might consider now the special situation that faced President Kennedy on that January morning in 1961. John Fitzgerald Kennedy was the youngest man and the first Catholic to be elected to the highest office in America, and he had been elected by a narrow margin of votes. His youth, his religious affiliation, and his narrow victory at the polls—all these combined to establish some doubts about him in the minds of his own people and the people of other countries. Having created an image, during the campaign, of enormous vitality and considerable political shrewdness, this leader of the New Frontier had to fulfill his promise to push the country forward. Clearly, this was an occasion when a powerful ethical appeal would have to be exerted if the confidence and initiative of the people were to be aroused.

What about the audience for this address? There would be the immediate audience—the high dignitaries on the platform and the thousands of people gathered in the plaza in front of the Capitol building. Then there were the millions of people who would see and hear the speaker through the medium of television. And finally there would be the millions of people in foreign lands who would read accounts of the speech in their newspapers the next day. Taken together, this was a vast, heterogeneous audience, posing special problems for the speaker. As we have remarked before, the larger and more heterogeneous the audience is, the more difficult it is to adjust the discourse to fit the audience. In his content and his style, the President must strike some common denominator—but a common denominator that does not fall below the dignity that the occasion demands.

Having looked at the general situation that prevailed for the speech, let

us now see how the President accommodated his means to his end. In this analysis, of course, we are going to investigate only the way in which the President accommodated his *style* to the subject matter, occasion, audience, and his own personality.

The Speech as a Whole

One of the first things that strikes the reader is the relative brevity of the speech—1343 words, which at the normal rate for public address would take between nine and ten minutes to deliver. When the President wrote this speech he could not have known that the “live” audience for the speech would be standing in the biting cold that followed a heavy snowstorm in the Washington area on the day before the inauguration. So the President had not made his speech brief out of consideration for his wind-chilled audience. In preparing the speech, however, he might have taken into consideration that it would be delivered at the end of some lengthy preliminary speech-making. But perhaps the consideration that mainly determined the brevity of the speech was the traditional nature of inaugural addresses. As we have observed, inaugural addresses usually deal in broad, undeveloped generalities. Principles, policies, and promises are enunciated without elaboration.

Paragraphs

The relative brevity of the speech is reflected in the paragraph and sentence structure. A glance at the printed text of the speech reveals a succession of short paragraphs. Of the twenty-seven paragraphs in the speech, ten have only one sentence; seven paragraphs are two sentences long; and another seven are three sentences long. The longest paragraphs (9 and 24) contain only four sentences. In terms of averages, there are 49.3 words per paragraph and 1.92 sentences per paragraph.

The President is trying to cover a lot of ground in this short speech. In order to do this, he enunciates his principles, promises, and policies in a litany of capsule paragraphs. The effect of these unelaborated paragraphs would have been slight if the President had not rendered many of those paragraphs memorable by the brilliance of his style.

Sentences: Length

Descending to the next smallest unit of discourse, the sentence, we note some interesting facts about the length and kinds of sentences. The two extremes of sentence length are represented by the sentence of eighty words (second sentence of paragraph 3) and the sentence of four words (third sentence of paragraph 20). The average length of the President's sentences is 25.8 words. But what is more revealing about the President's style is the variation above and below this average. Fourteen of the fifty-two sentences (27

per cent) in the speech are ten words or more *above* the average; but twenty-three sentences (44 per cent) are five words or more *below* the average. Although the President has a number of unusually long sentences—66 words (paragraph 10), 64 words (paragraph 22), 54 words (paragraphs 8 and 13)—an unusually high proportion of his sentences are composed of twenty words or less. Even by modern journalistic standards, a twenty-word sentence is short. This high proportion of short sentences matches the over-all brevity of the speech and the short paragraphs. Although the President displays an admirable variety in sentence-length, his heavy use of the short sentence does suggest that he had his *listening* audience in mind when he composed his speech. Another consideration that may have influenced the President in the use of short sentences is that short sentences help to create the effect of sententiousness that is appropriate for a ceremonial speech.

Sentences: Grammatical Types

Having noted a high proportion of relatively short sentences, we might expect that a majority of the sentences would be of the simple or compound type. But a close investigation of the grammatical types reveals that this is not so. Twenty (38.4 per cent) of the sentences are simple; only six (11.6 per cent) sentences are compound. But twenty-six sentences (exactly 50 per cent) are complex. Taken together, the simple and compound sentences constitute 50 per cent of the whole, but the predominant grammatical type is the complex sentence. What this reveals is that the President manages the expansion of his sentences mainly through the sophisticated pattern of subordination. A study of the sequence of sentences, however, shows how well the President has mixed the grammatical types in order to avoid monotony of structure. Only in a half dozen or so places in the speech does he string together two or more sentences of the same grammatical type.

Sentences: Rhetorical Types

When we study the rhetorical patterns of the speech, we note another interesting feature of President Kennedy's style. The predominant rhetorical structure is antithesis. This recurring structure was perhaps dictated by the fact that the speech deals mainly with comparisons of opposites (end-beginning, old-new, rich-poor, friend-enemy). He strikes the theme of the speech and the antithetical keynote in the first sentence: "We observe today *not a victory of party/ but a celebration of freedom*—symbolizing *an end/* as well as *a beginning*—signifying *renewal/* as well as *change*." Additional examples of antithesis are not hard to find:

to friend and foe alike (paragraph 3)

United . . . Divided (paragraph 6)

To those old allies . . . To those new states (paragraphs 6, 7)

If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich. (paragraph 8)

What problems unite us . . . those problems which divide us (paragraph 15)

And the most memorable line of the speech is cast in the form of an antithesis:

... Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.

Most of these antitheses of thought are laid out in parallel grammatical structure. The recurring parallelism is appropriate here because although the President is pointing up opposites by his antitheses he wants to suggest that these opposites can be reconciled. Opposites can be reconciled only if they are co-ordinate, and one way to emphasize the co-ordinate value of opposites is to juxtapose them in a parallel grammatical structure.

The other use that the President makes of parallelism is for the purpose of specification or enumeration, as in these three examples:

born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage (paragraph 3)

pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe (paragraph 4)

Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, and encourage the arts and commerce (paragraph 17)

As we shall see when we come to study the figures of speech, there are additional schemes intertwined in many of these parallel and antithetical patterns.

Before concluding this section on rhetorical patterns, we shall point out some other features of style. If the student needed any evidence to justify his use of a co-ordinating conjunction at the beginning of the sentence, he could cite this speech. The President begins fourteen of his sentences (over 25 per cent) with a co-ordinating conjunction. There is, of course, ample precedent for this usage in modern prose and the prose of earlier centuries. But it is interesting to note how effective rhetorically this means of articulating sentences is in the President's speech. Let us look at just one example of this usage:

We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed. (paragraph 12)

Contrast the effect of this with the following:

We dare not tempt them with weakness, for only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.

The content and rhetorical scheme of both sentences is exactly the same, and perhaps if one were *reading* the second sentence aloud he could produce the same effect as the first sentence has. But on the printed page, a special emphasis is achieved by setting off the second clause in a sentence by itself and by signaling the syllogistic relationship of the two clauses by the capitalized initial *For*. If the student analyzes the other uses of initial co-ordinating conjunctions, he will usually find some rhetorical purpose being served.

Sentences: Functional Types

The overwhelming majority of the sentences are declarative. This proportion is appropriate in a speech that is designed to inform and reassure the world about the objectives of the new administration. Occasionally, however, the President uses some other functional types of sentence. In paragraph 23, he uses two rhetorical questions ("Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?"). These questions occur at the point in the speech when the President is about to launch into his peroration. Up to this point the President has been declaring what he will do, what the American people will do. Now he wants to suggest what the international community can do to support his program of peace and prosperity. But he can only suggest—he cannot dictate or predict—what other countries will do. The rhetorical questions are phrased in such a way, however, that the natural answer to them is a resounding *Yes*.

The President groups together two other types of functional sentences—imperatives and hortatives. In paragraphs 25, 26, 27 (the concluding paragraphs of the speech), we see three sharp imperatives, using the verb *to ask*, which leave the citizens with a call to action. Up to this point, the audience have been mere listeners to this ceremonial discourse. Now the audience must be engaged actively. The imperatives point to the general line of action that they must take.

The series of fourteen hortative sentences ("Let us . . . Let both sides . . .") in paragraphs 14 through 20 also lays down a program of action, but the directives are softened by being cast in a hortatory form. (The Latin and Greek languages would have used the subjunctive mood of the verb to create this effect.) The President here is seeking to induce action, not command it. In other words, he wants to persuade rather than coerce.

To those old allies . . . To those new states (paragraphs 6, 7)

If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich. (paragraph 8)

What problems unite us . . . those problems which divide us (paragraph 15)

And the most memorable line of the speech is cast in the form of an antithesis:

... Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.

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Diction

The diction of the speech unobtrusively but unmistakably exerts an influence on the effect of the speech. The simplicity of the diction is perhaps not immediately noticeable, but when one studies it, one notes that there is almost no word that a moderately intelligent high-school graduate would have to look up in a dictionary. A closer study of the diction reveals a high proportion of monosyllabic words: some 951 words in the speech (71 per cent) are monosyllabic. In paragraphs 19 and 20, the proportion of monosyllabic words is as high as 80 per cent. Even in the peroration of the speech, where one might expect the orator to make use of the sonorous cadence that can be achieved with polysyllabic diction, one finds a high proportion of one-syllable words. This monosyllabism helps to account not only for the impression of simplicity but also for the note of strength in the speech—a note that people had come to associate with the vigor of this youthful public figure. In working over the drafts of the speech, the President must consciously have sought out simple, Anglo-Saxon words.

Having noted the high proportion of monosyllabic words, one might expect to find also a high proportion of concrete words. But this is not the case. Investigation of the nouns in the speech turns up many abstract words—words like *freedom*, *poverty*, *tyranny*, *loyalty*, *devotion*, *responsibility*, *aggression*, *subversion*. And most of this abstract diction is Latinate and polysyllabic. Aside from the figures of speech—which we will investigate later—there are surprisingly few concrete words—*huts*, *villages*, *stars*, *deserts*, *graves*. Whatever air of concreteness the speech has is created by the figures of speech. Perhaps the high proportion of abstract words is the natural consequence of the brief, unelaborated character of the speech. Once the President had decided to enunciate only the broad, general policy of his administration, it was almost inevitable that most of his substantive words would be abstract. What we have in this short speech really is a series of undeveloped topic sentences.

Another thing that accounts for the formal quality of this ceremonial speech is the occasional use of slightly archaic diction. We find the President using such words as *forebears* (twice), *host*, *anew*, *asunder*, *foe*, *adversary*, *writ*. Besides echoing the tone of Lincoln's *Gettysburg Address* ("Fourscore and seven years ago," "our fathers," "final resting-place," "hallow"), this quaint diction has Biblical overtones and a certain appropriateness to the old-new motif. The President reinforced the effect of this kind of diction by two quotations from the Old Testament and the folksy adage about riding the back of the tiger. The repetition of certain honorific key terms, like *pledge*, *citizens*, *peace* also helps to reinforce the reverential tone of the speech.

Figures of Speech: Schemes

First of all, let us look at some of the schemes—those patternings of words which represent departures from the ordinary way of speaking. Since we have already remarked about the pervasive parallelism and antithesis in the speech, we will concentrate here on some of the other schemes.

There are a number of schemes of repetition. The most notable of these is anaphora—repetition of the same words at the beginning of successive clauses. Anaphora is conspicuous in two key passages in the speech: the section (paragraphs 6-11) in which the President is making a series of pledges (“To those . . .”); and the section (paragraphs 15-18) in which the President is suggesting a course of action (“Let both sides . . .”). We have previously observed that these two sections make use of parallelism. The addition of *anaphora* to these passages performs two functions: it combines with the parallelism to mark off and emphasize the co-ordinateness of the series, and it helps to establish the rhythm of the passages. The speech has no example of the opposite scheme, epistrophe (repetition of the same word at the end of successive clauses), but it does have two examples of repetition of similar words in a medial position: “bear *any* burden, meet *any* hardship, support *any* friend, oppose *any* foe” (paragraph 4); “sufficient *beyond doubt* . . . certain *beyond doubt*” (paragraph 12).

The most remembered sentence in the speech—“ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country”—contains a figure of repetition known as antimetabole (repetition of words in converse order). Another memorable utterance—“Let us never negotiate out of fear. But never fear to negotiate”—appears to be another example of antimetabole, but it is more accurately classified as polyptoton (repetition of words derived from the same root). Here we have different conjugates of the word *fear*—serving as a noun in the first clause and as an infinitive in the second clause. There is another example of polyptoton in paragraph 22 (“Not as a call to *battle*, though *embattled* we are”)—although, as the editors of the *New Yorker* observed, there is a suggestion here too of the trope called paronomasia (play on words).

President Kennedy made sparing use of the scheme of repetition known as alliteration. There are only two instances of noticeable alliteration in the speech—“the area in which its *writ* may run” (paragraph 10); “to *lead* the *land* we *love*” (paragraph 27). Perhaps in accord with his personality, the President avoided frequent use of alliteration because of the soft, effeminate sound-effect often produced by this figure; the President was striving for a note of strength and vigor. One wonders, though, whether the President did not intend some sound-effect of appropriate harshness in the succession of

s and d sounds in "before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction" (paragraph 11).

Let us look briefly at a few more schemes. In most of his parallel series, the President shows a preference for the hurried rhythms that can be achieved with asyndeton (omission of conjunctions)—e.g. "born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage" (paragraph 3). The President makes little use of the scheme called anastrophe (unusual word order). In the entire speech, there is only one structure that is inverted: "*United*, there is little we cannot do in a host of co-operative ventures. *Divided*, there is little we can do" (paragraph 6). It is easy to see the special emphasis the President achieves here by placing the past participles in the initial position, even though these participles do not modify, as they normally do in this position, the subject of the main clause. One could regard this structure, however, as ellipsis rather than anastrophe. The closest the President comes to the figure known as climax is in paragraphs 25, 26, 27; but even here we have to strain a bit to find any element of rising importance in the series.

Figures of Speech: Tropes

Although the President makes rather skillful use of the schemes, he is less satisfactory in his use of tropes. There are a number of metaphors in the speech, and those metaphors represent, as we remarked earlier, the chief way in which the President introduces concreteness into the speech. But many of these metaphors—"the torch," "bonds of mass misery," "the chains of poverty," "corners of the earth," "the trumpet," "the glow from that fire"—are rather hackneyed. He achieves a little more freshness in some of his more subtle metaphors, like "iron tyranny," "destruction unleashed," "twilight struggle," "forge." Perhaps his most successful metaphor is the one in paragraph 19—"And if a beachhead of co-operation may push back the jungle of suspicion." By themselves, *beachhead* and *jungle* are rather shopworn metaphors, but they acquire a certain freshness by being combined in a complex metaphor.

The several uses of "hands" (part for the whole) and "arms" (genus for the species) can be looked upon as examples of synecdoche, but those tropes too are fairly trite. The use of "hand" in paragraph 13—"that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final war"—should be classified as an instance of personification rather than of synecdoche. Perhaps the only other expression in the speech which might be read as an instance of personification is found in the last paragraph—"with history the final judge of our deeds."

Style of Delivery

Undoubtedly, a good deal of the effect of this speech was produced by the "style" of delivery. Those who watched the inauguration ceremonies on television may recall the President's clear, crisp voice, the distinctive Bostonian accent, the mannerisms of the jabbing finger, the pauses, the inflections, the stresses. All of these features of voice and gesture helped to put the speech across; combined with the carefully worked-out style, they helped to communicate the President's message to the electorate and to the world. And perhaps it would be well for the student who has read this close analysis of the style to put the speech together again by listening to it on one of the many memorial records that were issued shortly after the President's assassination. Listening to a recording of the speech will make the student aware that this was a discourse designed for oral delivery, and it might prove interesting to note how much of the highly refined style of the speech comes through to the student once he has had the devices of style pointed out to him.

Concluding Remarks

The various stylistic devices we have been observing may be looked upon by some people as the ornamentation of the speech. These devices do "dress up" the speech, but if they are regarded as no more than ornamentation, they have failed to perform the functions that rhetoricians traditionally assigned to them. These formal devices should be one of the carriers of meaning. If the diction, the composition of words, and the figures of speech are not functioning to clarify, enliven, and emphasize the thought, if they are not exerting an ethical, emotional, or logical appeal, then indeed the style of a piece is so much sounding brass and tinkling cymbals, so much sound and fury signifying nothing.

It is not so important that the style of the speech be recognizable as the "Kennedy style" as it is that the style be seen as appropriate to the subject matter, the occasion, the purpose, and the audience. Just as Lincoln's *Gettysburg Address* was not particularly impressive to the audience who heard it in the National Cemetery on November 19, 1863, so Kennedy's Inaugural Address was not—if we may judge from the restrained applause that greeted it while it was being delivered—notably impressive to the audience who heard it in the snow-packed Capitol Plaza on January 20, 1961. It is only when we get a chance to read and reread Lincoln's and Kennedy's speeches that we realize what splendid performances they were. Only a close analysis such as we have engaged in can make us aware of the great care and deliberation President Kennedy devoted to the "expression" of his speech. So

much eloquence did not come by chance. It had to come from calculated choices from among a number of possibilities.

We should now be in a better position to judge whether the President's choices were judicious. And we should be in a better position to predict whether future generations will judge this Inaugural Address to be one of the noblest utterances to issue from the lips of an American statesman.

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN: A COLLECTION OF REMARKS ON STYLE

The modern student could gain a complete course in the art of rhetoric by studying the public addresses and writings of John Henry Newman. Newman was engaged in controversy of some sort or other throughout most of his adult life, and most of his lectures, sermons, tracts, essays, letters, and books had a suasive purpose—even when they purported to be primarily expository. Newman had been exposed to rhetoric while he was a student at Trinity College, Oxford; he had an intimate knowledge of Aristotle's Rhetoric and of Cicero's orations; he delighted in the debating activities in the Oriel Commons Room; and when he was a fellow at Oriel, he helped Richard Whately prepare the articles on logic that Whately later expanded into a highly successful companion textbook to his Elements of Rhetoric.

We should not be surprised then that Newman had some very sound ideas on the rhetorical functions of style. His attitude toward style is epitomized by his recognition that logos signified for the Greeks both thought and word. During his teenage years Newman made a systematic effort to cultivate his style by imitating some of the recognized masters of English prose. Some students today find Newman's style too "Ciceronian" for their taste, but no one can deny that Newman has one of the most limpid styles in English letters. From a man who wrote as brilliantly and as effectively as Newman wrote we would expect to learn some valuable lessons on style. The following remarks on style occurred passim in "Literature," "English Catholic Literature," "Elementary Studies," and "University Preaching"—four of the discourses that Newman included in the volume to which he gave the title The Idea of a University.

And, since the thoughts and reasonings of an author have, as I have said, a personal character, no wonder that his style is not only the image of his subject, but of his mind. That pomp of language, that full and tuneful diction, that felicitousness in the choice and exquisiteness in the collocation of words, which to prosaic writers seem artificial, is nothing else but the mere habit and way of a lofty intellect. Aristotle, in his sketch of the magnanimous man,

From *The Idea of a University*, 1899 printing, by Longmans, Green, and Company, of the definitive edition of 1873.

tells us that his voice is deep, his motions slow, and his stature commanding. In like manner, the elocution of a great intellect is great. His language expresses, not only his great thoughts, but his great self.

You will say that Cicero's language is undeniably studied, but that Shakespeare's is as undeniably natural and spontaneous; and that this is what is meant, when the Classics are accused of being mere artists of words. Here we are introduced to a further large question, which gives me the opportunity of anticipating a misapprehension of my meaning. I observe, then, that not only is that lavish richness of style, which I have noticed in Shakespeare, justifiable on the principles which I have been laying down, but, what is less easy to receive, even elaborateness in composition is no mark of trick or artifice in an author. Undoubtedly the works of the Classics, particularly the Latin, *are* elaborate; they have cost a great deal of time, care, and trouble. They have had many rough copies; I grant it. I grant also that there are writers of name, ancient and modern, who really are guilty of the absurdity of making sentences, as the very end of their literary labour. Such was Isocrates; such were some of the sophists; they were set on words, to the neglect of thoughts or things; I cannot defend them. If I must give an English instance of this fault, much as I love and revere the personal character and intellectual vigor of Dr. Johnson, I cannot deny that his style often outruns the sense and the occasion, and is wanting in that simplicity which is the attribute of genius. Still, granting all this, I cannot grant, notwithstanding, that genius never need take pains,—that genius may not improve by practice,—that it never finishes off at leisure what it has thrown off in the outline at a stroke.

In this point of view, doubtless, many or most writers are elaborate; and those certainly not the least whose style is furthest removed from ornament, being simple and natural, or vehement, or severely business-like and practical. Who so energetic and manly as Demosthenes? Yet he is said to have transcribed Thucydides many times over in the formation of his style. Who so gracefully natural as Herodotus? yet his very dialect is not his own, but chosen for the sake of the perfection of his narrative. Who exhibits such happy negligence as our own Addison? yet artistic fastidiousness was so notorious in his instance that the report has got abroad, truly or not, that he was too late in his issue of an important state-paper, from his habit of revision and recomposition. Such great authors were working by a model which was before the eyes of their intellect, and they were labouring to say what they had to say, in such a way as would most exactly and suitably express it. It is not wonderful that other authors, whose style is not simple, should be instances of a similar literary diligence. Virgil wished his *Aeneid*

to be burned, elaborate as is its composition, because he felt it needed more labour still, in order to make it perfect. The historian Gibbon in the last century is another instance in point. You must not suppose I am going to recommend his style for imitation, any more than his principles; but I refer to him as the example of a writer feeling the task which lay before him, feeling that he had to bring out into words for the comprehension of his readers a great and complicated scene, and wishing that those words should be adequate to his undertaking. I think he wrote the first chapter of his *History* three times over; it was not that he corrected or improved the first copy; but he put his first essay, and then his second, aside—he recast his matter, till he had hit the precise exhibition of it which he thought demanded by his subject.

I shall then merely sum up what I have said, and come to a conclusion. Reverting, then, to my original question, what is the meaning of Letters, as contained, Gentlemen, in the designation of your Faculty, I have answered, that by Letters or Literature is meant the expression of thought in language, where by “thought” I mean the ideas, feelings, views, reasonings, and other operations of the human mind. And the Art of Letters is the method by which a speaker or writer brings out in words, worthy of his subject, and sufficient for his audience or readers, the thoughts which impress him. Literature, then, is of a personal character; it consists in the enunciations and teachings of those who have a right to speak as representatives of their kind, and in whose words their brethren find an interpretation of their own sentiments, a record of their own experience, and a suggestion for their own judgments. A great author, Gentlemen, is not one who merely has a *copia verborum*, whether in prose or verse, and can, as it were, turn on at his will any number of splendid phrases and swelling sentences; but he is one who has something to say and knows how to say it. I do not claim for him, as such, any great depth of thought, or breadth of view, or philosophy, or sagacity, or knowledge of human nature, or experience of human life, though these additional gifts he may have, and the more he has of them the greater he is; but I ascribe to him, as his characteristic gift, in a large sense the faculty of Expression. He is master of the two-fold Logos, the thought and the word, distinct but inseparable from each other. He may, if so be, elaborate his compositions, or he may pour out his improvisations, but in either case he has but one aim, which he keeps steadily before him, and is conscientious and single-minded in fulfilling. That aim is to give forth what he has within him; and from his very earnestness it comes to pass that, whatever be the splendour of his diction or the harmony of his periods, he has with him the charm of an incommunicable simplicity. Whatever be his subject, high or

low, he treats it suitably and for its own sake. If he is a poet, "*nil molitur ineptè*." If he is an orator, then too he speaks, not only "*distinctè*" and "*splendidè*," but also "*aptè*." His page is the lucid mirror of mind and life—

"Quo fit, ut omnis
Votivâ pateat veluti descripta tabellâ
Vita senis."

He writes passionately, because he feels keenly; forcibly, because he conceives vividly; he sees too clearly to be vague; he is too serious to be otiose; he can analyze his subject, and therefore he is rich; he embraces it as a whole and in its parts, and therefore he is consistent; he has a firm hold of it, and therefore he is luminous. When his imagination wells up, it overflows in ornament; when his heart is touched, it thrills along his verse. He always has the right word for the right idea, and never a word too much. If he is brief, it is because few words suffice; when he is lavish of them, still each word has its mark, and aids, not embarrasses, the vigorous march of his elocution. He expresses what all feel, but all cannot say; and his sayings pass into proverbs among his people, and his phrases become household words and idioms of their daily speech, which is tessellated with the rich fragments of his language, as we see in foreign lands the marbles of Roman grandeur worked into the walls and pavements of modern palaces.

I have been speaking of the authors of a literature, in their relation to the people and course of events to which they belong; but a prior consideration, at which I have already glanced, is their connection with the language itself, which has been their organ. If they are in great measure the creatures of their times, they are on the other hand in a far higher sense the creators of their language. It is indeed commonly called their mother tongue, but virtually it did not exist till they gave it life and form. All greater matters are carried on and perfected by a succession of individual minds; what is true in the history of thought and of action is true of language also. Certain masters of composition, as Shakespeare, Milton, and Pope, the writers of the Protestant Bible and Prayer Book, Hooker and Addison, Swift, Hume, and Goldsmith, have been the making of the English language; and as that language is a fact, so is the literature a fact, by which it is formed, and in which it lives. Men of great ability have taken it in hand, each in his own day, and have done for it what the master of a gymnasium does for the bodily frame. They have formed its limbs, and developed its strength; they have endowed it with vigour, exercised it in suppleness and dexterity, and taught it grace. They have made it rich, harmonious, various, and precise. They have furnished it with a variety of styles, which from their individuality may almost

be called dialects, and are monuments both of the powers of the language and the genius of its cultivators.

This is not a day for great writers, but for good writing, and a great deal of it. There never was a time when men wrote so much and so well, and that, without being of any great account themselves. While our literature in this day, especially the periodical, is rich and various, its language is elaborated to a perfection far beyond that of our Classics, by the jealous rivalry, the incessant practice, the mutual influence, of its many writers. In point of mere style, I suppose, many an article in the *Times* newspaper, or Edinburgh Review, is superior to a preface of Dryden's, or a Spectator, or a pamphlet of Swift's, or one of South's sermons. Our writers write so well that there is little to choose between them. What they lack is that individuality, that earnestness, most personal yet most unconscious of self, which is the greatest charm of an author. The very form of the compositions of the day suggests to us their main deficiency. They are anonymous.

Alas! what are we doing all through life, both as a necessity and as a duty, but unlearning the world's poetry, and attaining to its prose! This is our education, as boys and as men, in the action of life, and in the closet or library; in our affections, in our aims, in our hopes, and in our memories. And in like manner it is the education of our intellect; I say, that one main portion of intellectual education, of the labours of both school and university, is to remove the original dimness of the mind's eye; to strengthen and perfect its vision; to enable it to look out into the world right forward, steadily and truly; to give the mind clearness, accuracy, precision; to enable it to use words aright, to understand what it says, to conceive justly what it thinks about, to abstract, compare, analyze, divide, define, and reason, correctly. There is a particular science which takes these matters in hand, and it is called logic; but it is not by logic, certainly not by logic alone, that the faculty I speak of is acquired. The infant does not learn to spell and read the hues upon his retina by any scientific rule; nor does the student learn accuracy of thought by any manual or treatise. The instruction given him, of whatever kind, if it be really instruction, is mainly, or at least pre-eminently, this,—a discipline in accuracy of mind.

All this will be best arrived at by trying how far he can frame a possible, or analyze a given, sentence. To translate an English sentence into Latin is to *frame* a sentence, and is the best test whether or not a student knows the difference of Latin from English construction; to construe and parse is to *analyze* a sentence, and is an evidence of the easier attainment of knowing what Latin construction is in itself. And this is the sense of the word "Grammar" which our inaccurate student detests, and this is the sense of the word

which every sensible tutor will maintain. His maxim is, "a little, but well"; that is, really know what you say you know: know what you know and what you do not know; get one thing well before you go on to a second; try to ascertain what your words mean; when you read a sentence, picture it before your mind as a whole, take in the truth or information contained in it, express it in your own words, and, if it be important, commit it to the faithful memory. Again, compare one idea with another; adjust truths and facts; form them into one whole, or notice the obstacles which occur in doing so. This is the way to make progress; this is the way to arrive at results; not to swallow knowledge, but (according to the figure sometimes used) to masticate and digest it.

Study and meditation being imperative, can it be denied that one of the most effectual means by which we are able to ascertain our understanding of a subject, to bring out our thoughts upon it, to clear our meaning, to enlarge our views of its relations to other subjects, and to develop it generally, is to write down carefully all we have to say about it? People indeed differ in matters of this kind, but I think that writing is a stimulus to the mental faculties, to the logical talent, to originality, to the power of illustration, to the arrangement of topics, second to none. Till a man begins to put down his thoughts about a subject on paper he will not ascertain what he knows and what he does not know; and still less will he be able to express what he does know.

LEONARD R. N. ASHLEY: A GUIDED TOUR OF GOBBLEDYGOOK

1 Some intelligent person has said—I may have said it myself—that the most important skill a student acquires in college is the ability to express himself in words. Well, perhaps that isn't what he actually acquires, but that's what he pays for. (Education is one of the very few things in this country that people are willing to pay for and not get.)

2 Seriously, though (as the comedians are beginning to say today) . . . seriously, though, the most fundamental and the most universally applicable skill a student can develop is the ability to communicate: to write and speak, to inform and explain and persuade.

3 To change tires or to jerk sodas or deliver groceries not much skill in expression is necessary. But at all levels beyond that, in both business and the professions, success, recognition, and advancement go to those (and only

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to those) who can convey their ideas. Men, even in the most technical specialties, must work together. No one makes a product alone any more: it seems that even executives (who manufacture decisions) are being compelled to work in teams. And even those who still enjoy the luxury of thinking for themselves and making their own decisions have to transmit their ideas—straight-forwardly, forcefully, accurately, convincingly, even inspiringly.

4 Part of my job as a college teacher is to teach students how to think and to write. (We prefer it when the two abilities coincide.) And one of the biggest difficulties encountered by those of us who teach English is the rapid and alarming collapse of the American language under an ever increasing load of gobbledygook and jargon.

5 As Duffy used to say in the dear, dead days of radio: “Leave us face it.” The American language, a comparatively youthful and obstreperous offspring of English, is even more vigorous than its parent and (like many children today) even more confused. We are a nation that delights in misquoting the Chinese proverb that “one picture is worth a thousand words.” Writing started with pictures, and it looks as if there is a real danger that we might revert. We don’t read magazines any more; we look at pictures. We don’t talk to each other any more; we watch pictures of other people talking to each other on television. When we get tired of television we don’t read a book; we go to the cinema and look at pictures, bigger ones. Have you noticed that people no longer “give you the word”? Now they “put you in the picture.”

6 We can understand pictures fairly well now—even the complicated anatomical ones in the TV commercials—but we are no longer so good at using words.

7 To make matters worse, America’s highest-paid and most widely-published authors (I mean the advertising boys) are far more often determined to confuse you rather than tell you something clearly and simply. They bombard you with meaningless statistics, pseudo-scientific jargon, empty phrases studded with vague terms such as “additives” and “conditioners.” They’re taking the logic out of language. What’s the “regular” size of soap? Why the one you don’t regularly buy. (It’s too small.) What’s the “economy” size? The one that costs more.

8 Advertising ballyhoo has made us all insensitive to superlatives. A Hollywood producer is asked about his latest picture: “How is it?” “It’s colossal, magnificent,” he replies, “but it’s improving.” A 21-inch TV screen is described as “huge.” If it is, what’s a 9’ x 12’ rug? (I must admit that even the advertising boys are embarrassed about calling a 21-inch screen “huge”—by the way, that’s the *diagonal* measurement!—and now they give the area in square inches, relying on the fact that, if there’s anything the American public knows less about than its native language, it’s mathematics.)

9 The politicians are adding to the confusion. "Nationalization" has become "public ownership." A "bust" has become "deflation," "retrenchment," or "downward readjustment." The word "free" has lost nearly all meaning, now that the "Free World" includes South Africa, Spain, and the vilest governments of South America. "Peace" has become a dirty word. Preparations for war are called "defence programmes." Hydrogen bombs are "thermonuclear deterrents"—which sounds as if they were protections against hydrogen bombs. We even have "clean" bombs. The Ultimate Detergent?

10 The fact that more than a million young thugs are hauled before the courts every year doesn't sound nearly so bad if you'll call young criminals "juvenile delinquents." A "delinquent," by definition, *hasn't* done something. These kids *have!*

11 All this fuzzy expression reflects either plain dishonesty or mental incapacity. People who listen to this sort of thing day in and day out become the victims of Stupidity Fallout. We shop in "superettes" (a word formed from the Latin for "big" and the French for "small"). We say "A-OK." Our leaders talk of "future planning," as if we could plan for the past or this instant. I'd better get off this one. As a writer of occasional articles on military history I have been guilty of "past planning": telling the generals how to fight the last war. But, speaking of generals, I once met a janitor whom I thought to be a major-general because he told me he was the "superintendent" of West Point.

12 No wonder Emery Jacobs, a largely illiterate official of the Agriculture Department testifying before a Congressional Committee that was trying (I think) to nominate Billie Sol Estes as Farmer of the Year, could say: "The state to which the situation has been definitized is uncertain." No wonder the chief of staff of the United States Air Force bumbles about the "globility" of Strategic Air Command. No wonder Peter de Vries can satirize people who complain of a charge that is "nominal in name only." No wonder Sonny Liston's manager announces that he won't let his fighter fly because on airlines today "people are dying who never died before." No wonder I personally have picked up a printed matchbook in a cafeteria at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C., as a souvenir of "The White House Mess." No wonder I saw a sign in New Rochelle, New York, that read "Eyes Examined While You Wait."

13 Even our bright young men and women in the colleges have been infected. Pick up anything they've written: a note, a term paper, an examination. What do you find? Very often you find weak logic, vague language, blatant inaccuracy in more than orthography, and so little imagination that you seldom find an adjective in bed with a noun to which it has not been married for centuries.

14 Frequently those that are imaginative are deliriously so. Here are some gems of purest ray serene from the dark, unfathomed caves of my student files:

Entrance requirements have gone so high that nobody can get into college, and the reason that nobody can get in is that everybody is going.

Abstinence is a good thing if practised in moderation.

It was the painter Donatello's interest in the female nude that made him The Father of the Renaissance.

(Examination question: Identify "Skylark.") Skylark is the merchant of Shakespeare's play. When we first see him he is on the Rialto, which is the business end of Venus.

An active verb shows action, and a passive verb shows passion.

(If *pro* is the opposite of *con*, give examples.) Progress and Congress.

In Bernard Shaw's play *Mrs. Warren's Profession* her profession is the Oldest Profession but she is not really a Lost Woman. She is just mislaid.

The food in the cafeteria is absolute poison and they give you such small portions. It's about time the students spoke up about this unspeakable situation.

In Shakespeare's comedies every Tom, Dick and Harry is named Sebastian.

Socrates died from an overdose of wedlock, but before he went he had the crowned heads of Athens shaking in their shoes. It was a good thing for them he was determined to stay and die even if it killed him.

The world's greatest problem today is the H-Bomb. That's dynamite!

A virgin forest is a place where the hand of man has never set foot.

All these atrocities clearly demonstrate the connection between fuzzy writing and fuzzy thinking, and the student's explanation only makes matters worse: "I may be wrong, but I'm not far from it." As they say in businesses: "Here is creeping stagnation on a high plateau."

15 Some Americans, of course, write brilliantly, vividly, concretely, memorably. There are those who can say what they mean—and mean to say something. But there's a strange thing about our American civilization. (I believe we do have an American civilization, despite the charges of my European friends who claim that America is the only nation in the history of the world that has moved from barbarism to decadence without passing through civilization.) The strange thing here is that a number of Americans are

called upon to speak when they have nothing to say—and they get up and say it!

16 Pity the poor president—and my example is drawn from history, not the current administration—inarticulate by nature and by military training, largely ungrammatical and faced by a battery of reporters who fire questions—many of which should not be asked or cannot be answered—and expect replies then and there. In a press conference the chief executive cannot use any of these sensible replies, however appropriate: “I don’t know,” “I’ve never understood it,” “They don’t tell me these things,” “That’s a secret,” “God only knows,” “We don’t know yet,” etc. He has to say something. Moreover, he must begin now and go on until he thinks of something: he must start the mouth before the brain is engaged. He has to hem and haw and sound like a fool and know all the while that every inanity will be copied *verbatim* and reported in full in the *New York Times*. He cannot obey the first rule of communication: when you have nothing to say, say nothing. He goes on, “verboosing it up,” stalling, stumbling, obfuscating, hiding behind words, embroidering with meaningless clichés, decorating any idea that may be there with a fringe of dangling modifiers.

17 To quote from a press conference transcript would be too painful, but here are some remarks (from an *ex tempore* address at West Point, June 5, 1960) which demonstrates the effect the presidency can have on a man’s prose:

It is indeed, difficult, in the circumstances in which I find myself, to discover words that seem appropriate to the situation. . . .

Now tonight we meet at a time of bewilderment. I don’t like this term or the using of the term that we are living always in crisis. We are not. There is no nation in this world that dares at this moment to attack the United States, and they know it.

But we wonder what is the outcome of every decent, proper gesture we make to those that live in the other camp. They live in a closed society, secrecy of intent—which we try to penetrate, and in my opinion properly, but we are certain of this: our problem is not only keeping ourselves strong, and by strong I don’t mean merely militarily. I mean spiritually, intellectually, scientifically, economically and militarily; and then, we must make certain that all of those people who live with us, in the hope that those concepts of human dignity and freedom and liberty are going to prevail in the world, will always stand by our side in the determination that freedom and liberty will eventually triumph over tyranny.

Dwight MacDonald, who quotes this speech as well as Oliver Jensen’s brilliant *New Republic* parody of Eisenhower delivering The Gettysburg Ad-

dress (*Parodies*, Random House, 1960), is not certain which is funnier, fact or fiction.

18 William H. Whyte, Jr. (*Is Anybody Listening*, Simon and Schuster, 1957) tells us about the executives in business who have to speak when they have nothing to say (annual meetings) or don't wish to say anything accurate (retiring employees). He defines their diction on these occasions as *reverse gobbledygook*:

Where the traditional jargon is multisyllabic, longwinded, and passive, it [reverse gobbledygook] is filled with short, terse words; its sentences are short and the construction of them so much more active than passive that exclamation marks are as frequent as periods. Heavy on personification, homely analogies, and a rigid glossary of hard-hitting words, it lends a powerful straight-from-the-shoulder effect to ambiguity and equivocation.

Whyte and the editors of *Fortune* studied 200 business speeches, identified the 60 most characteristic expressions, and constructed an hilarious composite address. Look it up in Mr. Whyte's book (pages 55–58). You'll vastly enjoy reading it—and, if some day you're stuck for something to say, you can always steal it and deliver it at a board meeting, business convention, Rotary club gathering, academic convocation, etc. They'll love it. But you must deliver it with a straight face, like the ship captain in the Conrad novel who tended to "enunciate platitudes, not with a desire to dazzle, but from honest conviction."

19 Some people are deliberately hiding behind words or thinly veiling their meaning. Thus one British parliamentarian says that another "seldom deviates into accuracy," so Churchill describes Attlee as "a sheep in sheep's clothing," so Sam Goldwyn says, "The best I can give you is a definite maybe" and John Foster Dulles at the Washington airport (on one of his infrequent visits to the United States) said to a reporter: "No comment. And don't quote that." Subtlety is commendable. But what about other motives for being unclear or devious? What about the undertakers who call themselves "morticians," the carpenters who are "construction consultants" when they are simply driving nails ("interfibrous friction fastener installation")? Aren't things getting confused when a man employed to cut things *out* of TV scripts is called a "continuity *acceptance* man" instead of a "censor"? Why is the garbage man ashamed of his work to the point where he calls himself a "sanitary engineer"? And what happens to people who really are sanitary engineers? Must every man who cleans toilets prettify it into "restroom attendant employment"? Must every Billy Goat Hill become Angora Heights? What's wrong with "rat-catchers" (now "rodent operatives") and "watchmen" ("surveillance personnel")?

20 This kind of elegant variation can lead to a man whose father was hanged as a horse thief explaining the death by saying that “my father was taking part in a public ceremony when the platform collapsed.” (If the father were electrocuted one could make him sound like a deceased professor: “My father occupied the chair of Applied Electricity at a large institution in one of the western states.”)

21 It’s only silly when pompous people talk about their “residences” instead of their homes and wear “suitings” and “shirtings” instead of suits and shirts, “creations” instead of dresses. But it may indicate a deep dishonesty when the Army purchases 2000 portable showers, for the use of laborers (“Missilemen Fourth Class”?) who spill rocket fuel on themselves, and calls them “Rocket Propellant Personnel Neutralizers.”

22 It’s the same unwillingness to call a spade a spade that lies behind this next example, an extract from an imaginary lecture by an Army sergeant who is compelled to “gobbledygook it up” because he is ordered (and ashamed) to lecture 50 minutes on an ordinary whistle:

Awright, you men! Now today we introduce the U.S. missile whistle, Model M-1. This is a self-repeating, shoulder-strap, general personnel model issued to relevant ranks. It is lung-operated, reverberating-blast, and air-type cooled.

The whistle itself proper weighs in the neighborhood of about an ounce and the attached chain (which you see attached) adds about another half an ounce or so to the overall weight. The whistle is divided up into two component related parts: these are the whistle-cylinder blowing assembly and the whistle-retaining chain assembly mechanism.

At the blowing aperture there are two raised sections—the men in the back better stand up to see this—one on each side. They are called the upper-teeth guard lug and the lower-teeth guard lug, respectively.

The opening from the blowing end into the main cylinder is termed the compressing blow channel. The remaining component part of the whistle is known as the chamber-cylinder operating assembly complex. *That* consists of the opening sound-emission slot, the cylinder-butt lock (onto which the whistle-retaining chain assembly part is attached on), and the cylinder-reverberating operating cork pellet device (which in this case is a common garden variety pea.)

The “disassembly” procedure is pretty funny too. But that’s for ordnance only and will not be included in the final examination. We’ll finalize this example here. (“Finalize,” you’ll have noticed, means “we haven’t finished with it but to hell with it.”)

23 Executives in the “Armed Forces” are prone to ape business. They, too, never begin anything—they “initiate action.” They don’t collect information—they “assemblize imponderables.” Then they make these imponderables

as ponderous as possible, “process” them, and “phase them in” with other “factors.”

24 My own experience (in the Royal Canadian Air Force, among the paragraph troopers at a chairborne headquarters) includes a Wing Commander who advised me, in writing, to “get behind this thing and lead.” There are other good examples of the military mind at work (or not working). Take my “opposite number” in the Navy when I was a staff officer at AFHQ. He belonged in the Navy, where he could use flags and heliographs to communicate, because he couldn’t use prose. One day he telephoned me to say that he couldn’t give me, over the ’phone, the information I needed. It was secret. It was still secret, to me, after I read his subsequent memorandum, which I quote in part:

In the referenced period under review, brought to your liaison for the cross-fertilization of ideas in a recent telephonic communication with the undersigned, the following SECRET situation, uncommunicable thereby, is hereby adumbrated in detail:

Our sea/air strikes against the enemy realized a very real improvement in results relative to fighter forces and, while the reverse might obtain for the enemy, the steady rise in blanket cover of the opposing fighter effort (as disclosed by the figures in Appendix “A”) is not materially altered when due allowance is made for this possibility.

This shows what can happen when you stop using human intelligence and start using military intelligence. It’s the sort of thing that creates the “climate” in which a high-ranking officer can put this “minute” (the official term for a jotting in a margin) on a junior officer’s “dossier”:

Flight Lieutenant A_____ is not recommended for this liaison duty as I consider him inexperienced. He has little Air Force experience and no naval.

Add jargon to gobbledygook and the result is horrendous. The officer who barks in trenchant monosyllables writes like this:

We have locked on to operationally significant quantities of practicable equipment to zero in on optimum capabilities if the aforementioned philosophy materializes. Conceptual imponderables will be minimized by programming on the mach so as to firm it up and cream it off.

That’s swashbuckling prose that buckles where it ought to swash! The deleterious effect of advertising jargon is apparent. Advertising jargon! I can just see General George Washington showing Betsy Ross’s new American flag to the Continental Congress. “I’m just talking off the top of my head,

of course," he says, "but what do you fellows say we run it up the pole and see if anybody salutes it?"

25 Advertising men and promotion men and public relations men! The PR people will soon make their "undertaker accounts" acceptable. I can see the black-bordered signs around the city: DIG WE MUST FOR A GREATER NEW YORK. The copywriters will begin to peddle "the only coffins with a lifetime guarantee." Supraliminally, liminally, and subliminally we'll be sold death. "Death: It's Only Nature's Way of Telling You To Slow Down." "Why not? Everybody's doing it." "Eventually—Why Not Now?"

26 Not only advertising jargon but the cant of other closed groups—thieves, dope addicts, teenagers—has permeated all levels of American life. Low-level people imitate their middle-class betters. High-level people use it to be arch or funny, to avoid having to choose words, to be "democratic" (as stupid as everybody else). You know what I mean, I mean meaningwise? Like man, it's the *least!*

27 Then there's the pedant. He's capable of being polysyllabically stupid in sesquipedalian vocabulary. He writes:

Individuals domiciled, perforce constrained to be resident, in vitrious structures of patent frangibility should desist absolutely from employing petrous formations as projectiles.

At least this means something—people who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones—while jazz musicians, for example, can talk for hours without meaning anything or meaning to mean anything. They just dig each other and bury communication.

28 Many critics of literature—not the good ones, the ones John O'Hara so aptly calls "the professional pipe-smokers"—write this way. So do many other people who ought to know better, especially historians who want to impress rather than to inform. Political scientists and economists use (sorry, "utilize") more clichés and are more apt to split an infinitive and end with prepositions when they have nothing else to end with. (No matter what lengths they go to.) That's something which the more consciously literary pedant won't . . . ah, *up with which* he will not put.

29 Here's what the political scientist or the sociologist might do with a pithy piece of prose from the King James Version. First, here's *Ecclesiastes*:

I returned and saw under the sun that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all.

Now here's the same passage as translated by George Orwell (whose 1984 warned us, perhaps too late, against "doublethink" and "doublespeak"):

Objective consideration of contemporary phenomena compels the conclusion that success or failure in competitive activities exhibits no tendency to be commensurate with innate capacity, but that a considerable element of the unpredictable must be taken into account.

That's torturous, but it does mean something, and it does say it, if only "as in a glass, darkly." But what about the bad writers who have nothing to say? And what about the professors of education (always the laughing-stocks of any faculty) who have something to say but are immensely embarrassed because it's so simple a child could understand it (or have thought it up)? The typical education course, I sometimes think, starts with nothing and is continually taking up class time with review. Most of these education experts are renowned for their intolerable lectures and unreadable textbooks and so incompetent, indeed, that even the other pendants notice it. (Of course not *all* professors of education are laughable. You can easily identify the sensible ones: they occasionally speak hesitantly in favor of a little less "methodology" and a modicum of "subject-matter content," and they call themselves "teachers." The others call themselves "educators" or even "educationalists." Some are disguised as psychologists, student advisers, and so on, but they aren't fooling anybody.)

30 In the soft (or "social") sciences the writers most ridiculed (not always most deservedly) are the sociologists, so I suppose we'd better have a sample of their language. The story of the Good Samaritan. Brace yourselves, for such people are literate only in clichés.

And behold, a certain Socialite stood up and tempted Him, saying, "Master, what shall I do to be socially acceptable?"

And He said unto him, "Thou shalt love thy in-group as thyself."

But he, willing to justify himself, said unto Him, "And who is my in-group?" And He, answering, said:

"A certain fellow travelling down from Aix to Ghent fell among traditionalists, who stripped him of his pretense, offended him, and departed, leaving him half mortified. And by chance there came down a certain realist that way: and, looking upon him as an out-group, he passed him by on the other side. And likewise an idealist, when he was at the place and also looked upon him as an out-group, he passed him by on the other side. But a certain man with a rounded personality, as he journeyed, came where he was: and when he saw him, he adjusted himself to the social situation. And he went to him and took him to an inn and associated with him. Now which of these three, thinkest thou, was in-grouped with him who fell upon hard times?"

And he said, "He that acted *democratically* towards him." Then He said unto him: "Go, and adjust thyself."

No wonder there's a rumor going around that sociologists are defining *orgy* as "sexual educational group dynamics."

31 Our college students see enough bad writing in the newspapers they read (if any) and in the pretentious as well as the shoddier magazines. They shouldn't find it in the textbooks we force them to buy and read in college. There's an ever-present danger that if they don't fall into one trap (impairing their minds by aping the slangy and inexact dialect of the common man) they may fall into another and plump for padded pedantry.

32 It's all right to write like Henry James if you're struggling with something subtle and involved, for even Henry James was doing his best to present the complexities lucidly and not consciously attempting to compound the difficulty, but it's pompous foolishness to take a phrase like "there was mob rule at this time" or "you can't concentrate when you are distracted" or "small business is failing in Utica" and make it utterly incomprehensible. There's something radically wrong when a great university cannot turn out a readable catalogue of courses, when students cannot read their psychology textbooks on "the learning process," when professional writers cannot use our language to produce simple income-tax instructions.

33 I once taught at a university whose president issued a Parents' Letter with so little feeling for the language that the one memorable sentence made him the butt of jokes for months. It seems that the university was offering, at the students' request, a course "on the subject of preparation for marriage" (read "sex"). It was to be given, said the announcement, by the chaplain and "three noted lay authorities."

34 I suggest that colleges hide their catalogues and, if necessary, their presidents. Tender minds ought not to be exposed to things like:

The initiation of a beginning looking toward the commencement of a foundation for the establishment of an opening of a channel for communication of our day-to-day problem-solving activities is, in the writer's opinion, an important tool in the provision of a step forward in the right direction, and should eventually so alter the total university silhouette as to produce a maturation of the striving for the higher echelons of excellence which we are all involved in . . . in which we all have involvement.

Give us freedom from that sort of baleful influence, and we can educate your sons and daughters in their native language, a language which, incidentally, is spoken by 300 million other people. We can equip them with the essential, the fundamental, ability to understand, manipulate, and express ideas. We would even offer a guarantee: we shall succeed, or we shall

cheerfully refund your child. The young person must be given something to say and taught how to say it. He must be cautioned that when he has nothing to say he must say nothing. He must be admonished never to use two words where one will suffice, to avoid sloppiness and imprecision. He must be reminded that it is hard to read and painful to listen, that he must have the good manners to make whatever he has to communicate as worthwhile, as accurate, as easy to assimilate as possible.

35 I try to teach my students to make all sentences as long as they have to be and as short as they can be. I tell them to bundle their ideas into packages worth carrying and, at the same time, light enough to be lifted. I tell them to write with distinction if they can—but with distinctness, at any rate. Clarity covers a multitude of sins. A good style may be dramatic and beautifully rhythmic and nicely balanced and euphonious—but above all it is clear, concise, concrete. I encourage them to be as adventurous in their expression as in their ideas—but sound.

36 I invite you as parents to assist in the home, to set an example and teach your children to speak simply, to think clearly, to write logically. Improve their manner of expression: teach them honest English and you will be giving them a great legacy, one that will gain them acceptance in college or professional schools or in life.

37 I invite (exhort) you as executives and administrators and people who deal in communication to speak and write simply yourself. Astound your colleagues. Don't begin letters with "Yours of the 16th *inst.* received and contents duly noted and beg to state..." Get to the point. Resolve that the next dozen letters you write will be only 50 words long each—and watch the results. Build the vocabulary you need—and begin by throwing away all the words you now have that are bent, broken, or worn out. Use what's left (supplemented by new words if necessary) to say honestly and straightforwardly exactly what you mean, to inform rather than to impress or confuse. The ability to handle that vocabulary (and the ideas it represents and contains) is your greatest asset in handling your important jobs, your associates, and your lives.

A SURVEY OF RHETORIC

The history of classical rhetoric covers more than two thousand years, from the fifth century B.C. until the first quarter of the nineteenth century. During most of that time, rhetoric was a prominent, and for long stretches the dominant, discipline in the schools, and some of the most famous men in history were involved in either the teaching or the practice of rhetoric. In view of this long and honorable tradition, it is presumptuous of anyone to think that he could present a satisfactory, not to speak of an adequate, survey of rhetoric in a few dozen pages. The article that R. C. Jebb wrote for the Ninth Edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* was devoted almost entirely to Aristotle. Because of the formidableness of the task, most historians of rhetoric have sensibly confined themselves to a coverage of individual rhetoricians or to limited periods. The Bibliography appended to this survey directs the student's attention to some of the best of these limited histories. But to date, no one has attempted to write a history of rhetoric on the scale of George Saintsbury's *History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe* or even of René Wellek's more recent *A History of Modern Criticism, 1750-1950*.

Despite the impossibility of presenting an adequate survey of rhetoric in a few pages, an attempt will be made here to introduce the student to at least some of the key figures and some of the significant developments in rhetoric. Occasionally, authors and rhetoric texts will be mentioned, not because of their enduring worth or influence, but because they were historically important (the first of a kind, for instance) or representative of an especially important type.

Classical Rhetorics

The “art” or “science” of any discipline is almost always formulated inductively from a study of the long-standing practice of that discipline. This is certainly true of all the verbal arts—grammar, logic, poetics, and rhetoric. In the case of these language arts, the codification of principles did not come until several centuries after the practice had become a conspicuous feature of a national culture. There is ample evidence in extant Greek literature that rhetoric, conceived of as persuasive oratory, figured prominently in Hellenic society many hundreds of years before the first handbook of rhetorical precepts was compiled. One has only to note the prominence of speeches and debates in the Homeric epics, in the plays of the Greek dramatists, in the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, and in the philosophical treatises of Hesiod, to be convinced that persuasive discourse exerted a continuing influence upon the ancient Greeks almost from the dawn of their civilization.

Although the practice of an art antedates its codification, there comes a time when men feel the urge to derive a set of “rules” from the study of accepted practice. The art of rhetoric was first formulated, in Sicily, during the second quarter of the fifth century B.C. Corax of Syracuse is commonly designated as the first formulator of the art of rhetoric. Certain political and social changes taking place at the time prompted him to establish some system of rhetoric. When Thrasybulus, the tyrant of Syracuse, was deposed and a form of democracy established, the newly enfranchised citizens flooded the courts with litigations to recover property that had been confiscated during the reign of the despot. The “art” that Corax formulated was designed to help ordinary men plead their claims in court. Since, understandably enough, no documentary evidence was available to prove their claims, they had to rely on inferential reasoning and on the general topic of probability (*eikos*) to establish their proprietary rights. Perhaps the chief contribution that Corax made to the art of rhetoric was the formula he proposed for the parts of a judicial speech—proem, narration, arguments (both confirmation and refutation), and peroration—the arrangement that becomes a staple of all later rhetorical theory.

There are references in Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian to the part that Corax and his pupil Tisias played in formulating rhetorical theory, but none of their handbooks survive. All we know of Tisias from the scattered references to him is that his theory was concerned exclusively with the rhetoric of the courtroom, that he wrote some judicial speeches for others

to deliver, and that he may have been one of the teachers of at least two of the Attic orators—Lysias and Isocrates.

If modern students have heard the name of Gorgias at all, it is probably in connection with the Platonic dialogue that bears his name. In the history of rhetoric, however, Gorgias of Leotini is notable, first of all, for having stirred up interest in oratorical theory and practice among the Athenians. As an ambassador from Sicily to Athens in 427 B.C., he dazzled the Athenians with the brilliance of his speech-making. Thereafter he was, for several years, the most successful teacher and practitioner of oratory in Athens. Although he was one of the first rhetoricians to recognize the persuasiveness of emotional appeals, he distinguished himself mainly by the attention he paid to the cultivation of an ornate style. He placed great emphasis on the value of figures of speech, especially antithesis and parallelism. All the later rhetoricians who concentrated on the cultivation of a highly literary style of address could, for the sake of convenience, be placed in the Gorgianic school, but it is unfair to blame Gorgias for all the excesses of those rhetoricians who were concerned more with the flowers of style than with the substance. If some of Gorgias' speeches had survived, we would be better able to judge just how much the gaudy, mannered style known in Renaissance England as "Euphuism" owed to his influence.

Gorgias may well lay claim to being the *first* of the successful Sophists in Athens, but Isocrates competes with Aristotle for the title of the most influential of the Greek rhetoricians. Judging from the length of his reign as a renowned teacher of rhetoric (he lived to be 98 years old) and from the number of skillful orators who emerged from his school, it would probably be safe to say that Isocrates was the most influential Greek rhetorician among his contemporaries. Aristotle, with his more philosophical treatise on rhetoric, wins the title for long-range influence.

A word needs to be said here about the term *Sophist*, since it applies to men like Gorgias and Isocrates and since it figures in the views that Plato and Aristotle entertained toward the art of rhetoric. Among the Athenians of the fifth century B.C., the term *Sophist* carried no invidious connotations. It was a rather neutral term applied to professors who lectured on the "new learning" in literature, science, philosophy, and especially oratory. The Sophists set up small private schools and charged their pupils a fee for what amounted in many cases to tutoring. These schools eventually proved to be so lucrative that they attracted a number of charlatans into the teaching profession, and it was men like these who eventually gave Sophists an unsavory reputation and made "sophistry" a synonym for deceitful reasoning.

But men like Isocrates were highly ethical, with noble ideals and unimpeachable standards of intellectual integrity. We have already mentioned

that he may have studied under Tisias, and there are hints in some of the early histories of rhetoric that he also studied under Gorgias and Socrates. He began his professional career as a *logographos*, the Greek term for a hired writer of courtroom speeches—a beginning that he later wanted to forget. About 392, he set up a school of oratory, and although he charged unusually high fees, he soon had more students than any other Sophists. During his lifetime he amassed a considerable fortune from his teaching.

Although some twenty-one discourses and nine letters of Isocrates have survived, the *Art of Rhetoric* that Isocrates is said to have compiled has been lost; hence we are forced to abstract his rhetorical theory from such autobiographical works as his *Antidosis* or his educational works like *Against the Sophists*. One of his major contributions to rhetoric was his development of an artistic prose style. He took the rather artificial style of Gorgias, tempered it, refined it, and made it an elegant vehicle for both written and spoken discourse. Whereas the structural units that Gorgias was most interested in were antithesis and parallelism, Isocrates, with his great interest in the rhythm of prose, centered his attention on the sonority of the periodic sentence—certainly one of Cicero's debts to him. His concept of the proper training for the ideal orator also had a marked influence on Cicero and Quintilian. He preached that the whole man must be brought to bear in the persuasive process, and so it behooved the aspiring orator to be broadly trained in the liberal arts and securely grounded in good moral habits. In all his discourses, he stressed the Greek ideals of freedom and autonomy, and perhaps as much as any other ancient humanist, he preached the value of the supreme Greek virtue, *sophrosyne* (that we may translate as "self-control," for want of a more adequate English equivalent).

Despite the high ideals that Isocrates set for his pupils and the exemplary eloquence of his discourses, he did not succeed in allaying Plato's suspicions of rhetoric. We should look briefly at what Plato (through his spokesman Socrates) had to say about rhetoric, because all the derogatory things that men have said about this art down through the ages have their roots in Plato's strictures.

Remarks about rhetoric are scattered through several of Plato's dialogues, but the two dialogues in which he concentrated his attacks were the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*. Ironically, in the very act of depreciating rhetoric, Plato shows himself to be a masterful rhetorician; and equally ironic is the fact that some of the charges he made against the Sophists (e.g. that they corrupted young people and accepted fees for their teaching) were indictments later made against Socrates—as we see in the *Apology*. Students who read *The Republic* are often shocked to find that Plato would exclude poets from his ideal commonwealth. Basically, Plato's objections to poets are the same as those he made against the teachers of rhetoric. For one thing, rhetoric

could not be considered a true art because it did not rest on universal principles. Moreover, rhetoricians, like poets, were more interested in opinions, in appearances, even in lies, than in the transcendental truth that the philosopher sought. They made the "worse appear the better reason." They were mere enchanterers of the soul, more interested in dazzling their audience than in instructing it. Rhetoric—to bring it down to its lowest terms—was a form of flattery, like cosmetics.

Toward the end of the *Phaedrus*, Plato concedes the possibility of a true art of rhetoric. But it could be a true art only if the speaker made an effort to learn the truth about the subject he was going to talk about; if he would seek out essential definitions of key terms in his discourse; if he learned to make the proper divisions of his subject; and if he made an effort to fashion his speech to suit the nature of his audience. There are a lot of *ifs* here, and it is apparent that Plato does not have much confidence that rhetoricians, in their great eagerness to please the ignorant multitudes, will devise and teach such a rhetoric.

Certainly one of Aristotle's purposes in composing his *Rhetoric* was to counteract his former teacher's low estimate of the persuasive art. Even while he was still a pupil at Plato's Academy, he opened a school of rhetoric in competition with Isocrates. It is not known precisely when Aristotle first started to write his *Rhetoric*, but it is known that his treatise was not published until the second period of Aristotle's residence in Athens, sometime around 333 B.C. From internal evidence alone, we know that he completed his *Poetics* before he wrote Book Three of his *Rhetoric*. The late composition of Book Three, which deals mainly with style and arrangement, may suggest that this book was an afterthought, a concession to the interest taken in style by the other schools of rhetoric. But we must remember that he devoted several chapters of his *Poetics* to a discussion of language and style, and it is believed that the *Theodectea*, one of his lost rhetorical works, treated in great detail the subject matter of Book Three of the *Rhetoric*. Nevertheless, it is true that Aristotle was not as much interested in style as he was in the invention of arguments. And it is this primary interest in invention that indicates how he sought to counteract the bad opinion that many of his contemporaries had of rhetoric.

By concentrating in the first two books of his *Rhetoric* on the discovery of arguments, Aristotle sought to answer those who accused rhetoricians of being more concerned with words than with matter. And by abstracting first principles from the practice of oratory, he hoped to show that rhetoric was not, as Plato had accused it of being, a mere "knack," but was a true art, a teachable and systematic discipline that could guide men in adapting means to an end. With his philosophic treatise, Aristotle became the fountainhead of all later rhetorical theory. As Lane Cooper has said, "...the

Rhetoric not only of Cicero and Quintilian, but of the Middle Ages, of the Renaissance, and of modern times, is, in its best elements, essentially Aristotelian."

Perhaps the key to understanding Aristotle's approach to rhetoric is the recognition that *probability* is the basis of the persuasive art. The orator often based his arguments on opinions, on what men *believed* to be true rather than on what was demonstrably and universally true. But whereas Plato found this to be a defect in the art, Aristotle saw it as a necessity. Discoverable, verifiable truth fell within the province of science or logic. But in dealing with contingent human affairs, men soon learned that universal truths were not always discoverable or verifiable. It was in this area that dialectic and rhetoric had a part to play. "Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic," Aristotle said in the very first sentence of his *Rhetoric*. It is significant that the Greek word that Aristotle used for rhetorical proofs was *pisteis*, which has its roots in the word *pistis*, "belief." *Belief*, Aristotle perceived, is often the highest degree of certainty to which we can attain in dealing with the everyday affairs of men.

This recognition of probability as the essence of the persuasive art lies behind most of Aristotle's contributions to rhetorical theory: the three modes of proof—the appeal to reason (*logos*), the appeal to emotion (*pathos*), the ethical appeal (*ēthos*); the enthymeme as the rhetorical equivalent of the syllogism, the example as the rhetorical equivalent of logical induction; the topics as a system of discovering available arguments; his stress on the audience as the chief informing principle in persuasive discourse. Another of his contributions was the removal of the success-at-any-price emphasis that had brought rhetoric into bad repute. By stressing the notion of "the available means of persuasion in any given case," he emphasized the virtuosity of the effort rather than the success of the results. This stress also tended to make rhetoric a morally indifferent activity. Another of his unique contributions was his analysis, in Book Two, of the more common emotions or passions. One of the three modes of appeal that Aristotle explores is the emotional, and he was trying to show his students how to evoke the appropriate emotional response. This was the beginning, admittedly primitive but amazingly perceptive, of psychology.

There is a great temptation to follow out all the ramifications of Aristotle's rhetorical theory, but this brief survey will not permit such an intriguing excursion. In fact, this textbook is so much indebted to Aristotle's theory that it can be regarded as a mere restatement, with some modifications and extensions, of the *Rhetoric*. So brilliant is Aristotle's treatise—it is certainly one of the great books of the Western world—that we can only regret the loss of the aforementioned *Theoedectea* and of his history of rhetoric, *Gryllus*, named after Xenophon's son. For many years, the anonymous

Rhetorica ad Alexandrum was thought to be another of Aristotle's rhetorical works. But scholars today are convinced that Aristotle is not the author of this sprawling work, and they are inclined to attribute it to Anaximenes of Lampsacus, an older contemporary of Aristotle. It was never an influential work in the history of rhetoric.

Another Greek rhetorical treatise that deserves mention here is a text that has come to bear the English title *On Style*. The date and authorship of this work are uncertain. For a long time it was attributed to Demetrius Phalereus, who governed Athens from 317 to 307 B.C. and who was invited by Ptolemy Soter to help collect books for the great library at Alexandria. On the basis of internal and external evidence, however, W. Rhys Roberts, who has made an English translation of *On Style* for the Cambridge University Press, concludes that Demetrius Phalereus did not write this text, that it was written sometime in the first century B.C. or the first century A.D. This text, which deals exclusively with the *elocutio* (style) division of rhetoric, is notable for being one of the first to analyze the "kinds" of style. Whereas most later rhetorics discussed only three styles (the elevated or high style; the elegant or middle style; and the plain or low style), the author of this text discusses a fourth type, the forcible style. Throughout his discussion of style, the author is interested particularly in the choice and arrangement of words.

Until the end of the fifteenth century, the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* was thought to have been written by Cicero. Whether Cornificius is the author of this text, as some modern scholars maintain, is still being debated, but the *Ad Herennium*, written probably between 86 and 82 B.C., has the distinction of being the earliest extant Latin work on rhetoric and the earliest treatment of prose style in Latin. Furthermore, as Harry Caplan, who translated the treatise for the Loeb Classical Library, points out, the *Ad Herennium* offers "the oldest extant division of the kinds of style into three and the oldest extant formal study of figures." It should also be pointed out that the treatise presents the most complete treatment of *delivery* and *memory* that we have in any of the surviving classical rhetorics. Although virtually unknown in the ancient world, the *Ad Herennium* enjoyed wide currency in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Professor T. W. Baldwin reveals that it was the basic elementary text in the English grammar-school curriculum when rhetoric had its great revival during the Tudor Age.

Although Cicero was not the author of the *Ad Herennium*, he has enough titles under his name to assure his place in the history of rhetoric. Among his minor rhetorical works, written between 84 and 45 B.C., are *De Inventione*, *De Optimo Genere Oratorum*, *Topica*, and *De Partitione Oratoria*. His major rhetorical works are the *De Oratore*, the *Brutus*, and the *Orator*.

There is no room here for an exposition of any of these works, but some general word can be said about Cicero's contribution to rhetoric. Cicero was a skillful orator as well as an esteemed teacher of rhetoric; some literary historians hold that he gave more effective instruction by the example of his orations and epistles (*rhetorica utens*) than he did by his theoretical treatises (*rhetorica docens*). His works played a great part in mediating the controversy between the "Asiatics" (the exponents of the florid, highly mannered style) and the "Atticists" (the exponents of the plain, neat, severe style). Cicero's chief contribution, however, is probably his extension of the scope of rhetoric. Unlike Aristotle, who held that rhetoric had no proper subject matter, Cicero felt that the perfect orator had to be conversant with many subjects. In order to invent his arguments, the perfect orator must have a command of a wide range of knowledge. Accordingly, under the Ciceronian system the study of rhetoric really became a liberal-arts course. This broadening of the scope of rhetoric helps to explain Cicero's appeal for the English and Continental Humanists when the study of rhetoric was revived during the Renaissance.

A later rhetorician whose name is invariably coupled with Cicero's is M. Fabius Quintilianus. Born in Spain about A.D. 35, Quintilian eventually went to Rome, where after completing his education he became a successful pleader in the law courts. In time he acquired such a great reputation that Vespasian established a chair of rhetoric for him at Rome. The prestige of this imperial endowment made him the supreme authority on rhetoric even after his death, about A.D. 96. About the year 88, he retired from his teaching post to write his great work on the training of the orator, the *Institutio Oratoria*. Fragments of this work seem to have been available throughout the Middle Ages, but after a complete text was discovered in the monastery of St. Gall in 1416, the *Institutes of Oratory* steadily gained popularity and firmly established itself in the European educational network. Between about 1475 and 1600, more than one hundred editions of the *Institutes* were published.

The twelve books of the *Institutio Oratoria* are divided as follows: Book I deals with the preliminary education necessary for a study of rhetoric. Book II defines the nature, aims, and scope of rhetoric. Books III-VII treat of oratory itself, with emphasis on the finding (*inventio*) and arranging (*dispositio*) of material. Books VIII-X treat of style (*elocutio*). Book XI deals with memory (*memoria*) and delivery (*pronuntiatio*). Book XII deals with the requirements for a perfect orator.

As the subject matter of Book I might suggest, Quintilian, like Cicero, regarded the broadly educated man as the fittest candidate for a course in rhetoric. Quintilian, moreover, emphasized a qualification that earlier rhetoricians had hinted at but did not belabor. Having accepted Marcus Cato's

definition of the perfect orator as "a good man skilled in speaking" (*vir bonus dicendi peritus*), Quintilian insisted that in addition to being intellectually fortified for his office the orator must be trained to be a man of strong moral character. It was this insistence on the intellectual and moral training of the aspiring orator that made Cicero and Quintilian the two most potent classical influences on rhetorical education in England and America. The moral bias was especially important, because from the seventeenth through most of the nineteenth century the English and American school systems were dominated largely by clergymen.

Although the influence of the Roman rhetoricians had become dominant by the first century B.C., a few Greek works exercised a significant influence on the development of rhetoric. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a Greek contemporary of Horace, taught rhetoric at Rome from 30 to 8 B.C. He wrote a monumental history and criticism of the great Attic orators and some minor rhetorical works which deal for the most part with a study of the style of such Greek luminaries as Plato, Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon. But the work of his that influenced—or plagued—schoolboys was a work which bears the English title *On the Arrangement of Words*. Dionysius treated only one aspect of rhetorical style, the order of words. Although he realized that eloquent expression involves a due regard for *arrangement* and *choice* of words, he decided to confine himself to a study of arrangement because he felt that other rhetoricians had adequately dealt with the choice of words. Dionysius' particular contribution is that he made schoolboys aware of the inherent beauty of words and of the possibility of producing pleasing effects even with ordinary words if they were skillfully arranged.

Hermogenes and Aphthonius did not exercise as much influence on their contemporaries as they did on European schoolboys of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Both of them published rhetorical texts entitled *Progymnasmata*. The *progymnasmata* were the first writing exercises, the "themes," that schoolboys attempted after they had learned their elementary rhetorical precepts. In addition to supplying technical rules for the construction of these minor forms of composition, the texts provided illustrations of the dozen or so common forms. These texts were clearly in the tradition of "formulary rhetoric"—the kind of rhetoric that taught by models. The *Progymnasmata* by Hermogenes and Aphthonius went through an astounding number of editions, in both Greek and Latin versions.

The mention of one more Greek text will end this survey of the more important classical rhetorics. This text is the famous *On the Sublime* by Longinus. Today, *On the Sublime* is for most students one of the cardinal documents of literary criticism. But one must not forget that this work was written by a rhetorician (earlier, about A.D. 260, he had written a now lost *Art of Rhetoric*) and that it has made a contribution to rhetoric as well as to

literary criticism. "The object of the author," says W. Rhys Roberts, who has made one of the modern English translations of this treatise, "rather is to indicate broadly the essentials of a noble and impressive style." Three of the five sources of the sublime that Longinus discusses concern style: the appropriate use of figures of speech (chs. 16-29); nobility of diction (chs. 30-38); and dignity and elevation of word order (chs. 39-40). By making *enthusiasm* a respectable resource, Longinus encouraged the exploitation of emotional appeal in the suasive process, and by insisting that sublimity was "the echo of a great soul," he abetted the moralistic trend in later rhetorical education.

Rhetoric During the Middle Ages

Under the aegis of Hadrian and the Antonines (A.D. 117-80), the teachers of rhetoric attained a prestige and an immunity that they were never to enjoy again. These second-century Sophists acquired their unsavory reputation because they eventually abused their privileged office and adulterated their discipline. The object of the Sophists was to amaze an audience rather than persuade it. To effect this end, they encouraged all the flashy tricks of style and delivery. The schools of rhetoric during this period had two curricula: the "sophistic," which designated the academic study of rhetoric as an art; and the "political," which was concerned with the practical applications of the art. But because the "sophistic" school enjoyed greater prestige and higher emoluments, rhetoric took a turn that debased it.

Under the influence of the second-century Sophistic, rhetoric in the Middle Ages ceased to be pursued primarily as a practical art and became rather a scholastic exercise guided by the *compendia* of such medieval rhetoricians at Cassiodorus, Capella, and Isidore. Grammar, logic, and rhetoric constituted the *trivium*, the four-year undergraduate course of studies leading to the degree of bachelor of arts. Music, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy made up the *quadrivium*, the three-year graduate course that led to the degree of master of arts. Scholastic logic held a decidedly superior position in the *trivium*. The province of rhetoric became principally a study of the art of letter writing (*ars dictaminis*) and of preparing and delivering sermons (*artes praedicandi*). True, the students were exercised in two forms of scholastic declamation—*suasoriae*, discourses on some historical or legendary subject, and *controversiae*, discourses on some classic legal question—but these declamations were conducted so much in the spirit of epideictic or ceremonial display that the product of such training was usually a glib, clever "entertainer" rather than a resourceful orator in command of all the available

means of persuasion. Accordingly, the art of rhetoric stood still, if it actually did not retrogress, despite the prominent position that rhetoric held in the curriculum. As Richard McKeon has said in his essay "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages" (*Speculum*, 1942): "Yes, if rhetoric is defined in terms of a single subject matter—such as style, or literature, or discourse—it has no history during the Middle Ages."

Although St. Augustine (A.D. 353-430) is not chronologically of the Middle Ages, we might look at him as a representative figure in the development of rhetoric during the medieval period. Anyone who has read *The Confessions* knows that during the period of his "flaming youth" Augustine was a student of, and later a teacher of, the "pagan" rhetoric that derived largely from the second Sophistic of Rome. After his conversion, Augustine made a significant contribution to rhetoric in the Fourth Book of his *De Doctrina Christiana* (A.D. 426-27). Augustine was interested in rhetoric as a means of persuading Christians to lead a holy life. With that exclusive interest he can be said to have narrowed the province of rhetoric. But by rejecting the sophists' preoccupation with style and the other elements of display and by returning to the more comprehensive rhetoric of Cicero he can be said to have extended the province of rhetoric once again. He concentrated on Biblical texts and especially on the Epistles of that masterful rhetorical artist, St. Paul. Augustine's analyses of these texts, however, were concerned not so much with the "message" as with the rhetorical craftsmanship. Somewhat surprisingly, Augustine rejected Quintilian's notion that the rhetor must be a morally good man. He did not deny that a preacher's reputation for a virtuous life would have a persuasive effect on an audience, but he recognized that even a vicious preacher could induce his audience to follow Christ if he were skillful enough in the manipulation of his suasive resources.

Augustine's rhetoric laid the groundwork for the rhetoric of the sermon, the branch of study known today as homiletics—a science that was to command a great deal of attention during, and for many years after, the Renaissance and the Reformation. None of the classical rhetoricians, of course, had discussed the art of preaching, but the foundations for such an art lay in the epideictic variety of rhetoric.

Kenneth Burke, in his discussion of Augustine in *The Rhetoric of Motives*, pointed out that Augustine had noted the instructional function of rhetoric. Burke says that "once you treat instruction as an aim of rhetoric you introduce a principle that can widen the scope of rhetoric beyond persuasion. It is on the way to include also works on the theory and practice of exposition, description, *communication* in general." Following this lead, some modern students of rhetoric, like Donald C. Bryant, have seen the possibility of adapting classical rhetoric to cover at least two of the four forms of discourse—argumentation and exposition. As a matter of fact, there seems to be no

reason why we could not develop a rhetoric of description and a rhetoric of narration too. As a case in point, Wayne C. Booth in his book *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (University of Chicago Press, 1961), has provided us with an excellent study of the rhetorical technique of non-didactic fiction.

Some Continental Rhetoricians

For the history of rhetoric on the European continent after the Middle Ages, we shall mention only a few Continental rhetoricians, confining our attention to the four or five who had a marked influence on the development of rhetoric in England.

The most influential rhetorician was Erasmus. Although this illustrious scholar spent only five years in England (1509-14), he set the pattern for the English grammar-school curriculum and for rhetorical training in the schools. He happened to be in England just at the time Dean Colet was founding St. Paul's school, and at the request of Colet he prepared a number of textbooks. Among these were *De Ratione Studii* and *De Duplici Copia Verborum ac Rerum*. Originally published in 1512, both of these texts went into an astounding number of editions in subsequent years. (The *De Copia*, for instance, had at least 150 editions—only a few of those, it should be pointed out, issuing from presses in England.) The *De Ratione Studii* is more a treatise on pedagogy than a rhetoric, but it is of interest to students of rhetoric for its incidental remarks about the language arts. It was not by endless drilling in rules that students learned to write and speak well, Erasmus maintained, but by discriminating reading and much practice. Erasmus is one of the early enunciators of that sanest of all precepts about writing: "write, write, and again write." He also recommends the exercise of keeping a commonplace book; of paraphrasing poetry into prose, and vice versa; of rendering the same subject in two or more styles; of proving a proposition along several different lines of argument; and of construing from Latin into Greek.

The *De Copia*, which became a widely used textbook of rhetoric in the Tudor schools, was designed to assist grammar-school students in acquiring elegance and variety of expression in Latin composition. This text was based on the traditional *res-verba* distinction (literally, the *thing* and *words*; more broadly, *matter* and *form*). The first book of *De Copia* showed the student how to use the schemes and tropes (*elocutio*) for the purpose of variation; the second book instructed the student in the use of topics (*inventio*) for the same purpose.

The matter of *copia* became one of the major concerns of Tudor education. The Latin word *copia* meant literally "plenty, abundance"; in a more

particular sense, the phrase *copia dicendi* or *copia orationis* meant "fullness of expression." One achieved this fullness of expression by accumulating a number of things to say on a subject and by being able to say the same thing in a variety of ways. So *copia* was partly a matter of fertile invention and partly a matter of stylistic resourcefulness. By way of illustrating *copia*, Erasmus in Chapter 33 of Book One presents 150 variations of the sentence "Tuae literae me magnopere delectarunt" and 200 variations of "Semper dum vivam tui meminero."

The only other rhetorical work by Erasmus that we shall mention is his text on letter writing, *Modus Conscribendi Epistolas*, published in 1522. As we have seen, letter writing had been one of the favorite rhetorical exercises during the Middle Ages. During the Renaissance, it dropped to an inferior, but not insignificant, position in the curriculum. For Erasmus, letters became the first extended form of composition that the student wrote after he had mastered the fundamental rules of rhetoric. In that age which lacked our means of rapid communication and transportation, diplomatic and business affairs were promoted principally through letters. Accordingly, the man skilled in letter writing was as much sought after as the man skilled in oratory. And the number of letter writing manuals, both in Latin and in the vernacular, attests to the demand for this training in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Today we also cannot afford to neglect formal training in this form of written discourse. Letters—friendly letters, business letters, promotional letters, letters to the editor—are the major form of written discourse that many of us will be called upon to produce after we leave school. There is as much rhetoric involved in some kinds of letters (the "begging letter," for instance) as there is in the most elaborate campaign oratory.

Along with Erasmus, Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540) stands in the forefront of those Continental scholars who spent only a few years in England but exercised an influence on the English grammar school that endured for well over a century. Born in Spain (and, for that reason, sometimes called the "second Quintilian"), educated in Paris and Flanders, he was appointed by Cardinal Wolsey in 1523 to the Lectureship of Rhetoric at Oxford. King Henry VIII entrusted the education of his daughter Mary to the joint tutorship of Vives and Thomas Linacre. Vives became *persona non grata* when Henry VIII was seeking a divorce from his compatriot, Catherine of Aragon, and he left England, never to return, in 1528.

Vives exercised an influence on English rhetoric, not so much from his textbooks as from his treatise on education, by which he helped to set the pattern of the rhetorical curriculum. Unlike Erasmus, Vives did not publish any rhetorical works during his sojourn in England, and none of his rhetoric texts that he later produced were widely used in the schools. Vives published the *De Disciplinis*, his major work on education, at Antwerp in 1531, three

years after he left England. Three works on rhetoric followed soon after: *Rhetoricae, sive De Ratione Dicendi, Libri Tres* (Louvain, 1533); *De Consultatione* (Louvain, 1533), a short treatise on rhetoric that he had composed while he was teaching at Oxford; and *De Conscribendis Epistolas* (Basel, 1536), his contribution to the rhetoric of letter writing.

The *De Ratione Dicendi* and the companion *De Consultatione* provided a rich mine of material for Ben Jonson when he composed his own rhetorical work *Timber or Discoveries*, and it is highly probable that Shakespeare too was exposed to these works in his grammar school. But an examination of the statutes of the various grammar schools of the period shows that where Erasmus's textbooks are frequently recommended for the curriculum, Vives's textbooks are seldom mentioned. In his monumental study of Tudor grammar schools, *William Shakespere's Small Latine & Lesse Greeke*, Professor T. W. Baldwin accounts for the pre-eminence of Erasmus on the ground that he was the true Renaissance champion, whereas men like Vives and Colet belonged to the Catholic Reformation rather than to the Renaissance. Vives and Colet, he maintained, were more interested in moral reform than in literary polish.

Three other Continental rhetoricians who had a noticeable influence on English rhetoric deserve brief mention here. The first of these is Petrus Mosellanus or, to use his family name, Pierre Schade (1493-1524), a German professor of Greek at Leipzig University. He published a rhetoric text entitled *Tabulae de Schematibus et Tropis Petri Mosellani*. As early as 1530 the boys at Eton were using Mosellanus's text in the sixth form, and during the first half of the sixteenth century Mosellanus became the standard author on *elocutio* in the English grammar schools.

Philippus Melanchthon or Philip Schwartzerd (1497-1560), a professor of classics at Wittenberg and a close associate of Martin Luther, published three rhetoric texts: *De Rhetorica Libri Tres* (Wittenberg, 1519); *Institutiones Rhetoricae* (Hagenow, 1521); and *Elementorum Rhetorices Libri Duo* (Wittenberg, 1531). Whereas Mosellanus had concentrated on style, Melanchthon gave only a minimum treatment of the schemes and tropes, referring his readers, for a fuller treatment, to such rhetoricians as Cicero, Quintilian, Erasmus, and Mosellanus; he devoted most of his attention to *inventio* and *dispositio*. Melanchthon tended to relegate *inventio* and *arrangement* to the province of logic, and by doing so, he laid the groundwork for the revolution that Ramus and Talaeus were to effect in rhetoric later on in the sixteenth century.

Joannes Susenbrotus's *Epitome Troporum ac Schematum* (Zurich, 1540) was an amalgam of Mosellanus and Melanchthon. The *Epitome*, with its collection of 132 schemes and tropes, had a printing in England in 1562, and

thereafter, for the remainder of the sixteenth century, it replaced Mosellanus as the standard grammar-school text for the figures and served as the model for the later vernacular treatments of these stylistic devices.

English Vernacular Rhetorics of the Sixteenth Century

All of the rhetorics mentioned so far in this survey were written in either Greek or Latin, and most of the compositions by English schoolboys up to the second decade of the sixteenth century were in Latin. With the Renaissance, which began in Italy, spread to France, and eventually made its influence felt in England through the apostleship of Humanists like Roger Asham, Sir John Cheke, and Sir Thomas Elyot, there came a revival of interest in the pagan literature produced by the classical authors. When Aldus, in 1503, published the works of the chief Greek rhetoricians, classical rhetoric was assured of its share of this renewed interest. The cause of rhetoric was further aided, as we have seen, by the direction that men like Erasmus and Vives gave to the curriculum of the English schools. It was not long before rhetoric became the dominant discipline in the Tudor grammar schools and universities.

Although the rhetoric taught in the schools was basically Aristotelian, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was never a prominent textbook. It was the Latin rhetoricians, especially Cicero, Quintilian, and the anonymous author of the *Ad Herennium*, who dominated the early teaching of rhetoric in the English schools. As the pride of the English people in the status and achievements of the nation grew, pride in their native language grew correspondingly, and it was natural that schoolmasters should begin to think of composing textbooks, and of getting their students to orate and write, in the vernacular.

It is common to classify the vernacular rhetorics produced during the English Renaissance into three main groups: (1) the Traditionalists—those who taught a full-fledged rhetoric, with attention given to the five parts: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery; (2) the Ramists—those who assigned invention and arrangement to the province of logic and allocated only style and delivery to rhetoric; (3) the Figurists—those whose primary, if not exclusive, interest centered on the study of the schemes and tropes. Actually, these three groups differ more in their pedagogical approaches than in their fundamental conception of the art of rhetoric. The Ramists, for instance, believed as strongly in the importance of invention and arrangement as the Traditionalists did, but they believed that these subjects were more properly studied under logic. The Ramists may not have considered as many

schemes and tropes as the Figurists did, but many figures that the Figurists studied under the aspect of style, the Ramists studied in connection with the topics of invention. Even from the brief exposition of the vernacular textbooks that follows, the reader should be able to determine into which of these three groups the books fall.

Leonard Cox, a schoolmaster at Reading, has the distinction of having written the first rhetoric textbook in English, *Arte or Crafte of Rhetoryke* (1530). It is perhaps appropriate that this first English rhetoric should be of the traditionalist school. F. I. Carpenter, in a modern edition of Cox's text, demonstrates quite convincingly that it was based upon, even partly translated from, the first book of Melanchthon's *Institutiones Rhetoricae*. Like Melanchthon, Cox was interested primarily in *inventio*.

In 1550, Richard Sherry, a headmaster at Magdalen College School, published through J. Day's press *A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes*, which has sometimes been called "the second book on rhetoric in English." It can certainly lay claim to being the first English textbook on the schemes and tropes. Five years later, Sherry printed a Latin-English revision of the earlier text, changing the title to *A Treatise of the Figures of Grammar and Rhetorike* and treating about 120 figures. Sherry produced his text in the hope of capturing the grammar-school trade. But his hopes proved futile, for Mosellanus and Susenbrotus were at the time too firmly entrenched in the curriculum to be dislodged. The *Treatise of Schemes and Tropes* had only one edition.

Although the compilers of vernacular rhetorics found the competition with Latin texts disheartening, they continued to produce them, and although their texts did not at first replace the classical texts in the schools, English rhetorics eventually superseded the older texts, in sales if not in prestige.

The first of the vernacular rhetorics to gain wide currency was Thomas Wilson's *The Arte of Rhetorique* (1553). G. H. Mair, who has published a handsome modern edition of this rhetoric, says of Wilson that he was one of the Cambridge men "who . . . did much to mould the course of the Renaissance in England on its pedagogic side and who had no inconsiderable influence on the development of English prose." Wilson's text is a "Ciceronian" rhetoric, in that it treats of the five parts, but as Russell H. Wagner, perhaps the chief modern authority on the *Rhetorique*, has pointed out, Wilson appropriated some of his rhetorical doctrines from Erasmus, Cox, and Sherry.

The *Arte of Rhetorique* has the careful organization and schematic form that characterized the best of the classical and medieval texts. Book I considers such matters as the five elements of rhetoric ("Inuention, Disposition, Elocution, Memorie, Utterance"); the seven parts of an oration ("Entrance, Narration, Proposition, Division, Confirmation, Confutation, Conclusion"); the three kinds of oratory ("Demonstrative, Deliberative, Judicial"); and, in connection with these three kinds of oratory, the matter of Invention.

Book II treats of Disposition and the Figures of Amplification. Book III deals mainly with Elocution (style) but gives also a summary treatment of Memory and Delivery. The chief appeal of the *Rhetorique* stemmed from the fact that Wilson had collected a great mass of sound classical doctrine and stitched it all together with his own observations, expositions, and illustrations, in an appealing English prose style. For native Englishmen there was something appealing too in Wilson's strictures on what he called "strange inkhorn terms."

Many vernacular rhetorics appeared in England from this point on, but the most popular were not necessarily the soundest rhetorics or the most venturesome ones. We will mention some representative texts of several kinds to show the vigor and variety of the rhetorical tradition in English schools (and later in American schools) up to about the end of the eighteenth century.

The rhetoric of letter writing, originating in the Middle Ages and continuing with the popular treatises of Erasmus and Vives, received another impetus late in the sixteenth century with the publication of Angel Day's *The English Secreterie* (1586). Day discusses some thirty different kinds of letters under four main headings: demonstrative, deliberative, judicial, and familiar. In the second edition of 1592, Day added a section on the figures of speech and provided marginal glosses identifying the various tropes and figures in the illustrative letters.

George Puttenham's *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589) is remembered by students of English literature as one of a group of Elizabethan treatises that attempted a defense of, or an apology for, poetry; but it also made a contribution to rhetorical theory. The third book of the *Arte of English Poesie*, with its elaborate treatment of figures, is operating in the tradition of Susenbrotus, Mosellanus, Erasmus, and Sherry. Puttenham made two contributions to English rhetoric: he invented vernacular names for the Greek and Latin figures, and, seeking a more rational basis for the classification of the figures, he decided to classify them according to the nature of their appeal. So we have the *auricular*, those figures which depend for their effect on alterations of "sound, accent, time" and therefore appeal primarily to the ear; the *sen-sable*, those figures which depend upon alterations of sense and therefore appeal primarily to the mind; the *sententious*, those that appeal both to the mind and to the ear. All in all, Puttenham treats 107 figures. George Saintsbury is not entirely right when he said of the *Arte of English Poesie* that it contained "the most elaborate treatment of rhetorical figures to be found, up to its time, in English literature," for Henry Peacham in his *The Garden of Eloquence* of 1577 distinguished 184 figures.

Richard Rainolde's *Foundacion of Rhetorike* (1563) was an English adaptation of Hermogenes and Aphthonius's *progymnasmata* exercises that proved

so popular in the early Tudor schools. Rainolde, in fact, considers the same fourteen types of elementary compositions that Aphthonius treated, with examples that Rainolde himself had supplied. Rainolde's hope of replacing Aphthonius was doomed to disappointment, since only one edition of his text was published, and that has approached so close to oblivion that only five copies of the original edition exist today.

About this time a revolution in rhetorical studies was effected by the French scholar, Peter Ramus. Dissatisfied with the repetitiveness and vagueness that prevailed in the teaching of the subjects of the *trivium*, Ramus distributed the traditional parts of rhetoric between logic and rhetoric. *Inventio* and *dispositio*—that is, the discovery and arrangement of matter—he assigned to the province of logic. Rhetoric had a franchise only on *elocutio* (style) and *pronuntiatio* (delivery). The fifth office of rhetoric, *memoria*—the memorization of the speech—Ramus simply ignored. Style would confine itself to a study of schemes and tropes, leaving to grammar the study of etymology and syntax. Ramus was working for a strict departmentalization of knowledge, for he felt that a great deal of the error and confusion that had sprung up in the arts was the result of scholars' mistaking the proper subject matter of the arts. Although the teaching of the two arts would be kept separate, logic and rhetoric in practice would combine and work together. As Karl Wallace has pointed out, the effect of this Ramistic dichotomy was that henceforth such processes as discovery, arrangement, and judgment tended to be assigned exclusively to the intellect, while the "dress" or "ornament" that style gave to matter fell to the lot of the imagination. We shall see later what Francis Bacon is to make of this division of labor between the reason and the imagination.

Although Ramus himself never published a rhetoric text, he did inspire a number of rhetorics based on his philosophy. His most fervent disciple and propagator was Audomarus Talaueus (Omer Talon). Talaueus published in Paris in 1544 his *Institutiones Oratoriae* (or, as it is more familiarly known, *Rhetorica*) as a companion to Ramus's logic text, *Dialecticae Libri Duo*. As John Brinsley tells us in his *Ludus literarius; or The Grammar Schoole* (1612)—one of the most valuable primary sources of information about English schools in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries—Talaueus's *Rhetorica* soon became the rhetoric text "most used in the best Schooles." The main reason for the popularity of Talaueus's text with schoolmasters seems to have been its brevity and simplicity.

In his extensive treatment of the Ramistic revolution (see *Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700*, pp. 146-281), Wilbur Samuel Howell has pointed out that it was Gabriel Harvey who first introduced Ramistic rhetoric to his countrymen, when he became praelector in rhetoric at Christ's College, Cam-

bridge, in the spring of 1574, just about the time that Roland MacIlmaine was publishing in London the Latin text of Ramus' *Dialecticae Libri Duo*. Thereafter Talaeus and Ramus served as the model for the rhetoric and logic texts of Dudley Fenner (*The Artes of Logike and Rethorike*, 1584), Abraham Fraunce (*The Lawiers Logike* and *The Arcadian Rhetorike*, both in 1588), Charles Butler (*Rameae Rhetoricae Libri Duo*, 1597), and Thomas Farnaby (*Index Rhetoricus*, 1625; the fifteenth edition of this appeared as late as 1767). The appearance and success of these texts lend support to Professor Baldwin's contention that by the end of the sixteenth century the French-Calvinistic school of Ramus and Talaeus had scored a complete triumph over the German-Lutheran school of Melanchthon and Sturm.

English Rhetorics of the Seventeenth Century

During the course of the seventeenth century, we find English criticism gradually making the passage from the broad Humanistic ideals of the Italian Renaissance to the more rationalistic, stringent attitudes of the French critics. Renaissance critics had drawn eclectically from classical, medieval, and contemporary theory. No one authority or system was accepted as final or all-inclusive. It was the French critics of the second half of the century who induced the English to write and judge by a single, settled canon of rules. Since most of the French criticism of the seventeenth century was concerned with the epic and drama (largely as a result of the importation of the neo-Aristotelianism of such sixteenth-century Italian critics as Scaliger, Castelvetro, and Robortello), poetics began to absorb more attention than rhetoric. Furthermore, the line of demarcation between poetics and rhetoric began to blur. Consequently, it is sometimes difficult to point to a seventeenth-century textbook and say with any finality, "This is a rhetoric book" or "This is a treatise on poetics." One is just as likely to find rhetorical theory in Spingarn's collection of seventeenth-century critical essays as in a textbook whose title explicitly designates it as a rhetoric book. Another result of the shift in emphasis is that fewer rhetoric books were produced in the seventeenth century than in the previous period, and none of those that were produced exercised the influence or enjoyed the popularity of some Renaissance texts.

Besides the growing preoccupation with the rules, the seventeenth century exhibits some concern for the development of a simple, utilitarian style. The incipient interest in science—an interest created largely by Francis Bacon and fostered, after the close of the anti-science regime of the Puritans, by members of the Royal Society—encouraged the development of a "scientific" style.

Coupled with this growth of the scientific spirit was the reaction against "Ciceronianism," the movement that fostered the development of an ornate, highly mannered style by proposing Cicero as the principal, if not the sole, model for imitation. Morris Croll and George Williamson (see Bibliography) have traced out for us the counter development of the so-called "Senecan style," characterized by the relative brevity of the sentences, looseness of structure, succinctness and pithiness of phrasing, and jerkiness of rhythm. It was this movement that prepared the way for the development of the easy, colloquial style that graced so many eighteenth-century compositions. As might be expected, the growing interest in the "plain style" resulted in a diminishing concern for the schemes and tropes. But as we shall see in the discussion of the Royal Society's proposal for the development of a suitable expository style, John Dryden's development of an impressive "middle style" prevented the development of a prose style that would be as severely barren and denotative as mathematical symbols.

Our discussion of seventeenth-century rhetoric might well begin with Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Although Bacon wrote no systematic work on rhetoric, there are scattered throughout his writings remarks and discourses that throw light not only on his own literary practice but on the direction that rhetorical theory was to take in the seventeenth century. The chief loci for Bacon's rhetorical theory are *The Advancement of Learning* and the expanded Latin translation of this work, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*. Complementary material can be found in his *Colours of Good and Evil* and *Apophthegms, New and Old*. The best guide to Bacon's rhetorical theory is Karl R. Wallace's *Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric* (University of North Carolina Press, 1943). Our discussion must be limited to two or three points.

"The duty and office of Rhetoric," Bacon says in *The Advancement of Learning*, "is to apply Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the Will." In a later work, Bacon says, "Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as Logic is to the understanding; and the duty and office of Rhetoric, if it be deeply looked into, is no other than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to imagination, in order to excite the appetite and will." By viewing the imagination and reason as definitely distinct faculties, Bacon lays the groundwork for the great amount of subsequent discussion about the separate provinces and the separate cultivation of these faculties; and of course he is thereby fostering the Ramistic dichotomy between logic and rhetoric.

The view that imagination and reason were distinct and yet had to work together constituted the basis for Bacon's observations on style. Because he considered imagination subservient to reason, he advocated the precedence of *res* over *verba*. He took issue with the Renaissance school of rhetoric—the

Ciceronians especially—that was more concerned with words than with matter. As a result of this preoccupation with style,

men began to hunt more after words than matter; and more *after* the choiceness of the phrase, and the round clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and figures, than after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of invention, or depth of judgment. (From *The Advancement of Learning*.)

Though preferring *res* to *verba*, Bacon did not entirely neglect the matter of style. The three stylistic features that he concentrates on were the conformity of the style to the subject matter, the use of simple words, and the cultivation of “agreeableness.” Bacon’s insistence on the integral relationship between style and content is one expression of his revolt against the Ciceronians, who tended to employ the copious style for all forms of address. Closely connected with this idea of style suiting the matter is Bacon’s admonition that the style should be so adapted to the audience that “if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should nevertheless use different words to each of them.”

One of the seventeenth-century rhetoricians obviously influenced by Baconian doctrines was the Roman Catholic lawyer Thomas Blount (1618–79). In 1654, Blount published *The Academie of Eloquence*. As Professor Hoyt Hudson has demonstrated, the first forty-eight pages of this 232-page book are copied, without acknowledgment, from *Directions for Speech and Style*, a little book produced earlier in the century by another lawyer, John Hoskins, but never published under his name until the 1930’s. Blount was one of the first English rhetoricians to draw his illustrative material from contemporary English writers, such as Sir Philip Sidney, Ben Jonson, and Edmund Spenser.

For Blount, the four virtues of style are brevity, perspicuity, “life” or wit, and “respect” or propriety. Note the premium that Blount placed on *brevity* (what other rhetoricians called *conciseness*). This emphasis and Blount’s discussion of *sententia* and other figures connected with the “curt style” indicate that the Senecan manner was beginning to gain some attention. Blount was undoubtedly referring to the “pointed style” when he says in the section of the book dealing with commonplaces: “Eloquence is a way of speech prevailing over those whom we design it to prevail; That is, if we will take it in the short or Laconick way, a distilling our notions into a quintessence, or forming all our thoughts in a Cone and smiting with the point.” Blount treats of only twenty-five figures (for the most part, those treated by Talaues in his *Rhetorica*) and devotes about thirty pages of his book to amplification.

Blount’s text concentrates on style, but it was style held under the tight checkrein of the reason. In the thirty years after the original publication of

his work, five editions appeared. George Williamson, who has given us one of the most valuable studies of seventeenth-century rhetoric in his book *The Senecan Amble*, attests that "no other rhetoric of that time seems to have been quite so popular."

A number of rhetorics made use of the Scriptures. The most popular of these was *The Mysteries of Rhetorique Unvail'd* (1657) by John Smith, which defined rhetorical figures with special reference to the Scriptures; by 1709 nine editions of the work had appeared. With the ascendancy of the Puritans in the seventeenth century, rhetoric came more and more to serve as the tool of the sermon-writer and the expositor of the Scriptures. The subtitle of *Centuria Sacra* (1654) by Thomas Hall, a Puritan clergyman and schoolmaster at King's Norton, reveals the use to which rhetoric was being put during the Commonwealth period:

About one hundred Rules for the expounding and clearer understanding of the Holy Scriptures. To which are added a Synopsis or Compendium of all the most materiall Tropes and Figures contained in the Scriptures.

John Prideaux, who was, successively, Rector of Exeter College, Oxford University, Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, and Bishop of Rochester, published a rhetoric in 1659 entitled *Sacred Eloquence: or, The Art of Rhetoric as It Is Laid Down in the Scriptures*. The names of John Smith, John Prideaux, and Thomas Hall have all but passed into oblivion, and although John Smith's book alone of these three enjoyed a spurt of success, neither the popularity nor the influence of these Scriptural rhetorics was ever widespread or long-lived.

One section of Thomas Hobbes's *Answer to Davenant's Preface to Gondibert* (1650), the section dealing with the "natural" style, has some pertinence to rhetoric and to the easy, colloquial style that Dryden was to "father" later in the century. True and natural expression is based, according to Hobbes, on two things, *to know well* and *to know much*. Hobbes goes on to examine the psychological effects of these two qualities:

A signe of the first is perspicuity, property, and decency, which delight all sorts of men, either by instructing the ignorant or soothing the learned in their knowledge. A signe of the latter is novelty of expression, and pleaseth by excitation of the minde; for novelty causeth admiration, and admiration curiosity, which is a delightful appetite of knowledge.

To know much was taken care of by *inventio*, that part of rhetoric concerned with finding things to say. The invention of matter, however, eventually had its effect on style when there developed a great interest in amplification. *Copia* resulted in that variety of expression which pleased because of its novelty and ingenuity. *To know well* was originally more the concern of logic

than of rhetoric. But here too the quality of one's knowledge was seen to have some effect on style. Many rhetoricians, both before and after Hobbes, insisted that an idea could not be *expressed* clearly if it were not *apprehended* clearly.

The natural style must also avoid words that are high-sounding but hollow (those "windy blisters") and phrases that express either "more than is perfectly conceived, or perfect conception in fewer words than it requires." Since Hobbes's consistent aim is to chasten the exuberance of a kind of prose that had been fashionable, one is not surprised to find that he devotes little attention to the figures and tropes. In general, his feeling is that while figures of speech add a certain grace and charm to writing they should be used sparingly and discreetly.

Although Hobbes may seem bent on undermining the classical tradition, he was in fact thoroughly steeped in the classics. He wrote several of his works in Latin, translated Thucydides and Homer, and published a helpful digest of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. In his efforts to bridle rampant fancy, he may be said to be operating under the great classical principle of moderation. With his rationalistic aesthetics he is laying the groundwork for the "temperate" prose of the neo-classical period and for the psychological approach that was to figure in eighteenth-century rhetoric and criticism.

Another spur to the development of restrained prose was given by the activities of the Royal Society. In December 1664, two years after its founding, the Royal Society named a committee for the improvement of the English language. Among those named to the committee were John Dryden, John Evelyn, Thomas Sprat, and Edmund Waller. Their hope was that the authority of the Royal Society would help to refine, augment, and fix the English language. Although this project never advanced much beyond the planning stage, the Royal Society was to have some influence on the kind of prose written in the neo-classical period. The encouragement that Bacon had given to the formation of a "scientific" prose was to be supported by the Royal Society and given a new impetus. One section of Thomas Sprat's *History of the Royal Society* (1667) contains the manifesto of this reform.

The "superfluity of talking," Sprat said, had had such a devastating effect on the arts and professions that he could not help concluding that "*eloquence* ought to be banish'd out of all *civil Societies*, as a thing fatal to Peace and good Manners." The only remedy for this disease of "fine speaking" is "to reject all amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style; to return back to the primitive purity and shortness, when men deliver'd so many things almost in an equal number of words." In "An Account of the Life and Writings of Mr. Abraham Cowley" (1668), Sprat proposed Cowley as an exemplar of this "proper style." In his choice of words, Cowley "neither went before nor came after the use of the Age," and he "forsook the Conversation,

but never the Language, of the City and Court." Cowley, Sprat goes on to say, had mastered "the hardest secret of good Writing, to know when he has done enough." Despite the "new comliness" that Cowley achieved in his expression, he did not lose sight of *decorum*: "But it seems all to arise out of the Nature of the subject, and to be justly fitted for the thing of which he speaks."

It is regrettable that Cowley did not live long enough to write his projected "Discourse Concerning Style." Undoubtedly he would have said many sensible things about the plain style, for he was himself an admirable prose-stylist, one whom John Dryden himself took as a model. This "metaphysical" poet distrusted metaphysics, because he felt that the schoolmen had reduced philosophy to a matter of mere words. Scattered throughout his poems are several instances of the sort of comment that might have figured in his proposed treatise on style.

Many of the same ideas about the plain style as those advanced by Sprat were presented by John Wilkins (1614-72), one of the pillars of the Royal Society and later Bishop of Chester, in his *Ecclesiastes* (1646) and *An Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language* (1668). In the former essay he maintains that style should be "plain and natural, not being darkened with the affectation of *Scholastical* harshness, or *Rhetorical* flourishes." Obviously influenced by the doctrines of style in Seneca's *Epistles*, Wilkins recommends a style that follows a happy medium. Style, he says, "must be *full* without empty and needless Tautologies"; our expressions "should be so close, that they may not be obscure; and so plain, that they may not seem vain and tedious."

The extreme to which the Royal Society's advocacy of a plain, utilitarian style could be pushed is discovered in Wilkins's *Essay* where he proposes "a Real universal Character, that should not signify words, but things and notions." In other words, a series of symbols would be established, each symbol having a univocal, universal, and constant meaning. Literary symbols would thus approach the precision and stability of mathematical symbols. Fortunately for literature, this project never crystallized. Instead of words with rich associations and many-leveled meanings, our literary vocabulary might have been made up of "useful," universal ideographs.

Perhaps it was John Dryden, as much as anyone, who prevented the English language from taking that turn. Dryden preserved our language from taking on this mathematical character as much by his practice as by the rhetorical pronouncements scattered throughout his writings. He made *propriety* the central doctrine of his views on style. The propriety that Dryden called for is threefold: the language and style must fit "the occasion, the subject, and the persons." Closely allied to this concern for propriety is his discouragement of a "foreign" bias in our language. Dryden condemned Ben

Jonson because "he did a little too much to Romanize our tongue." It is Dryden's move "to English" contemporary prose that has been largely responsible for his reputation as the father of modern English prose style. His advocacy of native words and his encouragement of the use of vernacular, rather than Latinate, syntax are part of his program to refine the language and to attain more naturalness, more ease, more spontaneity in writing. And in his recognition of the "beauties" and the "spirits" of writing he is preparing the way for the triumphant re-entry of the Longinian "transport" into the rhetorical criticism of the eighteenth century.

The documents we have been considering over the last few pages have not been, strictly speaking, rhetoric texts at all. They reflect rather the intellectual currents that contributed to the development and to the eventual decay of the rhetorical tradition in the eighteenth century. In their preoccupation with style, these texts indicate how much the Ramistic program had caught on: the province of rhetoric seemed more and more to be restricted to style alone. But these documents also indicate how the groundwork was laid for the development of the kind of easy, natural, colloquial prose style that prevails today. The kind of prose style that is most admired today is not the Euphuistic prose of the Renaissance nor the Ciceronian prose of the nineteenth century but rather the plain but elegant prose found in such magazines as the *New Yorker* and the *Reporter* and exemplified in such writers as E. B. White, James Thurber, and George Orwell. And this kind of writing had its origin during the Restoration period with writers like Dryden, Bunyan, and Temple and its development during the Queen Anne period through writers like Defoe, Swift, and Addison.

English Rhetorics of the Eighteenth Century

As we pass to the eighteenth century, we confront the last full century in which rhetoric, in all its classical complexion, occupied a prominent position in the academic programs of the schools. During at least the first half of the eighteenth century, the influence of French critics, especially of Boileau, Rapin, and Le Bossu, was even more dominant than it had been in the last half of the previous century. The lamentable feature of this adulation for classical precepts was the uncritical manner in which they were accepted as absolute, inviolable law.

The questioning of Aristotelian and Horatian canons came with the appearance of editions and translations of Longinus. With the gradual emergence during this century of Longinus's *On the Sublime*, judgment came to be more a thing of taste and less a thing of rule. The new temper was

displayed in such works as Leonard Welsted's *Dissertation Concerning the Perfection of the English Tongue and the State of Poetry* (1724), Robert Lowth's *De Sacra Poesi Hebraeorum* (1753), and Edward Young's *Conjectures on Original Composition* (1759). With the freer, more subjective type of criticism gradually claiming more and more adherents, the stage was being set for the appearance of the "romantic" writers.

These shifts in the perspective of criticism were reflected in the rhetoric books of the period. The eighteenth-century rhetoricians still paid allegiance to the classical precepts, but at the same time they urged their pupils to strike out on their own, to discover a style that was natural to themselves, to submit to the dynamic force of *enthusiasm*. They no longer felt it necessary to classify, define, and illustrate multitudes of figures and tropes. Delivery, that aspect of rhetoric which had been so long neglected in the schools, began to receive attention again, largely as a result of the elocutionary programs of such mentors as Sheridan and Walker. Pulpit oratory continued to be assiduously cultivated, inspired by the elegant practice of such famous English preachers as Tillotson, Barrow, Atterbury, and of the even more famous French preachers, Bossuet, Bourdaloue, and Massillon. By the end of the century, collections of sermons sold on the scale of popular novels today.

It can be said to the credit of eighteenth-century teachers that for the most part they regarded rhetoric as a practical art, much as Aristotle had conceived of it, rather than as a more speculative art. As in the seventeenth century, the line between poetics and rhetoric was hard to ascertain. Critics and rhetoricians drew on native belles-lettres for their illustrations. "In fact," George Saintsbury says, "Rhetoric, new dubbed as Eloquence, becomes the Art of Literature, or in other words Criticism." This merger of poetics and rhetoric helps to explain why the eighteenth century was the last great age of a serious academic interest in rhetoric.

At least fifty rhetoric texts produced during the eighteenth century are important enough to deserve being mentioned, but we shall have to content ourselves with a look at only six or seven. Although a number of informative books have been published in recent years about English rhetoric in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see the Bibliography), no survey has yet been published about English rhetoric in the eighteenth century. A fairly exhaustive survey, but that only of the latter half of the century, is the unpublished doctoral dissertation that Harold F. Harding wrote at Cornell University in 1937, *English Rhetorical Theory, 1750-1800*. A number of books, monographs, articles, and dissertations have been done, however, on individual rhetoricians of this period.

John Stirling's very popular rhetoric, *A System of Rhetoric* (1733), only thirty pages long, contains in the first part a listing of ninety-seven figures

and tropes. The Greek or Latin terms for the figures and tropes are translated into their English equivalents, and all are simply defined and briefly illustrated. The second part, entitled *Ars Rhetorica*, is nothing more than a Latin translation of the first part (apparently a concession to those schoolmasters who refused to use vernacular rhetorics in the classroom).

With its list of ninety-seven figures and tropes, *A System of Rhetoric* has the distinction of providing a catalogue of more figures than was given by any other rhetoric book in the eighteenth century—a century in which rhetoricians generally were defining and illustrating fewer and fewer figures. Among eighteenth-century rhetorics, only John Holme's *The Art of Rhetoric* (1739), with eighty-three figures and tropes, approaches this abundance.

Lectures Concerning Oratory was published in 1758 by John Lawson (1712–59), a Master of Arts from Trinity College, Dublin, and the first librarian of the University library. Lawson's book is firmly based on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and is pieced out by examples, mainly from Cicero and Quintilian. The first six lectures give a short history of classical and modern rhetoric. Lecture 7 presents "some thoughts concerning Imitation." The remaining lectures treat of eloquence in relation to reason (chs. 8–9), to passion (chs. 10–11), and to the senses (chs. 12–18). It is in the seven lectures devoted to eloquence and the senses that Lawson treats of style "as it comprehendeth Ornament, Composition, Figures."

Lawson is a sensible, sometimes original, scholar, one who had absorbed a good deal of the learning of the past without closing his mind to the excellences of the present and the promises of the future. Following Aristotle as he did, he was deviating from the Longinian direction that criticism and rhetoric were taking in the eighteenth century. The encouragement Lawson gave to the cultivation of a simple, jargonless prose is remarkably akin to Jonathan Swift's pronouncements on style in *A Letter to a Young Clergyman* (1720).

John Ward served as professor of rhetoric at Gresham College in London from 1720 until his death in 1758. In the year after his death there appeared a two-volume collection of lectures on rhetoric, *A System of Oratory*, that Harold Harding in his survey of eighteenth-century rhetoric has called "the most elaborate and detailed synthesis of Greek and Roman rhetorical theory published in English." Although his greatest debt is to Quintilian, Ward acknowledges early in the first volume that he has borrowed "the finest precepts of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Longinus, and other celebrated authors, with proper examples taken from the choicest parts of purest antiquity." The fifty-four lectures cover 863 pages—a bulk which indicates the thoroughness of the work but which helps to explain why it never became a widely used school text. Ward's text is, however, the only English rhetoric published in

the eighteenth century which came anywhere near matching the comprehensiveness of Hugh Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric*, a text that we shall discuss presently.

Ward's chief preoccupation is with style. Exactly one half of the lectures are devoted to *elocutio*. The other parts of rhetoric receive adequate, but less thorough, treatment. Disposition rates eight lectures; six lectures treat invention; four lectures are spent on delivery; memory is the subject of only one lecture. The last eight lectures deal with imitation, the nature of the passions, the character of the orator, and a brief history of oratory. This collection of lectures shows how seriously and exhaustively rhetoric was still being taught as late as the mid-eighteenth century.

We shall turn now to a consideration of two men who were most responsible in the eighteenth century for quickening an interest in *pronuntiatio* or the delivery aspect of rhetoric. The most successful of these speech teachers (he might be called the Dale Carnegie of the eighteenth century) was Thomas Sheridan, the father of the dramatist Richard Brinsley Sheridan. Sheridan's works fall into three categories: those dealing with (1) reading and speaking; (2) pronunciation; and (3) education.

The most popular and probably the most representative of his printed works was *Lectures on Elocution* (1762). This book, which is a compilation of seven of his public lectures, deals exclusively with the problems of delivery—articulation, pronunciation, accent, emphasis, tone, pause, pitch, voice control, and gesture. His *Lectures on Reading* (1775) gives directions for reading prose and for reading verse. Archbishop Whately, in his rhetoric text published in the nineteenth century, lauded and recommended Sheridan's system of marking passages to be read aloud. Sheridan's success as an actor lent great weight to his pronouncements on matters of delivery. He is the chief figure in the late-eighteenth century elocutionary movement which resulted in the shift of meaning of *elocution* from *style* to *delivery* and in the later vogue of the "elocution contest" in the schools.

John Walker (1732–1807), the other eighteenth-century promoter of the art of delivery, was, like Sheridan, an Irish actor. In 1769, he gave up the dramatic stage, and after teaching for a time at Kensington Gravel-Pits School, he began a career of lecturing, at which he continued, with signal success, for the next thirty-five years.

Walker's first appearance in print came in 1777 when he published *The Exercises for Improvement in Elocution*, which was nothing more than a collection of readings from select authors for those seeking to acquire the art of reading or speaking in public. Perhaps the best and most popular of Walker's works was *Elements of Elocution* (1781). This two-volume work covered such matters as rhetorical punctuation, voice inflections, gesture,

accent, emphasis, and pronunciation. The similarity of this work with Sheridan's *Lectures on Elocution* is apparent.

It should not be surprising that it was professional actors who gave a special impetus to a study of delivery, for all the spell-binding orators in history (men like Demosthenes, Churchill, William Jennings Bryan, Bishop Sheen, Billy Graham) have been, in a sense, great actors. Walker had the acting skill to qualify him as a teacher of delivery, but he lacked the grounding in the classics that Sheridan had and accordingly did not have the reserves to draw upon when it came to citing collaborative or illustrative material.

The history of British rhetoric in the second half of the eighteenth century is dominated by three Scottish rhetoricians. With the great cultural renaissance that took place in Scotland after its union with England, Edinburgh soon came to be known as "the Athens of the North." During this period, in such fields as philosophy, aesthetics, psychology, history, economics, there are more eminent Scottish names than English names. And in rhetoric during this period, men like Kames, Campbell, and Blair had no serious rivals.

Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782), a Scottish jurist and psychologist, published in 1762 the three-volume *Elements of Criticism*, a work that was frequently reprinted and that exercised a marked influence on subsequent poetical and rhetorical theory. The scope of *The Elements of Criticism* is much broader than that of most texts considered in this survey. Kames's book, as a matter of fact, makes its major contribution to aesthetics. In that regard, it is of a piece with three other Scottish works—Francis Hutcheson's *Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1725), David Hume's *Of the Standard of Taste* (1757), and Alexander Gerard's *Essay on Taste* (1758). Only a small part of Kames's book deals with rhetoric in the traditional sense of that word. His purpose, he tells us, is "to examine the sensitive branch of human nature, to trace the objects that are naturally agreeable, as well as those that are naturally disagreeable; and by these means to discover, if we can, what are the genuine principles of the fine arts." Kames hoped that by probing human psychology he could find an immutable standard of taste by which to assess all works of art.

Despite its undeniable influence on literature, Kames's *Elements* was never widely used in the schools. His book was bulky, involved, and written in a rather ponderous style. Kames's influence was exercised indirectly, through the medium of those more popular Scottish rhetoricians whom he helped to form. As Helen Randall, who wrote a full-length study of Kames's critical theory, says: "If one may consider the direct influence of Blair as a secondary influence of Kames, one may almost say that the textbooks on this subject for about a hundred years owed their main outline and many of their rules to the *Elements of Criticism*."

The second of the noted Scottish rhetoricians whom we are considering was George Campbell (1709-96). No less a critic than George Saintsbury has called Campbell's *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1776) "the most important treatise on the New Rhetoric that the eighteenth century produced." Campbell was at once more readable than Lord Kames and more profound than the other member of this Scottish triumvirate, Dr. Hugh Blair.

What was Campbell's peculiar contribution to the art of rhetoric? For one thing, he ventured the notion that rhetoric could have an end other than to persuade. In the first two paragraphs of his treatise, he defines *eloquence* (the term he prefers to *rhetoric*) as the "art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end," and he says that a speech may have any one of four ends: "to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will." This is reminiscent of Cicero's notion of the tripartite function of rhetoric: to teach (*docere*), to persuade (*movere*), to delight (*delectare*). Reversing the notion advanced by Aristotle and his followers that rhetoric was a mere offshoot of dialectic, Campbell proposed that logic be regarded merely as the tool of rhetoric. Campbell is perhaps best known to students of the English language as the one who proposed as the criterion of good usage the norm that locutions be *reputable, national, and present*.

Campbell's probing of the "philosophy" of rhetoric was so adventurous and original that his book exerted a fascination for students of rhetoric for many years after its original publication. More than twenty editions of *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* were demanded during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it was regularly used in American colleges until about 1870. His book might have proved even more popular if it had not been for the formidable competition it received from one of the most widely reprinted rhetorics ever written, Hugh Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres*.

By 1783, when Blair published his book, he had been delivering lectures to the students at the University of Edinburgh for twenty-four years. It was in 1759, at the urging of Lord Kames, that he agreed to deliver, without salary, a series of lectures on rhetoric. This series was so enthusiastically received that a group of his friends proposed to George III that he establish an endowed Chair of Rhetoric at the University and that Blair be installed as the first holder of the post. The reputation of the celebrated preacher of St. Giles in Edinburgh was already so high that the English monarch had no hesitation about commissioning Blair in 1762 as the first Regius Professor of Rhetoric. Blair was finally prompted to publish his lectures because for years handwritten copies of them had circulated freely among enthusiastic students and had been boldly offered for sale in the bookshops.

We shall probably never get an accurate count of the number of editions and reprints of Blair's *Lectures*, but by 1835 there were at least fifty editions.

Later this text was translated into such languages as French, Italian, and Russian. It continued to be used in English and American schools until almost the end of the nineteenth century. William Charvat, a historian of American critical thought, has said that at one time Blair's *Lectures* was a text "which half the educated English-speaking world studied."

Why was Blair's text such a popular rhetoric? One reason was the amazing comprehensiveness of the forty-seven lectures in this one-volume text. In addition to the thirteen lectures devoted to belles-lettres, there were discussions of taste, beauty, and sublimity (three of the key terms in eighteenth-century criticism); a survey of philology and a review of classical and English grammar; a detailed exposition of the principles of style, with special attention to the major figures of speech, and a detailed analysis of several pieces of prose composition; a history of oratory; and instructions for the composition of various kinds of speeches; discourses on poetry; and a compilation of the best classical and contemporary rhetorical doctrines. The marked religious tone of the *Lectures* also played a part in recommending Blair's text to schoolmasters. Blair's insistence that a man of eloquence must be a man of virtue became the warp upon which his lectures were woven. The mode and style of presentation also contributed to the popularity of the *Lectures*. Besides being clearly and systematically organized, the lectures were presented on an elementary level. Presuming in his students no previous training in rhetoric, Blair took great pains to define his terms, to elaborate on what might strike us as commonplaces, and to supply whatever background he deemed necessary for an understanding of the topic under discussion. As a result, Blair's *Lectures* could be used on several levels of the school curriculum.

The history of English rhetoric might well terminate with the end of the eighteenth century, but it is customary to carry the history one step further to include Richard Whately's *Elements of Rhetoric* (1828). Whately was one of that brilliant group of Oxford reformers that gravitated to Oriel College in the 1820's. Eventually he was made Archbishop of Dublin. In 1826, with some help from John Henry Newman, he published his *Elements of Logic*, which had grown out of an article he wrote earlier for the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana*.

Whately's rhetoric has a strong Aristotelian flavor. Agreeing with Aristotle that rhetoric was "an offshoot of logic," Whately treated rhetoric as the art of "argumentative composition." His book is organized under four heads: (1) the appeal to the reason or understanding (this was the equivalent of Aristotle's logical proofs); (2) the appeal to the will (Aristotle's ethical and pathetic appeals); (3) style; (4) delivery. Among the notable features of Whately's *Rhetoric* were his elaboration of such Aristotelian concepts as sign, example, and probability, his brilliant analyses of argumentative fal-

lacies, and his development of the function of presumption and burden of proof in the conduct of an argument.

Throughout the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, Campbell, Blair, and Whately were the three modern rhetoricians most often used in the English and American schools wherever rhetoric continued to be taught. Although Blair proved to be the most popular of this trio, modern teachers of rhetoric speak with most respect of Campbell and Whately. Neither of them was a particularly original thinker, but both of them based their rhetorics on sound principles of logic and psychology. If their texts had come somewhat earlier, the tenure of rhetoric in the schools might have been extended for several more years.

Conclusion

The classical strain of rhetoric came to an end with Whately. Although rhetorics of Blair, Campbell, and Whately continued to be used in English and American schools through most of the nineteenth century, the tradition of classical rhetoric in the schools was noticeably on the decline. Alexander Bain's *English Composition and Rhetoric* (1879), John F. Genung's *The Practical Elements of Rhetoric* (1902), and the many textbooks that Francis P. Donnelly produced for high-school and college students during the late 1920's and early 1930's retained something of the classical flavor, but by the time these books appeared, academic interest in traditional rhetoric had reached a low-water mark. Rhetoric courses in the schools gradually assumed a new orientation—the study of the four forms of discourse: exposition, argumentation, description, and narration. The virtues that were stressed in this approach to composition were unity, coherence, and emphasis. Style continued to engage some attention, but the focus shifted from the schemes and tropes to a concern for diction (which gradually deteriorated into a neurotic concern for “correct usage”) and for syntax (which, under the influence of the popular handbooks, became a rather negative approach to “correct grammar”). The study of the paragraph concentrated on the topic sentence and the various ways of developing the topic sentence to achieve maximum unity, coherence, and emphasis. The new rationale of the composition course is mentioned not to disparage it but to point out how far the rhetoric courses in our modern schools have departed from the kind of training in rhetoric that was provided by the texts reviewed in this survey.

It was the Speech Department at Cornell University that fostered the resuscitation of classical rhetoric in our time. In the fall semester of 1920-21, Alexander Drummond and Everett Hunt established a seminar at Cornell

in which the students read and discussed Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Cicero's *De Oratore*, and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*. The effects of this classically oriented program began to be felt when graduates of Cornell's Speech Department took posts at universities in various parts of the country. The place to find articles on classical rhetoric during the '30's and '40's was not the journals directed to teachers of English but the *Quarterly Journal of Speech* and *Speech Monographs*. English teachers began to take notice when studies appeared of the rhetorical training of some of the great English writers—studies like T. W. Baldwin's *William Shakespeare's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke*, Donald L. Clark's *John Milton at St. Paul's School*, and Karl Wallace's *Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric*. The renewed interest in classical rhetoric was given another boost by the vogue of Mortimer Adler's *How to Read a Book* and by the post-war popularity of the New Criticism, for both Adler and the New Critics were applying rhetorical techniques to the reading process. In recent years, a number of books and articles have appeared which subject some of the literary masterpieces to a rhetorical analysis.

There has been sporadic talk during the last thirty years or so of a "new rhetoric." This "new rhetoric" is said to have profited by what it appropriated from the modern refinements in psychology, semantics, motivational research, and other behavioral sciences. Two of the names commonly mentioned in connection with the "new rhetoric" are I. A. Richards and Kenneth Burke. The roots of Richards's interest in rhetoric can be found in the book on semantics that he wrote with C. K. Ogden in 1923, *The Meaning of Meaning*. In 1936 he published *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. One of his purposes in this work was to point up the limitations of the rhetoric of persuasion as it was taught by the ancients. To confine oneself to the persuasive aspect of language, he maintained, was to cut oneself off from some of the other uses of language. It was just because Bishop Whately had announced in his *Elements of Criticism* in 1828 that he was going to confine his study to "argumentative composition, generally and exclusively" that Richards chose him as the chief target of his strictures on the old rhetoric. George Campbell's *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, with its concern for the psychology of the audience and its broadening of the function of rhetoric to include enlightening the understanding, pleasing the imagination, moving the passions, and influencing the will, represented for Richards a more desirable model for a twentieth-century rhetoric. We can epitomize Richards's approach to rhetoric by saying that he is interested mainly in how language *in any kind of discourse* works to produce understanding (or misunderstanding) in an audience. Something of this concern can be seen in the four terms he uses in his study of human utterances—sense, feeling, tone, and intention.

Kenneth Burke has more reverence for the classical rhetoricians than I. A. Richards does, but like Richards, he sees the possibility of extending the scope of rhetoric. In an article in the *Journal of General Education* in 1951, a year after the publication of his *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke said: "If I had to sum up in one word the difference between the 'old' rhetoric and a 'new' (a rhetoric re-invigorated by fresh insights which the 'new Science' contributed to the subject), I would reduce it to this: The key term for the old rhetoric was 'persuasion' and its stress was upon deliberate design. The key term for the new rhetoric would be '*identification*,' which can include a partially 'unconscious' factor in appeal." "Appeal" is the essence of communication for Burke. When men use symbols to induce co-operation in other human beings, they must *identify* themselves with the audience, must, in Burke's term, become *consubstantial* with them. Rhetoric becomes for Burke a study of the various modes of achieving identification. *Structure* of any kind is a mode of identification. The way we structure or arrange our discourse, for instance, could be one of the ways in which we adjust our discourse to fit the needs of our audience. Style, too, can be a mode of identification, since it can be a conscious or an unconscious attempt on our part to suit our language to the level of the audience. Burke's "dramatistic pentad"—name, agent, agency (means), scene (background), purpose—constitutes his critical apparatus for analyzing the motivation of human acts.

There is no room to explore further Burke's exciting and sometimes hard-to-understand "new rhetoric." Nor is there room to explore the refinements that modern advertisers have made on the art of persuasive rhetoric. Advertising agencies are the most successful practitioners in our time of the kind of rhetoric taught by Aristotle. Quintilian might raise some questions about the ethics of their profession, but even he would not deny that they have done a superlative job of influencing the buying-habits of consumers and thereby benefiting the economy of the nation. Their cousins, the public-relations men, have learned many valuable lessons from them in fostering good public images of the institutions they represent.

This survey of rhetoric, abbreviated and hurried as it is, has probably left the student's head swirling with names and titles and dates. It is not so important that the student be able to recall and place all these details as it is that he be aware, in a general way, of the long and honorable tradition that classical rhetoric has enjoyed. His being aware of the history of rhetoric should make this book's approach to the problems of composition more meaningful and fruitful. The tradition of classical rhetoric may currently be dormant, but the discipline itself was not and is not moribund. What was once so vital cannot be, even with the passage of time and the creation of a new world, entirely irrelevant and ineffectual.

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